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Review of Accounting Studies
Published in: Review of Accounting Studies 1/2024

01-12-2022

The power of not trading: Evidence from index fund ownership

Authors: Caleb Rawson, Stephen P. Rowe

Published in: Review of Accounting Studies | Issue 1/2024

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Abstract

Index funds are an increasingly important part of the U.S. stock market, with the average S&P 1500 firm having more than 20% of its equity held by index funds in 2018. Compared to other owners, index fund managers face greater constraints and limitations when selecting portfolio investments and making trading decisions about whether, and when, to enter or exit a position. Using hand-collected data to examine the ramifications of increased ownership by constrained index funds, we find that greater index fund ownership is associated with less bias (greater frequency of missing earnings and fewer abnormal accruals) and less obfuscation (more readable, more negative, and more specific disclosures) in financial reporting. Additional analysis finds results consistent with this effect being due to index funds wielding power through lower trading and not higher oversight. Finally, we document several important conceptual and empirical factors to consider when examining index fund ownership, compared to institutional-level holdings or changes in index constituents.
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Appendix
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Footnotes
2
An extensive stream of research has examined different aspects of index funds and institutions by following Bushee (1998), who classifies a subset of institutional investors as being “quasi-index institutions,” due to their “high diversification and low portfolio turnover” (p.311). This research often uses quasi-index institutional ownership to proxy for the amount of firms’ stock held by indexed or passive investors or funds. We discuss this literature and limitations with utilizing institutional ownership to proxy for index ownership in detail in Sect. 4.3.
 
3
For example, BlackRock discusses how “By definition, index funds generally have lower turnover since the stocks are traded almost exclusively to track the performance of the underlying index as closely as possible” and how this lower trading activity in turn lowers costs (BlackRock, 2017).
 
4
Prior literature indicates that managers may behave differently when given the option to have a “quiet life” due in part to lower engagement by owners or less competition (e.g., Zhao and Chen 2008). Index fund ownership increasing the likelihood of managers pursuing the “quiet life” is also consistent with our main results.
 
5
Index funds share the benefits of corporate governance and resulting broad market performance with other investors. Given that exercising corporate governance is costly and index funds have open access to the returns, an index fund acting independently in its own self-interest will not invest in corporate oversight due to the cost. This lack of investment could lead to a deterioration in market returns, similar to the tragedy of the commons.
 
6
Alternatively, some prior research has argued that the lack of an ability to exit can lead to increased incentives for index funds to exercise governance by voice (e.g., Appel et al. 2016; Schoenfeld 2017). This debate over whether diversified long-term investors provide more or less governance has been occurring for 30 years, with Porter (1992) arguing that fragmented ownership leaves diversified investors with little incentives to monitor firms while Monks and Minnow (1995) argue that, because trading ability may be limited, this will lead to stronger incentives to monitor management.
 
7
Fisch et al. (2019) argue: “Passive investors increasingly use their voting power as leverage to gain an audience with managers and directors at their portfolio companies to communicate their views and encourage changes” (p.48).
 
8
Bebchuk and Hirst (2019) find that 87–95% of Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street’s portfolio companies had no private engagement between 2017 and 2019, due to the relatively small size of their engagement and stewardship offices. State Street’s head of equity indexing has also publicly said that the company must be selective about its interactions with firms due to resource constraints (Lim 2019B).
 
9
Zhu (2020) finds that coverage and accuracy in the CRSP database surpasses coverage from Thomson Reuters. We confirm this by verifying the holdings information in CRSP for a random sample of ETFs and mutual funds.
 
10
We also exclude regulated industries (e.g., banks and utilities) for our annual financial reporting quality tests.
 
11
For example, CRSP classifies the MassMutual Premier Enhanced Index Growth Fund as being an “index-enhanced” fund (the same classification as many funds that track the S&P 500 Growth Index), despite it being an actively managed fund that seeks to “outperform the total return performance of its benchmark index, the Russell 1000 Growth Index.”
 
12
Fund classifications are available for download on Caleb Rawson’s website at https://​calebrawson.​com.
 
13
Due to the static nature of most indices, index funds buy the stock of a company when it is added to an index and hold it until the company is dropped from the index. One ramification of this is that the shares of a company held by index funds are effectively “locked up” and reduce the amount of a firm’s stock that is available to be traded at any given point in time (i.e., index funds decrease portfolio firms’ “effective” public float).
 
14
Deviations below 6.5% are almost exclusively due to firms having substantial private holdings unavailable for trading (leading to less public float), like Kraft-Heinz or Walmart.
 
