An Introduction to EU Legal Culture

See the introductory chapter of this volume by Koch and Kjølstad (this volume). The Legal Cultural Model is based on Sunde’s concept, which defines legal culture as “ideas of and expectations to law made operational by institutional(-like) practices”, Sunde (2020), p. 27 (first developed in Sunde 2010).

Sunde (this volume), Sect. 1. The Legal Cultural Model is the operationalised version of Sunde’s concept of legal culture, see Section 6.

Koch (2020), p. 67.

Ibid.

For a comprehensive overview of the wider European legal history, see, e.g., Padoa-Schioppa (2017) and Lesaffer (2009); for a concise overview, see Robinson et al. (2000).

For a concise introduction to the history of the EU, see, e.g., Chalmers et al. (2014), pp. 1−56; Craig (2014), pp. 9−30; Foster (2013), pp. 3−40; Reinisch (2009), pp. 1−12.

Cf. Robinson et al. (2000), p. 309; Foster (2013), pp. 5−6. One of the first initiatives that followed was the creation of the Council of Europe (“CoE”) in 1949 (see Statute of the Council of Europe, signed 5 May 1949, entered into force 3 August 1949, E.T.S. no 1, U.N.T.S. Vol. 87, p. 103 (“CoE Statute”)), with the aim of promoting closer European cooperation in economic, social, and cultural matters. The CoE’s most important offspring is the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol Nos. 11 and 14, opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953, E.T.S. no 5, U.N.T.S. Vol. 213, p. 221 (“ECHR”), and the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). Two other European initiatives in the early 1950s, namely the idea of a European Defence Community (“EDC”) and a European Political Community (“EPC”), were not crowned with success; cf. Robinson et al. (2000), p. 309. On these initiatives, see Foster (2013), p. 7 (“too ambitious for the time and thus very premature”); on the EDC, see Chalmers et al. (2014), pp. 12−13. See further Fursdom (1980).

Treaty instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, signed 18 April 1951, no longer in force, U.N.T.S. Vol. 261, p. 140 (“ECSC Treaty”).

Articles 8−19 ECSC Treaty. On the history of the High Authority, see Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994).

Articles 20−25 ECSC Treaty.

Articles 26−30 ECSC Treaty.

Articles 31−45 ECSC Treaty.

The term “supranationalism” refers to the “the formal transfer of legal authority and decision-making power from member states to an institution or international body” (Hurrell 2018) that goes beyond mere intergovernmentalism. For a historical account of the term “supranationalism”, see Büthe (2016).

Cf. Robinson et al. (2000), p. 310.

In 2012, the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize; cf. Foster (2013), p. 4. In today’s political discussions, this central feature of the EU is all too often forgotten. The wars in former Yugoslavia and the current war in Ukraine are sad reminders that war in Europe is still not unthinkable.

Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed 25 March 1957, entered into force 1 January 1958, U.N.T.S. Vol. 294, p. 3 (authentic French version) (“EEC Treaty”), and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, signed 25 March 1957, entered into force 1 January 1958, U.N.T.S. Vol. 294, p. 259 (authentic French version) (“EURATOM Treaty” or “EAEC Treaty”).

See the discussions at the Messina Conference (1955) and the following report of then Belgian Foreign Minister P-H Spaak (the so-called Spaak Report; see Intergovernmental Committee on European Integration. The Brussels Report on the General Common Market, June 1956 (unofficial Engl. transl., available at http://​aei.​pitt.​edu/​995/​).

Cf. Chalmers et al. (2014), p. 13.

Note that in the beginning, the freedoms of trade in goods, services, and establishment were still limited.

Robinson et al. (2000), p. 310.

See the Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, signed 15 March 1957, no longer in force, U.N.T.S. Vol. 298, p. 267. Final institutional unity was achieved by the Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, signed 8 April 1965, entered into force 1 July 1957, [1967] O.J. 152, pp. 2−17 (“Merger Treaty”), which made the Council and the Commission unified organs for all three Communities. The ECSC expired in 2002 (see Decision of the Representatives of the Member States meeting within the Council on the consequences of the expiry of the European Coal and Steel Community, [2002] O.J. L194, p. 35), while EURATOM maintains a distinct legal identity despite sharing members and institutions. See the consolidated versions of the EAEC Treaty, [2012] O.J. C 327, pp. 1–107, and Protocol (No. 2) annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, [2007] O.J. C 306, pp. 199−202. Cf. Lenaerts et al. (2021), p. 3.

The Schengen acquis—Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, [2000] O.J. L 239, pp. 13–18 (“Schengen Convention”).

Single European Act, [1987] O.J. L 169, pp. 1–28. On the SEA, see Foster (2013), pp. 27−30.

Foster (2013), pp. 27−28; see also Chalmers et al. (2014), p. 22, referring to the “most significant treaty reform in the Union’s history”.

Foster (2013), p. 27.

Ibid., pp. 28−29.

Robinson et al. (2000), p. 310; Foster (2013), p. 29.

Treaty on European Union, [1992] O.J. C 191, pp. 4−112 (“Treaty of Maastricht”). On the Maastricht Treaty, see Foster (2013), pp. 30−32, and Chalmers et al. (2014), pp. 24−28. On the development from EC to EU, see Lenaerts et al. (2021), pp. 3−39.

Foster (2013), p. 31.

Agreement on the European Economic Area, [1992] O.J. L 1, pp. 3−570.

Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, [1997] O.J. C 340, pp. 1–144 (“Treaty of Amsterdam”). On the Treaty of Amsterdam, see Foster (2013), pp. 33−34; Chalmers et al. (2014), pp. 29−30.

Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, [2001] O.J. C 80, pp. 1–87 (“Treaty of Nice”). On the Treaty of Niece, see Foster (2013), pp. 34−36; Chalmers et al. (2014), pp. 35−36.

Cf. Foster (2013), pp. 33−36; Chalmers et al. (2014), pp. 35−36.

Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, [2004] O.J. C 310, pp. 1−474. On the Constitutional Treaty, see Foster (2013), pp. 36−37; Chalmers et al. (2014), pp. 36−38.

For the results in France, see https://​www.​interieur.​gouv.​fr/​Elections/​Les-resultats/​Referendums/​elecresult_​_​referendum_​2005/​(path)/​referendum_​2005/​/​000/​000.​html; for the Netherlands, see https://​web.​archive.​org/​web/​20110721125928/​http://​www.​kiesraad.​nl/​nl/​Actueel/​Persberichten/​2005/​Vaststelling_​uitslag_​raadplegend_​referendum_​Europese_​Grondwet.​html.

For a fuller discussion, see Piris (2006).

Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, [2007] O.J. C 306, pp. 1–271 (“Treaty of Lisbon”). On the Treaty of Lisbon, see the excellent analysis by Craig (2010); see also the short discussion in Foster (2013), pp. 37−38, and in Chalmers et al. (2014), pp. 39−46.

Only EURATOM kept its separate existence, see n 24.

Cf. Craig (2010), p. 43.

Cf. ibid., pp. 36−39.

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2007] O.J. C 303, pp. 1−16; Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, [2007] O.J. C303, pp. 17−35. The Charter has been reissued with the Lisbon Treaty, [2010] O.J. C83/2.

Articles 1 and 6 TEU and Article 1 (2) TFEU. Cf. Craig (2010), p. 200.

Such as the European Financial Stability Facility (“EFSF”) and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (“EFSM”), which were later replaced by the European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”), see Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, signed 2 February 2012, entered into force 27 September 2012, [2011] O.J. L 91, p. 1.

Treaty on European Union (Consolidated version), [2016] O.J. C 202.

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated version), [2016] O.J. C 202.

51.9% in favour of leaving the EU, 48.1% against leaving. On the wider legal ramifications of Brexit, see the contributions in Fabbrini (2017).

On the conditions for withdrawal under Article 50, see Hillion (2015).

See the Official Website of the EU (2022) Facts and figures on life in the European Union, available at https://​european-union.​europa.​eu/​principles-countries-history/​key-facts-and-figures/​life-eu_​en.

On the Council and the EU Council, see Craig and de Búrca (2020), pp. 70−79; Foster (2013), pp. 45−53.

