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Towards an Arithmetical Logic

The Arithmetical Foundations of Logic

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About this book

This book offers an original contribution to the foundations of logic and mathematics and focuses on the internal logic of mathematical theories, from arithmetic or number theory to algebraic geometry. Arithmetical logic is the term used to refer to the internal logic of classical arithmetic, here called Fermat-Kronecker arithmetic and combines Fermat’s method of infinite descent with Kronecker’s general arithmetic of homogeneous polynomials. The book also includes a treatment of theories in physics and mathematical physics to underscore the role of arithmetic from a constructivist viewpoint. The scope of the work intertwines historical, mathematical, logical and philosophical dimensions in a unified critical perspective; as such, it will appeal to a broad readership from mathematicians to logicians, to philosophers interested in foundational questions. Researchers and graduate students in the fields of philosophy and mathematics will benefit from the author’s critical approach to the foundations of logic and mathematics.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Introduction: The Internal Logic of Arithmetic
Abstract
The idea of an internal logic of arithmetic or arithmetical logic is inspired by a variety of motives in the foundations of mathematics. The development of mathematical logic in the twentieth century, from Hilbert to the contemporary scene, could be interpreted as a continuous tread leading to arithmetical logic. Arithmetization of analysis with Cauchy, Weierstrass and Dedekind and arithmetization of algebra with Kronecker have lead to the foundational inquiries initiated by Hilbert. Frege’s logical foundations of mathematics, mainly arithmetic, have contributed to clarify philosophical motives and although Frege’s logicism has not achieved its goals, it has given birth to Russell’s theory of types and to some extent to Zermelo’s set-theoretic cumulative hierarchy while launching philosophical logic and philosophy of language. But the “arithmetism” I have in mind here is mostly anti-Fregean in that in turns logicism upside down and asks the question: “how far can we go into logic with arithmetic alone” rather than the Fregean question: “how far can we go into arithmetic with deductive logic alone?” It is Kronecker’s polynomial arithmetic that guides here and the purpose of this book is to see how far a Kroneckian constructivist program can go in the arithmetization (and algebraization) of logic in the twenty-first century. The present work has been conceived has a sequel to my 2002 book Internal Logic, Foundations of Mathematics from Kronecker to Hilbert (Kluwer) and as a continuation of my efforts towards an arithmetical logic.
Yvon Gauthier
Chapter 2. Arithmetization of Analysis and Algebra
Abstract
Arithmetization of analysis evokes at once the names of Cauchy, Weierstrass, Cantor and Dedekind and to a lesser degree those of Dirichlet, Abel or Bolzano; the process of arithmetization illustrates the need to instill rigour in analysis through what Cauchy called algebraic analysis in order to overcome the intuitive limitations of the geometer’s method of proof. The story of arithmetization needs not to be retold here (see Grattan-Guinness 1970); it is not a one-sided history, for rigour had a different meaning then and the tools used for rigorization (e.g. quadratic forms or homogeneous polynomials) were partly available in the nineteenth century. The algebraic symbolism (Descartes, Fermat and Leibniz) was already invading geometry and number theory (Diophantine equations) from Fermat on was to become the queen of arithmetical sciences.
Yvon Gauthier
Chapter 3. Arithmetization of Logic
Abstract
Hilbert is not the originator of the expression “metamathematics”, but he is the first to define it as the theory of formal systems designed to capture the internal logic (“inhaltliche Logik”) of mathematics and it is the internal logic of arithmetic, what I call arithmetical logic, that was to be his primary concern.
Yvon Gauthier
Chapter 4. Kronecker’s Foundational Programme in Contemporary Mathematics
Abstract
