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Published in:
Legal Cultures: Combining Diversity and Structure Read chapter Read first chapter

2023 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

An Introduction to Italian Legal Culture

Authors : Esmeralda Colombo, Lars Kvestad

Published in: Handbook on Legal Cultures

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Italy’s contribution to legal cultures in Europe and beyond is phenomenal as the country is often viewed as the source of the civil law tradition. Given the country’s kaleidoscopic history and relatively short unitary experience, however, the very quandary to confront head-on is whether the Italian legal culture exists, or is rather a conceptual artefact. After examining Italy’s socio-cultural context and legal history, this chapter establishes that the enabling conditions for the emergence of an Italian legal culture have not surfaced before 1861. To establish whether the Italian legal culture has formed after 1861, this analysis sheds thus light on the elements of the legal cultural model and their interaction. This chapter finds that the legal cultural model enables the articulation of significative and surprising aspects of what we can safely hold to be the Italian legal culture. Notably, to bring some order to the hyperlegalization of social life, courts have emerged as crucial enablers of legal-cultural unity in Italy. Particularly, Italian courts have devised substantive and institutional strategies drifting Italy toward new legal-cultural shores, notably a system that we call “attenuated stare decisis,” and judicial lawmaking confrontations even with the International Court of Justice. Overall, rather than a “majoritarian” model of power-sharing, courts have tried to secure a “Madisonian” model where justices, professionals, and doctrine are interpreters of societal changes and needs, often in opposition to a fragmented political system.

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previous chapter An Introduction to Hungarian Legal Culture
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Footnotes
1
See Sunde (this volume), Sect. 3.
 
2
Tuori (2002), p. 40.
 
3
See Sunde (this volume), Sect. 6.
 
4
Tuori (2002), pp. 154 ff.
 
5
Sunde (2005), pp. 27–31.
 
6
On interactions, see also Sunde (this volume).
 
7
Pliny the Elder, Historia naturalis, Book III v.38.
 
8
Territorio e ambiente (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, 2016), p. 6 and https://​www.​tuttitalia.​it/​province/​popolazione/​. On the trope of Italy as a land of cities, see Bispham (2007), p. 43.
 
9
Galli della Loggia (1998), pp. 8–9.
 
10
Ibid, p. 15.
 
11
E.g., French, German, Slovene, Croatian, Albanian Arbëresh, Greek, and Catalan, see https://​www.​britannica.​com/​place/​Italy/​Languages.
 
14
Territorio e ambiente, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, p. 5.
 
16
Cittadini non comunitari: presenza, nuovi ingressi e acquisizioni di cittadinanza, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, 14 November 2018.
 
17
Ibid.
 
21
“Agricultura” in Annuario Statistico Italiano, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica 2017, p. 450.
 
24
Galli della Loggia (1998), pp. 59 ff.
 
25
Padoa-Schioppa (2010), pp. 21–29.
 
26
Ibid, p. 22. The two sources of law were what we would now call case law (rescripta) and general law (edicta).
 
27
The Corpus Juris Civilis is a compilation of classical and late classical Roman law.
 
28
Padoa-Schioppa (2010), p. 23.
 
29
Ibid, p. 23.
 
30
On the influence of the Arab legal method and jury on England through Sicily, see Watanabe (2012), p. 74.
 
31
See Brundage (2008), p. 82.
 
32
On references to Roman law in the Decretum Gratiani, see Winroth (2008).
 
33
Padoa-Schioppa (2010), p. 24. Within this phase, the school of glossators started in Bologna, see Domingo (2018), Chapter 6.
 
34
Padoa-Schioppa (2010), p. 26.
 
35
Northern Italy was under the French influence from 1797 to 1814 with a blip from 1799 to 1801. While Northern Italy was only formally independent from France, Naples was an independent republic in 1799 and a kingdom from 1805 to 1815, often but not always under the influence of France.
 
36
Padoa-Schioppa (2010), p. 42. Murat’s Proclama di Rimini is often entwined with the beginning of Risorgimento.
 
37
Galli della Loggia (1998), p. 61.
 
38
Ibid, p. 62.
 
39
Ibid, p. 77.
 
40
Ibid, pp. 59–84.
 
42
Padoa-Schioppa (2010), pp. 37–38.
 
43
The Liber Augustalis is also called the Constitutions of Melfi. It was promulgated by Frederick II, then King of Sicily, King of Italy, and Holy Roman Emperor.
 
44
D’Amico (2008), p. 245.
 
45
On the doctrine of sources of law, see infra Sect. 3.2.1.
 
46
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 3.
 
47
On the personalist principle and equality, see infra Sect. 5.
 
48
On the democratic principle, consider that the Constitution sets forth the requirement of democracy for both political parties and unions, which has not been implemented.
 
49
See infra Sect. 3.2.3.
 
50
On the republican principle, see in this sub-section. On the internationalist and pacifist principle, see infra Sect. 7.3.2.
 
51
C.​C.​ Decision 1146/1988 (authors’ translation), para 2.1.
 
52
Italian Constitution, Article 139; Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 14.
 
53
C.​C.​ Decision 1146/1988, para 2.1. This is known as the “counter-limits” theory, which was first deployed by the Constitutional court vis-à-vis the European Communities. See C.​C.​ Decision 183/1973 and infra Sect. 7.
 
