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2019 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

4. When Average Is Irrelevant: Computational Modeling of Religious Groups

Author : Michael D. Makowsky

Published in: Advances in the Economics of Religion

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Consider a thought experiment. Two groups are competing for members in a small town religious market. Each of the groups, the Alphas and Omegas, count 100 members on its respective registry, but while the Alphas can boast 90 members in its pews every Sunday, the Omegas must demure to only having 60. Which group is more successful? Which receives more in yearly tithing? Which is more likely to still exist in 20 years?

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Footnotes
1
While computational models in the economic study of religion has been relatively sparse, there have been a handful of models constructed within other social scientific disciplines, including sociology, anthropology, and evolutionary biology (Bainbridge 1995, 2006; Doran 1998; Upal 2005; Chattoe 2006; Dow 2008). In fact, cognitive models of religious groups and theology, well still early stage theoretical contributions, are perhaps the first to computationally model beliefs, symbolism, and the structure of ritual (Whitehouse 2002; Whitehouse et al. 2012). In general, the consideration of beliefs in economic models of religion has been notably sparse (Montgomery 1996a, b).
 
2
The “corner solution” issue is accommodated in different manners in the club theory of religion literature. In his formal model of church and sect, Iannaccone (1988) assumes that the returns to personal religious conduct always have an interior maximum. Berman (2000), in point of contrast, simplifies the sacrifice to purely screening mechanism (omitting secular good-club, good substitution effects). Subsequent laboratory research found the sacrifice mechanism effective in a purely non-religious context, but also found the screening mechanism dominated (nontrivial) price effects (Aimone et al. 2013).
 
3
One of the themes in Krueger’s (2007) empirical investigation of terrorism is the insufficiency of average rates of education and income in trying to empirically predict terrorism rates and other national level outcomes.
 
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Metadata
Title
When Average Is Irrelevant: Computational Modeling of Religious Groups
Author
Michael D. Makowsky
Copyright Year
2019
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98848-1_4