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2017 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

3. What Are the Conditions for Interest Group Influence?

Author : Maja Kluger Dionigi

Published in: Lobbying in the European Parliament

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Why are even ostensibly strong interests, such as “big business”, sometimes less influential in shaping policy outcomes than weak interests, such as labour unions and non-governmental organisations? In this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework for studying interest group influence in the European Parliament. I do so by focusing on a number of key factors that may further, or limit, the ability of interest groups to shape policy outcomes. These relate to interest group factors (the ability to stand united), issue factors (the complexity and saliency of issues) and institutional factors (decision-makers’ receptiveness to certain arguments and interests). Together, these factors explain why interest groups with a high potential for influence often see their powers curtailed.

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previous chapter Where, When, and How Does Lobbying Take Place in the European Parliament?
next chapter Regulating CO2 Emissions for Vans: Is the European Parliament Still a Defender of Environmental Interests?
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Metadata
Title
What Are the Conditions for Interest Group Influence?
Author
Maja Kluger Dionigi
Copyright Year
2017
Book
Lobbying in the European Parliament

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-42687-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-42688-4

Copyright Year: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42688-4_3