54
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 10 and C.C. Decision 7/1996.
 
55
C.C. Decision 1/2013. This type of interpretation is termed logic-systematic by Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 17.
 
56
See, e.g., C.C. Decision 80/2010. Such construction mirrors the German Constitutional Court’s theory of Wesensgehalt, which is often recalled by the Italian doctrine. See Koch (this volume).
 
57
See infra Sect. 4.
 
58
D’Amico (2008), p. 245.
 
59
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 10 and C.C. Decision 7/1996.
 
60
The reckoning includes ordinary laws, law-decrees, legislative decrees and regional laws; see Finizio (2015). On these types of legislative instruments, see infra Sect. 3.2.
 
61
Delzio (2017).
 
62
See Canzio (2017), p. 4.
 
63
Baschiera (2006), p. 288.
 
64
Provisions on the law in general (premised to the civil code), Article 1.
 
65
By law, we refer to either constitutional or ordinary law. We refer to ordinary laws, when non-constitutional laws are passed by the Parliament in the ordinary legislative process. We refer to law decrees and legislative decrees when non-constitutional laws are not passed by the Parliament in the ordinary legislative process, yet enjoy the same legislative status as ordinary laws.
 
66
A constitutional reform was passed in 2019 by Parliament and confirmed in 2020 by referendum to downsize the number of members of parliament from 945 to 600. Different types of voting procedures are available, with a variable degree of autonomy of the commission discussing the bills vis-à-vis the full chamber. Notwithstanding, both chambers represent the whole of the people, rather than regions or municipalities.
 
67
On the violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, due to the lack of independence and impartiality of the judicial section of the chamber of deputies in a particular labor dispute, see Savino and Others v Italy App no(s) 17214/05, 20329/05, 42113/04 (ECHR, 28 April 2009).
 
68
On monism in norm production as a model, see Comba (2002), pp. 47 ff.
 
69
Italian Constitution, Article 76.
 
70
Italian Constitution, Article 77.
 
71
C.C. Decision 360/1996 and Barsotti et al. (2015), p. 166.
 
72
Ibid, p. 165.
 
73
Macchia (2013), p. 262.
 
74
See Sect. 2.3.2 above on the constitutional principle of regionalism.
 
75
Benvenuti (2015), p. 391.
 
76
Barsotti et al. (2015), pp. 186 ff.
 
77
It should be recalled that regions are enabled to pass laws also in domains of exclusive state legislation, where the role of state legislation is to guarantee a baseline. See Paolo Stella Richter, “I rapporti tra legislazione statale e legislazione regionale,” pp. 3–5, available at http://​www.​dsg.​univr.​it/​documenti/​Iniziativa/​dall/​dall353864.​pdf. Similarly, exclusive state legislation at times needs to be so sweeping as to have an impact on both concurrent and residual legislation. This type of matters is called “cross-cutting.” See Barsotti et al. (2015), pp. 195 ff. Sweeping state legislation has been approved by the Constitutional Court also in matters that were concurrent in kind, where in principle the State can solely pass framework laws or principles. These are called “catch-all” competences. See Barsotti et al. (2015), pp. 197–198.
 
78
Interestingly, the provisions in the Constitution refer to fundamental principles to be set forth by the state (Article 117(3)). Truly, the Constitutional Court has allowed the State to set forth “detailed principles,” see Barsotti et al. (2015), pp. 198–199.
 
79
Stella Richter, “I rapporti tra legislazione statale e legislazione regionale,” pp. 5–6.
 
80
Ibid, p. 7.
 
81
Italian Constitution, Article 120. Such substitution power can be wielded also vis-à-vis metropolitan cities, provinces, and municipalities.
 
82
Stella Richter, “I rapporti tra legislazione statale e legislazione regionale,” p. 14. See Barsotti et al. (2015), pp. 194–195, who identify such a trend only lately.
 
83
Barsotti et al. (2015), p. 195.
 
84
Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardegna, Sicilia, Trentino-Alto Adige, and Valle d’Aosta.
 
86
Ordinary regions have the power to lay down their charter, which in no way may be qualified as a constitution, as the charter itself needs to conform to the Italian Constitution, Barsotti et al. (2015), pp. 190–191. Within regions, charters are hierarchically superior to the other norms passed by the regions. Regions must follow special procedures for the approval of charters, but the approval of the central government is not required.
 
88
See Sect. 2.3.2 above.
 
89
In 1946, a treaty was signed between Italy and Austria on the conditions of autonomy of Südtirol, which would nevertheless belong to Italy.
 
90
The level of government deploying administrative powers should be adequate and tailored to the capacity of the particular level of government, see Article 118 of the Italian Constitution.
 
91
One of the most important statutes regulating the subject is Law n. 400/1988.
 
92
See http://​www.​treccani.​it/​enciclopedia/​regolamento-dir-cost_​(Diritto-on-line)/​, and Macchia (2013), p. 265. On the criticism of rule-making power as assigned to entities that are often remote from the citizens, such as the Ministers rather than municipalities, see Mattarella (2010), p. 347.
 
93
Mattarella (2010), p. 351.
 
94
Ibid, p. 345.
 
95
Disposizioni sulla legge in generale, Article 8.
 
96
Italian Constitution, Article 10.
 
97
Literally, Padoa-Schioppa (2010), p. 526 refers to “the deep crisis of the normative system” (authors’ translation).
 
98
Livingston et al. (2015), pp. 143–144.
 
99
Padoa-Schioppa (2010), p. 522. The same author considers the architecture of the Italian civil code more harmonic and rational than the BGB and the Swiss Civil Code.
 