On the EU Parliament, see Craig and de Búrca (2020), pp. 80−87; Foster (2013), pp. 53−58.

On the EU Commission, see Craig and de Búrca (2020), pp. 60−70; Foster (2013), pp. 42−45.

On the CJEU, see below, Sect. 2. In addition, the EU has a Court of Auditors and the European Central Bank (“ECB”).

Cf. Foster (2013), p. 42. Its composition, function, and competences are regulated in Article 16 TEU, and Articles 237−243 TFEU.

Article 16 TEU.

Article 15 TEU.

Ibid.

Article 14 TEU. Its composition, function, and powers are regulated in Article 14 TEU and Articles 223−34 TFEU.

Article 223 TFEU.

See, e.g., the Official Website of the EU (2022) Enforcement of EU law, available at https://​eur-lex.​europa.​eu/​EN/​legal-content/​glossary/​enforcement-of-eu-law.​html. See Article 17 TEU.

Cf. Foster (2013), p. 42. Its functions and tasks are regulated in Article 17 TEU, and Articles 244−250 TFEU.

Cf. Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 64.

For this and the following, see the official website of the EU (2022) Facts and figures on life in the European Union, available at https://​european-union.​europa.​eu/​principles-countries-history/​key-facts-and-figures/​life-eu_​en.

See the Official Website of the EU (2022) EU motto, available at https://​european-union.​europa.​eu/​principles-countries-history/​symbols/​eu-motto_​en. On the meaning and relevance of this motto, see Fornäs (2012), pp. 103−114.

Article 3 TEU. The 24 official languages of the EU are: Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish, and Swedish (cf. Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 517/2013, L 158/1.

Cf. Koch (2020), p. 46.

Ibid., pp. 45−47.

The nature of the EU has been, and continues to be, a much-contested issue. In its Article 1, the TEU simply refers to the “Union”. The labels attached to the EU include, e.g, Staatenverbund (in English “association of sovereign national states”; see, e.g., FCC, Lisbon, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009—2 BvE 2/08—ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2009:es20090630.2bve000208, para. 229 (“Lisbon (FCC)”)), “federative association” (see, e.g., Rosas (2004), “multi-level system of governance” (see, e.g., Börzel and Risse 2000, pp. 50 and 58; Rosas and Armati 2012, p. 26; Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch (1996), “international organisation” (see de Witte 2014, p. 175, with qualifications), and “integrated legal system” (see, e.g., Rosas and Armati 2012, p. 26). Other labels that are used include “regional economic integration organisation”, “Community”, “political union of states”, “supranational organisation”, “confederation”, “federation”, “incomplete federation” and “post-modern state” (see the overview in Rosas and Armati 2012, p. 7).

Cf. Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the EU and European Commission, joined cases nos C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351 (“Kadi II (ECJ)”). See also Börzel (2003), p. 2; Klabbers (2015), p. 52. See more on the relationship between the EU and international law below in Sect. 7.

The term “federalism” has been defined by Börzel (2003), p. 1, as follows: “federalism refers to a spatial or territorial division of power between two (or more) levels of government in a given political system. Both levels have to hold some autonomous decision-making powers which they can exercise independently of each other. Finally, the federal unit is represented in central decision-making processes. In a nutshell, a federal system is characterized by sovereignty being shared and divided between different levels of government rather than being located at one level exclusively.” See also the definition in Burgess (1986). See, generally on “federalism”, Føllesdal (2022).

Börzel and Risse (2000); Börzel (2003), p. 2; Weiler (1995), p. 23. See, however, the proposal for a “European Federation” (but not a “European Federal State”) by the former German Foreign Minister J Fischer: From Confederacy to Federation—Thoughts on the finality of European integration. Speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin, 12 May 2000, printed in Joerges et al. (2000), pp. 5−17 (German version), 19−30 (English version), 31−43 (French version).

Börzel (2003), p. 2.

See the list of federal features in Börzel and Risse (2000), p. 53; see also Rosas and Armati (2012), p. 26; Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch (1996).

On the federal features of the EU, see, e.g., Börzel and Risse (2000), p. 53, arguing that the “EU already constitutes an emerging federation”; see also Börzel (2003), p. 3; Kelemen (2007), p. 52 (“For the purposes of the present analysis, the EU has the necessary minimal attributes of a federal system and crucially the EU is riven with many of the same tensions that afflict federal systems”); Koslowski (2001); Weiler (2001a), p. 70 (“Europe has charted its own brand of constitutional federalism”); Weiler (1995), p. 27, challenges the view “that the only way to imagine the Union is in some statal form: Staat, Staatenbund, Bundesstaat, Staatenverbund”.

Ipsen (1972), p. 197 (“Zweckverband funktionaler Integration”).

Cf. Börzel and Risse (2000), p. 52; Börzel (2003), p. 2.

Börzel and Risse (2000), p. 53; Börzel (2003), p. 3.

On the US federal system, see Wilson (this volume), Sect. 1.3. On the German federal system, see Koch (this volume), Sect. 1.1.

Börzel and Risse (2000), p. 53; Börzel (2003), p. 3. On the division of competences, see below Sect. 3.1.2.1.

See, e.g., Germany: Article 31 Basic Law (“Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht”; transl. “Federal law shall take precedence over Land law”).

Börzel and Risse (2000), p. 53; Börzel (2003), pp. 2−3. On the supremacy of EU law, see Claes (2015). See, however, n 87 and 108 on the (relative) challenge to EU law’s supremacy by some EU Member States’ courts.

For this and the following, see Börzel and Risse (2000), p. 53; Börzel (2003), p. 3.

Börzel and Risse (2000), p. 46; Börzel (2003), p. 4.

Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU. On EU citizenship, see Nic Shuibhne (2015).

Article 50 TEU.

The CJEU awards itself this “Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz” based on considerations of the coherence of the EU’s legal system, cf. Firma Foto Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck Ost, case no C-314/84, ECLI:EU:C:1987:452 [1987] E.C.R. 4199; on the contrary, see the “ultra-vires” jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht; “FCC”), Maastricht, Judgment of the Second Senate of 12 October 1993, cases no 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92, BVerfGE 89, 155 (“Maastricht (FCC)”) (“ausbrechender Rechtsakt”); Lisbon (FCC) (n 69); Honeywell, Order of the Second Senate of 6 July 2010, case no 2 BvR 2661/06, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2010:rs20100706.2bvr266106, BVerfGE 126, 286 (“Honeywell (FCC)”); FCC, OMT, Judgment of the Second Senate of 21 June 2016, case no 2 BvR 2728/13, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20160621.2bvr272813; PSPP, Judgment of the Second Senate of 5 May 2020, case no 2 BvR 859/15, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2020:rs20200505.2bvr085915, BVerfGE 154, 17, paras. 111ff., 118ff. (“PSPP (FCC)”). For critical voices on the FCC’s ultra vires jurisprudence, see Mayer (2020), Pernice (2020) and Ipsen (2020). See also the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, Slovak Pensions, Judgment of 31 January 2012, case no Pl.ÚS 5/12 (“Slovak Pensions”), and the comments on this judgment, see Faix (2012); Komárek (2012); Vincze (2013); the Danish Supreme Court, Ajos, Judgment of 6 December 2016, case no 15/2014, and comments on this decision, see Madsen et al. (2017); and the Polish “Constitutional Tribunal”, Assessment of the conformity to the Polish Constitution of selected provisions of the Treaty on European Union, Judgment of 7 October 2021, case number K 3/21, which is an outright attack against the rule of law in Poland, cf. Statement of retired judges of the Constitutional Tribunal of 10 October 2021, available at https://​ruleoflaw.​pl/​statement-of-retired-judges-of-the-constitutional-tribunal-of-10-october-2021/​.

Cf. Articles 15 and 16 TEU.

Article 17 and 19 TEU. On the appointment of CJEU judges, see below Sects. 2.1 and 2.2.

Article 19 (3) (b) TEU and Article 267 TFEU.

Article 2 (2) TFEU.

See below Sect. 6.

