An Introduction to Polish Legal Culture

This publication was prepared as part of the projects supported by funds from the National Science Centre (NCN), grant number UMO-2015/18/E/HS5/00762 and grant number UMO-2016/21/B/HS5/03221.

See Sunde (this volume), Sect. 4.

Johnson (2011).

‘The World Factbook’, Central Intelligence Agency, available at https://​www.​cia.​gov/​library/​publications/​the-world-factbook/​rankorder/​2001rank.​html; ‘How Poland Became Europe’s Most Dynamic Economy’, Bloomberg Businessweek, available at https://​multishoring.​info/​market-news/​bloomberg-businessweek-%E2%80%9Ehow-poland-became-europes-most-dynamic-economy%E2%80%9D/​. Cf. as well: ‘Human Development Reports’, United Nations Development Programme, available at http://​hdr.​undp.​org/​en/​2018-update.

Davies (1997), p. 554; Wandycz (2001), p. 66.

Jerzy Jedlicki (2002), p. 94.

More, e.g.: Klimaszewska (2020, pp. 89–109); Sójka-Zielińska (2008); Pomianowski (2018).

Cf. Mańko (2016).

Justification of the draft of the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, version of 25 September 2018, 17–18, 28.

CBOS research communication no. 18/2016, available at www.​cbos.​pl.

Domański (2014), pp. 8–17.

In 2002, it was the lowest in Europe, in 2016 Poles took the 4th place in the distrust ranking in Europe—results of a European public poll; available at https://​europeansocialsu​rvey.​org. Cf. Sztabiński and Sztabiński (2018).

Ereciński (2009), pp. 523–525; Marciniak (2019), pp. 1140–1141.

Adamczyk (2015), p. 201; Krzemiński (2005).

Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act of 4 July 2019; Dz.U. 2019; 1469.

See multiple conference lectures: How to resolve a difficult economic dispute amicably, Gdańsk 19 October 2018; Marine economy dispute resolution specifics, Gdańsk 6 July 2019; Trade secret and compliance. Mediation in the labour law and business, Gdańsk 23 May 2019; available at www.​pcaim.​org.​pl.

For this section, military courts are of minor interest and will not be discussed in detail.

From a formal point of view, the Constitution also provides for the existence of the Tribunal of State, but in practice it does not function. Cf. Landau and Skrzeszewska (1961).

This term is used in the official translation of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997—Dz.U. 1997, 78, 483, available at https://​www.​sejm.​gov.​pl/​prawo/​konst/​angielski/​kon1.​htm. However, we stick to the terminology recommended by the European Commission, see https://​e-justice.​europa.​eu/​content_​ordinary_​courts-18-en.​do.

‘Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland’, Warsaw 2018, pp. 162–163.

Cf. Inter alia: Banaszak (2009), p. 780; Dudek (2009), p. 247; Stępień-Załucka (2016); Szmulik (2008); Wiśniewski (2013), p. 17.

Bałaban (2015), pp. 211–222.

Data of the Statistical Information Management Department of the Ministry of Justice.

See Appendix, Table 1, below.

Art. 17 of the CCP.

Art. 299 of the Act of 6 June 1997 (Penal Code, hereinafter: PC); Dz.U. 2018, 1600 as amended.

Ibid Art. 150 § 1.

Ibid Art. 151.

Art. 25 § 1 of the Act of 6 June 1997 (Code of Penal Procedure, hereinafter: CPP); Dz.U. 2018, 1987 as amended. It is also the provincial court that issues safe-conducts (Art. 281 CPP) and the European Arrest Warrant (Art. 607a CPP).

Art. 477⁸ § 1 of the CCP.

See Appendix, Table 1, below.

Art. 477⁸ § 2 of the CCP.

More: Piaskowska and Piesiewicz (2018).

See Appendix, Table 2, below.

See Appendix, Table 1, below.

Between 2002 and 2019, the number of cases referred to the courts increased by 89%, with around 9 million cases submitted to court in 2002 and around 17 million in 2019.

Obietnice a rzeczywistość—statystyki sądów rejonowych po pięciu latach ‘reform’ (2015–2020) [Promises versus reality—district court statistics after 5 years of ‘reforms’ (2015–2020)], IUSTITIA Association of Polish Judges, https://​www.​iustitia.​pl/​images/​pliki/​e-Raport_​2015-2020-opt.​pdf.

Restrictions on the guarantees of judicial independence and the independence of judges were introduced faster than any improvements in judicial proceedings that citizens could benefit from (changes in judicial proceedings were introduced only in 2019) see more: Ereciński (2021), pp. 19–23; Malmuk-Cieplak, Torbus (2021), pp. 109–111; Gutowski and Kardas (2019), pp. 7–9.

