U.S. Leadership in a World of Uncertainties

Since the end of the Second World War and the brief unipolar moment that followed, the U.S. has assumed (and claimed) leadership over the world—at least over the “free world.” Sometimes analyzed as hegemony or as empire, this work offers a definition of leadership that is related to, but distinct from these concepts. It relies on the full range of American power in foreign affairs, including attractive “soft” power and traditional military and economic might. The ongoing discussion of leadership by American policymakers confronts a world that is ever-changing and in which this leadership is increasingly challenged. That U.S. leadership is weaker today in many ways than after the Cold War or after the Second World War is only further reason to explore the complexities of American foreign policy that in many ways is facing limits, new and old, but continues to retain special advantages. In an uncertain and crisis-filled world, assessing U.S. leadership is critical for understanding American policy, and global international relations.

The terms of American liberal internationalism were sketched out by President Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and given life at the end of the Second World War. Washington’s hegemonic leadership assured a wide range of multilateral institutions providing for the collective defense of the trans-Atlantic democracies and the increasing openness to each other of their national economies. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new form of American liberal internationalism materialized, one far more offensive, reflecting the vaunted “primacy” of “the unipolar moment.” With the occupation of Afghanistan beginning late in 2001, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and support for the Arab Spring opening in 2011, Washington’s policies metamorphized into imperialism with the claim that its expanding dominion would foster a democratic peace. The presidency of Donald J. Trump (2017–2021) was basically a repudiation of the terms of liberalism in all its guises. The presidency of Joe Biden (2021-) promises to mark a return to liberal internationalism. But with what program in mind? It is the emphasis on domestic changes meant to buttress liberal internationalism that could make this period innovative.

Ever since the turn of the last century, U.S. statesmen have insisted emphatically, loudly, and with great consistency that it is America’s destiny to be a Pacific power. Since World War II, they have insisted that America’s destiny called for the United States to assume a historically necessary role as the dominant power in and the leader of the Asia–Pacific region. Only Washington, according to this now well-worn script, could provide and maintain the regional peace, order, and stability needed for the states and societies of the Asia–Pacific region to thrive. That a hegemonic position in that region served American strategic and economic purposes has always been a given. Yet top U.S. officials have often publicly framed the nation’s role in selfless terms, emphasizing responsibilities more than interests. This essay highlights the continuities, and occasional discontinuities, in America’s aspirational—and actual—dominance in the Asia–Pacific region, looking broadly at the period from 1900 to the present. It ends with an examination of the challenges to American regional preeminence posed by the humiliating defeat in Indochina and, even more fundamentally, by the current rise of China and the unprecedented challenges it poses to American aspirations for continued regional dominance.

United States’ involvement in the Middle East started at the end of World War I with President Woodrow Wilson’s participation in the Paris Peace Conference and deepened in the 1930s as the result of the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia. But what started as a simple policy—the United States would buy oil from Saudi Arabia and in return make itself grantor of its security, became increasingly complicated. France and Britain, the two colonial powers that had controlled the region, increasingly renounced their role. The Middle East became more complex and unpredictable, as the new countries created after World War I started acting independently and old ones also freed themselves from European tutelage. The United States found they had to deal with Arab nationalist regime’s intent on regaining control of their country’s resources, in particular oil, competing with the Soviet Union for influence and dealing with the rising threat of radical Islamic movements. Washington approached the region in an imperial fashion, trying to reorganize it and occasionally remake its regimes to suit its views and needs. It was a complex game with many moving parts and the United States suffered many setbacks over the years, from Iran to Afghanistan.

From the emergence of U.S. power in the nineteenth century until current times, asymmetry has deeply characterized the Western Hemisphere nations, with the United States ahead of all the hemisphere’s members. U.S. policy toward the Americas tended to be imperialistic, then hegemonic, and, from the end of the Cold War to the early twenty-first century, hegemonic “by default.” Since then, China has gained considerable ground in Latin America, profoundly changing the hemispheric picture and the relationship with Washington, and reviving great power competition. This chapter explores the main concepts presiding over the U.S.-Latin American relationship and analyzes the current challenges to U.S. leadership in security, democracy, and economic matters in a historical perspective, as well as the enduring U.S. power of attraction to the populations of the hemisphere. Although President Biden claimed in 2018 that “U.S. leadership is indispensable to addressing the persistent challenges that prevent our region from realizing its fullest potential,” the United States is now at a crossroads, a major actor facing the challenge of a fragmented leadership, with Latin Americans developing multiple partnerships and eager to try new adventures, for better or for worse.

