4.4.1 German Policies for Science Cooperation Versus Policies for Development Cooperation
Transnational research cooperation between partners in the Global North and the Global South touches the political fields of both development policy and science policy. The German case provides an empirical illustration of the importance of the specific political framework of research cooperation between the Global North and South, which determines its potential effects. Although countries differ in view of their political institutions—and the findings therefore cannot be generalised—the separation of policy fields into science policy, on the one hand, and development policy, on the other, can be commonly observed. Along the German example, I argue that the coherence of science policy and development policy objectives on the country level might benefit from a closer focus of global governance mechanisms on the role of research cooperation between the Global South and North—and that it is therefore a worthwhile scientific endeavour to analyse the political context in different national political set-ups.
In the German context, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) is the largest provider of public funds for research
cooperation between German researchers and partners in the Global South. Decisively setting the course of cooperation, the policies for research
cooperation with developing countries or emerging economies
are a field of science policy
and not the policies of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The same division of responsibilities
holds true in the European Union (EU), which funds research cooperation between EU member states and developing countries and emerging economies
within its Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, which is currently Horizon 2020 (BMBF
2008; European Commission
2015). In other European countries, such as Switzerland and France, the policies and funding for research
cooperation are the shared responsibilities
of both the ministries of science
as well as the ministries of development cooperation (Institut de recherche pour le développement
2012; KFPE
2013).
In view of funding research
cooperation with the Global South, the BMBF provides the largest amount of public funding in Germany. BMBF expenditures for cooperation with BRICS
countries alone amounted to approximately €47 million in 2012 (BMBF
2014b). In view of BMBF funding for cooperation with other countries of the Global South, the only numbers available were those reported as official development assistance
(ODA) expenditures, which increased from €112.7 million in 2012 (BMZ
2013) to €149.9 million in 2015 (Bohnet et al.
2018). Quite likely, these figures include activities of cooperation in education as well as research
. Other official sources state that between 2011 and 2015, the BMBF allocated €206 million to cooperation with African partner countries (18. German Federal Parliament
2017). The BMBF’s Subdepartment for Sustainability
, Climate, Energy has the longest tradition of cooperating with countries of the Global South—both on a political level as well as in funding cooperative research
. As with other BMBF research programmes, its framework programme Research for Sustainability Development (FONA) is primarily dedicated to supporting German researchers. Nevertheless, in the scope of the programme, many initiatives for cooperation between Germany and the Global South have been funded. The importance given to the international dimension of sustainability
and environmental issues is shown in the high amount of expenditures for inter- and transnational cooperation, which amounted to 20 per cent of the total funds of FONA, €100 million per year, from 2010 to 2014 (Fischer and Mennicken
2013). Larger funding initiatives for research
cooperation with partners in the Global South include funding initiatives on Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) (BMBF
2004a) and sustainable Megacities (BMBF
2004b), as well as the establishment of two Regional Climate Science Service Centres in Western and Southern Africa in 2010, now in their second funding phases (BMBF
2019).
The BMZ funds activities within higher education and research
, including individual scholarships and university partnerships
for science
management, with approximately €50 million per year (18. German Federal Parliament
2017). The BMZ’s policies for research
cooperation, as part of the development policy portfolio, are often coupled with (higher) education (BMZ
2015). BMZ programmes instead target infrastructural measures and capacity development
in the higher education sector. For example, the BMZ supports cooperation with higher education institutions in developing countries, aligning curricula to job market demands, sharpening research
profiles, and fostering internationalisation
. In addition, the BMZ funds some research through intermediary organisations, such as the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). For example, funded through the BMZ, the DAAD and GIZ cooperated with the Commission of the African Union to set up the Pan African University’s Institute of Water and Energy Sciences. Aiming at fostering higher education, science
, and technological development across Africa, the Pan African University established new institutes at existing research
centres in addition to educating postgraduates as well as PhD candidates and conducting applied research (German Academic Exchange Service
2016; Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
2016). Distinguishing more specifically between funding for higher education and funding for research
, as such, shows that although higher education is funded comprehensively within the BMZ’s portfolio, compared to other sources of research cooperation funding—and also compared to the BMZ’s overall expenditures—its funds for research-related activities are small (BMBF
2014b).
4.4.2 Coherence of German Science Policy and Development Policy
Next to the source of funding for research cooperation between partners of the Global North and the Global South, the policy objectives of different ministries also vary. In view of the policies for research cooperation, the different institutional and discursive frameworks of the BMBF and the BMZ influence the objectives, mode, and target groups of cooperation. This is essential, also in view of policy coherence for development.