On direct effect, see, e.g., NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, case no C-26/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, [1963] E.C.R. I-1 (“Van Gend en Loos (ECJ)”). On EU law’s supremacy, see e.g. Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., case no C-6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, [1964] E.C.R. I-585 (“Costa v E.N.E.L. (ECJ)”); Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, case no C-11/70, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114, [1970] E.C.R. I-1125 (“Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (ECJ)”); Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA, case no 106/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49, [1978] E.C.R. 00629 (“Simmenthal (ECJ)”); Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, case no C-106/89, ECLI:EU:C:1990:395, [1990] E.C.R. I-04135 (“Marleasing (ECJ)”. See also n 109 and 104. See also Claes (2015).

See below Sect. 5.

See below Sect. 4.

Koch (2020), pp. 46−47.

Ibid.

See, for example, the comparison of the EU’s system of multilevel governance to federal systems: Kristoferitsch (2007) and Börzel and Risse (2000).

See in contrast Wieacker and Bodenheimer (1990), p. 5, who include in their concept of European Legal Culture the entire European continent in a geographic sense and all former European settlements and colonies (“Atlantic-European” legal culture).

Cf. Foster (2013), p. 58.

Article 31 ECSC Treaty.

On the creation of the CFI, see Naômé (2018), pp. 1–16.

See, e.g., Stone Sweet (2004). See, however, Pavone (2022), proposing a narrative that focuses on the role of “Euro-lawyers” in the “judicial construction” of the EU, rather than on the role of judges.

See, e.g., Costa v E.N.E.L. (ECJ) (n 93); Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (ECJ) (n 93); Simmenthal (ECJ) (n 93); Marleasing (ECJ) (n 93). See also Claes (2015). Today, the supremacy of EU law has been explicitly acknowledged by the Member States; see Consolidated Version of the TFEU—Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007, A. Declarations concerning provisions of the Treaties, 17. Declaration concerning primacy, [2008] O.J. C 115, p. 344. However, certain national courts have reserved the right to hold up so-called counter-limits to EU law’s effect in national law under certain circumstances. For example, the German FCC has formulated three kinds of “counter-limits”. According to the Solange control, the Court will not exercise judicial review of EU law in Germany “so long as” EU law provides fundamental rights protection that is equivalent (but not necessarily identical) to the level of fundamental rights protection under the German Constitution. See FCC, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, Order of the Second Senate of 29 May 1974, case no BvL 52/71, BVerfGE 37, 271 (“Solange I (FCC)”); FCC, Re Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft, Order of the Second Senate of 22 October 1986, case no 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE 73, 339 (“Solange II (FCC)”); Maastricht (FCC) (n 87); Lisbon (FCC) (n 69); FCC, Emission Allowance, Order of the First Senate of 13 March 2007, case no 1 BvF 1/05, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2007:fs20070313.1bvf000105, BVerfGE 118, 79; FCC, European Act on Warrants of Arrest, Judgment of the Second Senate of 18 July 2005, case no 2 BvR 2236/04, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2005:rs20050718.2bvr223604, BVerfGE 113, 273; Honeywell (FCC) (n 87); FCC, Data Retention, Judgment of the First Senate of 2 March 2010, case no 1 BvR 256/08 and others, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2010:rs20100302.1bvr025608, BVerfGE 125, 260; FCC, Constitutional Identity, Order of the Second Senate of 15 December 2015, case no 2 BvR 2735/14, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2015:rs20151215.2bvr273514, BVerfGE 140, 317. According to the “ultra vires control”, the FCC (and other Member States’ courts) reserve(s) the right to review whether an EU act remains within the limits of the powers transferred to the EU. See the references in n 87. According to the “identity control”, the FCC reserves the right to review whether the powers transferred to the EU and the exercise of these powers by the EU are compatible with the constitutional identity of the German Constitution. See, e.g., Lisbon (FCC) (n 69); FCC, Constitutional Identity, Order of the Second Senate of 15 December 2015, case no 2 BvR 2735/14, BVerfGE 140, 317. For “identity” control, see also the Polish “Constitutional Tribunal”, Lisbon Treaty, Judgment of 24 November 2010, case no K 32/09, the Polish “Constitutional Tribunal”, EU Accession Treaty, Judgment of 11 May 2005, case no K 18/04. The term contralimiti (counter-limits) has been coined by Barile (1969), p. 49, cited in Martinico (2012), p. 419, fn. 103. On “counter-limits” in German law, see Paulus (2014), Paulus and Leiss (2018), and Paulus and Hinselmann (2019). For discussions on the relationship between the FCC and the CJEU, see, e.g., Giegerich (2016), Kranenpohl (2016), Poli (2016), Calliess (2016) and Voβkuhle (2010). Generally, on the “two-dimensional” character of EU law’s supremacy, see Claes (2015).

See the ground-breaking judgment Erich Stauder v City of Ulm – Sozialamt, case no C-29/69, ECLI:EU:C:1969:57, [1969] E.C.R. I-419 ff., 425 (“Stauder (ECJ)”. Other important milestones are Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (ECJ) (n 93); J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities, case no C-4/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:51, [1974] E.C.R. I-491 (“Nold (ECJ)”); Roland Rutili v Ministre de l’intérieur, case no C-36/75, ECLI:EU:C:1975:137, [1975] E.C.R. I-1219 (“Rutili (ECJ)”); Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz, case no C-44/79, ECLI:EU:C:1979:290, [1979] E.C.R. I-3727 (“Hauer (ECJ)”).

On the difficult demarcation of the scope of application of EU law and national law, see FCC, Right to be forgotten I, Order of 6 November 2019, case no 1 BvR 16/13, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2019:rs20191106.1bvr001613, and Right to be forgotten II, Order of 6 November 2019, case no 1 BvR 276/17, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2019:rs20191106.1bvr027617.

Cf. Article 24 (1) TEU. On the question of whether this restriction is absolute or relative, see Lonardo (2016).

Article 19 (3) (b) TEU, Article 267 TFEU. See below Sect. 3.3.1.

Cf. Nicola (2016). See next section.

Cf. Foster (2013), p. 59; Arnull (2006), p. 13.

See the list of languages in n 67.

Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Consolidated version of Protocol (No 3), annexed to the Treaties, as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 741/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 August 2012, [2012] O.J. L 228, p. 1.

Article 253 TFEU. See Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, [2012] O.J. L 265, pp. 1–42 (“ECJ Rules of Procedure”).

Article 19 (2) TEU.

Article 19 (2) TEU, Article 253 TFEU.

Arnull (2006), p. 20.

Article 253 TFEU.

Article 9 ECJ Statute. Cf. Arnull (2006), p. 20.

Article 19 (2) TEU, Article 253 TFEU.

Shaelou and Veraldi (2020), pp. 4−5. See, e.g., Ramón Margarit Panicello v Pilar Hernández Martínez, case no C-503/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:126, [2017] E.C.R—general, para. 37, and Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, case no C-64/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, [2018] E.C.R—general, para. 44. On the various mechanisms that should be in place to ensure judicial independence, see Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2010) Judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities, CM/R(2010)12.

Ibid., p. 19; see Shaelou and Veraldi (2020), p. 4.

Article 253 TFEU.

Cf. Shaelou and Veraldi (2020), p. 5. On the differences among the Member States, see Volcansek (2007), p. 368.

Article 253 TFEU.

Pointing to the “uncertainty” surrounding the term, Shaelou and Veraldi (2020), p. 5; see also Bobek (2015b), p. 289 [note 31], who speaks of an “amorphous” term.

Cf. Arnull (2006), p. 20; more information on the backgrounds of the judges can be found here: Brown and Kennedy (2000), pp. 58−63, 71−74. For a wider interpretation, see also Shaelou and Veraldi (2020), p. 5; Arnull (2006), p. 20; and the former EFTA Court President Baudenbacher (2016), p. 141.

Article 255 TFEU. The panel has published a report in 2019 elaborating on the considerations it takes into account in its assessment, including the candidates’ legal capabilities, their professional experience, their ability to perform the duties of a judge, their language skills, their ability to work as part of a team in an international environment, and whether their independence, impartiality, probity, and integrity are beyond doubt (see the Sixth activity report of the panel provided for by Article 255 of the TFEU, available at: https://​comite255.​europa.​eu/​documents/​5642886/​5678369/​6eme+Rapport+d%27activit%C3%A9+du+D255+-+EN.​pdf).

