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2020 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

5. Subordinated Debt and Banking Regulation: An Overview

Authors : Giulio Velliscig, Josanco Floreani, Maurizio Polato

Published in: Banking and Beyond

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The recent literature has started focusing on the evolving role of subordinated debt and its investors within the EU resolution framework. The market monitoring function employed by its investors and its crucial role in complying with the minimum amount of own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) make the subordinated debt an interesting case of study under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). This chapter provides an overview of the literature about subordinated debt and discusses its evolution within banking regulation with a focus on the BRRD. We deepen the streams of literature able to ground both theoretically and empirically future research on the role of subordinated bondholders under recovery and resolution rules.

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Metadata
Title
Subordinated Debt and Banking Regulation: An Overview
Authors
Giulio Velliscig
Josanco Floreani
Maurizio Polato
Copyright Year
2020
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45752-5_5