7. The Case of Thailand

Thailand’s fourteen “southern provinces” include, but are not limited to, Narathiwat, Yala, Phuket, Satun, Krabi, Phatthalung, Phang Naga, Surat Thani, and Nakhon Si Thammarat. In turn, the “Deep South” refers to Satun, Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, and twenty-five percent of Songkhla province (4/16 districts). Those four districts are: Channa, Nathawi, Sabai Yoi, and Thepa.

That wide-ranging set of opinions reflect Allison’s notion of “Miles Law,” namely that “where you stand (on an issue) depends on where you sit.”.

For McCargo, the “upper southern” provinces include Patthalung, Nakhon Si Thsmmarat, and Songkhla.

The Thai terrorism under consideration could be described as nationalist-irredentist with Islamic underpinnings. It falls under the “nationalist-irredentist” heading, even though some contemporary Thai terrorist groups might not (in some cases) have the goal of a specific Islamic state in mind, but rather government disruption.

Thailand’s Prime Ministers after the overthrow of Siam’s “absolute monarchy” (1932) and the establishment of Thailand (1932), include: Phaya Manopakorn Nitithada (1932–1933); Phraya Phahon (i.e., Phahonphonphayuhasena) (1933–1938); Phibun Songkhram (i.e., Plaek Phibunsongkhram) (1938–1944), (April 1948–Sept 1957); Khuang Aphaiwong (Aug 1944–Aug 1945), (Jan–May 1946), (Nov 1947–April 1948); Pridi Phanomyong (i.e., Pridi Banomyong; Luang Praditmanutham) (Mar 1946–Aug. 1946); Pote Sarasin (Sept 1957–Jan 1958) [40, 60; 45, 108–111; 61].

In comparison to Ockey, McCargo provides a figure of 80%.

For Helbardt, his term is “Islamo-nationalism”.

In this sense, Thailand’s experience with “representative politics” and corruption is reminiscent of the wide ranging and deep corruption that led Nigeria’s “Second Republic” to fail.

There are what Yusuf calls “well integrated” Muslims outside of the south who live in Northern Thailand, so religious fissures might not be as distinct in that case.

For Croissant, a first phase ranges from the 1940s to the 1980s. In contrast, Chalk breaks down Thailand’s terrorism struggle into three distinct time periods. The first period is 1960–1998, the second period is from 1998 to 2004, and the third period is from 2008 onwards. Be that as it may, 2004 remains a watershed year for the intensification of struggle. In essence, Abuza skillfully breaks down what can be called the “second phase” of terrorism in Thailand, into “five waves.”

The Global Terrorism Data (GTD) data base records between zero and under fifty terrorist attacks for five year intervals between 1970 and 2000.

This event unfolded in ways reminiscent of how the 1960 Sharpsville protest and police massacre further radicalized the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in South Africa.

Croissant provides a date of 1948 for GAMPAR’s inception, while Abuza suggests the date is 1945.

Alternately, Croissant states BNPP was crafted in 1963.

BNPP activist estimates for around 1972 are based on Gunaratna, Acharya, and Chua’s work and range from: 600 X 0.51 = 306 (low BNPP estimate); 600 X 0.60 = 360 (average BNPP estimate); 600 X 0.65 = 390 (high BNPP estimate).

By contrast, Croissant provides 1963 as the inception date for BNPP.

Helbardt reports that original BRN incarnation dissolved in 1981.

Gunaratna, Acharya, and Chua report much of the problem revolved around Amin Tohmeena’s collusion with elements of Malaysia’s military to overthrow Malaysia’s government, thereby in effect promoting Pattani’s eventual liberation from Thailand.

For Gunaratna, Acharya, and Chua the single, most predominant goal was to craft “an Islamic Republic”.

This seems reminiscent of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) historical trajectory where Marxist-Leninist terminology was eventually eschewed in favor of Islamic phraseology to frame political statements in the post-Cold War world.

Conversely, McDermott reports that PULO is “…the second largest….” terrorist organization in Thailand’s southern provinces [41, 8, 21].

Abuza also tells us several less significant terrorist groups or proto-groups materialized at that time that included, but were not limited to, Dawlaw Taloh, Tantra Jihad Islam and Sabil-illah. In turn, Gunaratna, Acharya, and Chua report that Tantra Jihad Islam was crafted from a group of “disgruntled” BRN and PULO activists [13, 20; 33, 161].

Gunaratna and Acharya provide at date of 1995.

In contrast, Helbardt contends that the BRN-C organizational structure is a “hybrid” of both the top-down hierarchal bureaucratic model and the “horizontal” or “flat” model of organization [35, 6, 17–18].