Article 4 ECJ Statute and Article 6 ECJ Statute.

Article 4 ECJ Statute.

Article 253 TFEU, Article 9a ECJ Statute.

Article 9 ECJ Rules of Procedure.

Article 9a ECJ Statute, Article 10 ECJ Rules of Procedure.

Article 253 TFEU.

Article 251 TFEU, Article 16 ECJ Statute. This includes cases under Article 228 (2), Article 245 (2), Article 247, or Article 286 (6) TFEU. Cf. Arnull (2006), p. 8.

Article 251 TFEU, Article 16 ECJ Statute, and Article 44 (3) ECJ Rules of Procedure. Cf. Arnull (2006), p. 8.

Derlén and Lindholm (2019), p. 1092.

Article 251 TFEU, Articles 16 and 17 ECJ Statute.

Article 19 (2) TEU. The minimum number of AGs required is eight, but the Council may, upon request by the Court, increase the number; cf. Article 252 TFEU. On the role of the AG, see Darmon (1988), Borgsmidt (1988) and Burrows and Greaves (2007a).

Burrows and Greaves (2007b), pp. 2−3 (highlighting that they are not identical, though); Darmon (1988), p. 427; Borgsmidt (1988), p. 106.

Turenne (2012), pp. 723–744; Tridimas (1997), pp. 1349–1387; Léger (2004), pp. 1–8; Burrows and Greaves (2007b), p. 2.

Article 252 TFEU, Article 20 ECJ Statute. Though not every case requires the involvement of an AG, cf. Article 20 ECJ Statute.

Burrows and Greaves (2007b), p. 5.

Tridimas (2012), p. 308, fn. 6 (“in the overwhelming majority of cases”). See also Arnull (2006), p. 15.

Article 19 (2) TEU, Article 253 TFEU, Article 255 TFEU, Articles 6 and 8 ECJ Statute. Some judges have been AGs before and vice versa; cf. Arnull (2006), p. 19, fn. 108.

Cf. Article 19 TEU and Articles 251−281 TFEU.

See, e.g., Articles 86−87 of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community 2019/C 384 I/01XT/21054/2019/INIT, [2019] O.J. C 384I, pp. 1–177.

Gruber (2018), p. 556.

Article 19 (3) (a) TEU, Articles 258–260 TFEU. On infringement proceedings, see Arnull (2006), pp. 34−52.

See France v United Kingdom, case no 141/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:225, [1979] E.C.R. 02923; Case 388/95 Belgium v Spain, case no 388/95, ECLI:EU:C:2000:244, [2000] E.C.R. I-03123; Spain v UK, case no C-145/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:543, [2006] E.C.R. I-07917; and Hungary v Slovakia, case no C-364/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:630, E.C.R.—general. Cf. Gormley (2022), p. 65.

Article 19 (3) (a) TEU, Article 263 TFEU. On the action for annulment, see Arnull (2006), pp. 53−94.

Article 263 TFEU.

Article 19 (3) (b) TEU, Article 267 TFEU.

Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 496. On the preliminary ruling procedure, see Broberg (2017); Arnull (2006), pp. 94−137.

Article 267 TFEU.

Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 496; Arnull (2006), p. 96. It would also go too far to interpret the mechanism as an additional vehicle to assess national provisions’ compatibility with EU law as the final decision in the case remains with the national court (even though the outcome is usually determined by the ECJ’s ruling); cf. Arnull (2006), pp. 95−96.

Ibid., p. 96.

Cf., e.g., Stone Sweet (2004) and Broberg (2017).

Jacob (2014), p. 19. See also Schepel and Blankenburg (2001), pp. 9, 41−42.

Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 497.

Stone Sweet (2004), p. 21. See also Weiler (1991, 1994).

Article 268 TFEU.

Article 51 ECJ Statute. However, these appeals are rarely successful. For example, in 2017, only two out of 21 appeals from the GC in damages cases were successful (European Ombudsman v Claire Staelen, case no C-337/15 P, ECLI:EU:C:2017:256, [2017] E.C.R.—general, and European Union Intellectual Property Office v European Dynamics Luxembourg SA and Others, case no C-677/15 P, ECLI:EU:C:2017:998, [2017] E.C.R.—general).

Article 265 TFEU.

Article 56 ECJ Statute.

Article 58 ECJ Statute. This is subject to Article 58a.

Article 256 (2) TFEU.

Article 20 ECJ Statute. In some cases, the oral part may be dispensed with, e.g. when an appeal is brought against a decision of the GC; cf. Article 59 ECJ Statute.

Article 36 ECJ Rules of Procedure. See the list of languages in n 67.

For this and the following, see Article 37 ECJ Rules of Procedure. Cf. Arnull (2006), p. 13, including fn. 65.

Cf. Foster (2013), p. 59; Arnull (2006), p. 13.

Article 143 ECJ Rules of Procedure.

Article 41 ECJ Rules of Procedure. See also Arnull (2006), p. 13.

On the GC, see Foster (2013), pp. 64−65.

Cf. Naômé (2018), pp. 1–16; Foster (2013), p. 64.

Rules of procedure of the General Court, [2015] O.J. L 105, pp. 1–66 (“GC Rules of Procedure”).

Article 19 TEU.

Ibid.

Article 48 ECJ Statute.

Article 19 (2) TEU, Article 254 TFEU.

Article 49 ECJ Statute.

Article 50 ECJ Statute.

Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 89.

Article 270 TFEU and Article 50a ECJ Statute.

These include actions or proceedings referred to in Articles 263, 265, 268, 270, and 272, including most direct actions (these include Article 263 annulment actions, Article 265 actions for failure to act, Article 340 damage actions) (Article 254 TFEU). See also Article 51 ECJ Statute.

258 and 259 TFEU.

Article 267 TFEU.

Article 256 (1) TFEU.

Article 257 TFEU. On the specialized courts, see Foster (2013), p. 55.

Some even proposed to create regional or decentralised EU courts to reduce the caseload, see, e.g. Rasmussen (2000) and Jaques and Weiler (1990).

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/1192 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 6 July 2016.

Independent boards of appeal can be found e.g. in the European Chemicals Agency (“ECHA”), in the EU Aviation Safety Agency (“EASA”), in the Community Plant Variety Office (“CPVO”), and in the EU Intellectual Property Office (“EUIPO”).

On the Court of Auditors, see Foster (2013), p. 66.

See the list in Komárek (2015), p. 31.

Foster (2013), p. 94.

See below Sect. 3.3.

See footnotes 93 and 108.

According to Article 51 TEU, protocols and annexes are part of the Treaties. An example is the ECJ Statute.

See, e.g., the most recent Treaty of Accession of Croatia, [2012] O.J. L 112.

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2016] O.J. C 202, pp. 391–407.

Articles 1 and 6 TEU and Article 1 (2) TFEU.

On general principles in EU law, see Tridimas (2006).

Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 142.

The Treaties mention general principles in two contexts. Article 6 (3) TEU provides: “[f]undamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law”. Further, Article 340 TFEU mentions general principles “common to the laws of the Member States” in the context of non-contractual liability.

Cf. Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 418.

Ibid., p. 143.

Schweitzer and Dederer (2016), p. 165. It has been observed that, at times, the CJEU heavily draws on principles of individual legal cultures (e.g. the German legal culture); see Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 143.

Such as the ban on discrimination in Article 12 TEC (now Article 18 TFEU).

See the ground-breaking judgment in Stauder (ECJ) (n 109). Other important milestones are Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (ECJ) (n 93); Nold (ECJ) (n 109); Rutili (ECJ) (n 109); Hauer (ECJ) (n 109).

Then Article 6 (1) and (2) TEU.

