A Social Theory of the WTO

From a vantage point of post-11 September 2001, as the US is vigorously engaged in seemingly unilateral battles against terror in the Middle East, it is ostensibly difficult to speak of deepening multilateralism. At the same time, though, as the US is increasing its farm subsidies and hiking up tariffs to protect its ailing steel industry, it is increasingly clear that the US no longer fulfills its historical role as the white knight of the multilateral trade regime. Nonetheless the wheels are in motion and negotiations in the 2002—05 Doha Round have begun under the auspices of the WTO.

Traditional theoretical approaches all offer some insight into the relationship of states in regimes. However, an analysis using social theory tools best explains regime change and, particularly, the transition from the GATT to the WTO regime. This works towards the central aim of this book: to explain the increasingly important role of developing countries in changing the regime’s established social rules or normative framework.

The previous chapter argued that the shift from the GATT to the WTO represented a structural or cultural shift from limited multilateralism to superlateralism. Whereas the former was characterized by exemptions for national socio-economic purposes, the latter represented selfrestraint and cooperation, and an emerging collective identity. The new WTO regime embodied new socio-economic and organizational norms, based on disembedded liberal principles and legalism that made it stronger than its predecessor had been.

Just as the US did not fulfill its expected role as the defender of free trade during the Uruguay Round, developing countries did not play their accustomed role as opponents of the multilateral trading regime. America’s role as hegemon in the trading regime changed during the late 1970s and 1980s, reconstructing its identity and interests in the trading regime. Whereas America’s liberal trade policies had underpinned the trading regime since WWII, it adopted generally egoistic behavior during this period. At the same time, it began to focus more exclusively on developing regional trading relationships with Canada and Mexico where its interaction was greater, rather than focusing on the multilateral trade regime.

For multiple reasons, developing countries came to change their trading behavior during the Uruguay Round and new behavior changed the way developed and developing countries saw their roles in the multilateral trading regime. This behavioral change and the understandings it created had profound effects on the character of the multilateral trading regime, effectively changing its culture.

Developing countries adopted cooperative policies during the Uruguay Round, eroding their traditional identities as the Other in an egoistic trading regime. In adopting disembedded liberal norms, supporting legalism and unilaterally liberalizing during the Uruguay Round, developing countries adopted a new role. In sustaining this over time, they taught this identity to developed countries through representational practices. At the same time, the developing countries learned to see themselves as reciprocal traders. This helped to establish a new collective identity in the trading regime as the boundaries between developing countries and developed countries were re-formed and both groups became part of a Self of multilateral traders. This process represented a change in the regime’s culture from limited multilateralism to deeper multilateralism or superlateralism, based on a collective interest.

Developing countries changed their identities and their interests in the trading regime by adopting cooperative policies during the Uruguay Round. By implementing a new policy stance using disembedded liberal principals and stronger ‘black letter’ or formal law, these countries also changed the culture of the trading regime to become superlateral rather than multilateral. They created a new collective identity of multilateral trader while their egoistic identities as the protectionist Other eroded. This enabled developing countries to have more influence within this regime, although their capacity to change it was framed by the prevailing rules of social procedure.

In examining the way developing countries changed their role in trade negotiations and the implications for the trading regime, this book has used a different kind of light to that which is normally used in such a project. The kind of light normally used in neorealism, neo-Marxism and neoliberalism generally reveals states’ actions in bold outline against a clearly defined material world. Norms and meaning are merely shadows under this light, providing little definition of the scene. In this context, regimes such as the trading regime have no structural purpose. In contrast, this book has used a light that brings norms and meaning into the foreground. In so doing, it has redefined the actors and revealed a new and textured play. Under this light, actors are defined by the shadows.