A few important mathematicians have emphasized Kronecker’s influence on contemporary mathematics, among them, first and foremost Weil (1976, 1979a) has stressed the fact that Kronecker is the founder of modern algebraic geometry and Edwards (1987a,b, 1992) after Weyl (1940) has insisted on Kronecker’s pioneering work in algebraic number theory (divisor theory). Bishop (1970) has admitted in his work on the computational (or numerical) content of classical analysis that his enterprise was more in line with Kronecker than with Brouwer. Brouwer himself paid tribute to Kronecker—as did Poincaré and Hadamard—for his contribution to the fixed point theorems (see Gauthier 2009a).
Yvon Gauthier
Chapter 5. Arithmetical Foundations for Physical Theories
Abstract
The notion of analytical apparatus was introduced in the paper by Hilbert, Nordheim and von Neumann (1928) ≪ Über die Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik ≫ : The analytical apparatus <der analytische Apparat> is simply the mathematical formalism or the set of logico-mathematical structures of a physical theory. Von Neumann used the notion extensively in his 1932 seminal work on the mathematical foundations of Quantum Mechanics and he stressed particularly the auxiliary notion of conditions of reality <Realitätsbedingungen>. I want to show that this last notion corresponds grosso modo to our notion of model in contemporary philosophy of physics. Hermann Weyl, who has initiated group theory in Quantum Mechanics (1928), also exploited the idea in his conception of the parallelism between a mathematical formalism and its physical models.
Yvon Gauthier
Chapter 6. The Internal Logic of Constructive Mathematics
Abstract
Mathematical constructivism could be summarized by the phrase: “Arithmetical statements proven by analytical means can be proven without them, that is by elementary non-analytical means”. Herbrand expressed the idea clearly in the 1920s. It was repeated recently by H. Friedman, following Avigad (2003). The classical example in this connection is Dirichlet who proved in 1837 the prime number theorem and the theorem on arithmetical progressions by analytical means; the elementary proofs were provided only in 1949 by Selberg and Erdös. A less known example is the 1933 Gel’fond-Schneider theorem for which Gel’fond gave a constructive version in the 1960s. I give here a brief account of the theorem and its foundational implications.
Yvon Gauthier
Chapter 7. The Internal Consistency of Arithmetic with Infinite Descent: A Syntactical Proof
Abstract
The question of the consistency or non-contradiction of arithmetic is a philosophical question, that is the certainty of a mathematical theory and it has become a logical problem requiring a mathematical solution. It is Hilbert who has put the original question and who has attempted a first answer. Having demonstrated in 1899 the consistency of elementary geometry on the basis of a consistent arithmetic of real numbers, he turned to the question of that arithmetic (the second problem of his 1900 list) which included besides the axiom of elementary arithmetic an axiom of continuity, i.e. the Archimedean axiom with syntactic completeness. Hilbert introduces functionals, that is second-order functions or functions of functions, in order the use induction over the ordinals. Transfinite induction proved successful in the hands of Gentzen, and thereafter Gödel’s second incompleteness results which aimed to show that Peano’s arithmetic cannot contain its own consistency.
Yvon Gauthier
Chapter 8. Conclusion: Arithmetism Versus Logicism or Kronecker Contra Frege
Abstract
I understand arithmetical philosophy on the model of Russell’s mathematical philosophy as an internal examination of arithmetical concepts—in the case of Russell, the internal examination of logical and general mathematical concepts (Russell 1919). From the mathematical point of view, Kronecker’s general arithmetic could be seen as a successor to Newton’s Arithmetica Universalis in the sense that both Newton and Kronecker wanted to integrate algebra into a general or universal arithmetic. The two texts “On the concept of number” (Kronecker 1887a,b) and his last lectures in Berlin “On the concept of number in mathematics” (see the German text edited by Boniface and Schappacher 2001) summarize Kronecker’s conception of number or whole number (integer).
Yvon Gauthier
Backmatter
Metadata
Title
Towards an Arithmetical Logic
Author
Yvon Gauthier
Copyright Year
2015
Electronic ISBN
978-3-319-22087-1
Print ISBN
978-3-319-22086-4
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22087-1

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