100
Livingston et al. (2015), p. 193.
 
101
On these categories, see Cartabia (2016), p. 42.
 
102
The amount of decisions and orders varies from year-to-year, from 592 (in 2000) to 276 (in 2015). See the time span 1997–2017 in Verrengia et al. (2018), p. 7.
 
103
Baschiera (2006), p. 324.
 
104
Cartabia (2016), p. 38.
 
105
Ibid, p. 39.
 
106
Simoncini (2016), p. 86, and C.C. Decision 1/56. As known, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) established constitutional judicial review on the part of the US Supreme Court and is one of the most paradigmatic decisions in judicial review matters.
 
107
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 14. On Drittwirkung, see Baschiera (2006), p. 291. See also Koch (this volume), Sect. 2.4.
 
108
Macchia (2013), p. 270.
 
109
Pizzorusso (1990), p. 381.
 
110
Macchia (2013), p. 269.
 
111
Ibid, pp. 283–284.
 
112
Zicchittu (2015), p. 246.
 
113
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 2.
 
114
For further depth, see Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 7; Zicchittu (2015), pp. 245–246; Simoncini (2016), p. 87.
 
115
C.C. Decision 1/2013, para 10. Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 28.
 
116
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 16.
 
117
Ibid, pp. 28 and 34.
 
118
Ibid, p. 34.
 
119
Ibid, p. 13.
 
120
D’Amico (2008), p. 239.
 
121
Ibid.
 
122
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 19.
 
123
Ibid.
 
124
Cartabia (2016), p. 52. See D’Amico (2008), p. 231, who cautions against the risk that leaning on precedents may empty the particular decision of internal coherence. Until 2001, the Court has declared unconstitutionality for violation of its own case law six times, see D’Amico (2008), pp. 242–243, fn. 123.
 
125
Groppi and Spigno (2014), pp. 19–20.
 
126
Ibid, pp. 14–15.
 
127
Ibid, p. 20.
 
128
Ibid, p. 20. See also p. 15.
 
129
Ibid, p. 28.
 
130
The systematic interpretation may be aligned with coherent interpretation in the German legal culture, see Koch (this volume), Sect. 5.4.
 
131
Groppi and Spigno (2014), pp. 17 and 29. The subject is discussed twice in the paper.
 
132
Zicchittu (2015), pp. 242–243. See, however, Article 28, Law 87/1953 and Article 134 of the Italian Constitution, preventing the Court from exercising powers belonging to political institutions, as reported by Zicchittu (2015), p. 236.
 
133
Zicchittu (2015), p. 248. The Court has also declined jurisdiction, most likely on a political question basis, see Zicchittu (2015), p. 230.
 
134
See for other strategies to cope with politically charged matters, ibid, pp. 233–234.
 
135
Ibid, p. 250.
 
136
See also Koch (this volume), Sect. 2.4; Lachmayer and Sonntag (this volume), Sects. 2.2.3 and 4.2. See also Zicchittu (2015), p. 247.
 
137
Zicchittu (2015), p. 233.
 
138
Baschiera (2006), pp. 318–319.
 
139
On the symbol ↔, see bijective functions in Tao (2015), p. 55.
 
140
Zicchittu (2015), p. 252.
 
141
Cartabia (2016), p. 49; Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 11. The theory of consistent interpretation was first made explicit in C.C. Decision 356/1996. See also C.C. Decision 23/2011; C.C. Decision 200/2012 and C.C. Decision 1/2013.
 
142
Calamandrei (1965), p. 372.
 
143
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 30.
 
144
Ibid, p. 11.
 
145
See infra Sect. 4.
 
146
Cappelletti (1981), p. 381; Bussani (2016), p. 24.
 
147
Bussani (2016), p. 24.
 
148
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 11.
 
149
Simoncini (2016), p. 88; Cartabia (2016), pp. 48–49. Cf. what appears to be an endorsement of the interpretation rendered by lower judges in C.C. Decision 33/1981, para 2.
 
150
See C.C. Decision 379/2000 and C.C. Decision 338/2011. See Salvato (2018), p. 4. Cf C.C. Decision 242/2008, where the Constitutional Court asserts to evaluate the constancy and repetition of the Court of Cassation’s interpretation, but fails to define such features.
 
151
See Salvato (2018), p. 3. Cf. reference to the case law and doctrine in Order n. 237/2001.
 
152
On the stare decisis principle with regard to the Court of Cassation, see infra Sect. 3.4.2.
 
153
Cartabia (2016), pp. 85–86.
 
154
Zicchittu (2015), p. 236.
 
155
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 9.
 
156
Ibid, p. 12.
 
157
Cartabia (2016), p. 46.
 
158
Ibid.
 
159
Ibid, pp. 46–47.
 
160
Press of the Office of the Constitutional Court, Press Release of 11 January 2020, https://​www.​cortecostituzion​ale.​it/​documenti/​comunicatistampa​/​Press_​release_​AC.​pdf. It is important to note that the press release was in English, probably as a means of dialogue with other constitutional courts and the academia.
 
