A Rose by Any Other Name: Identity and Impression Management in Résumés

The distinction drawn here is one commonly used in ethical analysis, namely, that between means and ends or between intention and the act itself. Different ethical theories vary in their respective emphases, with deontological frameworks focused on the means (e.g., Kant’s elevation of “the good will”) and with utilitarian thought focused on outcomes and the extent to which they maximize the good.

Marcoux provides but a few examples of embellishment (p. 184). They seem likely to include such aspects as inflated titles, exaggerated job functions and overstated technical abilities, but plausibly extend into such areas as salary history and degree of foreign language fluency. The nature and extent of embellishment is an issue that Bishop (2006) considers more closely in his critique of Marcoux.

Itself a strong assumption.

We observe a useful analogy available in the literature and regulation associated with deceptive advertising. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) observes a distinction between express claims (i.e., what the ad literally says) and implied claims (i.e., one made indirectly or by inference). Both express and implied claims can be deceptive and advertisers are required by law to have substantiation of them, if challenged by the FTC. Gardner (1975) in his work on deceptive advertising identifies three types of deceptive ads. In addition to the “unconscionable lie,” there are other mechanisms in ads that deceive, including the claim-fact interaction, in which further information is required to avoid misleading inferences, and the claim-belief interaction in which information contained in the ad is literally correct, but might be reasonably expected to mislead the consumer.

Here again in its regulation of advertising, the FTC considers what the ad does not say, recognizing that the omission of information can mislead consumers.