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2019 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

The Interaction of Consumers and Load Serving Entity to Manage Electricity Consumption

Authors : Natalia Aizenberg, Nikolai Voropai

Published in: Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This paper addresses the coordination of interaction between various types of consumers and a load serving entity to manage electricity consumption by using several models: the Nash equilibrium pricing, and the adverse selection model based on the contract theory. We propose a method to form rate options for load curve optimization for different types of consumers and a load serving entity for different market configurations. The utility functions describe the real situation sufficiently well and allow the implementation of a system of incentives for load curve optimization (load shifting from a peak time of the day). The rates providing a separating equilibrium are determined. We compare the effectiveness of different retail market models. We use the pricing scheme that implies the change in electricity prices depending on the electricity consumption by all users during every hour so that all users are financially motivated.

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Appendix
Available only for authorised users
Footnotes
1
It means that a marginal utility of users is a nonincreasing function.
 
2
Here the condition (5) is taken into account as equality, which makes sense for the problem under consideration due to the following reasons. We consider some variant of distribution of the same load over different time intervals. Therefore, the assumption that the user, by shifting part of the load from the peak time, will increase its consumption, does not look realistic. Therefore, we can ignore it by reducing the number of variables in the main problem (4)
 
3
Here, the level of customer satisfaction increases with the shift of the lines of the utility function level down, and the profit level increases with the shift of indifference curves of costs upwards.
 
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Metadata
Title
The Interaction of Consumers and Load Serving Entity to Manage Electricity Consumption
Authors
Natalia Aizenberg
Nikolai Voropai
Copyright Year
2019
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33394-2_12

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