161
On the relational character of the court, see Cartabia (2016), p. 42. On relationality as the European style of constitutional adjudication, see Popelier (2016), passim.
 
162
Groppi (2016), p. 7; D’Amico (2008), p. 246.
 
163
Groppi (2012).
 
164
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 2: “an important feature of Italian constitutionalism lies in the fact that constitutional change has largely taken place informally – that is, outside of the rules established for the enactment of formal amendments – in a variety of forms: ordinary laws with constitutional effects (such as electoral laws or the Standing Orders of each Chamber of the Parliament), constitutional conventions and practices, European law, and, last but not least, decisions of the Constitutional Court.”
 
165
Canzio (2017), p. 1.
 
166
Lucia Tria, “La funzione di nomofilachia della Corte di cassazione alla luce dei principi del giusto processo di derivazione europea nonché del principio costituzionale di razionalità-equità” 21, available at http://​www.​europeanrights.​eu/​public/​commenti/​1%5E_​Commento_​Tria.​pdf.
 
167
Monateri (2002), pp. 21–30.
 
168
Ibid, p. 28.
 
169
Article 65(1) Royal Decree 12/1941, n. 12 (authors’ translation).
 
170
Tria, “La funzione di nomofilachia,” p. 5.
 
171
Italian Constitution, Article 135(1). The Constitution also mentions the CtC’s apex offices, the First President and Attorney General. See Article 106(4) of the Italian Constitution.
 
172
See Sect. 3.4.1 above.
 
173
See, e.g., C.C. Decision 105/2018; Acierno et al. (2011), p. 7; Salvato (2018), p. 2. Cf. Amoroso (2017), according to which the function is enshrined in Article 111(7) of the Italian Constitution.
 
174
Salvato (2018), pp. 4–5.
 
175
Ibid, p. 4.
 
176
C.C. Decision 336/2002, para 2.
 
177
See Sect. 3.4.1 above.
 
178
Cass. (Civil United Sections) 31 July 2012, n. 13620; Cass. 15 October 2007, n. 21553; Cass. 13 May 2003, n. 7355; Tria, “La funzione di nomofilachia,” p. 3.
 
179
On the doctrinal origin of the term, see Canzio (2017), p. 2. The term originates from Greek.
 
180
C.C. Order 149/2013.
 
181
Canzio (2017), p. 2.
 
182
Tria, “La funzione di nomofilachia,” p. 4.
 
183
Article 360-bis(1) of the Civil Procedural Code. This has been called a “filter,” see Taruffo (2014), p. 12.
 
184
Article 363 of the Civil Procedural Code.
 
185
Article 374(3) of the Civil Procedural Code. See similarly in criminal matters, Article 610(2) of the Criminal Procedural Code. See further examples in Tria, “La funzione di nomofilachia,” p. 4.
 
186
Article 374 of the Civil Procedural Code. See also Amoroso (2017), p. 11.
 
187
Canzio (2017), p. 2.
 
188
Taruffo (2015), p. 204.
 
189
Ibid, p. 204.
 
190
Ibid, p. 204.
 
191
Canzio (2017), p. 6. It should be recalled that at the time of writing of this document, Giovanni Canzio was First President of the Court of Cassation. See also Amoroso (2017), p. 8; Baschiera (2006), p. 317 (fn. 103): “As for the principle in question, there is an increasing awareness of the path dependence to be traced in Italian case law; the phenomenon is multi-faceted and involves both elements of legal culture and of ideology, referring, with this latter term, to the confines marked (by legislator but also by academics and judges) for judicial interpretation within the legal system. Positive legal constraints and judicial standards of civil liability for the judge are also part of the framework that shapes path dependence in Italian case law.”
 
192
Taruffo (2014), p. 203.
 
193
Ibid, p. 204.
 
194
Compare with stare decisis in England and Wales and in the United States, see Franklin (this volume), Sect. 3.2; Wilson (this volume), Sects. 3.3 and 5.3.
 
195
Tria, “La funzione di nomofilachia,” p. 5, referring to the decreasing systematic character of legislation, and lack of clarity. This is due to the multiplying of norm production sources, the difficulties of coordinating the existing sources and the worsening of the quality of black letter law in terms of formulations. On the normative crisis, see also Sect. 3.1 above.
 
196
Canzio (2017), p. 6. Tria, “La funzione di nomofilachia,” p. 4.
 
197
See Royal Decree 12/1941, n. 12 and Canzio (2017), p. 3.
 
198
On a dynamic type of nomophilachy, Canzio (2017), p. 5.
 
199
Taruffo (2014), p. 206. Ibid, this is also the way other courts go astray from precedents.
 
200
Canzio (2017), p. 5. See the case law where doctrinal solutions are adopted by the CtC in Baschiera (2006), p. 319.
 
201
Canzio (2017), p. 5 (authors’ translation).
 
202
E.g., Cass. 7 July 2011, n. 12408 and Spera (2018), p. 49; Acierno et al. (2011), p. 6. On the need for a bottom-up nomophilachy, see Canzio (2017), p. 5.
 
203
Acierno et al. (2011), p. 7; Taruffo (2015), p. 205.
 
204
Acierno et al. (2011), p. 5.
 
205
Cataldi (2017), p. 15. A precursor to the maxims’ office emerged in 1924, but was explicitly regulated by law only in 1941. See Amoroso (2017), p. 3. Compare with Leitsätze in Germany, see Koch (this volume), Sect. 3.2.
 
