Skip to main content
Disciplines
Automotive Business IT + Informatics Construction + Real Estate Electrical Engineering + Electronics Energy + Sustainability Insurance + Risk Finance + Banking Management + Leadership Marketing + Sales Mechanical Engineering + Materials
Events
DE
EN
Books
Journals
Topic Page
Marketing
Start single access now
Access for companies
EXTENDED SEARCH
Log in
Top
Published in:
Introduction Read chapter Read first chapter

2018 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

The Dragon Lady and the Beast of Kandahar: Bush and Obama-era US Aerial Drone Surveillance Policy Based on a Case Study Comparison of the 1960 U-2 Crash with the 2011 RQ-170 Crash

Author : Leah J. Ruckle

Published in: Technology and the Intelligence Community

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Log in

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Little is known about current surveillance policy regarding unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also known as aerial drones. Surveillance objectives, technologies, and policies are largely classified; however, occasionally there are glimpses into the programs. The 2011 RQ-170 crash in the Islamic Republic of Iran is one such glimpse. Upon comparison, that crash shows a number of similarities with the 1960 U-2 crash in the USSR in terms of the international political environment prior to the incident, the US agencies involved, the functional characteristics of the aircraft, the surveillance target, and the functional means of downing the aircraft. Fortunately, many details concerning the CIA U-2 program and crash are now declassified. By using the U-2 program as an analogy, this chapter explores a number of hypotheses concerning current US aerial drone surveillance policies.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now
previous chapter Exploring the Contributing Factors Associated with Intelligence Failures During the Cold War
next chapter Wiretapping: The Interaction of Policy and Technology
Footnotes
1
There is still some debate, however, whether Iran successfully brought down the drone by hacking the GPS system or whether the drone malfunctioned at an inopportune time.
 
2
In the case of the USSR, this was the development and alleged massive production of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable of carrying nuclear warheads to the United States, which was referred to as the:Missile Gap.” In the case of Iran, it was the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report that Iran’s nuclear program was showing signs of a weapons program.
 
3
Research done for the program in pilot life support systems and pressure suits would prove to be valuable in the space program.
 
4
Unfortunately, the estimate of Soviet radar technology capability was based on the false assumption that the Soviets were still using American-built radars acquired in WWII. In reality, the Soviets had made advances in their radar technology since that point and their radar ceilings were above the U-2 cruising altitude. As a result, from early in the program, the Soviets detected the U-2 overflights, but they lacked the capability of downing the aircraft until several years later with advances in their Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) technology.
 
5
See the Oversight section for more information about the Contingency Reserve Fund.
 
6
This happened to be Area 51 in Utah. The number of UFO reports in the area greatly increased in the area during U-2 flight testing. At the time, the U-2 had a silver finish that would catch the light of the sun, particularly in the early evening hours, and since no one believed that manned flight was possible at the U-2’s altitude, airline pilots would often report these sightings as UFOs. According the Air Force’s Operation BLUE BOOK which kept track of UFO sightings, more than half of the reported UFO sightings during the 1950s and 1960s were U-2 or A-12 OXCART sightings. (Pedlow and Welzenbach 1998)
 
7
Even the recruitment was secretive. Meetings and interviews often took place at motels and off-base locations.
 
8
The main bases were Weissbaden in West Germany (Detachment A), Incirlik airbase near Adana, Turkey (Detachment B) and, later, the Naval Air Station in Atsugi, Japan (Detachment C).
 
9
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC. 403j.
 
10
Pilot survival was an important part of the political calculation since a captured pilot could be used as political leverage and would present a security risk. However, neither the assurance of effective stealth nor the assurance of complete aircraft destruction would turn out to be true. The Soviets had been improving their radar systems since WWII, but the Americans assumed that the USSR was still operating the same radars. In regards to the state of the aircraft and the pilot after a crash, the unusual aerodynamics of the U-2 made the aircraft usually fall in a flat spin. This meant that crashed airframes were usually found to be largely intact following a crash, even from operational altitude.
 
11
The USAF and US Navy flew RB-47 s along the Soviet border in the early 1950s. When a radar gap was detected, the aircraft would dart in and dart back out. Soon these gaps were filled and these relatively low-flying aircraft were at high risk for being shot down as the Soviets became more aggressive in defending their airspace.
 
12
The USAF believed that a small company would give the project more time and effort than a larger company.
 
13
The initial design for the U-2 had no wheels. The aircraft was designed to land on its belly. Later, this was changed to a two-wheel ``bicycle” configuration.
 
14
Reportedly, this was the first and last time a U-2 overflew Moscow.
 
15
Though there are exceptions, such as the F-35 program which has been mired by program delays and has been in development since 1993 (when it was the JAST program).
 
16
There is some debate over whether Iran successfully hacked the UAV or whether the aircraft malfunctioned. The author believes that the evidence is strong enough to believe that Iran successfully hacked the drone.
 
17
It is too early in the Trump presidency to evaluate whether this policy has changed, but with President Trump’s criticism of Iran and the Iran Nuclear Deal, it has possibly changed.
 
Literature
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. §§403j (2017).
Kerns, A. J., Shepard, D. P., Bhatti, J. A., & Humphreys, T. E. (2014). Unmanned aircraft capture and control via GPS spoofing. Journal of Field Robotics, 31, 617–636.CrossRef
Pedlow, G. W., & Welzenbach, D. E. (1998). The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954–1974. Central Intelligence Agency.
Pocock, C. (1989). Dragon Lady. Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing Ltd.
Powers, F. G. (1970). Operation overflight. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Tippenhauer, N. O., Pöpper, C., Rasmussen, K. B., Čapkun, S. (2011). On the requirements for successful GPS spoofing attacks. Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security. Pages 75–86. Chicago: USA. Oct 17–21.
Metadata
Title
The Dragon Lady and the Beast of Kandahar: Bush and Obama-era US Aerial Drone Surveillance Policy Based on a Case Study Comparison of the 1960 U-2 Crash with the 2011 RQ-170 Crash
Author
Leah J. Ruckle
Copyright Year
2018
Book
Technology and the Intelligence Community

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-75231-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-75232-7

Copyright Year: 2018

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75232-7_6