Restrictions were introduced, among others, by the Act of July 12, 2017 on Amendments to the Act—Law on the System of Common Courts and Certain Other Acts, Official Journal of Laws ‘Dziennik Ustaw’ 2017, item 1452; the Act of December 8, 2017 on the Supreme Court, Journal of Laws ‘Dziennik Ustaw’ 2018, item 5; the Act of December 8, 2017 on Amendments to the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and certain other laws, Journal of Laws ‘Dziennik Ustaw’ 2018, item 3; the Act of April 12, 2018 on Amendments to the Act—Law on the System of Common Courts, the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and the Act on the Supreme Court, Journal of Laws ‘Dziennik Ustaw’ 2018, item 848; the Act of April 26, 2019 on Amendments to the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and the Act—Law on the System of Administrative Courts, Journal of Laws ‘Dziennik Ustaw’ 2019, item 914; the Act of December 20, 2019 on Amendments to the Act—Law on the System of Common Courts, the Act on the Supreme Court and certain other laws, Journal of Laws ‘Dziennik Ustaw’ 2020, item 190. For a synthetic analysis of the made and subsequent projected changes in the system of courts see: https://​www.​batory.​org.​pl/​oswiadczenie/​stanowisko-zespolu-ekspertow-prawnych-fundacji-im-stefana-batorego-dotyczace-tzw-reformy-sadownictwa-powszechnego/​; Kościerzyński (2020); A. Michalak, Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny wobec reform sądownictwa 2015–2019—kwestie wybrane, Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Iuridica, 83/2020, pp. 25–45.

Art. 47 § 1 of the CCP; Art. 28 § 1 of the CPP.

Art. 367 § 3 of the CCP; Art. 29 § 1 of the CPP.

Cf. Art. 47 § 4 of the CCP; Art. 28 § 3–4 and Art. 29 § 2 and Art. 544 § 1 of the CPP.

Cf. Art. 47 § 2 of the CCP, Art. 28 § 2 of the CPP, Art. 7 § 2 of the of the PC. List of cases heard with the participation of lay judges cf. Rycak (2011), pp. 6 ff.

Project of the Social Codification Commission developed in 2018, brought to the Parliament in 2021, https://​www.​sejm.​gov.​pl/​Sejm9.​nsf/​PrzebiegProc.​xsp?​id=​ABE7D26F5B29B82F​C125870B003CB33B​.

Draft laws—UD documents 1760 and 1761; see more: https://​www.​prezydent.​pl/​prawo/​wniesione-do-sejmu/​prezydencki-projekt-skierowal-do-sejmu-projekt-ustawy-o-sadach-pokoju-,41632.

See more Kielin-Maziarz (2021), pp. 55–56; Grudecki (2022), pp. 137–150; Piotrowski R, Sędziowie pokoju raczej sądom nie pomogą, https://​www.​prawo.​pl/​prawnicy-sady/​sedziowie-pokoju-wg-prof-piotrowskiego-raczej-sadom-nie-pomoga,507493.​html.

Act of 14 May 2020 on amending certain laws on protective measures against the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, Official Journal of Laws ‘Dziennik Ustaw’ 2020, item 875; Act of 28 May 2021 on amendments to the Act on the Code of Civil Procedure and certain other acts, Official Journal of Laws ‘Dziennik Ustaw’ 2021, item 1090.

See more; Małecki and Sławiński (2021), pp. 93–114; Markiewicz (2022), pp. 38–58; Zembrzuski (2022), pp. 59–79; Machnikowska (2022), pp. 80–124.

Draft amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure—UD document 156, https://​legislacja.​rcl.​gov.​pl/​projekt/​12350804.

Act of 27 July 2001—Law on the organisational structure of ordinary courts; Dz.U. 2001, 98, 1070.

Art. 64 and 77 of the Act of 12 July 2017; Dz.U. 2017, 1452.

Press Release No. 88/21, 20.5.2021.—Opinion of the Advocate General for the examination of Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19; see more: https://​curia.​europa.​eu/​jcms/​upload/​docs/​application/​pdf/​2021-05/​cp210088pl.​pdf.

Art. 183 para. 1 of the Constitution.

Art. 1 point 1 of the Supreme Court Act of 8 December 2017; Dz.U. 2019, 825.

Cf. Art. 398² and 519¹ of the CCP. Limitations in criminal cases, cf.: Art. 523 and 439 of the CPP.

One month (criminal cases) or 2 months (civil cases) for the parties. Public authorities entitled to file a cassation appeal, like the Minister of Justice—Public Prosecutor General, Ombudsman, or Children’s Ombudsman have a longer time limit. Art. 524 of the CPP and Art. 398⁵ of the CCP.

Wiśniewski (2019).

Five years as a rule and when a cassation appeal was filed—1 year from the judgment. Art. 89 § 3 of the Supreme Court Act. Moreover, under interim regulations, for the period of 3 years from the entry into force of the new regulations, an extraordinary appeal can be filed against every final and binding ruling issued in the last 21 years (after 17 September 1997). Ibid Art. 115 § 1. The Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs Chamber has been constituted to adjudicate these cases.