Examples of principles include the principle of proportionality (cf. Hermann Schräder HS Kraftfutter GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Gronau, case no C-265/87, ECLI:EU:C:1989:303, [1989] E.C.R. I-2237, para. 21. The principle is now enshrined in Article 5 (4) TEU), the protection of legitimate expectation (Westzucker GmbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Zucker, case no C-1/73, ECLI:EU:C:1973:78, [1973] E.C.R. I-723, paras. 10−13), the right to a fair hearing (Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, case no C-85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, [1979] E.C.R. I-461, para. 9), the principle of legality (Société nouvelle des usines de Pontlieue - Aciéries du Temple (S.N.U.P.A.T.) v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, joined cases nos C-42/59 and 49/59, ECLI:EU:C:1961:5, [1961] E.C.R. I-109, p. 87), the principle of legal certainty (Deuka / Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, case no C-78/74, ECLI:EU:C:1975:44, [1975] E.C.R. I-421, para. 14), and the principle of nulla poena sine lege (Alpha Steel Ltd. v Commission of the European Communities, case no C-14/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:76, [1982] E.C.R. I-749, para. 28). See further examples in Schweitzer and Dederer (2016), p. 166 [586]).

A. Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz, case no C-162/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:293, [1998] E.C.R. I-3655 (“Racke (ECJ)”).

Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp, case C-286/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:453, [1992] E.C.R. I-6019, paras. 9–10 (“Poulsen (ECJ)”); Racke (ECJ) (n 216), paras. 7; Kadi II (ECJ) (n 70), para. 291; and Hungary v Slovak Republic, case no 364/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:630, para. 44 (“Hungary v Slovak Republic (ECJ)”).

Article 5 (1) TFEU.

See Börzel and Risse (2000), p. 53; Börzel (2003), p. 3, and the discussion above in Sect. 1.2.1.

Article 5 (2) TFEU.

Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities, case no C-22/70, ECLI:EU:C:1971:32 (“European Agreement on Road Transport (ECJ)”).

Article 2 (1) TFEU.

Article 2 (2) TFEU.

Cf. Article 4 (1) TFEU.

Article 2 (5) TFEU.

Article 5 (1) and (2) TFEU.

Articles 25 et seq. TEU.

On this principle, see Craig and de Búrca (2020), pp. 126−127.

Article 5 (1) and (3) TEU. See also Consolidated version of the TFEU—Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, [2008] O.J. C 115, pp. 206–209. The parliaments of the Member States ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedure set out in this Protocol (Article 5 (3) TEU, see also Article 69 TFEU).

On the lawmaking procedure in the EU, see Foster (2013), pp. 120−125.

Article 24 (1), 31 TEU.

Article 289 (1) TFEU and Article 294 (2)−(15) TFEU. On the ordinary legislative procedure, see Foster (2013), pp. 121−123.

Article 289 (2) TFEU. On the special legislative procedure, see Foster (2013), pp. 123−124.

See the list in Article 288 TFEU.

Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 137.

Cf. Foster (2013), p. 98. See further below, Sect. 3.2.

See, for example, Article 82 (2) TFEU.

See, for example, Article 46 TFEU.

Article 5 (4) TFEU. Cf. Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 137.

Cf. Article 296 (1) TFEU.

Article 288 (2) TFEU. Cf. Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 138; Foster (2013), p. 99.

Cf. Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 138.

Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 138. See the judgment of the Court in Fratelli Variola S.p.A. v Amministrazione italiana delle Finanze, case no C-34/73, ECLI:EU:C:1973:101, [1973] E.C.R. I-981, para. 10.

Cf. Foster (2013), p. 99; Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 138. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, case no 128/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:32, [1979] E.C.R. 00419.

They do not necessarily need to be addressed to all Member States (cf. Article 288 (3) TFEU), though in practice they are (cf. Foster 2013, p. 99).

Cf. Foster (2013), p. 99.

Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 139.

Cf. the wording of Article 288 (3) TFEU.

Cf. Foster (2013), pp. 99, 164−165.

Foster (2013), p. 100.

Article 288 (4) TFEU.

Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 139.

On recommendations, see Foster (2013), p. 100.

See, e.g., Salvatore Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles, case C-322/88, ECLI:EU:C:1989:646, [1989] E.C.R. -04407; see also Foster (2013), p. 100.

See, e.g., Communication from the Commission—Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty, [2014] O.J. C 249, pp. 1–28. See also Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 140.

On the OMC, see the official website of the EU (2022), available at https://​eur-lex.​europa.​eu/​EN/​legal-content/​glossary/​open-method-of-coordination.​html.

Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 140: see also Foster (2013), pp. 115−116.

Article 289 (3) TFEU.

For this and the following, see Article 290 and 291 TFEU.

In EU terminology referred to as “comitology”. On “comitology”, see Türk (2015).

Cf. Hager (2009), p. 254; Tridimas (2012), pp. 307−308; Foster (2013), p. 64. On precedent in EU law, see, e.g., Komárek (2008–2009); Arnull (2006); Barceló (1997), pp. 407–436; Arnull (1993); Toth (1984); Koopmans (1982), pp. 11–27.

Tridimas (2012), p. 308. The expression was coined by Montesquieu (1748), who wrote that judges are “the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, inanimate beings who can moderate neither its force nor its rigor” (Engl. transl.).

Tridimas (2012), p. 308.

Ibid., p. 309; Arnull (1993), p. 252.

Ibid., p. 252.

Mackenzie Stuart and Warner (1981), p. 277.

Tridimas (2012), p. 309; Arnull (1993), p. 252. See, e.g., Gaetano Donà v Mario Mantero (Dona v Mantero), case no C-13/76, ECLI:EU:C:1976:115, [1976] E.C.R. I-1333; lexis de Norre and his wife Martine, née de Clercq v NV Brouwerij Concordia, case no C-47/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:11, [1977] E.C.R. I-65.

Tridimas (2012), p. 309. See, e.g., Merck & Co. Inc. v Stephar BV and Petrus Stephanus Exler, case no C-187/80, ECLI:EU:C:1981:180, [1981] E.C.R. I-2063, para. 12; Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft AEG-Telefunken AG v Commission of the European Communities, case no C-107/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:293, [1983] E.C.R. I-3151, para. 35; Timex v Council and Commission, case no C-264/82, ECLI:EU:C:1985:119, [1985] E.C.R. I-849, para. 16.

Tridimas (2012), p. 309. In 1993, Arnull observed that “[n]owadays, the Court frequently cites previous decisions in its judgments”, Arnull (1993), p. 252. Derlén and Lindholm (2014), p. 685, speak of a “dramatic” change in the Court’s practice; see also Derlén and Lindholm (2019), p. 1080.

Derlén and Lindholm (2019), p. 1074; Schermers and Waelbroeck (2001), p. 133. An explicit confirmation of the relevance of case law before the Court can be found in Article 99 ECJ Rules of Procedure, which regulates that “where a question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling is identical to a question on which the Court has already ruled, where the reply to such a question may be clearly deduced from existing case-law or where the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling admits of no reasonable doubt”, the Court may simply reply by order, not judgment, in which it refers to the previous decision. Cf. Arnull (1993), p. 252.

See examples in footnote 109.

Tridimas (2012), p. 310.

Arnull (1993), p. 251; Foster (2013), p. 64.

Tridimas (2012), p. 309, speaks of a dual role of precedent in this regard which serves as “a kind of self-legitimation”. See also Schermers and Waelbroeck (1987), p. 86.

Schermers and Waelbroeck (1987), p. 86; Barceló (1997), p. 434. See, however, Koopmans (1982), p. 17, who considers this explanation a “myth”. A final explanation could be that the Court uses case law as an instrument for “self-empowerment”; cf. Tridimas (2012), p. 309.

Arnull (1993), p. 248; Hager (2009), p. 255, speaks of a “factual binding effect” (“faktische Bindungswirkung”).

Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT and Others, case no C-176/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2, para. 50 (“Association de médiation sociale (ECJ)”).

Barceló (1997), p. 417, even claims that the Court “never” uses the term precedent. Others, however, do not shy away from using this term in the CJEU context; see, e.g., Derlén and Lindholm (2019), p. 1074. AGs also use this term occasionally; cf. Barceló (1997), p. 415. In some instances, the Court has acknowledged that the General Court’s judgments can “constitute a precedent for future cases”; cf. M v European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, case no C-197/09 RX-ll, ECLI:EU:C:2009:804, [2009] E.C.R. I-12033, para. 62; Oscar Orlando Arango Jaramillo and Others v European Investment Bank, case no C-334/12 RX-ll, ECLI:EU:C:2013:134, [2013] E.C.R. I-134, para. 50.

