Why Counterinsurgency Fails

De Tray describes high-level military enthusiasm, which produced no lasting effect, for expanding a development program, the People’s Development Fund. The program aimed to strengthen ties between the Afghan people and their government, a prime objective of counterinsurgency strategy, by shifting accountability for development projects to Afghan provincial and district governments from the international coalition led by the United States. De Tray had developed and piloted the program with the 173rd Airborne Division in two provinces of Afghanistan in 2009–2010. In a briefing, David Petraeus, then commander of the US Central Command, and John F. Campbell, commander of forces in the region of Afghanistan where the pilot took place, both urged that the program spread. But that did not happen. De Tray also describes his recruitment to the team, its civilian and military makeup, its meetings both inside the Green Zone in Baghdad and throughout the country, and its recommendations. The team’s first recommendation was that the coalition encourage the Iraq government to take ownership of the development program, overcome political obstacles to progress, and create pathways for advisors in government institutions.

De Tray considers the role of outsiders in postconflict reconstruction and development in Iraq in 2008. The coalition in Iraq attempted state building in a couple of years that development experts recognize takes decades and must be undertaken from within a society. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams, focused on using local governance and development projects to build links between people and government, were seen by Iraqis as foreign occupiers. US efforts were hindered since government experts avoided working in Iraq because of harsh living conditions, and contractors with inappropriate backgrounds were hired. The military, eager to deliver visible results, often bypassed the Iraqi government. Working with local governments—districts, towns, and communities—offers the best chance to strengthen people’s ties with their own government.

De Tray served briefly on a team created by David Petraeus to review strategy in the Central Command area, which spread from Egypt to Afghanistan and Pakistan. That led to an invitation to participate as a development expert when the 173rd Airborne Division undertook a yearlong deployment to Afghanistan. De Tray describes his training to work alongside the military, learning the jargon, getting used to living on a forward operating base, and adjusting to new styles of communications, briefings, and transport. The author’s first work with the 173rd, in November 2009–December 2009, included meetings with US, Afghan, and international development officials in Kabul and a meeting of a provincial development committee in Puli Alam. During 2010, de Tray took four more trips to Afghanistan to work with the 173rd as the People’s Development Fund program was developed and piloted. On these trips, he met with international development, coalition, and Afghan officials, including some who were implementing the People’s Development Fund. Experiences illustrate the imbalance on the ground between the military’s heavily armed appearance and local settings and the contrast between the resources local military leaders controlled and those local officials had available.

The United States and international community went to Afghanistan because after 9/11 they saw Afghanistan and the people it harbored as a security risk. Given that goal, the non-battle side of counterinsurgency should aim not at state building but at stabilization. Aid delivery by outsiders undermines the Afghan government at both the national and local levels. The People’s Development Fund supported people’s confidence in local government by assigning a great deal of authority to fund development projects to local Afghan governments so long as decisions represented the local population and projects met stringent transparency requirements. A pilot program beginning in June 2010 produced successful projects that responded to local judgments about what communities needed.

Both Iraq and Afghanistan continue to suffer from domestic struggles for power. The conflicts represent a mix of civil war, where contenders with some legitimacy vie for power, and insurgency, where one side is preponderant and the other uses guerrilla tactics. When appropriate, outside counterinsurgency must focus on building local government capacity, even at the cost of some inefficiency in delivering services. Current US counterinsurgency strategy theoretically stresses linking people to their government but practically often substitutes for government by directly providing services. Both counterinsurgency strategies and international development strategies need to refocus on local legitimacy and engage local governments, near the people, as their best opportunity.