Art. 390 § 1 of the CCP and Art. 441 § 1 of CPP.

Art. 77 § 1 of the Supreme Court Act.

Information of the Supreme Court activities in 2022 https://​www.​sn.​pl/​sprawy/​SitePages/​Zagadnienia_​prawne_​SN.​aspx?​Izba=​Cywilna&​Rok=​2022.

The way a ruling receives the status of a legal principle is described in detail below, in Sect. 3.

Art. 83 to 88 of the Supreme Court Act.

This type of duty of the ordinary court does not derive from the wording of the legislation, but has been formulated by the Supreme Court—Supreme Court judgment of 17.05.2017 V CSK 466/16.

Art. 82 of the Supreme Court Act.

Resolution of the Civil Chamber, the Criminal Chamber and the Labour and Social Security Chamber of the Supreme Court of 23.01.2020. http://​www.​sn.​pl/​aktualnosci/​SiteAssets/​Lists/​Wydarzenia/​AllItems/​BSA%20​I-4110-1_​20_​English.​pdf, see more: Tuleja (2020), pp. 48–70; Ziółkowski (2020b), p. 91.

Art. 101, 125 para. 4, and 129 of the Constitution.

The first President of the Supreme Court Małgorzata Gersdorf expressed her criticism of the reform proposals in Borkowski (2016), pp. 15–20.

According to the European Commission, the principles of the EU’s rule of law were also violated. The act was amended after Poland had lost the case before the CJEU. Particularly, the First President of the Supreme Court and the other judges of the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court were allowed to stay in office until the end of the term provided for in the Constitution (the new provisions also concern the judges of the latter court), while according to the earlier version of the new provisions, due to the reduced retirement age, 1/3 of judges would have to resign in the middle of their term of office, as well as the First President of the Supreme Court, although her term of office is explicitly defined by the Constitution (Art. 183 par. 3). Cf.: CJEU order of 19 October 2018, 15 November and 17 December 2018, respectively, CJEU judgment of 24 June 2019, C­619/18, European Commission v. Poland; available at http://​curia.​europa.​eu/​juris/​documents.​jsf?​oqp=​&​for=​&​mat=​or&​lgrec=​pl&​jge=​&​td=​%3BALL&​jur=​C%2CT%2CF&​num=​C-619%252F18&​page=​1&​dates=​&​pcs=​Oor&​lg=​&​pro=​&​nat=​or&​cit=​none%252CC%252CCJ%252CR%252C2008E%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252Ctrue%252Cfalse%252Cfalse&​language=​en&​avg=​&​cid=​2644767.

Art. 3 of the Supreme Court Act.

More in: Granat (2019), pp. 411–413; Wróbel (2019), p. 32.

See no. 68. Most members of the Chamber were public prosecutors, and they were appointed although the Supreme Administrative Court ordered the appointment procedure to be suspended for the time of reviewing appeals filed against the procedure. Cf. also the influence of the Prosecutor’s Office on judges’ independence in case of Romania in CJEU: C-355/19 Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din Romănia’ and Others; Case C-127/19 Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor Din România’ and Asociaţia Mişcarea Pentru Apărarea Statutului Procurorilor; Case C-83/19 Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor Din România’.

Kościerzyński (2020).

The blockage relates to the funds accruing to each EU country for the implementation of the National Reconstruction Plan.

Act of 9 June 2022 on amendments to the Act on the Supreme Court and certain other acts ‘Journal of Laws’ 2022, item 1259.

Article 27a—Act of 9 June 2022 on amending the Act on the Supreme Court and certain other acts ‘Journal of Laws’ 2022, item 1259. The quorum of the Chamber of Professional Responsibility also includes adjudication, as a court of appeal, in cases of, inter alia: patent attorneys, doctors, veterinary surgeons, nurses and pharmacists.

Bill—print 2870, brought to the Sejm on 13.12.2022 and subsequently withdrawn, see more: https://​www.​sejm.​gov.​pl/​Sejm9.​nsf/​PrzebiegProc.​xsp?​id=​B239EF3A2A4C5886​C1258917007CDE0A​.

See more: resolution of a panel of three combined Chambers—the Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance Chambers of the Supreme Court of 23.1.2020 in case BSA I-4110-1/20.

See more: judgment of the CJEU of 19.11.2019 in Joined Cases: C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18; CJEU judgment of 2.3.2021 in case C-824/18. 39.

https://​www.​gov.​pl/​web/​sprawiedliwosc/​stanowisko-ministerstwa-sprawiedliwosci-wobec-projektu-ustawy-o-sadzie-najwyzszym.

An example of such a flawed adjustment was the proposal of a provision in which the existing cases of professional liability of judges were to be transferred from the Supreme Court to the Supreme Administrative Court, despite the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of Poland does not provide for such a possibility, enumerating the cognition of both Courts.