206
Amoroso (2017), p. 5.
 
207
Taruffo (2015), p. 204, who refers to the importance of maxims as the most peculiar feature of the Italian system of precedents. Maxims and decisions/orders can be found on http://​www.​italgiure.​giustizia.​it/​.
 
208
See infra Sect. 4.5.
 
209
Tria, “La funzione di nomofilachia,” p. 5. Scoca (2009), p. 152.
 
210
Amoroso (2017), pp. 6–7. See the constant number of “dissents” at the level of the Court of Cassation itself, as provided in ibid, p. 6. Dissents are higher in criminal law matters, ibid, p. 6. On the contrasting decisions at the Court of Cassation, see Taruffo (2015), pp. 204–205.
 
211
Acierno et al. (2011), p. 6.
 
212
Ibid.
 
213
Amoroso (2017), pp. 6–7.
 
214
Ibid, p. 8.
 
215
Canzio (2017), p. 4.
 
218
The European Commission, “The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—COM(2022) 234,” p. 15. Administrative cases appear to be no exception in comparison with EU average, see ibid. No data were provided for criminal cases.
 
219
Ibid, pp. 9 ff.
 
220
Ibid, pp. 13 ff.
 
221
OECD, “Giustizia civile: come promuoverne l’efficienza?,” OECD Economics Department Policy Notes, No. 18 June 2013, p. 2.
 
222
Ferrua (2017), pp. 116–117.
 
223
The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 28.
 
224
Ibid, p. 29. The change in the number of judges from a society where 78% of the population was illiterate and practicing for the most agriculture (1865) to a more than doubled population in one of the most industrialized economies worldwide, where illiteracy has last been rated 2.1%, has been increased by roughly three/fifth, and only lately. See https://​www.​giustizia.​it/​resources/​cms/​documents/​piante_​organiche_​magistratura_​evoluzione_​storica.​pdf.
 
225
OECD, “Judicial performance and its determinants: a cross-country perspective,” OECD Economics Department Policy Notes, No. 5 June 2013, p. 24. Trial length tends to be lower in countries with good statistics, which Italy partly lacks. See ibid, p. 25.
 
226
Ibid, pp. 28–29.
 
227
Legal aid is provided in all matters pursuant to the level of income. See the example provided by The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 23.
 
228
OECD (2013), “Judicial performance and its determinants: a cross-country perspective,” p. 15.
 
229
Ippoliti (2014), p. 23.
 
230
Giacomelli et al. (2017), pp. 6 and 23–25.
 
231
OECD (2013), “Giustizia civile: come promuoverne l’efficienza?,” p. 9.
 
232
Italian Constitution, Article 111(1).
 
233
Italian Constitution, Article 101(2).
 
234
Salvato (2018), p. 4.
 
235
Italian Constitution, Article 110.
 
236
The first president and the first General Attorney of the Court of Cassation are members by law. On the clashes between the judicial council and the Minister of Justice, see Baschiera (2006), p. 309.
 
237
The Council of the Presidency of Administrative Justice was established by law in 1982 as the self-governing body of administrative judges. The Council of the Presidency, established in 1988, is the self-governing body of accounting judges. The Council of the Presidency of Tax Justice, established in 1992, is the self-governing body of tax commissions. The Council of the Military Judiciary is the self-governing body of military judges.
 
238
Italian Constitution, Article 107(3). Judges cannot be members of political parties, see the Italian Constitution, Article 98(3); Legislative decree 109/2006, Article 3(1)(h); C.C. Decision 224/2009.
 
239
For an overview of the subject, see Barsotti et al. (2015), pp. 49 ff.
 
240
The autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano are also entitled to bring such type of claims. Law no. 87/1953 and Article 98(2) of the Regional statute of Trentino-Alto Adige. When the conflict concerns a legislative act, conflict resolution intermingles with norm production. The central government can challenge the constitutionality of a Region’s Charter within 30 days from its publication and the Constitutional Court is called to carry out a direct review of constitutionality. The central government is also entitled to challenge the constitutionality of a Region’s statute within 60 days from its publication, and a Region can do the same against a State’s statute or another Region’s statute. The effects of the decisions rendered by the Constitutional Court are not erga omnes, but solely unfold with regard to the specific conflict among regions or regions/state.
 
241
Barsotti et al. (2015), p. 52.
 
242
Benvenuti (2015), p. 393.
 
243
Ibid, p. 394. Other conflict-resolving roles of the Constitutional Court revolve around (i) deciding on charges against the President of the Republic when the latter is impeached by the Parliament sitting in joint session, and (ii) deciding on the admissibility of referenda.
 
244
Code of Civil Procedure, Article 363 (authors’ translation).
 
245
Ippoliti (2014), p. 1.
 
246
See Response to a request from Parliament Members (Justice Minister Andrea Orlando, 16 November 2016), available at http://​www.​senato.​it/​japp/​bgt/​showdoc/​frame.​jsp?​tipodoc=​Sindispr&​leg=​17&​id=​997629; see also http://​www.​senato.​it/​japp/​bgt/​showdoc/​frame.​jsp?​tipodoc=​Sindispr&​leg=​17&​id=​997629. The reform is being gradually implemented, see ibid.
 
