The Authority of EU Law

It is to the credit of the prestigious Academy of European Law in Trier that it did not use the occasion of its 25th Anniversary to serve up the usual bland meal typical of these occasions, extoling yet again the wonders of European law, but instead provocatively called into question the Authority of European Law and invited a sober reflection of such. It would not have done so had there not been a pervasive feeling that indeed this authority is under stress.

“Do we still believe in the authority of EU law?” asks the title of the ERA Jubilee Congress. My personal, and qualified answer is yes, I still do. It is a qualified answer because, while being based on convictions about the legal principles that underlie the European construction, it has to be checked against the realities which prevail in Europe today.

I would wish to start by expressing my thanks to the European Law Academy. The Academy accompanied and assisted me on my journey as a European Union legislator from 2000 when I first visited the Academy as a new MEP and became aware of its huge potential in enhancing European legal education. Its importance lies as much in the high quality of its courses and conferences as in the networking role it provides as an important meeting and connecting point for European legal professionals. It is in my former capacity as both a European legislator and parliamentarian that I wish to address the challenge of the authority of European law as perceived in the work of the legislator: legislation.

A ses débuts, mais encore aujourd’hui, l’approche finaliste de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne a pu dérouter certains Etats membres et les cours constitutionnelles nationales peu accoutumés à se voir ainsi imposer un droit « extérieur ». Les tensions constatées dans les années 1960 entre les cours constitutionnelles allemande et italienne et la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes au sujet du respect des droits fondamentaux par les institutions européennes n’ont été que les premières illustrations des débats animés qui ont encore cours aujourd’hui dans certains pays d’Europe continentale sur la réception de la jurisprudence européenne en droit interne et sur l’articulation des ordres constitutionnels nationaux et européen. Toutefois, si les risques de confrontation entre le droit de l’Union et les droits nationaux ne sont pas purement théoriques, le déploiement des diverses techniques contentieuses d’articulation et de coordination des droits ainsi que la mesure et l’esprit de retenue dont ont pu faire preuve les juridictions nationales et européennes ont permis d’aplanir l’essentiel des divergences constatées.

The Ajos judgment of the Danish Supreme Court of December 2016 has to many seemed to raise questions about the authority of EU Law because of the non-compliant result. I will try to briefly explain the Supreme Court’s reasoning behind the judgment and the rather unheard-of non-compliance with a preliminary ruling from the CJEU. In this ruling the CJEU obliged the Supreme Court to give an EU principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age precedence over clear and contravening Danish law in a dispute between an employee and a private employer called Ajos. The dispute was about the entitlement of the employee to a special severance allowance. The CJEU told the Danish Supreme Court to rule contra legem and thus against the employer Ajos, as it would go against the said principle not to give the employee a severance allowance.

The dynamic development of the fundamental rights protection system has reached a level of enormous complexity with three ’supreme’ courts – Luxembourg, Strasbourg and Karlsruhe – in charge. Sharing this responsibility in a cooperative and respectful way is, now maybe more than ever, important to reach the common goal of the three courts: the effective protection of basic rights for European citizens. The idea of a judicial ’Verbund’ in terms of a network of interconnected courts, each acting from its very own perspective, must consider other viewpoints. A Verbund concept works as a pattern to better understand the complex, enriching, and sometimes conflictual relationship between the courts, and provides the material and procedural mechanisms to create a certain level of coherence.

At first sight, the authority of the law of the European Union (EU law) would appear to depend on the power and logic of the reasoning of the decisions of the court that ultimately decides what EU law is—the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It is better to consider the issue in the much wider context of the operation of a Union of democratic states by examining the perception of the CJEU in the context of a proper recognition of its role in the EU and of the limits of judicial power, its interdependent relationship with the other powers of the EU and with the national courts (based on mutual respect and not deference to the CJEU), its communication of its role and its decisions to the wider public and its accountability for those decisions.

The relationship between the Court of Justice and national supreme courts has been discussed and analysed from different angles for many years. While some of the controversies constitute evergreens in doctrinal analysis, others have been revealed in the case-law of national supreme courts. In some—admittedly rare—decisions of national supreme courts, the authority of the Court of Justice—as the supreme jurisdiction for the interpretation of EU law—has been challenged.

