Skip to main content
Top

2016 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

5. The Factors Influencing the EU Banking Regulatory Framework: Impediments for the New Regulations

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

The chapter identifies the determinants of regulations and their implications for the implementation of EU rules on the national levels. It describes the regulatory process and approaches the issue of regulatory capture in the EU banking sector. To determine the factors of regulation it builds on theories of regulatory choices—the private interest theory, the public interest theory and the regulatory dialectics theory—and conducts a series of empirical exercises. It also analyses the individual cases of the consultation processes concerning the new banking regulatory acts in the EU by considering stakeholders’ participation in the regulatory procedure. Subsequently it points to the opportunities and challenges relating to the movement of the regulatory process to supranational level.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Literature
go back to reference Armingeon, K., Leimgruber, P., Beyeler, M., & Menegale, S. (2014). Comparative political data set 1960–2004. Institute of Political Science, University of Berne. Armingeon, K., Leimgruber, P., Beyeler, M., & Menegale, S. (2014). Comparative political data set 1960–2004. Institute of Political Science, University of Berne.
go back to reference Baker, A. (2010). Restraining regulatory capture? Anglo-America, crisis politics and trajectories of change in global financial governance. International Affairs, 86(3), 647–663.CrossRef Baker, A. (2010). Restraining regulatory capture? Anglo-America, crisis politics and trajectories of change in global financial governance. International Affairs, 86(3), 647–663.CrossRef
go back to reference Barth, J. R., Caprio Jr., G., & Levine, R. (2004). Bank regulation and supervision: What works best? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13(2), 205–248.CrossRef Barth, J. R., Caprio Jr., G., & Levine, R. (2004). Bank regulation and supervision: What works best? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13(2), 205–248.CrossRef
go back to reference BCBS. (2011). Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems BCBS. Basel: BIS. BCBS. (2011). Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems BCBS. Basel: BIS.
go back to reference Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2013). Financial institutions and markets across countries and over time: Data and analysis. World Bank Economic Review. Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2013). Financial institutions and markets across countries and over time: Data and analysis. World Bank Economic Review.
go back to reference Becker, G. (1983, Aug). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(3), 371–400.CrossRef Becker, G. (1983, Aug). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(3), 371–400.CrossRef
go back to reference Blum, J. (1999). Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking? Journal of Banking & Finance, 23, 755–771.CrossRef Blum, J. (1999). Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking? Journal of Banking & Finance, 23, 755–771.CrossRef
go back to reference Calem, P., & Rob, R. (1999). The impact of capital-based regulation on bank risk-taking. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 8, 317–352.CrossRef Calem, P., & Rob, R. (1999). The impact of capital-based regulation on bank risk-taking. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 8, 317–352.CrossRef
go back to reference Demirgüc-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. (2011). Basel Core Principles and bank soundness: Does compliance matter? Journal of Financial Stability, 7, 179–190.CrossRef Demirgüc-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. (2011). Basel Core Principles and bank soundness: Does compliance matter? Journal of Financial Stability, 7, 179–190.CrossRef
go back to reference EC. (2009a). Consultation regarding the review of the financial conglomerates directive. EC. (2009a). Consultation regarding the review of the financial conglomerates directive.
go back to reference EC. (2009b). Review of Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes. Summary of the results of the public consultation in spring/summer 2009. EC. (2009b). Review of Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes. Summary of the results of the public consultation in spring/summer 2009.
go back to reference EC. (2011). Overview of the results of the public consultation on technical details of a possible EU framework for bank resolution and recovery 5 May 2011. EC. (2011). Overview of the results of the public consultation on technical details of a possible EU framework for bank resolution and recovery 5 May 2011.
go back to reference EC. (2012). Summary. Responses received to the Commissions Green Paper on shadow banking. EC. (2012). Summary. Responses received to the Commissions Green Paper on shadow banking.
go back to reference EC. (2015a). Commission Staff Working Document. Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD (2015) 111. EC. (2015a). Commission Staff Working Document. Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD (2015) 111.
