Top

Public Choice

Published in:

01-11-2018

Strategic and experimental analyses of conflict and terrorism

Authors: Timothy Mathews, Shane Sanders

Published in: Public Choice | Issue 3-4/2019

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config

AI-assisted search

Off

Abstract

Understanding the root causes of conflict and terrorism ultimately will allow policymakers to enact measures to reduce violence’s associated costs. This special issue on “Strategic and Experimental Approaches to the Study of Conflict and Terrorism” consists of papers that analyze issues related to conflict or terrorism using the tools of applied game theory or experimental economics. This introductory article provides an overview of, and explains the relationships between, the studies included in the special issue.

next article The attack and defense of weakest-link networks

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

We are grateful to Conference organizers John Geanakoplos, Ehud Kalai and Abraham Neyman for including the sessions as part of the larger event.

We are equally grateful to Public Choice Editor-in-Chief William Shughart for devoting scarce journal space to this special issue.

Aycinena, D., Baltaduonis, R., & Rentschler, L. (2018). Valuation structure in incomplete information contests: Experimental evidence. Public Choice. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0568-7.

Bagchi, A., Faria, J. R., & Mathews, T. (2018). A model of a multilateral proxy war with spillovers. Public Choice. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0586-5.

Baye, M., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C. (1996). The all-pay auction with complete information. Economic Theory, 8(2), 291–305.CrossRef

Bier, V., Oliveros, S., & Samuelson, L. (2007). Choosing what to protect: Strategic defensive allocation against an unknown attacker. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 9, 563–587.CrossRef

Boudreau, J. W., Rentschler, L., & Sanders, S. (2018a). Stag hunt contests and alliance formation. Public Choice. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0567-8.

Boudreau, J. W., Sanders, S., & Shunda, N. (2018b). The role of noise in alliance formation and collusion in conflicts. Public Choice. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0564-y.

Chang, Y. M., Potter, J., & Sanders, S. (2007). War and peace: Third-party intervention in conflict. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(4), 954–974.CrossRef

Chang, Y. M., & Sanders, S. (2009). Raising the cost of rebellion: The role of third-party intervention in intrastate conflict. Defence and Peace Economics, 20(3), 149–169.CrossRef

Chang, Y. M., & Sellak, M. (2018). A game-theoretic analysis of international trade and political conflict over external territories. Public Choice. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0505-9.

Clark, D. J., & Konrad, K. A. (2007). Asymmetric conflict: Weakest link against best shot. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51, 457–469.CrossRef

Hirshleifer, J. (1983). From weakest link to best shot: The voluntary provision of public goods. Public Choice, 41, 371–386.CrossRef

Hirshleifer, J. (1988). The analytics of continuing conflict. Synthese, 76, 201–233.CrossRef

Hirshleifer, J. (1989). Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success. Public Choice, 63(2), 101–112.CrossRef

Jiao, Y., & Luo, Z. (2018). A model of terrorism and counterterrorism with location choices. Public Choice. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0559-8.

Ke, C., Konrad, K. A., & Morath, F. (2013). Brothers in arms-an experiment on the alliance puzzle. Games and Economic Behavior, 77(1), 61–76.CrossRef

Konrad, K. A. (2009). Strategy and dynamics in contests. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Konrad, K. A. (2012). Dynamic contests and the discouragement effect. Revue d’Economie Politique, 122, 233–256.CrossRef

Konrad, K. A., & Kovenock, D. (2009). The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints. Economics Letters, 103(2), 84–86.CrossRef

Kovenock, D., & Roberson, B. (2017). The optimal defense of networks of targets. Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, working paper no. 17–18.

Kovenock, D., Roberson, B., & Sheremeta, R. (2018). The attack and defense of weakest-link networks. Public Choice. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0618-1.

Krishna, V., & Morgan, J. (1997). An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction. Journal of Economic Theory, 72(2), 343–362.CrossRef

Mathews, T., Bagchi, A., & Faria, J. R. (2018). Simple analytics of the impact of terror generation on attacker–defender interactions. Public Choice. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0538-0.

Mathews, T., & Lowenberg, A. D. (2012). The interdependence between homeland security efforts of a state and a terrorist’s choice of attack. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 29(2), 195–218.CrossRef

Nti, K. O. (1999). Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations. Public Choice, 98(3–4), 415–430.CrossRef

Polachek, S. M. (1980). Conflict and trade. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24, 55–78.CrossRef

Salehyan, I. (2010). The delegation of war to rebel organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(3), 493–515.CrossRef

Salehyan, I., Gleditsch, K. S., & Cunningham, D. E. (2011). Explaining external support for insurgent groups. International Organization, 65, 709–744.CrossRef

Schelling, T. C. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Siegel, R. (2014). Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations. Journal of Economic Theory, 153, 684–702.CrossRef

Skaperdas, S., & Syropoulos, C. (2001). Guns, butter, and openness: On the relationship between security and trade. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 91, 353–357.CrossRef

von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Title: Strategic and experimental analyses of conflict and terrorism
Authors: Timothy Mathews
Shane Sanders
Publication date: 01-11-2018
Publisher: Springer US
Published in: Public Choice / Issue 3-4/2019
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Electronic ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0624-3

Springer Professional

Abstract

Please log in to get access to your license.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Other articles of this Issue 3-4/2019

Stag hunt contests and alliance formation

Valuation structure in incomplete information contests: experimental evidence

The role of noise in alliance formation and collusion in conflicts

A game-theoretic analysis of international trade and political conflict over external territories

A model of terrorism and counterterrorism with location choices

The attack and defense of weakest-link networks

Premium Partner