Before joining the General Court in 2010, I had the pleasure of working in the Brussels office of a well-reputed Belgo-Dutch law firm. As any international firm combining people of various origins, generations and social background, it had its internal tensions. As one could expect, the relations between the Dutch and the Belgians were not always perfect. Neither were the relations between the Dutch speakers and the French speaking colleagues always harmonious. Even so, it was (and still is) an enjoyable and successful firm. With hindsight, I see two important factors that contributed to overcoming internal frictions. The first factor was explained to me by the then office manager of the firm. In his view, and now also mine, human conflicts often arise because of perceptions, which do not necessarily coincide with objective facts and true intentions. The stronger emotions are, the wider this gap tends to become. Lifting the veil of perceptions, therefore, helps to avoid and solve conflicts. The second factor that contributed to the firm’s success was a sense of common purpose. There were no fundamental doubts about the objectives pursued by the partnership: offering a good service and being paid accordingly. Readers may wonder what these personal recollections have to do with the internal market project and European integration. Now, the answers to this question relate to the two factors mentioned above: the contrast between perceptions and reality and the absence of uncertainties as to the objectives pursued.

For people in the street the process of making EU law is not sufficiently transparent. They have difficulties to understand its democratic legitimacy. As regards content they still today joke about the attempt of EU law to regulate the bending of cucumbers. Important parts of EU law have turned out to be overambitious, e.g. the Maastricht Criteria on Member State indebtedness, the Monetary Union and the Schengen/Dublin Union on migration. Some Parts of Union law are not applicable at all in some Member States—as a result there exist several Unions with membership that differs from Union to Union. The adoption of EU law is more and more replaced by intergovernmental solutions at Member States level, i.e. by traditional means of international public law. Whether the Commission as guardian of the Treaties in case of violation of EU Law takes steps for enforcement has become a matter of political opportunism. As a result people in the street have lost confidence in EU Law whereas the Commission keeps pressing for more EU law as if the many warning signs around did not exist.

Populism and protectionism are negatively affecting the EU Single Market, and this trend is increasing. Better use of and improving Single Market governance could contribute to preserving the economic accomplishments of the EU for the near future. Based on a number of concrete cases and years of experience of working on protectionism we present a number of concrete proposals: better use of notification procedures for national laws on products and services; introducing suspensive injunction to Internal Market law; link EU funding with upholding the Rule of law; and make infringement procedures more automatic and transparent.

Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion als Herausforderung des Unionsrechts oder als Illustration der „unvollständigen“ Union ist Teilthema der Leitfrage des Jubiläumskongresses der Europäischen Rechtsakademie nach der Autorität des Unionsrechts mit der provokativen Frage „Glauben wir noch daran?“ Sie versteht sich vor dem Hintergrund der Großprobleme von Staatsverschuldungsproblemen einzelner Eurostaaten, Rechtsstaatskrisen einzelner Beitrittsstaaten, Migrationsdruck auf die Europäische Union und britischem Austrittswillen. Aufgeworfen sind damit gleichermaßen die Fragen nach der Bedeutung der Autorität des Unionsrechts (1.), nach den Herausforderungen der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion für diese Autorität (2.) und nach den möglichen Antworten auf die Herausforderungen (3.).

Readers should be aware that the author of this contribution is an EU-critical MEP representing resistance against the federal EU model that is spiralling out of control and becoming the instrument that crushes our nation states. The European Union is in my view no longer about cooperation in the way that I defend her. It is about multilateral and multicultural supra-nationalism. Especially the Euro zone is an efficient ‘crushing mechanism’.

The European Union is facing a serious challenge from “populists”. The United Kingdom has fell victim to them with the 2016 vote on Brexit. Therefore, the time now is to be cautious and not push a strong federalist agenda, especially through an eurozone budget or an EU taxation, but rather implement incremental but key technical steps, such as the Banking Union and the ESAs reform, and take into account the message from the people. Otherwise, the risk is to face a major defeat like Rome at the battle of Cannae at the hand of a modern day would-be Hannibal.

Having been invited to add an economic viewpoint to the debate on the question of “Completing v. Rethinking the EMU”, I would like to emphasise the premise that the Deutsche Bundesbank, the institution I work for, is an integral part of the Eurosystem and as such has its very own interest in the stability of our currency, the Euro, and the stability of the Monetary Union.

This contribution deals with the ability or not of the European Union (EU) to act in situations of serious systemic violations of the rule of law in a Member State. It does this by looking at the different available mechanisms including Article 7 in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the new Rule of Law Framework and excluding infringement procedures before the Court of Justice of the EU. The contribution also discusses whether as a result of a serious breach of the TEU a Member State could be expelled from the organisation. The TEU contains no provision on expulsion, but the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties potentially does. In conclusion, the contribution finds that neither mechanism can be likened to a weapon, nor are they probably dissuasive, but they might be persuasive thanks to a persistent and protracted dialogue. The EU has no realistic choice but to be a gentle civiliser of Member States.

The rule of law is not a new principle in the EU legal order. During the last decades it has been firmly established in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and has been reaffirmed in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which explicitly refers to the rule of law as one of the common values on which the EU is founded. Despite being a deeply rooted principle, upholding the rule of law has never been so high on the EU agenda as it is today. Why has this common value become so important? This article presents four explanations.