247
Cass. Decision (Criminal United Sections) 10 July 2002, n. 30328, para 9. It is worth noting that the decision was penned by Giovanni Canzio, who is often cited throughout this chapter.
 
248
Acierno et al. (2011), p. 5; Calamandrei and Furno (1958), p. 1055.
 
249
Fabri and Langbroek (2007), p. 11.
 
250
Commercial tribunals had previously existed in Italy for two decades, from 1865 to 1888.
 
251
Tria, “La funzione di nomofilachia,” p. 17.
 
252
OECD (2013), “Judicial performance and its determinants: a cross-country perspective,” p. 27.
 
254
Ibid.
 
255
This is the most common interpretation of the Constitution, see Scoca (2009), p. 151.
 
256
Article 103 of the Constitution.
 
257
See Sect. 3.2 above.
 
258
Legislative Decree 24 December 2003, n. 373.
 
259
Cass. Decision of 17 January 2017, n. 956.
 
261
Administrative judges and the judges of the Court of Accounts do not belong to the judicial system, yet the main conflict-resolution principles are applicable to them. See Article 108(2) of the Constitution.
 
262
C.C. Decision n. 287 of 27 December 1974.
 
263
The system varies slightly in Trento and Bolzano.
 
264
Italian Constitution, Article 103(3).
 
265
Italian Constitution, Article 102. Mattarella (2010), p. 341.
 
266
Barbagallo (1999), pp. 123–124, where it is found that the Council of State’s reference to its own case law begins in 1930.
 
267
On the Council of State, see Article 99 Legislative Decree 2 July 2010, n. 104. With reference to the courts of accounts, see Articles 114 and 117 Legislative Decree 26 August 2016, n. 174 (Code of accounts-related justice).
 
269
C.C. Decision 254/2004.
 
270
Council of State—Appellate Division for Sicily, Decision 215/2018 (ECLI:IT:CONT:2018:215APPSIC).
 
271
Scoca (2009), p. 152.
 
272
Barbagallo (1999), p. 117.
 
273
Eastern Catholic Churches are governed by the 1990 Eastern Code.
 
274
OECD (2013), “Judicial performance and its determinants: a cross-country perspective,” p. 33, fn. 20.
 
275
Legislative Decree 28/2010.
 
276
See, e.g., Art. 37 Law-Decree 98/2001 and Article 696-bis civil procedural code.
 
277
See Art. 185-bis of the Civil Procedural Code.
 
278
See statistics in “Mediazione civile, Statistiche del 2017,” Ministrero della Giustizia, available at http://​www.​inmediar.​it/​wp-content/​uploads/​2018/​03/​Mediazione-Civile-Anno-2017.​pdf.
 
279
Ibid.
 
280
Colombo (2012), p. 80.
 
281
De Palo and Keller (2013), p. 264.
 
282
“Dalle buone prassi ai ‘modelli’ Una prima manualistica ricognitiva delle pratiche de organizzazione più diffuse negli uffici giudiziari italiani” (Delibera CSM 7.7.2016), available at http://​milanosservatori​o.​it/​wp-content/​uploads/​2016/​11/​CSM-BUONE-PRASSI-LUGLIO-2016.​pdf.
 
283
Mattarella (2010), pp. 340–341.
 
284
See, e.g., Teubner (2002), p. 199. On solid and liquid authority, see Krisch (2016).
 
285
Alighieri (1932), Paradiso, Canto XIX, pp. 58–63 (authors’ translation).
 
286
On the ideal of justice as shaped by the institutional elements, see Sunde (this volume), Sect. 6. On legal ideology, see Section 7.
 
287
Lorenzi (1956), p. 78.
 
288
See Sect. 3.4.2 above.
 
289
Cass. Decision (Criminal United Sections) 10 July 2002, n. 30328, para 6. Cfr. Kjølstad et al. (this volume), Sect. 4.4, referring to procedural predictability as part of the ideal of justice in Norway’s legal culture.
 
290
Cass. Decision (Criminal United Sections) 10 July 2002, n. 30328, para 4.
 
291
D’Amico (2008), p. 232, fn 91.
 
292
Cartabia (2016), p. 52.
 
293
Ibid.
 
294
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 25. C.C. Decisions 15/1982; 361/1998; 172/1999; 102/2008; 80/2010 and 200/2012.
 
295
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 25.
 
296
Tria, “La funzione di nomofilachia,” p. 16.
 
297
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 21.
 
298
Koch (2020).
 
299
On legal ideology, see Sunde (this volume), Sect. 7.
 
300
Italian Constitution, Article 3(1).
 
301
Italian Constitution, Article 41(2).
 
302
Mattioni (2008), p. 272; Pirozzoli (2007), pp. 80–81. See, e.g., C.C. Decision 161/1985 and Decision 10/2010.
 
303
See, e.g., the need to “individualize” the criminal sanction, Bellocci and Passaglia (2007), p. 73.
 
304
Pico della Mirandola (2003) cited by Pirozzoli (2007), pp. 23 and 29. See also Forti (2003), p. 277. Cfr. Bauman (2011), p. 32.
 
305
See also Koch (2020, this volume).
 
306
Tuori (2002), p. 161.
 
309
The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. See a middle-high litigation rate, OECD (2013), “Judicial performance and its determinants: a cross-country perspective,” p. 30. See on appeals OECD (2013), “Giustizia civile: come promuoverne l’efficienza?,” p. 10.
 