15
As of Dec. 31, 2018, these two funds collectively held 0.1% of Microsoft (the largest firm in the index) and 0.1% of Switch Inc. (the smallest firm in the index), even though the market value of the Switch shares was substantially smaller.
 
16
As of June 2020, the combined market value of all Russell 2000 firms was approximately $4.2 trillion, which was less than the combined value of Apple, Microsoft, and Amazon.
 
17
Some research has found that inclusion in an index is associated with better governance decisions and more independent directors (Appel et al. 2016), more disclosure (Schoenfeld 2017), lower information asymmetry (Boone and White 2015), and better financing opportunities (Cao et al. 2019). Alternatively, Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) find evidence of worse investment decisions, more CEO power, and no change in the number of independent directors.
 
18
For example, the BlackRock Large Cap Core Fund is an active fund that selects its portfolio from “securities that at the time of purchase have a market capitalization within the range of companies included in the Russell 1000 index.”
 
19
These studies often limit the population of companies to a subset of firms around an index threshold to reduce endogeneity. However, it is not clear that this reduction in sample and generalizability is warranted. For instance, index providers exercise discretion in determining which firms are included in the index, even if the mechanical thresholds for inclusion are met (FTSE Russell 2019; S&P Dow Jones Indices 2019).
 
20
In 2017, Coco-Cola Bottling Co. (COKE) was added to the S&P 600 and experienced index fund ownership increasing from 8 to 15%. While this may seem like an exogenous shock to ownership, it came after a ~ 70% (~ 270%) stock return in the past two (four) years due, in large part, to the Coca-Cola Company (KO) restructuring bottling and distribution territories. From 2014 to 2016, COKE acquired 12 distribution territories and three manufacturing facilities, doubling its assets. Any results that we may attribute to the change in index fund ownership from 2016 to 2017 may instead be due to the change in operations or management decisions related to the expansion activities that influenced its inclusion in the S&P 600.
 
21
Examining changes in index fund ownership or using firm fixed effects isolates the within-firm variation in index fund ownership and results in firms that have been added or dropped from indices driving the results due to their high within group variation (Armstrong et al. 2022; Whited et al. 2021). Further, given our meet or beat sample is an incomplete panel dataset, with some firms having no variation in the dependent variable, the model does not lend itself to the use of firm fixed effects (Breuer and deHaan 2022).
 
22
This restricts our sample in these tests to firms with earnings surprises in the range of either -$0.03 to $0.02 (21,844 observations) or -$0.04 to $0.03 per share (29,016 observations).
 
23
In untabulated analysis, we follow Chen et al. (2018) and control for first-stage variables in the second stage and find consistent results.
 
24
Prior research has sometimes used both accruals and misstatements to proxy for lower financial reporting quality (e.g., Cassell et al. 2019b) based on the notion that management can use both accruals and misstatements to manage earnings. In contrast, we predict that accruals and misstatements will move in opposite directions because management has fewer incentives to manage earnings or invest in high quality financial reporting.
 
25
Conversations with a senior executive at BlackRock highlighted that fund managers can vote the shares they manage however they want and that this, at times, leads to BlackRock voting on both sides of the same issue.
 
26
This is principally due to large index fund providers, such as Vanguard and BlackRock, being classified as dedicated institutions while large active fund providers such as PIMCO are classified as quasi-index institutions. In untabulated analysis, we find that quasi-index institutional ownership is more strongly correlated with active fund ownership (0.78) than index fund ownership (0.45). The correlations become more divergent when restricting the sample only to S&P 1500 firms (0.63 with active fund ownership and − 0.09 for index fund ownership).
 
27
For example, Khan et al. (2017) say that “Quasi-indexers’ investment mandate limits their flexibility to “vote with their feet,” and thereby provides an incentive for them to influence managerial actions,” (p. 102) thus conflating Bushee’s definition of quasi-index institutions with index funds, and Hillegeist and Weng (2021) contend that the quasi-index designation “includes both pure index funds and actively managed diversified funds that benchmark indices,” (p.1) thus conflating fund level investment strategies with institution level classifications.
 
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Metadata
Title
The power of not trading: Evidence from index fund ownership
Authors
Caleb Rawson
Stephen P. Rowe
Publication date
01-12-2022
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Review of Accounting Studies / Issue 1/2024
Print ISSN: 1380-6653
Electronic ISSN: 1573-7136
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-022-09726-9

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