Ziółkowski (2020a, b), pp. 1–16; Garlicki (2022), pp. 156–169.

Art. 194 para. 1 of the Constitution.

Ibid.

Art. 3 of the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal.

Art. 31 para. 1 of the Sejm regulation.

Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 December 2015, K 34/15.

Art. 188 points 1–3, Art. 122 para. 3 and 4, Art. 133 para. 2 of the Constitution.

Ibid Art. 79 and Art. 188 point 5.

Ibid Art. 189. Wronkowska-Jaśkiewicz (2020) pp. 46-59

Ibid Art. 188 point 4.

Ibid Art. 131 para. 1.

Local government bodies may initiate proceedings before the Tribunal in the procedure of abstract review of norms, if the normative act concerns matters falling within their scope of activity, however they are not allowed to lodge a constitutional complaint.

The entitled are also: the Prime Minister, the President of the Supreme Chamber of Control, as well as groups of 50 deputies or 30 senators, which in practice gives the opposition access to initiation of review by the Constitutional Tribunal (Art. 191 para. 1 point 1 of the Constitution).

Ibid Art. 191 para. 1 point 2–5. E.g., in matters of the judiciary, the National Council for the Judiciary can file a motion, and in trade-related matters—national trade union bodies can do so as well, while in matters of freedom of religion—churches and religious associations have the right to files motions.

The subject of the complaint may only be an allegation of non-compliance with the Constitution of a normative act on the basis of which a decision violating the applicant’s rights was issued. The complaint may be directed only against the legal norm (and not, e.g. the interpretation of the provision adopted in the process of applying the law), according to the narrow concept of the complaint adopted by the creators of the Constitution. For more, see Garlicki (2019), pp. 412 ff.

Art. 193 of the Constitution. For an overview over the case load of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, see Appendix, Table 4.

Under Chapter XX of the Polish Constitution, the judicial authority in Poland consists of two segments: the first are the courts constituting a hierarchical system of ordinary and specialised courts, and the second segment consists of two tribunals (Constitutional Tribunal and Tribunal of State) acting independently, in other words these tribunals are not part of the system of appeal and thus not part of the court system.

The verdicts of the Tribunal are therefore not subject to further appeal to any authority. See more: Winczorek (2008), p. 369.

Art. 190 para. 2 of the Constitution.

Cf. Florczak-Wątor (2014).

More: Derlatka et al. (2016).

The Constitutional Tribunal in previous composition concluded that the President had violated the regulations (judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 December 2015, K 34/1), in the new composition it decided that this activity was lawful (judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 24 October 2017, K 1/17).

In its opinion of March 2016, the Commission stated, among others, that ‘the current conflict over the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal originated from the actions of the previous Sejm’ and that ‘both the previous and the present majorities of the Sejm have taken unconstitutional actions’. Se ‘Opinion on Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session (Venice, 11–12 March 2016)’ 21–22.

Cf. Łętowska and Wiewiórowska-Domagalska (2016), p. 79.

K 47/15.

It clearly emphasised that ‘the Amendments of 22 December 2015, affecting the efficiency of the Constitutional Tribunal, would have endangered not only the rule of law, but also the functioning of the democratic system […]. They […] could lead to a serious slow-down of the activity of the Tribunal and could make it ineffective as a guardian of the Constitution’. See ‘Opinion on Amendments’, p. 24.

Since 2017, three acts regulate the organisation and proceedings of the Tribunal and the status of its justices. Two acts of 30 November 30 2016: on the organisation and procedure before the Constitutional Tribunal (Dz. U. 2019, 125) and on the status of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal (Dz. U. 2018, 1422), which, together with the Act of 13 December 2016—Introductory provisions (to both of these acts; Dz. U. 2018, 849) determined the current shape of applicable provisions on the Constitutional Tribunal.

Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the PiS party, clearly stated: ‘I am deeply convinced that the Tribunal (…) was to be that point, a kind of bastion [of opposition—AK, AM, SK] that could destroy all of our attempts to introduce reforms (…) not only in the administration of justice or in the media, but also such changes as PLN 500 per child’—statement in Radio Maryja, www.​dziennik.​pl.

See more: Pyziak-Szafnicka (2020), pp. 32–38; Sadurski (2020), pp. 94–148.

https://​trybunal.​gov.​pl/​postepowanie-i-orzeczenia/​wyroki/​art/​11662-ocena-zgodnosci-z-konstytucja-rp-wybranych-przepisow-traktatu-o-unii-europejskiej [dostęp 20.12.2022].

Cf. the feuilleton of Ewa Łętowska under the title ‘Tyranny of majority / Dictate of minority?’, available at http://​konstytucyjny.​pl/​tyrania-wiekszosci-dyktat-mniejszosci/​.

This term regarding the Polish Constitutional Tribunal was coined by Jacek Zaleśny, see Zaleśny (2018) pp. 79–80, see more Sadurski (2019).

