1 Introduction
1.1 Negotiation
1.2 Strategies and Approaches
1.3 Process Perspective
1.4 How has Bargaining been Defined and Categorised?
2 Methodology
2.1 Step 1: Focus
2.2 Steps 2 and 3: Locating Studies and Study Selection and Evaluation
Database | Number of papers |
---|---|
Scopus | 401 |
ProQuest | 1141 |
ScienceDirect | 327 |
JSTOR | 94 |
Web of Science | 833 |
Total | 2796 |
Exclusion criteria | Example |
---|---|
Consumer (rather than B2B) focused | Hayunga and Munneke (2021): consumer real estate market Knuth et al. (2021)—intrinsic consumer attributes on decision consistency in houseplant purchasing Brucks and Schurr (1990): consumers reduce information search when they have the option of bargaining |
Political/inter-governmental negotiations | Biermann and Weiss (2021): the EU’s intergovernmental negotiation Doyle (2017)—governmental negotiations for Trident missiles |
Marketing perspective | Angelmar and Stern (1986) |
Employee-employer relations | Sánchez-Mira et al. (2021)—collective bargaining and employment conditions in the Spanish long-term care sector |
Intra-organisational negotiation | Wu and Lu (2018): transfer pricing between procurement centres and other divisions |
Intra-household negotiation | Huang et al. (2021)—married couples expected equal division of housing property upon divorce |
Focusing on another stage in the negotiation process | Lin and Lin (2021)—the criteria for supplier selection Thompson and Zumeta (1981)—negotiations between stakeholders for budget allocations |
Referring to a “bargain” | |
Bargaining only referred to a recommendation from the findings or in the introduction but is not a core focus of the paper | Liu et al. (2017) and Zhu et al. (2019)—governments should consider using their bargaining power to reduce prices, abolish taxes on essential medicines Standing et al. (2010)—large supplier base is seen as an advantage by some since it improves the bargaining position of the buyer Levaggi (1999): bargaining is a possible activity outcome if other procurement methods are not successful |
No details of the paper could be obtained due to the age of the paper | Vaitsos (1970) Albertson (1989) |
Teaching focused | Ahmad (2015)—develop a two-party, single-issue, distributive negotiation case exercise Graham (1984)—describes a business negotiation simulation involving the purchase of capital equipment |
Intra public–private partnerships | Sarmento and Renneboog (2021)—bargaining power of private firms/corporate consortiums to extract additional rents to compensate for underbidding at the initial bidding rounds |
Corporate acquisitions | Patschureck et al. (2015)—contractual measures to reduce acquisition risk for buyers in corporate acquisitions |
2.3 Step 4: Analysis and Synthesis
Authors | Year | Theory used | Method | Industry | Construct | Measure/ Variable |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Xu et al | 2016 | N | Modelling | Energy | Size | Group buying leads to better cost outcomes |
Abbott and Reichman | 2020 | N | Secondary | Healthcare | Size | Centralised coordination by regional supply centres should assist in overcoming difficulties individual countries may encounter in addressing administrative and technical issues in procuring supplies, as well as creating improved bargaining leverage with potential suppliers |
Herweg and Schmidt | 2017 | N | Modelling | Not specified | Information | Early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation |
Enow and Kamala | 2016 | N | Survey | SMEs | Tactics | Buying on credit (as opposed to cash) may reduce bargaining power |
3 Findings and Discussion
3.1 Trends of PSM Bargaining Research
3.2 Construct and Measures/Variables Analysis
Construct | Measure/variable | Source Examples | Definition and notes |
---|---|---|---|
Purchasing volume | Amount of spend | Xu et al. (2016) Iwanaga et al. (2021) Niu et al. (2016) Stenger (2000) Li (2012) Chaves et al. (2017) He and Ioerger (2005) Den Ambtman et al. (2020) | The effect of growing the purchasing spend, through centralisation, bundling of requirements or consortia buying activities |
Prior interactions | Amount of contact prior to the current instance of bargaining | Sabasi et al. (2013) Ody-Brasier and Freek (2014) | Those who do not engage in prior trading may be at a bargaining disadvantage |
Information | Amount of information available | Trejos (1999) Bingham (1989) Gerding and La Poutré (2016) Ostwald (1987) Pauly and Burns (2008) Aligheri (1994) | Uninformed buyers may pay more in the bargaining process |
Timing of information availability | Lewis (1998) Barrow (1998) | Advance knowledge of information may place the buyer in a strong bargaining position | |
Level of quality and certainty of information | Lewis and Sappington (1991) Shupp et al. (2013) Moon and Kwon (2011) Trejos (1999) | Incomplete information may affect the bargaining process and outcomes | |
Level of asymmetry of information between bargaining parties | Nasser and Turcic (2019) Park et al. (2019) Bingham (1989) Cachon and Zhang (2006) Chang (2002) | Distance between the information known by the buyer and supplier may lead to inefficient results and a win-lose scenario | |
Level of information transparency | Gehrig et al. (2016) Gerding and La Poutré (2006) | When responders can observe whether proposers have acquired information or visibility of other negotiating parties, acceptance rates are higher | |
Bargaining power | Level of influence one party has over the other to generate concessions | Dan et al. (2018) Farrell and Fearon (2005) Hwang et al. (2018) | Greater levels of bargaining power may ensure greater concessions (pre-contract) or (post) contract performance from the other party |