What is significant here is that even though many terrorist assaults could be attributed as carried out by nationalist-irredentist with Islamic trappings, there could be no further identification based on specific terrorist group- name. That might help to explain the foregoing results where for terrorist group-type, the percentage rate for anonymous nationalist-irredentist groups (with Islamic trappings) almost matched the percentage of anonymous terrorist acts, but where with the terrorist group-name findings, there was a very large difference between the percentage of identifiable terrorist groups and anonymous groups.

There were twenty two (22) districts in Thailand that accounted for less than one percent of all business related terrorism. Those districts included: (1) Hua Hin district in Prachuap Khiri Khan province (0.6% or 2/314 acts), (2) Khuan Niang district in Songkhla (0.6% or 2/314 acts), (3) Krong Pi Nang district in Yala province (0.6% or 2/314 acts); (4) Lam Luk Ka district in Pathum Thani province (0.6% 2/314 acts), (5) Mueang Chiang Mai district in Chiang Mai province (0.6% or 2/314 acts), (6) Mae Lan district in Pattani (0.6% or 2/314 acts), (7) Sadao district in Songkhla province (0.6% or 2/314 acts), (8) Sukhirin district in Narathiwat (0.6% or 2/314 acts), (9) Bacho district in Narathiwat (0.3% or 1/314 acts), (10) Ban Pho district in Chachoengsao province (0.3% or 1/314 acts), (11) Betong district in Yala province (0.3% or 1/314 acts), (12) Cho-airong district in Narathiwat (0.3% or 1/314 acts), (13) Hat Yai district in Songkhla (0.3% or 1/314 acts), (14) Ko Samui district on Samui Island (0.3% or 1/314 acts), (15) Kapho district in Pattani (0.3% or 1/314 acts), (16) Mueang Chachoengsao district in Chachoengsao province (0.3% or 1/314 acts), (17) Mueang Krabi district in Krabi province (0.3% or 1/314 acts), (18) Mae Sot district in Tak province (0.3% or 1/314 acts), (19) Mueang Nonthaburi district in Nonthaburi (0.3% of 1/314 acts), (20) Sarapee district in Chiang Mai province (0.3% or 1/314 acts), (21) Si Sakhon district in Narathiwat (0.3% or 1/314 acts), (22) Waeng district in Narathiwat (0.3% or 1/314 acts). These findings suggest that even in deep southern provinces with high rates of business related terrorism, some districts were relatively unaffected by terrorism against commercial interests.

This relative frequencies test for “City, Towns, Villages” had an N set of 236 valid cases with 107 missing cases.

There were ninety-one (91) tambons, cities, villages, or towns that accounted for less than one percent of all business related terrorism in Thailand. Those tambons, cities, towns, or villages included: (1) Ban Bure (village, Narathiwat) with 0.8% (1/236 acts); (2) Bana (tambon, Pattani) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (3) Ban Bongo (tambon, Narathiwat) with 0.8% (2/236), (4) Bang Riang (tambon, Songkhla) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (5) Bo Thong (Pattani) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (6) Chana (tambon, Songkhla) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (7) Hua Hin (town, Prachuap Khiri Khan) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (8) Kaluwo Nuea (city, Narathiwat) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (9) Kayu Boko (tambon, Yala) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (10) Krawa (tambon, Pattani) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (11) Lat Sawai (town, Pathum Thani) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (12) Na Pradu (tambon, Pattani) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (13) Na Thawi (village, Songkhla) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (14) Ruangthip (town, Narathiwat) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (15) Sabai Yoi (town, Songkhla) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (16) Sakom (town, Songkhla) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (17) Sateng Nok (tambon, Yala) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (18) Talo Kapo (tambon, Pattani) with 0.8% (2/236 acts), (19) Yaha (town, Yala) with 0.8% (2/236 acts); (20) Ban Bo Thong (Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts); (21) Ao Nang (town, Krabi) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (22) Bangu Dudung (village, Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (23) Baju (village, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (24) Ban Ae Lae (village, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (25) Ban Bluka (village, Narathiwat), (26) Ban Cho Bantang (village, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (27) Ban Cho Batu (village, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (28) Ban Kayo (village, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (29) Ban Khae (village, Yala, Tachi tambon) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (30) Ban Khlong Tae (village, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (31) Ban Klong (village, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (32) Ban Kuyae (village, Yala, tambon Sa-Eh) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (33) Ban Lua (village, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (34) Ban Mae Kang (village, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (35) Ban More Saeng (village, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (36) Ban Na (tambon, Songkhla) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (37) Ban Nod (tambon, Songkhla) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (38) Ban Pa Mai (village, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (39) Ban Palas (village, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (40) Ban Phra Put (village, Songkhla) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (41) Ban Plug Taen (village, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (42) Ban Tala Khostar (village, Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (43) Ban Tha Muang (city, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (44) Ban Thung Ya Mu (town, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (45) Banang Dama (tambon, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (46) Bang Kro (tambon, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236), (47) Bang Nak (village, Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (48) Bang Po (tambon, Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (49) Barahom (tambon, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (50) Baro (tambon, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (51) Betong (town, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (52) Bindiyor (village, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (53) Bo Put (town, Surat Thani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (54) Buenae Nako (Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (55) Chaloem (Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (56) Hat Yai (city, Songkhla) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (57) Kabang (tambon, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (58) Kero (tambon, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (59) Kho Saba (tambon, Songkhla) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (60) Khok Khian (tambon, Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (61) Khok Pho (tambon, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (62) Koto Tuera (tambon, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (63) Krong Pinang (tambon, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (64) Lo Jood (tambon, Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (65) Marue Botok (tambon, Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (66) Mayo (tambon, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (67) Moo 2 (village, Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (68) Muno (tambon, Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (69) Na Muang (tambon, Chachoengsao) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (70) Panare (tambon, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (71) Pawang Nok (village, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (72) Prom (village, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (73) Puyut (tambon, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (74) Sai Khao (tambon, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (75) Samakkhi (tambon, Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (76) Suwari (tambon, Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (77) Talign Chan (tambon, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (78) Talubo (tambon, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (79) Tanoh Puteh (tambon, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (80) Ton Sai (tambon, Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (81)Tao Rabon (tambon, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (82) Tapoyo (tambon, Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts); (83) Tawan Ok (village, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (84) Tayong Limo (tambon, Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (85) Tha Muang (village, Songkhla) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (86) Tha Ruae (tambon, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (87) Tha Sap (tambon, Yala) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (88) Thai Sai (tambon, Nonthaburi) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (89) To Tee Tay (tambon, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (90) Tuyong (tambon, Pattani) with 0.4% (1/236 acts), (91) Yingo (village, Narathiwat) with 0.4% (1/236 acts).