See more Grabowski and Naleziński (2020), pp. 25–47; Sadurski (2020), pp. 392–395.

In 2015 the Constitutional Court issued 63 judgments, 18 judgments in 2021 and only 7 judgments in the first half of 2022, see more: https://​oko.​press/​jak-nie-pracowal-tk-przylebskiej-w-pierwszym-polroczu-2022.

See more Radziewicz (2020), p. 19; Dąbrowski (2019), pp. 128–148.

Art. 176 para. 1 (‘Court proceedings shall have at least two stages’.) and Art. 236 para. 2 (‘Statutes bringing Article 176 para. 1 into effect, to the extent relevant to proceedings before administrative courts, shall be adopted before the end of 5 years from the day on which the Constitution comes into force. The provisions relating to extraordinary review of judgments by the Supreme Administrative Court shall remain in effect until the entry into force of such statutes’.) of the Constitution.

It was introduced by means of three acts of 2002: the Act of 25 July—Law on the System of Administrative Courts (hereinafter also as the LSAC), Dz. U. 2017, 2188 as amended; the Act of 30 August—Law on Proceedings before Administrative Courts (hereinafter also as the LPAC), Dz.U. 2018, 1302 as amended; and the Act of 30 August—Provisions implementing the Act—Law on the System of Administrative Courts and the Act—Law on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, Dz.U. 2002, 53, 1271.

Art. 39 § 1 of the LSAC.

Ibid Art. 39 § 2–4. Table 7.

Art. 184 of the Constitution: ‘The Supreme Administrative Court and other administrative courts shall exercise, to the extent specified by statute, control over the performance of public administration. Such control shall also extend to judgments on the conformity to statute of resolutions of organs of local government and normative acts of territorial organs of government administration’.

Art. 16 § 2 of the LPAC.

Ibid Art. 16 § 1.

Ibid Art. 120. More about other exceptions: Kmieciak (2017), p. 176. In certain cases, a panel of seven judges, an entire chamber or a full panel of Supreme Administrative Court has to be gathered. See Art. 264 § 1 of the LPAC. The latter has happened only once. Cf. Resolution of the Supreme Administrative Court of 26 October 2009 – I OPS 10/09.

At least 8 years as a judge, prosecutor, advocate, attorney-at-law or notary public; or 10 years in public institutions, occupying positions involving the implementation or creation of administrative law. Art. 6 § 1 of the LSAC.

Introduced by means of the Act of 7 April 2017 amending the act—Code of Administrative Procedure and some other acts (Dz.U. 2017, 935), which entered into force on 1 June 2017.

See Appendix, Table 8.

The Supreme Administrative Court of Poland, ‘Annual Report 2017. Outline of activities of the Supreme Administrative Court and the Voivodship Administrative Courts in 2017’ 8. The Supreme Administrative Court of Poland, ‘Annual Report 2018. Outline of activities of the Supreme Administrative Court and the Voivodship Administrative Courts in 2018’ 9. Table 5.

The Supreme Administrative Court of Poland, ‘Annual Report 2017’ (n 124) 8. Table 6.

The Supreme Administrative Court of Poland, ‘Annual Report 2018’ (n 124) 9.

Changing the constitution requires a very complicated procedure provided for in Art. 235 of the Constitution. Since the entry into force of the current Constitution, i.e. since 1997, no act amending the Constitution has been passed.

Art. 142 para. 1.

Art. 146 para. 4 point 2.

Art. 148 para. 3.

Art. 149 para. 2 and 3.

Art. 213 para. 2.

Particularly, entrusting certain tasks to a given body based on the Constitution is not a premise for assuming that it can issue regulations for the purpose of carrying out these tasks, unless such a competence is expressly stipulated in the Constitution (Cf.: This was explicitly confirmed by the Constitutional Tribunal in its judgment of 2000, K 25/99).

Art. 92 of the Constitution.

Ibid Art. 94.

Act of 23 April 1964 (hereinafter: CC); Dz. U. 2019, 1145, as amended.

Act of 25 February 1964; Dz. U. 2019, 303, as amended.

Act of 15 September 2000; Dz. U. 2019, 505, as amended.

Act of 26 June 1974; Dz. U. 2019, 1040, as amended.

Act of 6 June 1997; Dz. U. 2019, 1950.

Act of 20 May 1971; Dz. U. 2019, 821, as amended.

Act of 18 September 2001; Dz. U. 2018, 2175.

Act of 17 November 1964; Dz. U. 2019, 1460, as amended.

Act of 6 June 1997; Dz. U. 2019, 150, as amended.

Act of 24 August 2001; Dz. U. 2019, 1120, as amended.

Act of 14 June 1960; Dz. U. 2019, 60, as amended.

Art. 56 of the CC.

Ibid Art. 65. Another example from the area of the civil law is Art. 69 of the CC: ‘If according to the custom established in the given circumstances or according to the content of an offer, it is not required that the other party’s declaration on the acceptance of an offer teach the party making the offer, in particular where the party making the offer demands immediate performance of the contract, the contract shall become effective if the other party sets about performing it in an appropriate time; otherwise the offer shall cease to be binding’.

