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Published in:
2010 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers
Authors : Amos Fiat, Christos Papadimitriou
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Much of Game Theory, including the Nash equilibrium concept, is based on the assumption that players are expectation maximizers. It is known that if players are risk averse, games may no longer have Nash equilibria [11,6]. We show that
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Under risk aversion (convex risk valuations), and for almost all games, there are no mixed Nash equilibria, and thus either there is a pure equilibrium or there are no equilibria at all, and,
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For a variety of important valuations other than expectation, it is NP-complete to determine if games between such players have a Nash equilibrium.