In this crosstabulation test, the variable, “Group Name” was recoded into “the same variable” to 2 → 2, 4 → 4, ELSE SYSMIS; while the variable “Business Target” was recoded into “the same variable” to 1 → 1, 4 → 4. ELSE SYSMIS. This test had a N set of 49 with 294 missing events.

N = 249 with 94 missing events. In this test, the variable “Group-Type” was recoded in the “same variable” with 3 → 3; 4 → 4; ELSE SYSMIS, and the variable “Business Target” was recoded 4 → 4; 7 → 7; ELSE SYSMIS. It is understood that “anonymous” is not a formal group type per se, but because there is one identifiable terrorist group-types and a very small number of identifiable terrorist groups in the contemporary Thai landscape, it is necessary to conduct the crosstabulation test with those categories.

2.5% X 8 = 20.0%

In this crosstabulation test, the variable “Business Target” was recoded into the same variable, with 7 → 7; 4 → 4, ELSE SYMIS; the variable “Deaths” was recoded into the same variable as 0 = 0; 1 = 1 → 15, ELSE SYSMIS. This test had an N set of 338 with 5 missing events.

In this crosstabulation test, the Variable “Group Type” was 3 → 3, 4 → 4, ELSE SYSMIS and the variable “reaction to Political Event” was recoded in the “same variable” to 0 → 0, 2 → 2, 5 → 5, ELSE SYSMIS. In this test N = 273 with 70 missing events.

For anonymous actors, the breakdown was “govt. policies” (7.4%) + “ground assaults” (4.0%) + “landmark events” (4.5%) + “religious holidays” (8.0%) = 23.9%. For Islamic nationalist-irredentist groups, the breakdown was “govt. policies” (4.5%) + “ground assaults” (10.9%) + “govt. assassinations” (1.3%) + “landmark events” (19.2%) + “religious holidays” (13.5%) + “secular holidays” (1.3%) = 50.7%

As only 4 out of 16 districts of Songkhla (25.0%) constitute part of the “deep south,” Songkhla was not included in the category “deep south.” There were no chronicled business-related terrorist events that happened in Satun in this six-year time interval. Helbardt reports there are few if any “Southern separatist” terrorist organization constituent group supporters in Satun province. By contrast, Gunaratna and Acharya report that PULO constituent support exists in Satun.

In this test, the variable, “Prov/State” was recoded into “a different variable,” “Region” with value labels “Deep South” (1.00 = 1 → 1, 2 → 2, 3 → 3) and “non-Deep South” (2.00 = 4 → 4, 5 → 5, 6 → 6, 7 → 7, 8 → 8, 9 → 9, 10 → 10, 11 → 11, 12 → 12, 13 → 13, 14 → 14, ELSE SYSMIS). The variable “Business Target” was recoded into the “same variable,” 1 → 1, 6 → 6, 7 → 7, ELSE SYSMIS).

There were no chronicled business-related terrorist assaults in Satun province for the 2013–2018 time period under consideration.