E.g., Art. 394 of the CC.

71.8% of judges pointed to the direct impact of legal scholarship on their own judgments—national survey in 2015–2016. Machnikowska (2018), p. 474; Rzucidło-Grochowska and Grochowski (2015); Wojciechowski (2016), pp. 275–294; Łętowska and Sobczak (2012), pp. 141–167, 340–341; Gizbert-Studnicki (2009).

E.g., Art. 401¹ of the CCP or Art. 145a of the Code of Administrative Procedure.

See below.

In 2018, there were, e.g. in total 143, and in 2017, 152 legal enquiries submitted by lower courts to the Supreme Court. In 2018, no rulings of the entire chamber or joint chambers, or all members of the Supreme Court were issued, only a few verdicts of seven judges were issued, but none of them received the rank of a legal principle. Cf. Article 390 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 441 of the Code of Penal Procedure, but also in the abstract procedure (Article 83 of the Act on the Supreme Court)—at the request of the First President of the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, the Prosecutor General, and some other bodies may result in a legal principle.

Art. 87. § 1 of the Act on the Supreme Court of 8 December 2017; Dz. U. 2018, 5 as amended, consistent with Art. 61 § 6 of the Act on the Supreme Court of 23 November 2002, Dz. U. 2016, 1254 as amended.

Art. 269 of the LPAC. Cf. Woś et al. (2016), pp. 1265 ff.

Resolution no. 190 of the Council of Ministers of 29 October 2013; Monitor Polski (hereinafter: MP) 2013, 979; Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 30 July 1992—Standing Orders of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, MP 2012, 32 as amended; resolution of the Senate of the Republic of Poland of 23 November 1990—Standing Orders of the Senate of the Republic of Poland, MP 2002, 54, 741 as amended.

Cf. the website of the appellate court in Wrocław: http://​orzeczenia.​wroclaw.​sa.​gov.​pl/​.

Judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal are published in Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland (Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) or in the official journal Monitor Polski and on the official website of Constitutional Tribunal: http://​otkzu.​trybunal.​gov.​pl/​.

Judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court are published in the official collection entitled Orzecznictwo Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego i wojewódzkich sądów administracyjnych, but are available as well at http://​www.​nsa.​gov.​pl/​baza-orzeczen.​php. Some important Supreme Court judgments are published in special official collections, however, many of them are available at http://​www.​sn.​pl/​orzecznictwo/​SitePages/​Baza_​orzeczen.​aspx.

Zembrzuski (2016), pp. 201–229.

See more Ziółkowski (2020a, b), pp. 70–95; Dąbrowski (2019), pp. 128–148; Matczak, ‘Dlaczego w Polsce nie obowiązuje już tradycyjne domniemanie konstytucyjności?’, available at https://​marcinmatczak.​pl/​index.​php/​2018/​07/​08/​dlaczego-w-polsce-nie-obowiazuje-juz-tradycyjne-domniemanie-konstytucyjnosci​/​. Cf. also statements of T Pietrzykowski, ‘Domniemanie konstytucyjności’, available at https://​www.​academia.​edu/​20133667/​Domniemanie_​konstytucyjno%C5%9Bci. Cf. as well the opinion of A. Grabowski in ‘Domniemanie konstytucyjności i reguła lex superior (w ujęciu argumentacyjnym kontroli konstytucyjności prawa)’, speech delivered at at the conference: Pierwsze Krakowskie Sympozjum Konstytucyjne: O problemach wykładni Konstytucji RP, 7 October 2017. Cf. as well Dębowska and Florczak-Wątor (2017), pp. 19 ff.

The courts also have the right of incidental control of the compliance of laws with the Constitution. In the context of disputes, attention should be paid to the systematic nature of the Constitution and the placement of Article 8 in the general part of the Constitution.

Judges statements at the Extraordinary Congress of Judges Warsaw, 4 September 2016, own unpublished documentation. Cf. Sobczak (2017), pp. 98 ff.

Judges have signaled adopting such course of action, among others in connection with the amendment of the Act on Public Gatherings, limiting the citizen’s rights to gather in public, adopted in December 2016. Under this amendment, no other gatherings may take place at the time and place of gatherings organised by state authorities. For example, judgment acquitting a group of people who protested in front of the Sejm in December 2016, when the Speaker of the Sejm, a member of the ruling party, deprived the parliamentary opposition of the possibility to participate in voting on the Budget Act.

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done at Rome on 4 November 1950, as subsequently amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5 and 8 and supplemented by Protocol no 2 (Dz. U. z 1993 r., Nr 61, poz. 284). https://​isap.​sejm.​gov.​pl/​isap.​nsf/​DocDetails.​xsp?​id=​wdu19930610284.