go back to reference EC. (2015b). Summary of the responses to the public consultation on the potential impact of CRR and CRD IV on the financing of the economy 18 December 2015. EC. (2015b). Summary of the responses to the public consultation on the potential impact of CRR and CRD IV on the financing of the economy 18 December 2015.
go back to reference Hardy, D. (2006). Regulatory capture in banking. IMF Working Paper WP/06/34. Hardy, D. (2006). Regulatory capture in banking. IMF Working Paper WP/06/34.
go back to reference Johnson, S., & Kwak, J. (2010). 13 Bankers: The Wall Street takeover and the next financial meltdown. New York: Random House. Johnson, S., & Kwak, J. (2010). 13 Bankers: The Wall Street takeover and the next financial meltdown. New York: Random House.
go back to reference Joskow, P., & Noll, R. (1981). Regulation in theory and practice: An overview. In G. Fromm (Ed.), Studies in public regulation (pp. 1–78). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Joskow, P., & Noll, R. (1981). Regulation in theory and practice: An overview. In G. Fromm (Ed.), Studies in public regulation (pp. 1–78). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
go back to reference Kane, E. J. (1987). Competitive financial regulation: an international perspective. In R. Portes & A. K. Swoboda (Eds.), Threats to international financial stability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kane, E. J. (1987). Competitive financial regulation: an international perspective. In R. Portes & A. K. Swoboda (Eds.), Threats to international financial stability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
go back to reference Kara, G. (2013). Explaining cross-country and over-time differences in bank capital regulations. Mimeo. Kara, G. (2013). Explaining cross-country and over-time differences in bank capital regulations. Mimeo.
go back to reference Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2014). The Worldwide Governance Indicators. Washington DC, World Bank. Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2014). The Worldwide Governance Indicators. Washington DC, World Bank.
go back to reference Klomp, J., & Haan, J. (2012). Banking risk and regulation: Does one size fit all? Journal of Banking & Finance, 36, 3197–3212.CrossRef Klomp, J., & Haan, J. (2012). Banking risk and regulation: Does one size fit all? Journal of Banking & Finance, 36, 3197–3212.CrossRef
go back to reference Kroszner, R. S., & Strahan, P. E. (1999). What drives deregulation? Economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4), 1437–1467.CrossRef Kroszner, R. S., & Strahan, P. E. (1999). What drives deregulation? Economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4), 1437–1467.CrossRef
go back to reference Llewellyn, D. (1999). The economic rationale for financial regulation. Financial Services Authority, Occasional paper series 1. Llewellyn, D. (1999). The economic rationale for financial regulation. Financial Services Authority, Occasional paper series 1.
go back to reference Lucca, D., Seru, A., & Trebbi, F. (2014). The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation. Journal of Monetary Economics, 65, 17–32.CrossRef Lucca, D., Seru, A., & Trebbi, F. (2014). The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation. Journal of Monetary Economics, 65, 17–32.CrossRef
go back to reference Marcinkowska, M. (2013). Regulation and self-regulation in banking: In search of optimum. Bank i Kredyt, 44(2), 119–158. Marcinkowska, M. (2013). Regulation and self-regulation in banking: In search of optimum. Bank i Kredyt, 44(2), 119–158.
go back to reference Melecky, M., & Podpiera, A. M. (2013). Institutional structures of financial sector supervision, their drivers and historical benchmarks. Journal of Financial Stability, 9, 428–444.CrossRef Melecky, M., & Podpiera, A. M. (2013). Institutional structures of financial sector supervision, their drivers and historical benchmarks. Journal of Financial Stability, 9, 428–444.CrossRef
go back to reference Monnet, E., Pagliari, S., & Vallée, H. (2014). Europe between financial repression and regulatory capture. Bruegel Working paper 2014/08. Monnet, E., Pagliari, S., & Vallée, H. (2014). Europe between financial repression and regulatory capture. Bruegel Working paper 2014/08.