See, e.g., The Queen, on the application of M and Others v Her Majesty’s Treasury, case no C-340/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:232, [2010] E.C.R. I-3913, para. 44 (“M and Others (ECJ)”) (“settled case law”); Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace eV, case no C-34/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:669, [2011] I-9821, para. 25 (“Brüstle (ECJ)”) (“settled case law”); Winner Wetten GmbH v Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim, case no C-409/06, ECLI:EU:C:2010:503, [2010] E.C.R. I-08015, paras. 36, 39, 53, 55, and 58 (“settled case law”); TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, case no C-188/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:90, [1994] E.C.R. I-833, paras. 13 and 15 (“TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf (ECJ)”) (“settled law”); Halifax plc, Leeds Permanent Development Services Ltd and County Wide Property Investments Ltd v Commissioners of Customs & Excise, case no C-255/02, ECLI:EU:C:2006:121, [2006] E.C.R. I-1609, paras. 68 and 79 (“settled case law”). On the importance of settled case law in proceedings before the CJEU, see Lasser (2009), pp. 107–112. The term “settled case law” is equivalent to the German term ständige Rechtsprechung or the French term jurisprudence constante.

Cf. Tridimas (2012), p. 316. There are, however, exceptions of judgments in which the Court engages in a detailed discussion of earlier judgments, e.g. Rosa María Gavieiro (C-444/09) and Ana María Iglesias Torres (C-456/09) v Consellería de Educación e Ordenación Universitaria de la Xunta de Galicia, joined cases nos C-444/09 and C-456/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:819, [2010] E.C.R. I-14031, paras. 93−99.

Bobek (2015a), p. 170.

Ibid., p. 170 (“case positivism”).

As has been observed by Tridimas (2012), p. 308, collective judgments “are not fertile grounds for stare decisis”. On the style of ECJ judgments, see below Sect. 5.4.

Arnull (1993), p. 264; Tridimas (2012), p. 315.

Arnull (1993), p. 249; Toth (1984), pp. 36−42; Koopmans (1982), pp. 22−24; Tridimas (2012), p. 313, See, however, occasional references to the ratio decidendi by Advocates-General, e.g. the Opinion of Maduro AG in Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, case no C-127/08, ECLI:EU:C:2008:335, [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, para. 13 (“ratio decidendi”), and the Opinion of Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer AG in Commission of the European Communities v AssiDomän Kraft Products AB, Iggesunds Bruk AB, Korsnäs AB, MoDo Paper AB, Södra Cell AB, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB and Svenska Cellulosa AB, case no C-310/97 P, ECLI:EU:C:1999:407, [1999] E.C.R. I-05363, para. 70 (“ratio juris”).

Arnull (2006), p. 631; Tridimas (2012), p. 313.

Arnull (1993), p. 253.

Tridimas (2012), pp. 313−314. See, e.g., TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf (ECJ), paras. 19−24, which the Court distinguishes from the case Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke and Others v Bundesanstalt für landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, joined cases nos C-133/85−136/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:244, [1987] E.C.R. I-2289, and the case Universität Hamburg v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Kehrwieder, case no 216/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:248, [1983] E.C.R. 2771. Further examples from the 1980s and 1990s can be found here: Arnull (1993), pp. 259−261.

Tridimas (2012), p. 316. According to Tridimas (2012), the first case of express overruling was the SA CNL-SUCAL NV v HAG GF AG, case no C-10/89, ECLI:EU:C:1990:359, [1990] E.C.R. I-3711, para. 10, which overruled the previous Van Zuylen frères v Hag AG, case no C-192/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:72, [1974] E.C.R. I-731. A later famous example of express overruling is the case Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, joined cases nos C-267/91 and C-268/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:905, [1993] E.C.R. I-6097), which overruled the previous rulings of the Court in Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville, case no C-8/74, ECLI:EU:C:1974:82, [1974] E.C.R. I-837, and Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), case no C-120/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:42, [1979] E.C.R. I-649. Tridimas (2012), p. 316, calls Keck the “most spectacular departure from precedent in the Court’s history”. For more examples of express overruling, see Tridimas (2012), pp. 318−320.

See the examples from the 1980s and 1990s in Arnull (1993), pp. 253−258.

A case of implicit overruling that is mentioned by Tridimas (2012), p. 320, is the case Laboratoires pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA and Jean-Jacques Goupil v Commission of the European Communities, case no C-352/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:361, [2000] E.C.R. I-5291, in which the Court has overturned its earlier decisions in, for example, the case Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council of the European Communities, case no C-5/71, ECLI:EU:C:1971:116, [1971] E.C.R. I-975.

See Derlén and Lindholm (2014), p. 1083.

Ibid., pp. 1083−1092.

Derlén and Lindholm (2014), p. 1086; Jacob (2014), pp. 16−18.

For this and the following, see Derlén and Lindholm (2014), pp. 1092–1094.

Tridimas (2012), p. 308. See already, e.g., Opinion of Roemer AG in Société Fives Lille Cail and others v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, joined cases nos C-19/60, 21/60, 2/61, and 3/61, ECLI:EU:C:1961:22, [1961] E.C.R. English special edition 00281.

Arnull (1993), p. 263.

Article 61 ECJ Statute. Cf. Tridimas (2012), p. 308 [fn. 4]; Arnull (1993), p. 262.

Tridimas (2012), p. 308 [fn. 4]; Arnull (1993), p. 262.

Tridimas (2012), p. 308 [fn. 4]; Arnull (1993), pp. 262−263; Millett (1990), p. 74; Arnull (1993), p. 263.

Yassin Abdullah Kadi v European Commission, case no T-85/09, ECLI:EU:T:2010:418, [2010] E.C.R. II-05177, paras. 121 and 123 (“Kadi III (GC)”).

Arnull (1993), p. 262.

On the question of the extent to which courts of Member States are bound by decisions of the CJEU, see Toth (1984).

Hager (2009), p. 254.

Article 99 ECJ Rules of Procedure.

Komárek (2015), p. 31.

Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (ECJ) (n 93). Cf. Tridimas (2012), pp. 308−309.

Komárek (2015), p. 31.

See, e.g., Opinion of Villalón AG in eDate Advertising GmbH v X and Olivier Martinez and Robert Martinez v MGN Limited, joined cases nos C-509/09 and C-161/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:192, [2011] E.C.R. I-10269, e.g. fn. 42, 45 (“AG Villalón in eDate Advertising (ECJ)”) (including European and non-European courts).

Frederiksen (2009), p. 211; Martens (2013), p. 290; Picod (2009), pp. 145, 147. See also Komárek (2015), p. 44, who does not include scholarship in the list of the sources that the ECJ can legitimately use in the justification of its decisions. See the critique by Schmidt (2015), pp. 273−275.

See Bragdø-Ellenes and Nguyên Duy, Sect. 5.6.

Kadi III (GC) (n 304), para. 115. This example is from Martens (2013), pp. 290−291. The CJEU judgment is Kadi II (ECJ) (n 70).

Martens (2013), p. 291.

See, e.g., Opinion of Maduro AG in Kadi II (n 70), ECLI:EU:C:2008:11, para. 35, fn. 41 (referring to Montesquieu (1748): “Il y a des cas où il faut mettre, pour un moment, un voile sur la liberté, comme l’on cache les statues des dieux”).

Cf. Picod (2009), pp. 145, 153; Martens (2013), p. 291.

For this and the following, see de Witte (2008); Martens (2013), pp. 287–289. Martens is critical of the fragmentation of EU law scholarship. On the idea of a European Staatsrechtswissenschaft, see von Bogdandy (2009).

This author cannot claim to be immune to such critique. This chapter relies largely on German and English scholarship.

Martens (2013), p. 289, speaks of the risk of a Gerichtshofspositivismus (transl. “judicial positivism”).

