World Opinion and the Northern Ireland Peace Process

A nagging question lingers about the Good Friday Agreement that ended the Troubles in Northern Ireland: How did the region end 30 years of ethnic and religious violence and terrorism in the midst of two decades in which the world suffered so many instances of these bloody conflicts? Rusciano offers the controversial thesis that one reason had to do with the changes in world opinion that occurred after the end of the Cold War. World opinion created conditions where by Northern Ireland’s international reputation affected its citizens’ sense of identity. This emerging importance of reputation altered the patterns of speech and silencing in the society, and changed what could be expressed by citizens and leaders. Further, the contact between Northern Irish leaders and the international community changed their perception of “the possible” regarding relations between Protestants and Catholics, and Unionists and Republicans. Finally, being part of a new “imagined international community” could continue the process, by allowing citizens of the six counties to create an “imagined community” in Northern Ireland, especially among the younger cohorts.

World opinion deals primarily with the global transmission of values. Why, then, did the US black civil rights movement end in legislation which altered social and political relations, while the Northern Irish Catholic civil rights movement ended in 30 years of the Troubles? Rusciano argues that a common basis for community existed in the USA, based upon Judeo-Christian values and traditional principles from the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. By contrast, religion was a primary basis of political division in Northern Ireland, and there were scant political traditions to form a basis for community to heal the divisions. In addition, world opinion had not undergone the fundamental transition needed to make it a force in this conflict.

Why did the end of the Cold War provide the conditions for world opinion to be a force in world affairs, particularly in Northern Ireland? What international relations theories can help explain this change? Rusciano answers these questions by linking two schools of thought: the English School of international relations and global opinion theory. Both theories deal with the influence of “international society” on global relations; the latter is used to provide specific details of how world opinion came to be a force defining the society’s boundaries. After the Cold War, world opinion ceases to be a mere East/West propaganda tool and becomes a moral and pragmatic force backed up by its ability to isolate nations and individuals from an international community. In an increasingly globalized world system, isolation can have dramatic economic and political effects. These effects helped alter the opportunities for peace in Northern Ireland.

Identity defined a primary source of division in Northern Ireland during the Troubles: British or Irish, Protestant, or Catholic? In the past, identity was viewed primarily as an internal characteristic, chosen by a society’s individuals or groups with little outside intervention. Rusciano argues that a newly emergent world opinion changes this process. In the present global environment, national or regional identity grows out of a negotiation between an area’s group consciousness (Selbstbild) and its reputation in world opinion (Fremdbild). Other writers note that as a consequence of the Cold War’s end, the identification of Unionists with the Western powers and Republicans with national liberation movements became irrelevant. However, identity in Northern Ireland was now affected by their global reputation as the scene of continuous violent conflict. This reputation affected the images both sides constructed for themselves, making the negotiation of identity more difficult, and suitable for change.

A palpable silence exists in Northern Ireland regarding the Troubles and whether they may return. Rusciano describes five reasons related to world opinion why this silencing occurs. First, international opinion demands that the society examine the abuses of the past; but residents fear that an examination will disrupt the peace and their reputation as a model for the world. A second related problem is that delving into the past, no matter how important for their Fremdbild, could prompt a resumption of violence. Third, despite its global reputation as a peaceful community, Northern Ireland remains a region divided into communities where individuals speak with their own about the past, and silence statements to the general public. Fourth, the consociational government that grew out of the peace agreement often silences citizen demands that do not fit into the Unionist/Republican narrative due to the guaranteed representation each group receives. Finally, because of the divisions still in the society, victims are often silenced because they cannot tell their stories until they have a sympathetic audience on both sides, but they likely cannot find a sympathetic audience on both sides until they speak. Rusciano examines patterns of silencing before and after the peace agreement, and finds that those in favor of the peace tended to fall silent before the referendum on the agreement. He also finds that afterwards those who supported the agreement were less likely to fear silencing than those who did not, but they were still often reluctant to speak out. He does find that those who identify as Northern Irish and who supported the agreement are more likely to state their affiliation in a foreign country, thereby suggesting a Selbstbild in line with their international reputation as a model for the world.

In order for world opinion to have significant effects upon the Northern Ireland peace process, it had to influence the actions of leaders involved in negotiating the agreement. Rusciano uses Gormley-Heenan’s notion of “chameleonic leadership,” or leadership that changes depending upon its environment, to map this influence. Rusciano shows how when leaders move between local, regional, and international leadership groups, their chameleonic abilities must come into play. They must adjust to fit in with the group they are addressing, while trying to negotiate and balance the constituencies they represent. He describes a model where leaders had leeway from their constituents within certain boundaries to negotiate; however, leaders had to be careful not to overstep those boundaries and lose support. This balance is complicated by negotiators’ contact with other global leaders, who represented a world opinion dictating that such boundaries had to be expanded to allow for a peace agreement. The influences of leaders, such as Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Nelson Mandela, among others, are studied to show how this delicate balance was maintained. Rusciano compares the Northern Ireland process to the successful transition out of conflict in South Africa and the unsuccessful transition in Israel/Palestine. In all cases, he shows how the state of world opinion affected the success or failure of these efforts.

Rusciano draws upon Benedict Anderson’s notion of the “imagined community” that defines a nation to examine whether such a unified community can emerge in Northern Ireland. He argues that this transition is most probable among younger cohorts who are less likely to declare a religious affiliation, more likely to declare an identity as Northern Irish, and more likely to have no link to an existing political party when compared with older cohorts. Rusciano compares the barriers to community with those of Germany after World War II and after reunification. In both cases, Germany struggled to find a “masterable past” to help define a common identity and transform their architectural designs to fit this new identity. Rusciano argues that Northern Ireland has similar problems. The six counties also need to define a “masterable past” that absorbs the Troubles and its aftermath to define a new identity. They also need to transform the architectural design of the “peace lines” to fit this new identity. One path might be to declare themselves citizens of a Northern Irish “imagined community”—a community that is British and Irish, yet neither alone, in history nor tradition. The special experience of the Troubles and the peace agreement could form the basis for this new identity, which world opinion has already ratified in its vision of Fremdbild for Northern Ireland. The next step would be to construct the Selbstbild that makes the negotiation of identity complete.