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2021 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

4. The Real Plan: The Successful Struggle to Consolidate Economic Governance

Author : Alejandro Angel

Published in: Consolidating Economic Governance in Latin America

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The Real Plan led to the control of hyperinflation in Brazil. The reforms underpinning the Brazilian struggle against inflation include privatization, trade liberalization, and monetary and fiscal reforms represented in the issue of a new currency, the Real. There were two elements that made possible the final consolidation of economic governance; first, after the Real Plan was implemented, there was a credible threat of hyperinflation. Second, there was a consensus on the political measures needed to address such threat. With this new set of policies in place, economic governance was consolidated since the possibilities for vested interests to affect the outcome of economic policies was substantially reduced. The complementarity between policies that helped to control hyperinflation illustrates a successful consolidation of economic governance.

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previous chapter Economic Governance in Latin America
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Footnotes
1
Edmar Bacha. Interview by the author. Rio de Janeiro. February 21, 2014. Bacha is a founding partner and Head of the Instituto de Estudos em Política Econômica/Casa das Garças. He was President of the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística—IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) during the Cruzado Plan in 1986. Later he was nominated as President of different institutions during the Real Plan.
 
2
Ferreira (2016) offers a discussion about the institutional evolution of the Treasury.
 
3
Franco (1999, 219–222) evaluates critically the relationship between development and inflation.
 
4
Indexation was used in salaries, exchange, taxes, financial contracts, and later in contracts in general (Franco 1999, 225). Indexation will be further discussed below.
 
5
Following the historical statistics compiled by the IBGE (1990, 186), the difference between January 1964 (23.992) and January 1965 (41.335) was 17.343 percentage points (January 1967 = 100). The increase in 1964 would have been 72.28%.
 
6
Although there were other measures introducing indexation in contracts, the abovementioned examples make reference to the ways of financing state activities, debt, and taxes.
 
7
The saying in Brazil was: “Sobrou mês no fim do salário” (There is plenty of month at the end of the salary).
 
8
These plans were: Cruzado, Cruzadinho (Little Cruzado), Cruzado II, Bresser, Arroz-com-feijão (Rice-and-beans), Verão (Summer), Collor I, and Collor II. Sometimes the first two are considered as only one, with an adjustment.
 
9
Paramount in the Brazilian technocracy was the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social—BNDES (National Development Bank), whose role will be further discussed below.
 
10
This decree created a special Commission composed of the Ministers of Planning, Finance, and Debureaucratization in charge of creating a list of businesses that could be sold to private interests. Its provisions were limited, as the president could decide if an enterprise was important for reasons of national security, because of state monopolies, in the interest of upholding basic social or economic infrastructure, or due to provisions allowing for national control of the development process.
 
11
Therefore, privatization responded to such demands with the aim of controlling the pace of the retreat of the state while simultaneously granting symbolic concessions to those groups.
 
12
Support for the campaign was based on a general support for representative government and the rule of law, and also because in a democratic regime business could better influence policy, in contrast to a situation in which bureaucrats favored foreign business (Skidmore 1988, 201).
 
13
The industries in which these companies acted were copper and steel mills, mining, ferroalloys, cellulose, and machinery (Velasco 2010, 317).
 
14
The founding of the Brazilian Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico—BNDE in 1952 was remarkably late, given its importance as a development bank. It was first founded to finance infrastructure projects and other long-term investments that the Brazilian government wanted to promote, such as metals, chemicals, and cement, among others (Musacchio and Lazzarini 2014, 84–86). However, soon, during the government of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1961), it became the financial instrument for the ambitious National Development Plan (Evans 1995, 61). The adjective “Social” was added during the 1980s in order to highlight the new scope in the bank’s activities relative to the development process (Schneider 1991b, 275 fn. 18).
 
15
However, a legitimate question would be whether the BNDES could decide on divestiture autonomously. During the transition to democracy, there was a high degree of continuity among the bureaucrats staffing the economic bureaucracy (Schneider 1991b, 230–233). Furthermore, financial profitability mattered to the bank because it had to pay for the use of the Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador—FAT (Worker’s Protection Fund), which the bank administers and on which it pays interests (Bernardino 2005). Autonomy and profitability might add to the reasons that the BNDES made a political decision that politicians were not ready to make themselves.
 
