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The Journal of Value Inquiry

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08-07-2020 | Regular Paper

Species of Pluralism in Political Philosophy

Author: Kyle Johannsen

Published in: The Journal of Value Inquiry | Issue 3/2021

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‘Pluralism’ is a familiar name in political philosophy. From John Rawls’s worries about reasonable pluralism and its implications for the legitimate institutionalization of principles of justice,¹ to Isaiah Berlin’s and G.A. Cohen’s radical plurality of conflicting values,² the name ‘pluralism’ frequently rears its head. However, though they use the same term, theorists often have different things in mind. Whereas reasonable pluralism is largely interpersonal, i.e., it’s concerned with different citizens possessing different conceptions of justice and the good; value pluralism is largely intrapersonal, i.e., it’s about the structure of practical reasoning and the need to balance conflicting fundamental considerations when deciding what ought to be done, all things considered.³ …

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Rawls 1993.

Berlin (2002); Cohen (2008).

For discussion of the distinction between value pluralism and reasonable pluralism, see Larmore (1996) chapter 7.

In this paper, I use the term ‘justice’ the same way Rawls does: to refer to the output of practical reasoning about how we should design shared institutions. However, I think that there’s good reason to think of ‘justice’ as an input in practical reasoning: specifically, as a fundamental value that should be balanced against other fundamental values. The reason I adopt Rawls’s usage here is because his is currently common among political philosophers, and thus using the term differently would distract from my paper’s argument. For the arguments I give in support of the view that justice is one fundamental value among many, see Johannsen (2018) chapters 5 and 6. For a defense of my arguments, see Johannsen (2019) pp. 769–77.

See Crowder (2002) pp. 158–84; and Galston (2002) pp. 46–7.

For his earlier thoughts about the justificatory relationship between value pluralism and liberalism, see Crowder (1998).

For worries about using value pluralism to justify political liberalism’s normative claims, see Larmore (1996) chapter 7. It is telling that Larmore tentatively concedes that value pluralism may play a role in explaining reasonable pluralism, even though he rejects the claim that it plays a justificatory role in political liberalism. For Larmore’s brief, unargued thoughts on value pluralism’s explanatory relationship with reasonable pluralism, see Larmore (2008) pp. 141–2; and Larmore (2015) pp. 71–2.

See, for example, Waldron (1999).

See, for example, Stocker (1990) and Stocker (1997), as well as Ross (1930).

See endnote 2 in the present paper.

For discussion of the phenomenon of rational moral regret see, for example, Williams (1973) and Stocker (1990). Value pluralists can explain rational moral regret more easily than monists can, but that hasn’t stopped monists from offering explanations of their own. See, for example, Hurka (1996).

The criteria I’ve listed roughly match those endorsed by Rawls. See Rawls (1993) p. 54.

Rawls (1993) pp. 140–54.

See, for example, Waldron (1999).

Though value pluralists have generally neglected the phenomenon of reasonable pluralism, two exceptions are George Crowder and William Galston. See endnote 5 in the present paper.

See endnote 11 in the present paper.

See Quong (2011) p. 142. For the quote, see Rawls (1993) p. 4.

For examples of philosophers who have interpreted reasonable pluralism as a fact about existing liberal societies, see Raz (1990); Habermas (1995); and Klosko (1997).

Rawls (1993) p. 35. Though Rawls stipulates that agreement about justice is one of the features of a well-ordered society, he sometimes acknowledges that reasonable disagreement about the correct political liberal conception of justice is both possible and likely. See endnote 29 in the present paper.

See Rawls (1993).

Rawls (1971) p. 3.

Rawls (1971) pp. 158–61.

Rawls (1971) pp. 34–9.

See for, example, Stocker (1990) p. 72.

Rawls (1971) pp. 40–4 and 302–3.

Rawls (1971) pp. 302–3.

Rawls (1971) p. 100–2.

Rawls (1971) pp. 102–6.

Rawls (1993) pp. 226–7. See also Rawls (1999) pp. 140–3.

Rawls (1993) p. 6.

Rawls (1993) p. 227.

Rawls (1993) p. 54.

Rawls (1993) p. 56.

Rawls (1993) pp. 56–7. See also Crowder (2002) pp. 165–71; and Galston (2002) pp. 46–7.

Rawls (1993) p. 57.

For the quoted sentence, see Larmore (1996) p. 170. For additional discussion, see Larmore (2015) p. 72.

For similar thoughts, see Galston (2002) pp. 46–7.

See Rawls’s discussion of “the liberal principle of legitimacy” in Rawls (1993) pp. 136–7. See also Larmore’s discussion in Larmore (2015) pp. 74–80.

Crowder (2002) pp. 158–84; Galston (2002) pp. 46–7.

See, for example, Crowder (2002) p. 159, p. 165, and pp. 167–8; and Galston (2002) pp. 46–7.

At one point, Crowder claims that value pluralism implies reasonable pluralism, i.e., that value pluralism is a sufficient condition for reasonable pluralism. See Crowder (2002) pp. 171–2.

Waldron (1999).

Cohen (2008) chapters 1 and 2.

For seminal discussion of Cohen’s critique of incentives and the basic structure restriction see, for example, Williams (1998); and Murphy (1999). For more recent discussion see, for example, Shiffrin (2010); Macleod (2011); Schouten (2013); Johannsen (2013); Johannsen (2016); and Albertsen (2019).

Whether the reason for redistribution is to secure equal resources, equal welfare, equal capabilities, equal access to advantage, etc., egalitarian theories converge on the conclusion that the radical inequalities of wealth and income existing in most contemporary societies are unjust. Nor must one be a so–called ‘distributive egalitarian’ to think so: ‘relational egalitarians’ concur. For a sampling of the different forms of egalitarianism on offer, see endnotes 46 and 47 in the present paper.

For articulations of the harshness objections, see Anderson (1999) pp. 295–300; and Scheffler (2003) p. 33.

For seminal examples of the luck egalitarian position, see Dworkin (2000); Arneson (1989); and Cohen (1989).

In response to the harshness objection, some luck egalitarians have argued that luck egalitarianism is a conception of one value among many, and that the requirements of luck equality must be balanced against competing values. See, for example, Segall (2007); Cohen (2009) pp. 34–6; Casal (2007) pp. 321–3; and Johannsen (2018) pp. 34–5.

See endnote 36 in the present paper.

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Title: Species of Pluralism in Political Philosophy
Author: Kyle Johannsen
Publication date: 08-07-2020
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Published in: The Journal of Value Inquiry / Issue 3/2021
Print ISSN: 0022-5363
Electronic ISSN: 1573-0492
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-020-09750-5

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