After WWII, United States hegemony was built upon the complementarity of four pillars: military might and relevant diplomacy, mastering a very efficient productive paradigm, an emblematic role in the defense of democracy and multilateralism, and finally the autonomy in the design of monetary and budgetary policies given the centrality of the dollar in international relations. Since then the catching up of Europe and Asia, the rise of global value chains at the initiative of large US corporations, lost wars, and poor international strategies have transformed an overwhelming and benevolent hegemon into a defensive and contested one. Nevertheless, the dollar is still an essential asset as well as the soft power associated with theorizing economics, not to mention energy self-sufficiency, quite important given the turbulence provoked by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The United States are at the forefront of the search for an escape from Quantitative Easing, i.e., a new mix between monetary and budgetary policies. These decisions will reverberate all over the world given the role of Wall Street in world financial intermediation.

The geo-economic rivalry between the United States and China is mainly fought in the technology sector. In the struggle for technopolitical spheres of influence both economic and military dominance is at stake. Rising Sino-American tensions will not only have a divisive effect on multilateral organizations and the liberal, rules-based world order, but will also have a significant impact on dual options countries in Europe, which have strong national security ties with the United States, but also strong economic ties with the United States and China. In the struggle for technological spheres of influence, the United States will increase pressure on third countries and put them before the choice of doing business with either America or China. The result of this de-globalization is a world divided into Chinese and American standards and systems. Internationally operating European companies have in particular fallen into the crosshairs of leadership rivalries and geo-economic strategies of the major powers United States and China.

The Covid-19 pandemic has reinforced the universal belief that the future of globalization will be digital. Yet, the governance of the digital economy has become more contested than ever, splitting the world between different data realms (Leblond and Aaronson in Journal of International Economic Law 21 (2): 245–272, 2018), and dividing societies over the costs and benefits of an ever-expanding metaverse. This chapter seeks to analyze how America has sought to reconcile its ambitions to preserve its economic leadership and the new moral and societal imperatives brought by digital trade.

Using the theoretical framework provided by the realist school of international relations, this article tries to explain why U.S. climate leadership has been mostly weak, erratic, and unreliable since the early 1990s, and why the attempt on the part of the Biden administration to revive U.S. climate leadership may yield disappointing results. From a realist perspective, flawed U.S. climate leadership may stem from a combination of three factors inherent to the international system: (1) the importance of material wealth in the international balance of power; (2) the willingness of nations to preserve their sovereignty; and (3) the enduring influence of nationalism, which undermines the ability of nations to trust one another.

This chapter theorizes America’s unique power to recognize, and thereby legitimize, ostensive pariahs and rogues in international society. Existing literature on the politics of recognition typically focuses on relations of mutual recognition. But many recognition conflicts occur in hierarchical contexts. The U.S. is in a unique position to grant recognition and legitimacy to the identities, rights and behaviors of all states in the international system and does not require recognition in return. I argue that this power is a consequence of the kind of post-World War II order the U.S. created—one that has both coercion and consent characteristics. To illustrate this dynamic, the chapter turns to the context of U.S. nuclear diplomacy with India while negotiating the 2008 civil nuclear agreement and Iran while negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal. Both states have a long history of wrapping recognition concerns into the bargaining process. But such recognition-seeking only reinforces an order in which the U.S. stands firm as the recognizing agent without needing recognition in return. The chapter ends with a consideration of whether China, a challenger to U.S. hegemony, will supplant the U.S.’s power to recognize in the future.

American leadership is underpinned by military power. The United States built up an important alliance network in the early Cold War years. Its extended network of bases and constant foreign operations have resulted in the U.S. military frequently being the first point of contact with the rest of the world. Institutionally, U.S. defense has been better funded, more consistently well organized and has enjoyed more bipartisan political support compared to civilian diplomatic services. Particularly after the Cold War, the Department of Defense took an active interest in alternative, non-military engagements with the rest of the world. Military-to-military contacts were fostered, not just for coordination of combined combat operations but also for diplomatic functions, and military leaders became pseudo-ambassadors. To this day, defense continues to play a significant role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. The foreign travels of the Secretary of Defense, strategic guidance, and the associated funding proved a source of international diplomatic consistency during the recent period of U.S. political volatility during which time more traditional diplomatic institutions were weakened. A thorough understanding of the U.S. role in the world requires recognition of Defense diplomatic actions and role in defining strategy as key components determining American leadership.

The long-held U.S. leadership in cyberspace seems to be waning. The return of great power competition on the international stage demonstrates a crisis of legitimacy and resources for the United States in cyberspace. But it also reflects an identity crisis concerning the capacity of the United States to ensure the stability of the “global commons” as well as to deter potential aggressors. Against this backdrop, the Biden administration has chosen to integrate the external and domestic dimensions of its cybersecurity strategies, while stepping up the technological competition with China. As a result, U.S. leadership in cyberspace now rests upon three pillars: peace through strength, embodied in a rather offensive doctrine and the constant expansion of cyber capabilities; strength through resilience, with a strong federal focus on building up the cybersecurity of domestic infrastructure; resilience through techno-nationalism, driven by the systemic rivalry with China. Yet, there is no guarantee that these choices will, in the long run, lead to greater security.