La prévision par les traités des principes et, après le Traité de Lisbonne, valeurs de l’Union européenne a été accompagnée par la prévision d’une procédure spéciale visant à prévenir, déclarer et sanctionner leur violation. Malgré cette procédure, la question de la violation des valeurs de l’Union par rapport à certains États membres a provoqué une évolution rapide du cadre juridique de l’Union pour faire face aux menaces pour les valeurs de l’Union, y compris l’État de droit, qui se caractérise par une multiplicité d’auteurs et d’instruments – notamment le Nouveau cadre pour l’État de droit, adopté par la Commission, ou la Résolution du Parlement européen sur la création d’un mécanisme de l’Union pour la démocratie, l’État de droit et les droits fondamentaux. Le texte adresse les traits principaux de cette évolution, aussi bien que les nouvelles questions juridiques qu’elle soulève, identifie certains doutes qu’il conviendra de clarifier ou surmonter et, finalement, esquisse quelques pistes de réflexion dans le cadre d’une future révision des traités.

Le régime de l’état d’urgence est régi par une loi du 3 avril 1955.

The title of our working session evokes the rule of law as the foundation on which the authority of EU law rests. Moreover, however, the rule of law is a foundation for the European Union itself. This is spelled out in Article 2 TUE, according to which the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the right of persons belonging to minorities. As the Article further spells out, those values underpin a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.

It is commonplace to bemoan the EU’s democratic deficiencies, as attested to by the wealth of literature discussing the issue from a variety of perspectives. This chapter is not a literature review. To the contrary, it advances my own view on the issue, albeit one that is informed by existing scholarship. The ensuing analysis is predicated on the assumption that a principal, albeit not exclusive, cause for concern about EU democracy is the mismatch, or absence of fit, between voter power and political responsibility.

Seit seinen Anfängen 1952 war das europäische Integrationsprojekt immer wieder durch Krisen bedroht, und immer wieder ist es erst in Krisen gewachsen. Das überrascht wenig angesichts der radikalen Neuartigkeit und Ambition seines Konzepts. In vielen Mitgliedstaaten ist seit Jahren ein Erstarken EU-kritischer Parteien und Bewegungen zu beobachten, die vor einer Gefährdung nationaler Interessen und Identitäten durch die immer weiter gehende europäische Integration warnen oder gleich den Austritt ihres Landes aus der Union anstreben, wie dies im britischen Fall zur Notifizierung des Austrittsentschlusses nach Art.50 EUV am 29.März 2017 geführt hat. Es stellt sich daher die Frage, ob das europäische Projekt heute Gefahr läuft, an Überambition zugrunde zu gehen, und ob es erforderlich ist, die Union durch effektive Beschränkung auf diejenigen Politikbereiche, in denen die Integration echten Mehrwert gewährleistet, auf Dauer zu bewahren und fortzuentwickeln.

Das Kongressprogramm zur Feier des 25jähirgen Bestehens der ERA sprach mit Blick auf Europa vom „Legitimitätsdefizit eines Elitenprojekts“. Diesem Befund kann ich so nicht zustimmen. Ich sehe Europa keineswegs als Elitenprojekt: Zahllose Bürgerinnen und Bürger der Europäischen Union profitieren von offenen Grenzen, InterRail-Reisen, Erasmus-Austauschprogramm und dem Euro. Ich muss meinen Kindern heute bei einer Reise durch Europa erklären, wie das vor gar nicht allzu langer Zeit mit den Grenzkontrollen und den unterschiedlichen Währungen war.

Sixty years after the Treaty of Rome and 10 years after the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union’s search for legitimacy still continues. The double source of legitimacy (a directly elected Parliament and a nationally legitimized Council) sets the democratic foundation of the EU and it would be unfair to disregard the advances for more democracy at EU level in recent years, but this is not enough. The “democratic deficit” remains real and has to be addressed through a meaningful European dimension in the European elections, a clear link between the vote of the citizens and the decisions of the European institutions and a stronger role of the European Parliament to ensure democratic legitimacy of economic and fiscal policy in the Eurozone, while allowing for political alternatives and democratic choices to be made also at national level. Time as come for a “democratic offensive” in the EU.

La question de la légitimité de l’UE (1.1) se déroule dans un contexte de crise démocratique sur le continent (1.2).

This paper studies the role of governments and its link to trust. We argue that the public’s trust strongly depends on governments delivering on their core tasks in a market economy. In some economies, a neglect of core tasks can be observed and there seems to be some erosion, notably in terms of securing sound rules of the game in industrialised countries. We find very little correlation between government expenditure and trust but a strong correlation with delivering on core tasks. This leads us to conclude that it is not government spending per se that needs to increase to build trust, but rather better focused government activities.