The first such interpretative decision was made by the presiding judge of one district court on 28 March 2022. https://​www.​rp.​pl/​w-sadzie-i-w-urzedzie/​art35967921-sad-po-raz-pierwszy-pominal-przepis-covidowy-ktory-wyrugowal-lawnikow.

The most recent example (although connected with the direct application of a CJEU judgment) is the case of judge Paweł Juszczyszyn, adjudicating in the provincial court in Olsztyn, who in his case referred to the judgment of the CJEU of 19 November 2019 regarding Poland, and for this reason was suspended as a judge, something that took place on 29 November 2019.

See the judgment of the CJEU of 19.11.2019 r. ref joint cases CX-585/18, C-624/18, C-625/18; ECLI:EU:2019:982; judgment of the SN z 5.12.2019 r. ref. III PO 7/19, LEX no 2746893.

The Supreme Court, in paragraph 20 of its judgment of 5.12.2019 4. ref. III PO 7/18, stated, inter alia, ‘when the regulation of a national law is in line with the national constitutional regulation and at the same time contradicts EU law, the refusal to apply the provisions of the national law cannot raise any controversy or objections from constitutional law, as it does not lead to a ruling that would be incompatible with the fundamental law’.

On rules of interpretation see more: Kozak (1997); Kozak (2002), p. 14; Wojciechowski (2004a); Wojciechowski (2004b), pp.197–199, 226–246. On the characteristics of a judge’s decision, such as rationality, legality, fairness, effectiveness, binding nature, certainty of content see more Gapska (2010), pp. 39–50.

More: Bardach and Senkowska-Gluck (1981).

Gałędek and Klimaszewska (2018), p. 269.

Wróblewski (1935), p. 11; Cf. Dziurzyński (1929), p. 356; Górnicki (2015), p. 75.

Górnicki (2012).

For more, see Lityński (2013).

Including Jellinek’s views. Kostrubiec (2015), p. 10; Peretiakowicz (1928), pp. 2–16.

Kozak (2010), pp. 70–71; Jabłońska-Bonca (2020), pp. 37–39, 211, 243.

Mańko (2018), pp. 75–82, 95–98; Pichlak (2019), pp.99–136; Barankiewicz (2010), pp. 10–24; Grabowski (2011), pp. 18–31; Zajadło (2008a), pp. 5–19; Zajadło (2008b), pp. 9–28; Pietrzykowski (2001), pp. 97–121; Jabłońska-Bonca (2012), pp. 296–313; Alexy (1993), pp. 34–49; Hart (2020), pp. 67–78, 149–174, 287–322

More: Lityński (2001); Czachórski (1970), p. 26; Stawarska-Rippel (2015); Machnikowska (2010); Moszyńska (2019).

Cf. Kitowicz (2003), pp. 205–225; Matuszewicz (1986), I–II, passim; Auguste (2012), pp. 41–46, 222, 267–268; Michalski (1958), pp. 15–187; Naworski (2004); Moniuszko (2013), pp. 62, 130–140, 160–175.

For more, cf. Bardach and Senkowska-Gluck (1981); Korobowicz (1995); Płaza (2002); Sobociński (1964); Klimaszewska (2019a, b), p. 97.

Sociological research on a representative national sample of judges—Machnikowska (2018), p. 482. This also applies to judges in criminal departments.

It has an impact on the very low rate of out-of-court proceedings. Cf. Conflict Resolution in this chapter.

This is why it is so strongly expected, for example, that the legal system should severely punish criminals, rather than include further elements of rehabilitation.

Machnikowska (2018), pp. 487–492.

Machnikowska (2018), pp. 350–401.

E.g., judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 4 June 2013, P 43/11. Granat (2008), pp. 23–41.

See their review in the resolution of the seven judges of the Supreme Administrative Court of 12 March 2001, OPS 14/00, ONSA 2001/3, item 101).

Chapter III of the Constitution, Art. 87–94.

Art. 87 para. 1.

Art. 87–94 of the Constitution.

The preamble of the Constitution speaks of justice, and under Art. 45 para. 1, citizens have a right to have their cases fairly reviewed, however these concepts are not directly linked to the sources of law or its interpretation. The concept of justice (iustitia) used in the Constitution is not synonymous with the concept of equity (aequitas). Cf., e.g. judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of 27 June 1995, K 4/94; of 22 December 1997, K2/97; of 5 July 2010, P 31/09.

In Poland, the popularity of the academic analysis of Gustav Radbruch’s Formula and the consequences of his approach to the contemporary legislation and case law may be contributed to J. Zajadło’s publications. It is also due to the fact that, in the Polish legal system from before the political transformation in 1989, the law was very oppressive in some cases although it aspired, undeservedly, to legality, taking advantage of the non-existence of a constitutional tribunal and very limited independence of courts; Zajadło (2007); idem, ‘Formuła “Gesetz und Recht”’ (2002) 1 Ius et Lex 39; pp. 37–49.

