The Modernisation of the Republic of Korea Navy

This is the first English-language book to explore the ROKN and its ongoing process of blue-water modernisation. This book argues that a new perception of South Korea’s maritime security requirements combined with greater South Korean access to modern naval technology facilitated a new approach to naval operations and seapower. One where mobility, multi-functionality, connectivity and lethality have primacy. These strategic and technological factors have coincided with a changing political landscape, which has been more amenable to the concept of an expanded operational role for the ROKN. The book contends that the United States first constrained but now facilitates and encourages the ROKN’s goal of an expanded operational role. The ROKN has engaged in a campaign to persuade the public and political elites of the importance of seapower and naval power to South Korea’s security and prosperity. It is shown that this effort has been partially successful and blue-water modernisation has matched the political and strategic vision of successive South Korean presidents. However, this volume emphasises that naval modernisation is a long-term project and resource-intensive endeavour and ROKN ambition remains vulnerable to changes in the strategic environment and the political orientation of the country.

This chapter argues that unique and constant operational challenge posed by North Korea in the littoral waters of the Korean Peninsula does not relieve the pressure that the wider East Asian strategic environment places on South Korea. It examines how the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) is developing a blue-water force to meet these challenges. It argues that despite the development of a blue-water navy since the early 1990s, at no point did the ROKN ignore the threat posed by North Korea. Instead, it is attempting to create a force structure than can both maintain deterrence in the littoral waters of the Korean Peninsula, protect South Korean maritime interests in the Northeast Asian region and protect South Korean’s Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). The chapter proceeds by examining South Korea’s maritime security interests in Northeast Asia, its perception of SLOC security including its role in the South China Sea and its desire to become a central tool in South Korea’s implementation of its global foreign and security policy. The chapter then addresses how the ROKN plans to balance the requirements for peninsular deterrence and warfighting with its future more expansive mission set and the difficulties it currently faces in meeting all of South Korea’s maritime security requirements.

This chapter explores the nature of South Korea’s naval modernisation through an analysis of its platforms, force structure and training regimen. It shows that the ROKN is creating a force based on four interconnected outputs: multifunctionality, mobility, lethality and connectivity. In combination, the four outputs are designed to transform the ROKN into a force that can perform effective operations in relation to its current and future threat environments. This means that the ROKN is developing forces that have utility in both peninsular and non-peninsular contexts. What follows in this chapter is a description and assessment of the ROKN’s force modernisation since 1993. Surface, subsurface and aviation capabilities are first examined with a combined analysis of new weapon and sensor systems. The ROKN’s current and future structure is then explored to assess how new capabilities are being integrated into the fleet. This allows for an assessment of deployment and operational priorities. Finally, the ROKN’s training regime will be explored to assess what this reveals about current and future missions and capabilities. The chapter ends by arguing that the ROKN is developing a fleet with credible combat capabilities in all domains of naval warfare.

This chapter analyses the role of the United States in the modernisation of the ROKN. It shows that the ROKN has successfully transitioned from a force that was wholly dependent on the US, to one that is now indigenously constructing advanced platforms and weapon systems. Further, it demonstrates that although the US was initially reluctant to support ROKN blue-water modernisation it now supports and facilitates it, as a strong, interoperable ROKN is strategically beneficial for US operations around the Korean Peninsula and in the Asian region. This chapter is divided into four main parts, each of which describes a different period in the US–South Korea alliance relationship and its impact on the ROKN. It begins with the formative period of the ROKN, when South Korea was entirely reliant on the US for economic and military aid and the US did not embrace the concept of South Korean seapower. The second and third parts examine the period after 1968 when the alliance relationship began to change as South Korea took more responsibility for its own defence. The chapter concludes with an examination of the alliance and its impact on the ROKN after the Cold War.

This chapter examines how the ROKN took advantage of changed political circumstances following the democratisation of South Korea to win presidential support for blue-water modernisation. It starts with the Presidency of Kim Young-sam who took office in 1993 and was the first elected civilian head of state in over 30 years. The chapter then proceeds to examine the relationship between the three subsequent administrations and ROKN modernisation. By covering a period of 20 years, the chapter demonstrates that internal naval goals for blue-water modernisation coincided with a political environment that was increasingly open to such concepts. Following the election of Kim Young-sam, successive administrations sought to expand South Korea’s security agenda, thereby providing the ROKN with a window to modify its operational posture. However, the nature of the political system in South Korea combined with the threat from North Korea exposes the ROKN to sudden shifts in administration policy. When conservative President Lee Myung-bak took office, the ROKN’s drive for blue-water operations fell afoul of political reprioritisation. The chapter concludes by arguing that political support for the ROKN blue-water modernisation is still not a given but has been helped by a strategic environment which can now justify such expenditure.

In the introduction, this book asked how and why South Korea, a historically inward-looking nation with an existential threat on its only land border, began a sustained period of blue-water naval modernisation. By taking a multifaceted approach, the book identifies the drivers and constraints of this modernisation, its operational benefits and outstanding limitations. The core argument is that Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) modernisation has been and is determined by the confluence of external strategic rationales and changes to the nature of South Korea as a state. The result is a ROKN which is benefitting from an overall increase in capabilities that have operational and strategic utility in both the littoral waters of the Korean Peninsula and the maritime strategic arena of East Asia.