16
These were Usiba (Steel Mills of Bahía) and Cofavi (Vitória Iron and Steel).
 
17
Licínio Velasco Jr. Interview by the author. Rio de Janeiro. February 24, 2014. Velasco Jr. was the Chief of the Department of Privatization Services of the BNDES in 1999. He entered the bank through one of its subsidiaries in the 1970s and made his career in the BNDES bureaucracy; he completed a Master’s and a Ph.D. in Political Science at the Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro—IUPERJ (Institute for Advanced Research of Rio de Janeiro) in the 1990s and the early 2000s.
 
18
The relationship between BNDE(S) and steel goes back several decades (Schneider 1991b, 102–105).
 
19
Subsidies were the main aim of low prices of state-owned enterprises. These also applied when state-owned companies were forced to buy from local suppliers even if their product was more expensive.
 
20
Wiring and rolling mills, the main clients of the copper metallurgy—Caraíba Metais—asked for such a suspension, which represented a not-so-veiled attempt to maintain the status quo.
 
21
José Sarney was a member of Aliança Renovadora Nacional—ARENA (National Renovation Alliance), which supported the military regime. Following a long-standing tradition in Brazilian politics, Sarney defected from ARENA and joined the Partido Democrático Social—PDS (Democratic and Social Party), which was also pro-dictatorship, and then moved to the Partido Movimento Democrâtico Brasileiro—PMDB (Party of Brazilian Democratic Movement) in the last days of the military regime. Subsequently he became Vice-President under Tancredo Nêves through an indirect election held in 1985. However, as Nêves became severely ill and eventually died before taking office, it was Sarney who became the first President of the transition.
 
22
The constitution of 1967 established a six-year term but Tancredo had promised a four-year term, so Sarney asked for five years (Schneider 1991a, 28).
 
23
This is reminiscent of the argument of the insulated technocratic elite that can push through market reforms even if they are not popular (Armijo and Faucher 2002).
 
24
Among the economic measures taken by the new government, privatization ranked third in the list published after its inauguration (Faria 1990).
 
25
While his presidential campaign emphasized a position against the Marajás (Maharajas) of public agencies, once he was in office, the eliminated or transformed agencies lacked any political significance—with the exception of SIDERBRAS, which was already in crisis (Globo 1990).
 
26
Gustavo H. B. Franco. Interview by the author. Rio de Janeiro, March 13, 2014. Franco was President of the Central Bank, head of its International Directorate, and Deputy Secretary of Economic Policy of the Ministry of Finance. He is now Chief Strategy Officer of Rio Bravo Investimentos.
 
27
Schneider (1992, 234) translates the Portuguese word pulverização as “people’s capitalism.” “Atomization” is the preferred term.
 
28
These new owners included the savings trusts of public employees, notably that of Banco do Brasil employees with 15%; foundations belonging to other public enterprises, with 7.7%; and even public enterprises (Companhia Vale do Rio Doce—CVRD), with 15%, at the time. Their participation helped to neutralize claims that the state had retreated completely (Velasco 1999, 199 fn. 15).
 
29
Kingstone (2000, 193) suggests that privatization and de-indexation were “key parts of the effort to stimulate competitiveness in the private sector.” He argues that privatization sought to encourage investments and competitiveness instead of solving fiscal problems. However, this account ignores that, by legislation, revenue from privatization had to be used to pay public debts and, as discussed further below, many public bonds were accepted as “privatization currencies” or “privatization legal tenders.”
 
30
The package of Collor’s economic reforms in the aftermath of his inauguration created these certificates. Forcing investors into compulsory debt to finance fiscal deficits represented a lasting tradition in Brazil, from which the ORTN, discussed above, was a departure (Simonsen 1970, 184–185).
 
31
The Certificates of Privatization were one among many “privatization currencies” or “privatization legal tenders.” Because the legislation stated that privatization revenue was earmarked to pay for public debts, different securities served as legal tender to pay for privatized businesses (Velasco 1997, 27). Every security was transformed into a new one, discounted by the Treasury, to use as legal tender in privatizations or to sell in the secondary market. There were also “rotten currencies,” as the press called them: agrarian public debt of which no one was aware (Licínio Velasco Jr. Interview with the author. Rio de Janeiro. February 24, 2014).
 
32
Collor’s government tied the policies together against inflation with broader reforms such as privatization (Almeida 1999, 432). This represented a significant shift from the previous status of privatization in the public agenda. While this first effort was not successful, the complementarity between privatization and other reforms would later prove fundamental to stabilization, as will be further developed below.
 
33
Collor was suspended from office on September 29, 1992, resigning officially on December 29, just before being found guilty by the Senate of “Responsibility Crime,” i.e., administrative actions taken by a political agent that are contrary to the Constitution. This interregnum added more uncertainty to policymaking.
 