External Environment | Level of competitiveness of the market | Dusing et al. (2005) Selvam (2020) Matsushima and Yoshida (2018) | Availability of suitable supply alternatives and the economic characteristics of the product being bargained over |
Level of legislation/government involvement | Degrassat-Thas et al. (2012) Rodwin (2021) | Legislation may impact a buyer’s ability to bargain effectively | |
Negotiation requirements/variables | Risk | Liang et al. (2019) Jackson et al. (2023) | Financial risk premium, exchange rate volatility |
Price | Wickelgren (2007) Gavurova and Kubak (2021) Leu et al. (2015) Yang et al. (2007) | Economic characteristics of the product, such as price and income elasticity | |
Interrelationships between different requirements | Wang et al. (2021) Kanniainen and Lehtonen (2019) Kolomvatsos et al. (2016) Lee and Kwon (2006) | Ability to bundle requirements may result in better bargaining outcomes | |
Tactics | Level of completeness and design of contracts/specifications | Cardenas et al. (2017) An and Tang (2019) Kim (2021) | Having specific clauses or having an incomplete contract may increase post-contract bargaining power |
Pricing approach | Adopting different approaches to pricing requirements (e.g., cost plus, fixed-price or lease v. buy) may affect bargaining outcomes | ||
Number of suppliers bargaining with | Cho et al. (2014) Deck and Thomas (2020) Stenbacka and Tombak (2012) McClaren (1999) Nakkas and Xu (2019) Bichler et al. (2009) Lin and Chuang (2020) | Single or multiple sourcing strategies may affect bargaining outcomes | |
Type of contact in the bargaining process | Huh and Park (2010) Kjerstad (2004) Hoezen et al.(2013) Shachat and Tan (2015) | Use of technology (e.g., online auction) may affect bargaining outcomes | |
Timing of offers in the bargaining process | Bayat et al. (2020) Shupp et al. (2013) Li and Gupta (2011) Perdue (1992) Cakravastia and Nakamura (2002) | The benefits of being the first proposer and possibly of imposing time pressures on the other party | |
Order in which suppliers are bargained with | Marx and Shaffer (2007) Zwick and Lee (1999) | Selection of the order by which suppliers are bargained with | |
Number of people in one party’s bargaining team | Min et al. (1995) | The size of a negotiating team may influence bargaining outcomes | |
Level of effort expended in the bargaining process | Franco-Watkins et al. (2013) Rooks et al. (2000) | Perception (i.e., being seen) of expending effort in bargaining may affect outcomes | |
Level of ability to identify the other party’s motives | Malhotra and Bazerman (2007) Ness and Haugland (2005) | Understanding the other side's motives and goals is the first principle of investigative negotiation. The second is to figure out what constraints the other party faces | |
Strength of alternatives | Ansar (2013) Wang and Zionts (2008) | Buyers can exert symmetric bargaining power against sellers provided the firm has competitive alternatives available | |
Individual characteristics | Level of trustworthiness of the bargaining party | Dyer and Chu (2003) Dion and Banting (1988) | Least-trusted buyer spent significantly more of its face-to-face interaction time with suppliers on bargaining leading to higher transaction costs. Openness and honesty, as opposed to success at the exploitation of the seller, support the collaborative viewpoint |
Level of risk appetite | Shalvi et al. (2013) Hanany and Gerchak (2008) Hoezen et al. (2013) Oliveira et al. (2016) Zusman and Etgar (1981) Guell (1997) | Prevention-oriented people (rather than promotion-orientated ones) may exit the bargaining process when lower monetary compensation becomes available | |
Age of the bargaining participant | Tiessen and Funk (1993) | The age of those involved in the bargaining process may affect outcomes | |
Gender of the bargaining participant | Min et al. (1995) Bear and Babcock (2012) Faes et al. (2010) | The gender of those involved in the bargaining process may affect outcomes | |
Cultural characteristics of the bargaining participant | Bachkirov et al. (2016) | Certain tactics (e.g., aggressive bargaining may be less used in some countries/regions than in others, who may prefer a problem-solving approach | |
Fair approach | Kadefors (2005) Pavlov et al. (2021) Atkin and Rinehart (2006) | There is a strong preference for fairness (and a lack of coercion) in human interaction so people who experience unfairness tend to react with anger, resentment and loss of motivation | |
Language used | Lai et al. (2010) | Language familiarity plays a critical role in inducing persuasion behaviour in negotiations | |
Skill level of the bargaining participants | Anglemar and Stern (1986) Green et al. (1994) Lawther (2006) Blau et al. (2015) Chalkley and McVicar (2008) | Range and quality of skills in the individual and the wider negotiation team. Social and technical sophistication of the buyer/team can increase bargaining power and can often negotiate intangibles such as extended service, longer warranties, and quicker delivery and affect the | |
Outcomes (requirements) | Level of success of the bargaining activity to meet the buying organisation’s requirements | Yan and Wang (2010) Summers and Wilson (2003) | How the bargaining process has been enacted to meet the buying organisation’s initial (or evolving) requirements/variables |
Outcomes (process) | How much time is spent on the bargaining process | Dyer and Chu (2003) Leu et al. (2015) | The transaction costs that may arise due to inefficiencies or time taken in the bargaining process |
Outcomes (relationship) | Level of impact on the ensuing relationship | Gourlay (1992) Foroughi et al. (1995) | Post-bargaining relationships may be affected by the nature of the bargaining taken to either agree a contract or post-contract activities |