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2018 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

17. When Beliefs and Logic Contradict: Issues of Values, Religion and Culture

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Abstract

In real debates, we often don’t think about the validity of the arguments from the strictly logical point of view and we often disagree even before we hear the particular argument. This chapter deals with confirmation bias in reasoning about controversial issues (in this case abortions) and it examines the effect of values (pro-life, pro-choice, neutral), religious and political affiliations on syllogistic reasoning. It shows how our beliefs prevent us from acknowledging the logic to the same type of arguments if they are made by the other side of the dispute. First, evidence of studies showing my-side bias and confirmation bias is presented, together with studies suggesting cultural differences in preference for distinct cognitive style or problem-solving. Then the results from one non-WEIRD (Slovak) sample (N = 321, M age = 20.47 years) are analysed. Participants first indicated their attitudes toward abortions in a short questionnaire (6 items from General Social Survey), then they solved 24 syllogisms, which had conclusions either in line with pro-choice or pro-life attitudes and 12 neutral syllogisms. The results showed that people holding opposing beliefs did display confirmation bias, but this confirmation bias was stronger for one side of the dispute, i.e. “pro-lifers”. Christian participants performed worse in neutral valid syllogisms, but mainly in all types of invalid syllogisms, where they differed by 10% from the non-religious participants. This chapter shows that when beliefs and evidence clash, it is often belief that wins. It is no surprise that people untrained in critical, scientific thinking resort to beliefs as their compass in navigating through the vast ocean of many conflicting information (claiming their origin in research) and many conflicting values (such as rights of children vs. rights of their mothers).

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Appendix
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Footnotes
1
WEIRD as acronym for Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, & Democratic. Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan [8] suggested that too much research in psychology is done on this kind of WEIRD samples and more research is needed on less typical samples, such as those from non-WEIRD countries.
 
2
This notion is probably based on many known sophisms used to trick people by stating premises that everybody agrees to and then drawing conclusion, which is based on premises but is against intuitive logic, e.g. if Diogenes is not Socrates and Socrates is a man, then Diogenes is not that Socrates is, i.e. Diogenes is not a man. In fact, study of formal logic began as a reaction to sophism [6].
 
3
Belief bias research uses two main paradigms: production tasks (participants are asked to draw conclusions from the presented premises) and evaluation tasks (participants are presented with some premises and a conclusion to be evaluated—as valid if it necessarily follows from the premises and as invalid if it does not).
 
4
Nisbett [19] observed that Westerners differ from East-Asians in the basic view on problems and how they can be solved. While Westerners (successors of ancient Greek philosophies) believe that world can be categorised and understood by means of simple rules and logic, East Asians despise using logic on complex problems, which plays only minor role in problem solving.
 
5
Triad task is used to distinguish between relational and taxonomical categorization. Participants are given target object (e.g. cow) and then are asked to choose which one of the two alternatives (e.g. chicken and grass) is the best associated with the target object. Asians tend to categorise more relationally (i.e. associate cow with a grass, because cow feeds on a grass), while Westerners tend to categorise more taxonomically (i.e. cow and chicken belong to the same category – animals) [27].
 
6
Syllogisms were constructed with the help of my student, Yeon Joo Lee (MeiCogSci program in Vienna).
 
7
Syllogism No. 25 (see Appendix) was later eliminated from all analyses due to a mistake in wording, which made it invalid. Thus, in pro-choice category there were four valid and seen invalid syllogisms. However, elimination of syllogism No. 25 did not substantially change the results.
 
8
Even great philosopher Plato advised us that when senses contradict the reason/logic, we should go with the reason.
 
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Metadata
Title
When Beliefs and Logic Contradict: Issues of Values, Religion and Culture
Author
Vladimíra Čavojová
Copyright Year
2018
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67024-9_17

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