The BMBF, as such, is not primarily aimed at international policy-making, but rather focusses on the German national context in its policies and funding measures. Nevertheless, international cooperation
is part of its policy spectrum. Across its departments, the BMBF funds international research
cooperation within the scope of different strategies, within different funding initiatives, with different partner countries, on different topics, and with different objectives (BMBF
2014c). The motivation for funding research
cooperation with developing and emerging countries is
not predominantly a concern for global sustainable development. It is of equal importance to foster German interests, such as positioning Germany as a player on future markets or contributing to technology exports (Schwachula
2019).
7
To ensure policy coherence
, ministries are legally obliged to cooperate with the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries (Cabinet of Germany
2011). At the same time, the German constitution grants a high degree of autonomy
to each ministry, which counteracts coherence
. In this sense, the fate of the Internationalisation
Strategy (BMBF
2008,
2016), which was issued by the BMBF but is inter-ministerial in scope, and the International Cooperation Action Plan (BMBF
2014a) is illustrative. Although on paper the documents set an overarching framework for funding international cooperation
in education and research
across the entire German government, the documents are not binding.
In addition, policy coherence is endangered by rivalries between ministries. Instead of viewing ministries as non-political entities of administration, the relations between the BMBF and the BMZ illustrate that policy-makers also defend their political turf, especially when policy fields overlap. Policies, programmes, and funding measures are the outcomes of previous processes of policy-making, and therefore they are the products of knowledge politics, of strategic or coincidental integration, or the inclusion of different actors in the policy process. They are subject to bureaucratic rules and regulations and coined by pre-existing norms, values, and beliefs, which finally crystallise in policies.
I argue that the causes of incoherent policies lie within the different logics and perspectives on cooperation with the Global South. Neither the processes of policy-making nor policy outcomes are reconciled, as the BMBF aims to maintain its own political autonomy
, whereas the BMZ is not in a position to prescribe policy coherence
for development (Schwachula
2019). Despite distancing itself from the policy rationales of the BMZ, however, the BMBF is able to report some of its activities as ODA
, contributing 0.9 per cent of the German ODA quota, which ranked it fourth among the German federal ministries in 2015 (Bohnet et al.
2018).
4.4.3 Global Governance of Science for Sustainable Development
More traditional types of development cooperation are defined, negotiated, and aligned on the global level in view of their modes of cooperation, thematic responsibilities, and development targets, such as the SDGs. Hence, global governance structures are in place for development cooperation. In contrast to other types of cooperation, however, science cooperation between the Global North and South has received little attention in global governance and is barely regulated. Thus, research cooperation is nationally and internationally mostly “ungoverned”, which is surprising in view of its high potential as a type of cooperation conducive to sustainable development and the SDGs, in particular. The existing institutions and norms of (sustainable) development on the global scale curiously still have not put North-South research cooperation into the spotlight.
International development agreements such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, its follow-up Accra Agenda for Action (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
[OECD]
2008), the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (OECD
2011), and the following GPEDC
set an overarching framework for national policies, such as the development policy of the BMZ, as well as for non-state action.
In contrast to development policy, the BMBF’s science policy
, which is directed at transnational cooperation, is
not bound to fulfilling international agreements relating to sustainable development, such as the 2030 Agenda
and its SDGs
. Thus, international development targets and agreements are of subordinate importance for the political framing of science
cooperation between the Global North and the Global South. BMBF funding for research
on sustainable development, in cooperation with partners from the Global South,
may be reported as part of German ODA
—but it does not
have to be. The BMBF could use at least part of its resources
to fund entirely different research
activities. International political agreements in the context of the G20 rarely address the role of science cooperation for sustainable development (Cabinet of Germany
2018).
Separate international and global policies or governance mechanisms for transnational research
partnerships
between the Global North and the Global South, as an equivalent to development cooperation, do not exist. In view of principles of cooperation and their conduciveness to sustainable development, transnational research
cooperation in practice often takes place outside of global agreements. The 2030 Agenda
, as such, does not specifically conceptualise knowledge
or science
cooperation as a contribution to development cooperation. In its portrayal of knowledge for development, the document remains ambiguous and vague. Although it portrays the SDGs
as global, encompassing concerns, science
is mainly portrayed in view of its economic viability, for example through technology development. Although SDG target 17.6 specifically calls for science cooperation—including North-South
, South-South, and triangular cooperation—it only relates to technology development. Next to technology development, the 2030 Agenda
specifically refers to the accompanying task of research
, such as developing indicators and monitoring implementation. In the agenda, the institutionalisation
of an online platform for information on existing science
and technology initiatives is called for (however, such a platform was only available in a test version at the time of research
) (UN
2018a). Institutions surrounding the 2030 Agenda
, such as the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), and the voluntary national reviews
rely on scientific data
collection for the SDGs
. Results of a yearly UN-convened Multi-stakeholder Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation for the Sustainable Development Goals
are fed into the HLPF (UN
2018b). The UN additionally mandates an international group of scientists with elaborating a science-based Global Sustainable Development Report for strengthening science-policy interfaces (UN
2018c).
