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2022 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

11. A Model of Consensus and Consensus Building Within the Framework of Committees with Permissible Ranges of Decision Makers

Author : Takehiro Inohara

Published in: Systems Research II

Publisher: Springer Nature Singapore

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Abstract

A model of consensus and consensus building is proposed within the framework of voting committees with permissible ranges of decision makers. A group decision-making situation is expressed by a voting committee with the unanimous decision rule, and a negotiation process among decision makers in the situation is expressed as a sequence of decision makers’ permissible ranges. Consensus is, moreover, defined as a permissible range of decision makers with a stable alternative and consensus building as a sequence of decision makers’ permissible ranges from the status quo to consensus. The existence of consensus and relationships between consensus in a committee, the core of the committee, and Nash equilibrium are investigated.

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Appendix
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Metadata
Title
A Model of Consensus and Consensus Building Within the Framework of Committees with Permissible Ranges of Decision Makers
Author
Takehiro Inohara
Copyright Year
2022
Publisher
Springer Nature Singapore
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9941-2_11