The Post-crisis European Union Before the Political Union: Coordinates and Keys of the Future Institutional Architecture

Partially, the following ideas and questions can be seen in extenso in Pereira-Menaut and Cancela-Outeda (2012).

Report on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union (2014/2248(INI) Committee on Constitutional Affairs. Rapporteur: Guy Verhofstadt. Available in http://​www.​europarl.​europa.​eu/​doceo/​document/​A-8-2016-0390_​EN.​pdf (last access: 6th July 2019).

White paper on the future of Europe, https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​commission/​sites/​beta-political/​files/​white_​paper_​on_​the_​future_​of_​europe_​en.​pdf (last access: 15th July 2017).

It started by stating that “Faced with the great challenges of our times, such as defence and security, great migrations, development, climate change, the digital revolution and regulation of a globalized economy, have European countries found means to defend their interests and values, and to guarantee and adapt their democratic and social model that is unique worldwide? Can they address each of these challenges alone? We cannot afford to keep the same policies, the same habits, the same procedures and the same budget. No more can we choose to turn inwards within national borders. The only way to ensure our future, is the rebuilding of a sovereign, united and democratic Europe”. Available at https://​es.​ambafrance.​org/​Initiative-pour-l-Europe-intervention-du-President-de-la-Republique. In 2019, just before the elections to the European Parliament, Emmanuel Macron published a letter called “A European Renaissance” (4th of March, 2019). In it, he mentions a variety of challenges and proposes the implementation of a set of institutions (common border policy, an Asylum European Office, a Home Security European Council, a European Security Council, European Climate Bank…). This document can be consulted at https://​es.​ambafrance.​org/​Pour-une-Renaissance-europeenne.

This document can be consulted at https://​euobserver.​com/​political/​140200.

Proposes the creation of a federal budget, under real democratic control and with the capacity to invest on a European level. Available at http://​tdem.​eu/​en/​manifesto/​.

Torreblanca (2014).

Delaume and Cayla (2017).

Hix and Hoyland (2012).

At an academic level, this transformation influenced the emergence of new theoretical approaches. Thus, Hix writes that “the recognition of the EU as ‘just another polity’ enabled a new generation of scholars to approach the EU from the fields of comparative politics and comparative public policy. This new generation brought a new set of research questions. Until the early 1990 s, the main focus had been to explain bargaining between the member states, power relations between member states and the supranational institutions, and the general long-run process of economic and political integration in Europe, mainly from the field of international relations” (Hix, 2007).

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000), the Declaration 23 of the Treaty of Nice, the Laeken Declaration (2001) or the Lamassoure Report on the division of competences between the EU and the member states (2002) have political-institutional inspiration.

Pereira-Menaut and Cancela-Outeda (2012).

The Court of Justice has supported a political-constitutional vision of European integration. Thus, the decisions of the Court are understood. Decisions such as Van Gend and Loos (1962) where the principle of the direct effect was established in the constitutive treaties or the decision Costa/ENEL (1964), that established the principle of primacy of European Law over the state Law. In 1969, the protection line started with the fundamental rights and freedoms regarding the act of European institutions on the base of general principles, common constitutional traditions and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950). Another remarkable legal contribution is that referred to as the consideration of the European Communities (today the EU) as a Legal community (the European institutions act subject to the rule of Law), to the safeguard of a certain separation of powers among the main European institutions, based on the principle of institutional balance. In this respect, the Court of Justice has acted somehow as a federal court, particularly when referring to the delimitation of the competences among the member states and the EU. The political significance of these decisions is unquestionable, in practice, moving the EU towards a federal style political system. Regarding EU constitutionalization, see Cancela (2001).

Ibid.

Troitiño et al. (2018).

Colomer (2018).

On uniformization, MacLaren wrote: “In attempting to achieve the internal market through the approximation of laws in the 1970s and early 80s, lengthy bargaining produced excessively detailed EC rules. Rather than secure total regulatory harmonization, the Commission has had to resort to mutual recognition of national regulations and a limited number of essential safety and technical requirements” (MacLaren 2001). Regarding centralization, Hix points out the following: “for example, consider the evolution of competences in the EU and the US. Both polities started with a low level of policy centralization. However, policy centralization occurred remarkably quickly in the EU compared to the US, and in some area faster than others” (Hix 2007).

Pereira-Menaut (2017).

But which federal version should inspire this process? The answer is not simple because there is no unique concept or meaning. Thus, “the term ‘federalism’ evokes different models of government in the large states. Roughly speaking, to the Germans it describes a division of powers; to the French an association of nation states; to the British a super-state” (MacLaren 2001).

Dawson and de Witte (2016).

Pereira-Menaut (2017).

The treaties inspire planning, uniformity and regulation (and also soft policy tools). At this point, the French influence is remarkable. Thus, as MacLaren points out: “The French political class have also largely determined the nature of post-war European integration. The edifice in Brussels reflects above all their habits, interests and vision of Europe. (For example, the European Union is run by a bureaucratic elite like France itself.)” (MacLaren 2001).

Hix warns that “for example, the states can be protected against policy drift to the center via a clear catalog of competences and independent judicial review of competence disputes. Nevertheless, under all constitutional designs, the division of competences is never completely fixed, and the long-term trend in most multi-level polities has been policy centralization” (Hix 2007).

Torreblanca (2014) and Kreuder-Sonnen (2016).

Conway (2011).

Dawson and de Witte (2016).

Torreblanca (2014).

Dawson and de Witte (2016) and Pereira-Menaut (2019).

Cancela (2014).

Torreblanca (2014).

Hix and Hoyland (2012).

Chryssochoou et al. (2003).

Troitiño (2017).

De Areilza (2016).

Colomina (2018).

This is one of the formulas included in the French president’s Initiative for Europe. Specifically, he defended the need to have transnational lists for the European elections of 2019.

Kerikmäe et al. (2019).

Pereira-Menaut and Cancela-Outeda (2012) and Pereira-Menaut (2017).