311
Salvo Intravaia, “Crollano gli iscritti a Giurisprudenza. E gli avvocati arrivano dall’estero,” laRepubblica.it 9 January 2018.
 
312
Cirica (2018).
 
313
Russo (2016).
 
314
The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 29.
 
315
Tuori (2002), p. 165.
 
316
Maddalena (2018).
 
317
Barbagallo (1999), p. 123.
 
318
Ibid.
 
319
Fiorentini and Infantino (2020).
 
320
Ibid.
 
321
Bartolini (2020), pp. 477 and 481.
 
322
There is no need to receive a degree from Schools of Legal Specializations if the candidate (i) is already a lawyer, professor, leader in public administrations, administrative/accounts judge, or (ii) has received a PhD in legal subjects, or (iii) has been a trainee in courts or at the state advocates for 18 months.
 
323
Eligible to take the state exam are lawyers/public servants—including militaries, other types of judges, members of the Parliament or of the Secretariat for the Presidency of the Council of Ministries or Regional/Provincial/Municipal Councils, and the most qualified scholars.
 
324
Eligible to take the state exam are lawyers/public servants, other types of judges, state advocates/prosecutors, members of the Parliament or of the Secretariat for the Presidency of the Council of Ministries or EU institutions, and the most qualified scholars.
 
326
Tria, “La funzione di nomofilachia,” p. 10. On the need to enhance clarity and brevity in line with other courts in Europe, see p. 22.
 
327
Ibid, pp. 10–11.
 
328
OECD (2013), “Judicial performance and its determinants: a cross-country perspective,” p. 31.
 
329
OECD (2013), “Giustizia civile: come promuoverne l’efficienza?,” p. 8.
 
330
Baschiera (2006), p. 314.
 
331
See the interest toward foreign decisions in one of the first reviews on Commercial law, Mozzarelli (1987), p. 11, fn. 12.
 
332
Internationalization is a methodical feature in the first criminal law review in late 1880, see Sbriccoli (1987), pp. 112–113.
 
333
Onida (2012), p. 20.
 
334
See Sect. 3.2.5 above.
 
335
Italian Constitution, Article 11.
 
336
Onida (2012), pp. 22–23.
 
338
See Sect. 3.2.3 above.
 
339
Barsotti et al. (2015), p. 80. On the exception, see Cass. (Civil United Sections) 11 marzo 2004 (“Ferrini”), n. 5044, where the CtC referred to the United States’ Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See also an end-of-life case where the CtC referred to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the US Supreme Court, and the House of Lords, Civil Cass. Dec. 21748/2007.
 
340
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 27.
 
341
Barsotti et al. (2015), p. 81.
 
342
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 34.
 
343
Groppi (2016), pp. 5–6, on the basis of the 40 most important decisions.
 
344
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 27.
 
345
Groppi (2016), p. 2.
 
346
Case 1/58 F. Stork & Cie v. High Authority of ECSC [1959] ECLI:EU:C:1959:4. See, however, the inception of the CJEU theory on the integration of fundamental rights within the general principles of the Communities in its decisions Case 29–69 Erich Stauder v City of Ulm – Sozialamt [1969] ECLI:EU:C:1969:57; Case 4–73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandling v Commission of the European Communities [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:51.
 
347
C.C. Decision 183/1973 (‘Franchini’).
 
348
Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECLI:EU:C:1970:114.
 
349
See, e.g., C.C. Decisions 170/1984 (‘Granital’), 284/2007, and 102/2008.
 
350
Council of State decision 4207/2005, C.C. Decision 24/2017, para 6.6. Barsotti et al. (2015), p. 216; Kunz (2019), p. 1162.
 
351
Barsotti et al. (2015), p. 215.
 
352
Treaty on European Union (2009), Official Journal C 326, 26/10/2012 p. 0001–0390, Article 6(3).
 
353
C.C. Decision 102/2008, para 8.2.8.1.
 
354
Cartabia (2016), p. 50.
 
355
C.C. Decisions 348/2007 and 349/2007. See also C.C. Decision 138/2010, para 10, although the ECHR case law that the plaintiff invoked was not considered pertinent.
 
356
C.C. Decision 80/2011, para 1.
 
357
On integration, C.C. Decision 80/2011, paras 5.4 and 5.5. On the lack of primacy of ECHR law, see also C.C. Decision 348/2017, para 3.3 and Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 15. On the evaluation of the case law, C.C. Decision 49/2015.
 
358
C.C. Decision 348/2008, para 4.7 (authors’ translation).
 
359
C.C. Decision 80/2011, para 2. C.C. Decisions 348/2007 and 349/2007, but see ibid, para 6.2. on the limits to such systematic integration. See also C.C. Decision 264/2012, para 4.2.
 
360
C.C. Decision 348/2007, para 3.3.
 
361
On treaties, see C.C. Decision 348/2007. On international customary law, see C.C. Decision 172/1999. See also Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 29.
 
362
C. C. Decision 238/2014.
 
363
See, inter alia, Cass. S.U. n. 5044/2004 (‘Ferrini’). For a thorough comment, see Bianchi and Ferrini (2005), p. 242. The decision is particularly interesting for the systematic interpretation of the law of state immunity carried out by the CtC.
 