Lando and Beale (1999).

von Bar et al. (2009).

Cf. Martens (2013), p. 288.

Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, case no 8-55, ECLI:EU:C:1956:7, [1954−1956] E.C.R. English special edition 00245. The principle of proportionality is strongly embedded in German administrative law (cf. Schwarze 2006, pp. 685−686) but can also be found in many other EU Member States’ legal cultures. However, it may differ in detail; cf. Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 583; Schwarze (2006), pp. 680−685. On this principle, see Craig and de Búrca (2020), pp. 583−591; Foster (2013), pp. 86−87; de Búrca (1993).

Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (ECJ) (n 93); For a more recent judgment, see The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd, case no C-491/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:741, [2002] E.C.R. I-11453, para. 122 (“BAT (ECJ)”).

BAT (ECJ) (n 328), para. 122. See also Maizena Gesellschaft mbH and others v Bundesanstalt für landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, case 137/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:493, [1987] E.C.R. 4587, para. 15; ADM Ölmühlen GmbH and Ölwerke Spyck v Bundesanstalt für landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, case no C-339/92, ECLI:EU:C:1993:324, [1993] E.C.R. I-6473, para. 15; and Käserei Champignon Hofmeister GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, case no C-210/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:440, [2002] E.C.R. I-6453, para. 59.

Craig and de Búrca (2020), pp. 584−591; Tridimas (2006).

Cf. Craig (2014), p. 14.

Cf. Craig and de Búrca (2020), pp. 584−585.

BAT (ECJ) (n 328), para. 123; The Queen, on the application of Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, case C-58/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:321, [2010] E.C.R. I-04999, para. 52.

Cf. Craig and de Búrca (2020), pp. 586−587. See, e.g., Council of the European Union v Heidi Hautala, case no C-353/99 P, ECLI:EU:C:2001:661, [2001] E.C.R. I-09565.

Cf. Craig and de Búrca (2020), pp. 584−585. See, e.g., Rutili (ECJ) (n 109) (free movement of workers) and Johannes Henricus Maria van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, case no 33–74, ECLI:EU:C:1974:131, [1974] E.C.R. -01299 (freedom to provide services).

See above Sect. 3.1.1.

Such as the ban on discrimination in Article 12 TEC (now Article 18 TFEU).

See the “Solange” jurisprudence of the FCC, n 109.

See footnote 125.

Then Article 6 (1) and (2) TEU.

By virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter enjoys equal rank as the Treaties, cf. Article 6 (1) TEU.

Article 1 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. On human rights as a basis for justice in the EU, see Douglas-Scott (2017).

See above, Sect. 3.3.1.

See above, Sect. 3.

See above, Sect. 3.3.

Ibid.

Cf. Martens (2013), p. 330. See the overview of this discussion, in Anweiler (1997), pp. 76−84.

Martens (2013), p. 335. See also Opinion 1/91, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490, [1991] E.C.R. I-6079; and Opinion 1/92, ECLI:EU:C:1992:189, [1992] E.C.R. I-2821.

Martens (2013), p. 336. See constant jurisprudence of the CJEU: Nicolaus Corman & Fils SA v Hauptzollamt Gronau, case no C-64/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:5, [1982] E.C.R. I-13, para. 8; Ekro BV Vee- en Vleeshandel v Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, case no C-327/82, ECLI:EU:C:1984:11, [1984] E.C.R. I-107, para. 11; Grand Duchy of Luxemburg v Berthe Linster, Aloyse Linster and Yvonne Linster, case no C-287/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:468, [2000] E.C.R. I-6917, para. 43; Adolf Truley GmbH v Bestattung Wien GmbH, case no C-373/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:110, [2003] I-1931, para. 35; Vereniging van Educatieve en Wetenschappelijke Auteurs (VEWA) v Belgische Staat, case no C-271/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:442, [2011] E.C.R. I-0000, para. 25; Brüstle (ECJ) (n 282), para. 25; Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA and PPHU ‘ADAX’/Ryszard Adamiak v Christianapol sp. z o.o, case no C-116/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:739, [2012] E.C.R. I-0000, para. 49; Pie Optiek SPRL v Bureau Gevers SA and European Registry for Internet Domains ASBL, case no C-376/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:502, [2012] E.C.R. I-0000, para. 33; Yaesu Europe BV v Bundeszentralamt für Steuern, case no C-433/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:750, [2009] E.C.R. I-11487, para. 18; Nokia Corp. v Joacim Wärdell, case no C-316/05, ECLI:EU:C:2006:789, [2006] E.C.R. I-12083, para. 21.

Hager (2009), pp. 251−252.

Martens (2013), p. 338.

Cf. Article 55 TEU and Article 53 TEU. See the list of languages in n 67.

Martens (2013), p. 340. See also Article 33 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”).

See, e.g., Internetportal und Marketing GmbH v Richard Schlicht, case no C-569/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:311, [2010] E.C.R. I-4871, para. 33, with further references to the case law of the CJEU on this point. See also the references in Martens (2013), p. 340, fn. 224.

See, e.g., Martens (2013), p. 338. See also the overview of the discussion and the references in Müller and Christensen (2002), pp. 31−42. See, e.g., Opinion of Lagrange AG in Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v Robert Bosch GmbH and Maatschappij tot voortzetting van de zaken der Firma Willem van Rijn, case no C-13-61, ECLI:EU:C:1962:3, p. 70, who stated that “[a]s you know, all… languages are authentic, which means that no single one of them is authentic”.

Hager (2009), p. 251; Müller and Christensen (2002), p. 31.

Hager (2009), p. 251.

Hager (2009), p. 251; Martens (2013), p. 340. See, e.g., M and Others (ECJ) (n 282), para. 44, with further references to the case law of the CJEU on this point.

Hager (2009), pp. 251−252.

Hager (2009), p. 252; Leible and Domröse (2015), p. 146.

Cf. Martens (2013), p. 378.

Hager (2009), p. 252; Müller and Christensen (2002), pp. 62−63. This finds support, e.g., in the cases Jean Humblet v Kingdom of Belgium, case no C-6/60, [1960] E.C.R. 01125, ECLI:EU:C:1960:48, and European Parliament v Council of the European Communities, case C-70/88, [1990] E.C.R. I-02041, ECLI:EU:C:1990:217.

Hager (2009), p. 252; Martens (2013), p. 394.

Hager (2009), p. 252.

Martens (2013), p. 379.

Ibid., pp. 398−399.

Hager (2009), pp. 250−251, 253; Foster (2013), p. 63.

Cf. ibid., p. 63.

See, e.g., Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian Republic, joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, [1991] E.C.R. I-05357, ECLI:EU:C:1991:428, para. 32; Franz Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein, case no C-9/70, ECLI:EU:C:1970:78, [1970], para. 5.

See above Sect. 3.1.2.1.

See above Sect. 5.2.

Cf. Martens (2013), p. 294.

Article 36, sentence 1, reads: “Judgments shall state the reasons on which they are based.” This provision also applies to the GC; cf. Article 53 ECJ Statute and Article 7 annexed to the Statute.

Tridimas (2012), p. 308.

Bobek (2015a), p. 169.

Tridimas (2012), p. 308; Komárek (2015), pp. 49−50; Bobek (2015a), p. 169 (clothed in an “immutable and fixed structure” and “dry and technical language”).

Ibid., p. 169.

Ibid., p. 169; see also Barceló (1997), p. 411.

Tridimas (2012), p. 315.

Komárek (2015), pp. 49−50.

Bobek (2015a), pp. 169–170. Tridimas (2012), p. 308; Lasser (2009), p. 107, speak of an impression of “imperial confidence”.

Komárek (2015), pp. 49−50, describes the approach of the Court as being “inconsistent”.

Bobek (2015a), p. 169; Barceló (1997), p. 411.

Bobek (2015a), p. 169; Foster (2013), p. 60; Barceló (1997), p. 411.

Komárek (2015), pp. 49−50; Bobek (2015a), p. 169.

Bobek (2015a), pp. 169−170; Andenas and Fairgrieve (2014), p. 383.

Bobek (2015a), p. 170.