go back to reference Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
go back to reference Pagliari, S., & Young, K. (2012). Who mobilizes? An analysis of stakeholder responses to financial policy consultations. In S. Pagliari (Ed.), Making good financial regulation—towards a policy response to regulatory capture. London: International Centre for Financial Regulation. Pagliari, S., & Young, K. (2012). Who mobilizes? An analysis of stakeholder responses to financial policy consultations. In S. Pagliari (Ed.), Making good financial regulation—towards a policy response to regulatory capture. London: International Centre for Financial Regulation.
go back to reference Pagliari, S., & Young, K. (2013a). Leveraged interests: Financial industry power and the role of private sector coalitions. Review of International Political Economy, 21(3), 575–610.CrossRef Pagliari, S., & Young, K. (2013a). Leveraged interests: Financial industry power and the role of private sector coalitions. Review of International Political Economy, 21(3), 575–610.CrossRef
go back to reference Pagliari, S., & Young, K. (2013b). The Wall Street-main street Nexus in financial regulation: Business. Coalitions inside and outside the financial sector. In M. Moschella & E. Tsingou (Eds.), The regulation of OTC derivatives, great expectations, slow transformations: Incremental change in financial governance. Colchester: ECPR Press. Pagliari, S., & Young, K. (2013b). The Wall Street-main street Nexus in financial regulation: Business. Coalitions inside and outside the financial sector. In M. Moschella & E. Tsingou (Eds.), The regulation of OTC derivatives, great expectations, slow transformations: Incremental change in financial governance. Colchester: ECPR Press.
go back to reference Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics, 19, 211–240.CrossRef Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics, 19, 211–240.CrossRef
go back to reference Rosenbluth, F., & Schaap, R. (2003). The domestic politics of banking regulation. International Organization, 57, 307–336.CrossRef Rosenbluth, F., & Schaap, R. (2003). The domestic politics of banking regulation. International Organization, 57, 307–336.CrossRef
go back to reference Santos, J. (2000). Bank capital regulation in contemporary banking theory: A review of the literature (BIS Working Papers No. 90). Santos, J. (2000). Bank capital regulation in contemporary banking theory: A review of the literature (BIS Working Papers No. 90).
go back to reference Shive, S., & Forster, M. (2014). The revolving door for financial regulators. Mimeo. Shive, S., & Forster, M. (2014). The revolving door for financial regulators. Mimeo.
go back to reference Stigler G. (1971) The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2(1), 3—21. Stigler G. (1971) The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2(1), 3—21.
go back to reference Tchana, F. T. (2012). The welfare cost of banking regulation. Economic Modelling, 29, 217–232.CrossRef Tchana, F. T. (2012). The welfare cost of banking regulation. Economic Modelling, 29, 217–232.CrossRef
go back to reference White, W. R. (2014). The prudential regulation of financial institutions: Why regulatory responses to the crisis might not prove sufficient. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1108, OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/5jz6zgzzw8s4-en White, W. R. (2014). The prudential regulation of financial institutions: Why regulatory responses to the crisis might not prove sufficient. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1108, OECD Publishing. doi:10.​1787/​5jz6zgzzw8s4-en
go back to reference Woll, C. (2014). Curtailing capture through the European Banking Union: A note of caution. Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Policy Letter No. 27. Woll, C. (2014). Curtailing capture through the European Banking Union: A note of caution. Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Policy Letter No. 27.
go back to reference Young, K. (2012). Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical examination of the transnational lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Review of International Political Economy, 19(4), 663–688.CrossRef Young, K. (2012). Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical examination of the transnational lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Review of International Political Economy, 19(4), 663–688.CrossRef
go back to reference Young, K. (2013). Financial industry groups’ adaptation to the post-crisis regulatory environment: Changing approaches to the policy cycle. Regulation & Governance, 7, 460–480.CrossRef Young, K. (2013). Financial industry groups’ adaptation to the post-crisis regulatory environment: Changing approaches to the policy cycle. Regulation & Governance, 7, 460–480.CrossRef
Metadata
Title
The Factors Influencing the EU Banking Regulatory Framework: Impediments for the New Regulations
Author
Katarzyna Sum
Copyright Year
2016
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41378-5_5