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2019 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Triggerflow: Regression Testing by Advanced Execution Path Inspection

Authors : Iaroslav Gridin, Cesar Pereida García, Nicola Tuveri, Billy Bob Brumley

Published in: Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Cryptographic libraries often feature multiple implementations of primitives to meet both the security needs of handling private information and the performance requirements of modern services when the handled information is public. OpenSSL, the de-facto standard free and open source cryptographic library, includes mechanisms to differentiate the confidential data and its control flow, including run-time flags, designed for hardening against timing side-channels, but repeatedly accidentally mishandled in the past. To analyze and prevent these accidents, we introduce Triggerflow, a tool for tracking execution paths that, assisted by source annotations, dynamically analyzes the binary through the debugger. We validate this approach with case studies demonstrating how adopting our method in the development pipeline would have promptly detected such accidents. We further show-case the value of the tooling by presenting two novel discoveries facilitated by Triggerflow: one leak and one defect.

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Title: Triggerflow: Regression Testing by Advanced Execution Path Inspection
Authors: Iaroslav Gridin
Cesar Pereida García
Nicola Tuveri
Billy Bob Brumley
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Book: Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-22037-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-22038-9

Copyright Year: 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22038-9_16

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