34
The uncertainty of having those reforms aborted is expressed in the literature on both privatization (Manzetti 1999, 168; Velasco 1997, 7) and commercial liberalization (Bonelli and Pinheiro 2008, 100; Pinheiro, Bonelli, and Schneider 2007, 81). It makes reference to the ideas of Itamar Franco on the role of the state in the economy, but the main reason for instability was probably the strongly negative view of Collor’s administration and its association with his corruption scandals.
 
35
Each privatization process demanded an evaluation from two different consulting firms hired through special procurement. This was intended to prevent accusations of inside trading on the part of the privatized enterprises or the BNDES, the privatization agent. The re-evaluations ordered by Itamar Franco thus showed his reservations about the process.
 
36
The biggest change was the composition of the tender used to make payments, now represented in current money and not only securities as with previous processes (Velasco 1997, 34).
 
37
Its mandate was “to investigate issues related to and caused by the implementation of the National Program for Privatization – PND” (my translation).
 
38
Força Sindical, commonly referred to as a Força (the Force), is a post-Soviet-era union with different priorities than those traditionally associated with labor unions (Rodrigues and Cardoso 2009).
 
39
This assumes that the international crisis does not affect consumption in Brazil. However, this is what happened around the world, including Brazil, as a consequence of the lockdowns during the pandemic of 2020.
 
40
Lamounier and Moura (1986) analyze the response to the oil shocks of the 1970s and their consequences.
 
41
Between 1981 and 1984, the accumulated devaluation of the Brazilian currency amounted to 1980% (CEPAL 2009, Appendix 5).
 
42
An important actor in this realm was the International Monetary Fund—IMF, whose policies did not always address the complexity of Brazil’s challenges. For a discussion of one such debate, see Bacha and Dornbusch (1983).
 
43
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira. Interview by the author. São Paulo. March 26, 2014. Bresser-Pereira is Emeritus Professor at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo. He was Finance Minister from April 29 to December 18, 1987, and Minister of Federal Administration (1995–1998).
 
44
Andre Lara Resende. Interview by the author. São Paulo. March 25, 2014. Resende is an Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University and founding partner of the Instituto de Estudos em Política Econômica/Casa das Garças. He taught economics at PUC-RJ, was a member of the board of directors of the Brazilian Central Bank, and was President of BNDES.
 
45
For details, see Kume, Piani, and Souza (2003, 20–22, Table 1).
 
46
For a discussion about Latin American populism, see Weyland (2001), and for its relation with neoliberalism, see Weyland (2003).
 
47
Frisch and Franco (1993, 27–32) provide an account of this.
 
48
Established by the Tratado de [Treaty of] Asunción (1991).
 
49
Kingstone (2004, 166) mentions that the Collor government excluded business from policy deliberations concerning trade liberalization, among other policies.
 
50
Puntigliano (2008) discusses the traditions of Brazilian foreign policy affecting the diplomatic corps.
 
51
The automotive industry enjoyed the maximum effective protection between 1987 and 1998 (Kume, Piani, and Souza 2003, 30ff).
 
52
Franco (2018, 466ff) provides a detailed account of pre-Real anti-inflationary plans, from both economic and legal points of view.
 
53
The larger debate was between those who preferred a gradualist approach to solving inflation while the economy continued to grow (the gradualistas or gradualists) and those who argued that inflation should be stopped through a shock treatment. Simonsen (1970) is a classic on this theme.
 
54
Transitional dynamics led Nêves to nominate a cabinet of compromise, with some of its members representing interests linked to the authoritarian government; after his passing, however, Sarney did not feel bounded by these compromises. The changes he made represented a departure from economic teams imbricated with the authoritarian regime and their interpretation of Brazilian inflation.
 
55
Its launch date was February 28, 1986, to start on March 1, surprising economic agents. It was thought that an unexpected shock would halt inflation. Further adjustments were made on July 24 and November 22. The latter was exactly one week after the general elections.
 
56
Modiano (1989, 357–365) offers details of the Cruzado Plan and its subsequent adjustments from an academic economist point of view, while Sardenberg (1987) provides a journalistic version. Modiano (1987) and Carneiro (1987) provide detailed contemporary analyses.
 