364
C.C. Decision 238/2014, para 5.1. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), ICJ Reports 99 (2012).
 
365
Ibid, para 3.5.
 
366
Civil Cass. Dec 15812/2016, para 9. Institution of Proceedings and Request for Provisional Measures, Certain Questions of Jurisdictional Immunity and Enforcement of Judgments (Germany v. Italy), ICJ 29 April 2022.
 
367
See Sects. 3 and 4 above.
 
368
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 5.
 
369
Tuori (2002), p. 167.
 
370
Ibid, p. 168.
 
371
See Sect. 4.2 above.
 
372
For example, the major premise is: “the law prohibits securities fraud, namely the material misstatement of fact or omission of a material fact which made the statement materially misleading.” The minor premise is: “in the posture of this case, enterprise X has not disclosed that it applied two proxy costs of carbon, which results in the omission of a material fact making the statement materially misleading.” The conclusion is: “Enterprise X committed securities fraud.”
 
373
Tuori (2002), p. 167.
 
374
For example, in a case of medical malpractice, specifically negligence, we would inquire on the level of certainty allowing us to state that if the doctor had performed specific tests, the patient would not have died.
 
375
Cass. Decision (Criminal United Sections) 10 July 2002, n. 30328, para 6.
 
376
Padoa-Schioppa (2010), pp. 26–27.
 
377
Ibid, p. 34.
 
378
Livingston et al. (2015), p. 181.
 
379
Donini (2010), p. 128.
 
380
Baschiera (2006), p. 317, referring to both systematic and analogical interpretive methods. On formants, see Sacco (1991a), No. 1; Sacco (1991b), No. 2, p. 343; Canzio (2017), p. 2.
 
381
Baschiera (2006), pp. 291–292.
 
382
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 28; Cartabia (2016), p. 52.
 
383
On these and other methods, see Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 17.
 
384
C.C. Decision 138/2010.
 
385
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 33.
 
386
Article 265 Royal Decree n. 2641 of 14 December 1865. Article 118(3) Implementing provisions to the Civil Procedural Code. See also Barbagallo (1999), p. 124. In administrative courts, there exists no prohibition to refer to doctrinal works. See Article 47 Royal Decree 17 October 1889, n. 6516 and Article 65 r. d. 17 August 1907, n. 642. Yet, reference is not frequent and generally to the “doctrine,” short of specific authors.
 
387
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 27. The rules of civil procedure apply to the Constitutional Court unless it derogates from them by laying down its own procedural rules. Still, the Constitutional Court has referred generally to the “doctrine,” see C.C. Decisions 15/82, 364/1988, 422/1995, 348/2007, 138/2010. According to a commentator, the Constitutional Court is recently less heedful of the suggestions put forward by the doctrine, D’Amico (2008), p. 37.
 
388
Bussani (2016), pp. 26–27.
 
389
Groppi and Spigno (2014), p. 34.
 
390
Groppi (2016), p. 5. The Conseil constitutionnel, of which the Constitutional Court has assumed some of the procedural style, allows for amicus curiae.
 
391
See also Kjølstad et al. (this volume), Sect. 5.4.
 
392
On the normative crisis, see Sect. 3.1 above.
 
393
Barbagallo (1999), p. 125.
 
394
On the sub-culture at the Council of State, see Sect. 4.5.2 above.
 
395
Grossi (2002), p. 152.
 
396
Monateri (2002), p. 25. French doctrine also influenced the bureaucracy, as libraries of ministries used to receive French law reviews, see Melis (1987), p. 49.
 
397
Livingston et al. (2015), p. 188.
 
398
Padoa-Schioppa (2010), p. 44.
 
399
Ibid, p. 43.
 
400
Mozzarelli (1987), pp. 39–40.
 
401
Ibid, p. 40.
 
402
Padoa-Schioppa (2010), p. 47.
 
403
This finding is inferable from the grounds of appeal in civil procedure, Article 339, co. 3 Civil Procedural Code.
 
404
No decision by equity is permitted when the case concerns template contracts and the opposition to decrees permitting execution by creditors. According to the Court of Cassation, cases that are devolved to the justices of the peace for subject-matter, rather than value, are not liable to be decided by equity. See Cass. Decision 26 October 2009, n. 22601; Cass. Decision 15 October 2009, n. 21926.
 
405
See Civil Procedural Code, Article 114.
 
406
Civil Procedural Code, Article 339(3).
 
407
Provisions on the law in general (premised to the civil code), Article 12(2).
 
408
Civil Procedural Code, Article 101(2).
 
409
Article 119(4) Implementing provisions to the Civil Procedural Code.
 
411
Civil Procedural Code, Article 822.
 
412
Article 829(4), n. 1–2, Civil Procedural Code; Article 36(1) Legislative Decree 17 January 2003, n. 5; Article 12 Legislative Decree 2 July 2010, n. 104; Article 209(14) Legislative Decree 18 April 2016, n. 5.
 
413
We are grateful to Professor Søren Koch for such precious two insights.
 
414
Livingston et al. (2015), pp. 143–144.
 
415
Hamilton et al. (2008).
 
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Metadata
Title
An Introduction to Italian Legal Culture
Authors
Esmeralda Colombo
Lars Kvestad
Copyright Year
2023
Book
Handbook on Legal Cultures

Print ISBN: 978-3-031-27744-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-031-27745-0

Copyright Year: 2023

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27745-0_18