Beyond technology development and accompanying research
on sustainable development, however, the 2030 Agenda
, as such, does not refer to transnational research cooperation
as a beneficial type of partnership for encompassing sustainable development. Target 17.16, on multi-stakeholder partnerships
, makes no reference to science
, or to different types of knowledge
at all (UN
2015). Cummings et al. therefore conclude “that there is a mismatch between the transformative vision and strategy within the SDGs
and the non-transformative nature of the means of implementation
and the goals and targets” and call for a more inclusive, pluralist perspective on knowledge
for development (Cummings et al.
2018, p. 738).
The development-related agreements, institutions, and norms
established by the members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) do not cover the role of science
, as such—more specifically, they also do not adequately cover the role of research
cooperation between partners of the Global North and South. The Paris Declaration (2005) does not allude to science or research at all. The Accra Agenda for Action mentions research institutes only in the context of taking “an active role in dialogue on development policy and on the role of aid in contributing to countries’ development objectives” (OECD
2008, p. 16). The Busan Partnership Agreement, while highlighting the role of new actors
in cooperation and alluding to the importance of knowledge
, does not consider the role of science
beyond its role of monitoring and assessing the performance of development institutions (OECD
2011). Following up on the Busan Partnership Agreement, the GPEDC
, as a shared initiative between the UN and the OECD, aims at effective partnerships
for reaching the 2030 Agenda
. It is based on four principles: joint ownership
, focus on results, inclusive development
partnerships
, transparency
and accountability (OECD and UNDP
2019). Although it promotes a “whole of society approach to development”, the role of cooperation with research
is neglected, whereas multi-stakeholder partnerships
with civil society organisations and the private sector are specifically encouraged.
The GPEDC
attributes a substantial role to monitoring, data
, and evidence, and thus to research
accompanying the implementation of the GPEDC’s objectives (OECD
and UNDP
2019). The GPEDC also acknowledges
the important role of knowledge for development. As an objective, the work programme of 2017/2018 stated that knowledge sharing
should be enabled by “[b]ringing together the learning, knowledge and technology available across constituencies to help scale development solutions at a faster pace” (GPEDC
2017, p. 5). Aiming at developing into a knowledge-sharing
hub for development actors on different levels, the GPEDC
also established an online knowledge
platform as a “one-stop shop to evidence-based solutions, peer learning and networking to advance the effectiveness of all development efforts, for achievement of national priorities and the SDGs
” (GPEDC
2019). However, researchers are not among the listed social actors for cooperating in development, nor is science
included as a topic of discussion in view of its potential benefits.
The neglect of research
cooperation in development norms
and partnerships
is mirrored in the low levels of research funding officially reported as ODA
, although the OECD
Development Assistance Committee’s
(DAC) reporting directives for ODA actually would allow research
activities to be reported as ODA
:
Research includes financing by the official sector, whether in the donor country or elsewhere, of research into the problems of developing countries. This may be either (i) undertaken by an agency or institution whose main purpose is to promote the economic growth
or welfare of developing countries, or (ii) commissioned or approved, and financed or part-financed, by an official body from a general purpose institution with the specific aim of promoting the economic growth
or welfare of developing countries. (OECD-DAC
Working Party on Development Finance Statistics
2018, p. 30)
Interestingly, thus, the OECD
reporting guidelines deviate from the GPEDC’s
discourse by specifically mentioning research
as a means of ODA
. For both GPEDC documents as well as 2030 Agenda
documents, it holds true that—beyond a very general reference to research for development, that is, research
on the problems of the Global South, or technology-oriented research and innovation
8—none of the documents or knowledge
platforms suggest any rules or guidelines on the role of research, as such, or on principles of cooperation in transnational research
. Accordingly, neither topics, nor principles, nor modes, nor partner regions of cooperation are regulated—none are incentivised, none are forbidden. Potentially, any researchers from the Global North may decide to cooperate with partners in the Global South on almost any given topic, in any given mode—and potentially also report it as ODA
.