57
There were two more stabilization plans during Sarney’s government. First, there was Feijão-com-Arroz (Beans-with-rice)—a reference to the simplicity of the recipe—which consisted of a tighter monetary policy, expenses reduction, and better indexation. Second, there was the Verão (Summer) Plan, which consisted of a new monetary reform and a combination of measures, like those of Feijão-com-Arroz, as well as more heterodox ones that aimed to eliminate existing indexes that were creating inertial inflation. However, while this plan lasted throughout 1989, it was quietly abandoned and the government merely administered hyperinflation until the new government took office in March 15, 1990 (Modiano 1989, 375–381). These stabilization plans are not presented in detail because they did not have significant legacies in terms of policy-learning and were generally perceived as simply the administration of hyperinflation.
 
58
See note 8 for the succession of anti-inflationary plans.
 
59
It represented a major political cost for the government because it sowed resentment among some sectors of society and empowered the opposition that would eventually lead Collor’s impeachment process.
 
60
His nomination signaled the support of significant parts of the Brazilian political system, both partisan and non-partisan.
 
61
It brings to mind a description of critical junctures: “a situation in which the structural (that is, economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on political action are significantly relaxed for a relatively short period” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 343).
 
62
In Congress, there was also a Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito—CPI (Parliamentary Commission for Inquiry) investigating corruption surrounding the congressional budget definition, known as the scandal of the Budget Dwarfs because of the short stature of the presumably benefiting congressmen.
 
63
Edmar Bacha. Interview by the author. Rio de Janeiro. February 21, 2014.
 
64
Abrucio (1994) discusses the importance of governors within the Brazilian political system.
 
65
The price freeze during the Cruzado Plan created the false expectation that no further actions were required to control inflation, e.g., fiscal adjustment, liberalization, etc. Their absence was crucial to its failure.
 
66
Edmar Bacha. Interview by the author. Rio de Janeiro. February 21, 2014.
 
67
This paragraph relies on Franco (1995).
 
68
Special presidential decree. It remains valid for three months and Congress has to approve it to become an Act, otherwise it has to be reinstituted to remain valid.
 
69
On the PSDB, see Roma (2002).
 
70
In my interviews with them, both Edmar Bacha and André Lara Resende refer to the paramount importance of Cardoso for the success of the plan. His prestige garnered the respect and support from the president and the political system, as well as intellectual respect from the members of his team.
 
71
Edmar Bacha. Interview by the author. Rio de Janeiro. February 21, 2014.
 
72
The Complementary Act No. 64 establishes that a person cannot be a presidential candidate if he or she has been a minister in the six months preceding the election date.
 
73
The Programa de Estímulo à Reestruturação e ao Fortalecimento do Sistema Financeiro Nacional—PROER (Stimulus Program to Restructuring and Strengthening of the National Financial System) was created to handle the bankruptcy of private banks.
 
74
This competition changed the productive structure of the country significantly. It involved many industries, though not all (Barros and Goldenstein 2000, 12).
 
75
Edmar Bacha. Interview by the author. Rio de Janeiro. February 21, 2014.
 
76
Economic authorities changed over the years, mainly because people asked for voluntary resignation. Key posts remained the same, however. People who had already participated, for instance, as Director of the Central Bank could become President of the same institution. Broadly speaking the economic authorities consisted of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, the President and some Directors of the Central Bank, the President of the BNDES, and other members of the government acting as counselors. They were all commanded by the President when a political decision was unavoidable.
 
77
Cardoso (2006, 377–398, 406–413) describes these debates at various moments of his first government (1995–1998).
 
78
Telebrás was the holding, operating one company per state.
 
79
These included the removal of its strategic character (8th Constitutional Amendment) in August 1995, its correspondent legal development (Act 9295), which created a regulatory agency in July 1996, and finally (Act 9472), in July 1997, market regulations and general guidelines for the privatization of public enterprises acting in the telecommunications sector (Velasco 2005, 56–59).
 
80
From 1996 to 1998 the revenues from privatization amounted to more than 35 billion USD, with 22.6 billion alone in 1996 (Manzetti 1999, 171–172).
 
81
The total revenue of the privatization of the Telebrás system were BRL 22.05 billion at the end of July 1998. Foreign resources were equivalent to BRL 15.8 billion (USD 13.6 billion) or 60% of the total (Dalmazo 2000, 211). Manzetti (1999, 217) puts the amount as 75% of USD 19 billion, which is 14.25 billion.
 
82
Edmar Bacha. Interview by the author. Rio de Janeiro. February 21, 2014.
 
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Metadata
Title
The Real Plan: The Successful Struggle to Consolidate Economic Governance
Author
Alejandro Angel
Copyright Year
2021
Book
Consolidating Economic Governance in Latin America

Print ISBN: 978-3-030-64521-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-64522-9

Copyright Year: 2021

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64522-9_4