Ibid., pp. 171−172.

Article 36 ECJ Rules of Procedure. See the list of languages in n 67.

As such, the Court is often described as a “Court French”; cf. Komárek (2015), pp. 49−50.

Bobek (2015a), pp. 171−172.

McAuliffe (2013), p. 485; see also Komárek (2015), pp. 49−50.

Gaja (1994), pp. 1966−1976; Barceló (1997), p. 434.

Weiler (2001b), p. 225; see also Barceló (1997), pp. 434–435; Lasser (2009), p. 351; Foster (2013), p. 60.

Lord Melville quote by Brown and Jacob (1977), p. 55.

Tridimas (2012), p. 308. Lasser (2009), p. 107; see also Barceló (1997), p. 411 (“magisterial”).

Gaja (1994), pp. 1966−1976.

Weiler (2001b), p. 225; see also Barceló (1997), pp. 434–435; Lasser (2009), p. 351.

Cartabia (2009), pp. 30−31; Weiler (2001b), p. 225; Barceló (1997), p. 434; Lasser (2009), p. 351.

Cf. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore (2012).

Weiler (2001b), p. 225.

Frederiksen (2009), p. 212; Bobek (2015a), pp. 171−172.

Bobek (2015a), pp. 171−172.

Article 253 TFEU. See above Sects. 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.

The situation in international law is similar and has triggered a debate on a plurality of international legal systems minted in national legal systems; cf. Roberts (2017).

Article 253 TFEU. See above Sects. 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.

On some of the challenges that follow from this plurality, see Hellwig (2003–2004a, 2003–2004b).

See Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities, and Recommendation No. R(2000)21 on the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer.

Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained. On the regulation of the legal profession in the EU, see Nascimbene (2009).

Other EU legal instruments include, e.g., Directive 77/249/EEC and Directive 2005/36/EC.

Other associations that represent the legal profession at the EU level are, e.g., the European Union of Rechtspfleger (“EUR”), the International Union of Judicial Officers (“UIHJ”), the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE), and the Council of the Notariats of the European Union (“CNUE”).

Molnár (2021), pp. 2−3.

Klabbers (2015), p. 53. The Treaties are largely silent on the relationship between EU law and international law (one of the exceptions is Article 351 TFEU). As such, much of the law has been developed by the CJEU; cf. ibid., p. 55.

On the conceptual framework of “openness” and “counter-limits”, see Paulus (2014), Paulus and Leiss (2018), and Paulus and Hinselmann (2019). On the concept of “counter-limits” and its application by national courts vis-à-vis the EU, see n 108.

Article 47 TEU. Cf. de Witte (2014), p. 192; Eeckhout (2011), p. 3. For the EC, see already Article 281 EC and the seminal judgment in European Agreement on Road Transport (ECJ) (n 221).

Molnár (2021), p. 3; see, however, Klabbers (2015), pp. 62−63, who considers the EU’s approach to be rather “ambivalent” and “hardly… völkerrechtsfreundlich”.

Molnár (2021), p. 3.

See, for example, Poulsen (ECJ) (n 217), paras. 9–10; Racke (ECJ) (n 216), paras. 7; Kadi II (ECJ) (n 70), para. 291; and Hungary v Slovak Republic (ECJ) (n 217), para. 44.

These include, e.g., international trade and fisheries; cf. de Witte (2014), p. 192.

Cf. de Witte (2014), p. 192.

Molnár (2021), p. 3.

Cf. Klabbers (2015), p. 52. See, however, de Witte (2014), p. 175 (with qualifications still an international organization).

Kadi II (ECJ) (n 70) can therefore be understood as a logical sequel to the seminal judgments Van Gend en Loos (ECJ) (n 93); Costa v E.N.E.L. (ECJ) (n 93) postulating the internal autonomy of the EU vis-à-vis its Member States.

See the discussion in Sect. 1.2.1.

See, e.g., Kadi II (ECJ) (n 70); Opinion 2/13, 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454 (“Opinion 2/13 (ECJ)”), and Slowakische Republik v Achmea BV, case C-284/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158.

Cf de Búrca (2010), pp. 44 ff.

Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, case no T-315/01, ECLI:EU:T:2005:332, [2005] E.C.R. II-03649 (“Kadi I (GC)”), paras. 192–207, but see ibid., para. 208, and Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation, case no T-306/01, ECLI:EU:T:2005:33, [2005] E.C.R. II-03533 (“Yusuf (GC)”), paras. 242–257, but see ibid., para. 258.

Ibid., para. 24.

Kadi II (ECJ) (n 70). See also Kadi III (GC) (n 304), European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi, joined cases no C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:518, [2013] E.C.R. 0000, and Faraj Hassan and Chafiq Ayadi v Council of the European Union and European Commission, joined cases C-399/06 P and C-403/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:748, [2009] E.C.R. I-11393. See further Bank Melli Iran v Council of the European Union, case no C-548/09 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:137, [2011] E.C.R. I-11381. See, however, the GC in Kadi I (GC) (n 433), in Yusuf (GC) (n 431), and in Faraj Hassan v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, case no Case T-49/04, ECLI:EU:T:2006:201, [2006] ERC II-00052.

Kadi II (ECJ) (n 70), paras. 282−285. See also the judgment in Omar Mohammed Othman v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, case no T-318/01, ECLI:EU:T:2009:187 [2009] E.C.R. II-01627, in which the GC followed the EJC’s Kadi II decision.

Lenaerts (2014). As such, the ECJ’s approach is quite similar to the “identity” control applied by some EU Member States’ courts vis-à-vis EU law; see the references in n 108.

Article 6 (2) TEU. See also Article 59 ECHR (“the European Union may accede to this Convention”), as amended by Protocol No. 14 to the Convention, which entered into force on 1 June 2010.

Opinion 2/13 (ECJ) (n 429). See also Opinion 2/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1996 I-01759, ECLI:EU:C:1996:140 (“Opinion 2/94”), in which the CJEU declared that the EU Treaties did not provide a sufficient legal basis for the EU joining the ECHR. The Treaty of Lisbon has introduced a legal basis for the EU’s accession to the ECHR (Article 6 (2) TEU). This effectively made ECJ’s Opinion 2/94 objections obsolete.

See, e.g., Nold (ECJ) (n 109); Hauer (ECJ) (n 109).

Lavranos (2010), p. 6. See, e.g., Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department, case no C-60/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:434, [2002] E.C.R. I-6279; Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, case no C-413/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:493, [2002] E.C.R. I-7091. For an early excellent analysis, see Pernice (1979).

See, e.g., Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Aruba, case no C-17/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:70, [2000] E.C.R. I-675; Eirini Lechouritou and Others v Dimosio tis Omospondiakis Dimokratias tis Germania, case no C-292/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:102, [2007] E.C.R. I-1519.

Lavranos (2010), p. 7.

See already the seminal judgments in Van Gend en Loos (ECJ) (n 93); Costa v E.N.E.L. (ECJ) (n 93). More recently again in Kadi II (ECJ) (n 70).

Cf. Lavranos (2010), pp. 2 and 15.

Lavranos (2010), p. 15.

Ibid., p. 15.

Ibid., p. 6; Klabbers (2015), p. 65.

Lavranos (2010), p. 4, referring to Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio SpA (FIAMM) and Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio Technologies LLC (C-120/06 P), Giorgio Fedon & Figli SpA and Fedon America, Inc. (C-121/06 P) v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, joined cases no C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2008:476, [2008] E.C.R. I 6513. See further: Jans and Lavranos (2009), pp. 356−362. See for an illustrative summary of the ECJ’s approach: Portuguese Republic v Council of the European Union, case no C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574, [1999] E.C.R. I-8395, paras. 40−47; see further the discussion in Lavranos (2005), pp. 449−460; Antoniadis (2005), pp. 460−476; and the critique of the CJEU’s approach in Lavranos (2010), p. 5.

Lavranos (2010), p. 6. with reference to the relevant case law. Bronckers (2008), pp. 885−898, refers to a “muted dialogue” between the CJEU and the WTO Appellate Body; see also Lavranos (2010), p. 6.