I argue that it is worthwhile to scrutinise the gaps in global governance for research cooperation between partners in the Global South and North, as they may aggravate policy incoherence on the national level. The example of Germany illustrates that, without informal agreements or formal rules on the international or global level, science policy for international cooperation may pursue objectives that are detached from—and potentially even run contrary to—those of development policy. In addition, the lack of detailed criteria for reporting science cooperation may have detrimental effects: In practice, this leads to research partnerships that are reported as ODA while not meeting the partnership principles agreed upon, as I elaborate below.
In appraising the absence of regulations and norms
—both formal and informal—for transnational research
cooperation, the concept of freedom of research has to be taken into account, a freedom that is granted to research in most democratic national constitutions in the Global North as well as the Global South. Some philosophers of science
even perceive the autonomy
of science as being the crucial element of ensuring its creativity and productivity (Polanyi
2000). In the science
systems of most countries, science policy
enables curiosity-driven, autonomous research
, while also guiding research towards specific societal aims.
Science is thus promoted as a means of reaching an objective
beyond science
, within other parts of society (Sarewitz et al.
2004; Sarewitz and Pielke
2007). In consequence, research
cooperation is never entirely free of being governed. Research on some topics or locations is restricted or enabled by certain rules: For example, ethical principles for medical research
, aimed at protecting the rights and lives of research participants, are internationally agreed upon (World Health Organization
2019). On topics such as nuclear research
, transnational research cooperation
is restricted due to security
issues, for example, between EU countries and Iran (DLR Project Management Agency
2019).
However, governing science
does not always imply that it is restricted. Conventions, rules, and norms
may also
enable or incentivise certain types of science or research
cooperation. For example, in an attempt to enable scientific cooperation, the Arctic Council issued an agreement on research cooperation in and on the Arctic (Arctic Council
2017). In this light, global agreements may help guide transnational research
cooperation between the Global South and the Global North towards becoming more conducive to sustainable development.
An explicit normative framework for research cooperation on the global level entailing principles of fair and successful cooperation, such as partnership, ownership, and benefit-sharing, might enhance policy coherence in, for example, the German case, where national science policies for transnational cooperation with the Global South are not aligned with policies for sustainable development. The field of science policy, even if it is oriented towards transnational cooperation with the Global South, is untouched by any global norms or regulations, thus it is open to deviations from globally agreed targets. In the German context, the bargaining power of actors within the BMBF, who pursue development-oriented targets of research policy, may be strengthened by integrating science cooperation among Northern and Southern partners more explicitly into the global development agenda. It would provide additional global legitimation for research policies targeting global development, which often compete against nationally oriented policy rationales. A focus on research partnerships on the global agenda might also strengthen the position of the BMZ or comparable development ministries where it concerns the enforcement of policy coherence of other political fields with developmental objectives.
The process of the policy design of older German funding initiatives for international cooperation
, such as the IWRM initiative (BMBF
2004a) and the Megacities initiative (BMBF
2004b), illustrates why gaps in global governance
mechanisms, in view of transnational research
, may have detrimental effects. Both funding measures were aimed at cooperation with different partner countries in the Global South, ranging from Namibia, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Brazil, Iran, and Peru to South Africa, among others. Despite their international focus, the funding programmes were unilaterally designed by the BMBF according to German research interests, and in the case of the IWRM initiative, also according to German business interests.
9 They were
not co-designed or co-financed by partner countries. Hence, this exclusion of Southern partners in setting agendas and designing cooperation policies ran contrary to any principles of ownership
and partnership, as specified in the GPEDC
. Furthermore, the mode of agenda-setting
as well as the funding modalities, which only allowed for minimal funds for Southern researchers, had severe consequences for the transnational research
projects implemented. Effects ranged from practical problems, such as finding funding for researchers in the Southern partner country, to the ethical problem of repeating old patterns of cooperation between well-paid foreign experts and local researchers as mere recipients of knowledge
—and in some cases the effects led to promoting technologies as a solution at the expense of social or other types of innovation (Schwachula
2019). Despite this mismatch with norms
for development cooperation, research
cooperation projects such as those in the IWRM and Megacities funding initiatives were reported as ODA
. This phenomenon is not restricted to Germany; similar criticism has been voiced in view of the British Global Challenges Research Fund for not supporting equitable partnerships
, despite being reported as ODA (Fransman and Newman
2019).
More recent science cooperation funding, such as the BMBF’s German–African Regional Science Service Centres, offers examples of more inclusive agenda-setting and policy design. During the creation of these centres, the BMBF and the governments of Southern and West African countries negotiated on topics and funding before the large-scale projects were initiated in 2010. These projects were reported as ODA and also complied with internationally agreed partnership principles of development cooperation. This, however, was a lucky coincidence of voluntary alignment and cannot be attributed to a steering effect of the global governance framework, as such.