Cf. Wojciechowski (2004a, b), pp. 9–26; Safjan (2007), p. 204.

Cf. examples in given in Sect. 3.

Cf.: Radwański and Zieliński (2007), p. 335 ff; Choduń et al. (2013); Zieliński (1997), p. 134 ff.; Wypych-Żywicka (2017), pp. 1359–1399; Leszczyński and Maroń (2013), p. 82 ff.; Zieliński (2000), p. 786; Zdyb and Stelmasiak (1992), p. 47; Szot (2016), p. 291.

E.g., Art. 417² of the CC. Cf. also: Drywa (2014), p. 28.

Therefore, databases with rulings occupy the second place (after databases with provisions of statutory law) in the statistics of using individual elements of legal information. In every legal profession they are a basic work tool. See Kokoszczyński and Wierczyński (2011), p. 81.

Among the many judgments that assume the significance grounded in earlier court decisions, it is worth pointing to characteristic statements such as ‘in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Administrative Court, the application of the provision […] has been checked many times and currently the interpretation of this provision does not cause any doubts’, judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 31 May 2000, I SA/Gd 102/98; ‘interpretation should be sought in court decisions’, judgment of the voivodship administrative court in Opole of 4 April 2004, I SA/Wr 3918/01; ‘the explanations provided are consistent with the grounded case law of the Supreme Administrative Court’, judgment of the voivodship administrative court in Warsaw of 16 June 2004, III SA 528/03. More: Bielska-Brodziak (2009), pp. 81 ff.

In publications intended for judges on the methodology of their work, not only legal institutions are discussed, but the case law of the Supreme Court which has shaped judicial practice, is strongly considered. Cf. Pietrzykowski (2014).

Tuleja (2014), p. 57; Frąckowiak (2018), p. 47.

Zieliński (2017), p. 299.

Bogucki (2016), pp. 218–219.

Romanowicz (2016), pp. 173–200; Safjan (2007) p. 15; Potrzeszcz (2007); Granat (2008), pp. 23–40. Cf also Tuleja (2016) and Florczak-Wątor (2014).

Cf. Judgment of 22 December 1997, K 2/97, in which the Constitutional Tribunal emphasised that Rawl’s concept of distributive social justice should be implemented in labour relations: ‘All social values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage’.; Rawls (1999), p. 54; Polish edition was cited by the Constitutional Tribunal: Rawls (1994), p. 89. The same reference was used in judgment of 2 December 2008, P 48/07. Cf. also judgment of 9 June 2003, SK 5/03, in which no specific publication of Rawl’s was cited, just his authority was used by judge Marian Zdyb in his dissenting opinion: ‘As truth in knowledge systems—John Rawls used to say—so is justice first virtue of social institutions’.

Stelmach and Brożek (2006). English version: idem, Methods of Legal Reasoning (Springer 2006).

According to Ewa Łętowska: ‘First of all, the court must note the problem that requires interpretation. Contrary to what is commonly thought, for the court the need for interpretation is not a matter of ambiguity or lack of precision of the text, but above all an axiological matter. The beginning of the whole process takes place in sensitivity, which makes it possible to realise that there is an “interpretation deficit.” The judge notices that the interpretation usually used so far is “bad,” and this axiological discomfort becomes an impulse for interpretive searches. That is why—at least when it comes to interpretive innovation—progress is made not so much with hard cases as with axiological cases’. See Łętowska (2003), p. 30.

See Wojciechowski (2016), pp. 286–294.

Stelmach (2003); Budzyńska, Logika a argumentacja, available at http://​www.​calculemus.​org/​neumann/​odczyty/​budzynska.​doc.

See Bogucki (2016), pp. 205–220.

Matczak (2007).

See https://​www.​gov.​pl/​web/​edukacja-i-nauka/​informacja-o-wynikach-rekrutacji-na-studia-na-rok-akademicki-20212022-w-uczelniach-nadzorowanych-przez-ministra-edukacji-i-nauki.

Data published by the Central Statistical Office (Główny Urząd Statystyczny): https://​stat.​gov.​pl/​obszary-tematyczne/​edukacja/​edukacja/​szkoly-wyzsze-i-ich-finanse-w-2018-roku,2,15.​html.

See https://​www.​rp.​pl/​Rankingi/​306179997-Ranking-Wydzialow-Prawa-2019, data from the Information Processing Center of the National Research Institute (Ośrodek Przetwarzania Informacji Państwowego Instytutu Badawczego).

See no. 213.

More: Act of 20 July 2018—Law on Higher Education and Science (Dz. U. 2018, 1668, as amended); Statute of the Polish Accreditation Commission; Annex to Resolution No. 4/2018 of the Polish Accreditation Commission of 13 December 2018 (consolidated text including changes introduced by the resolution of the Polish Accreditation Commission of 18 February 2019 No. 1/2019).

Cf., e.g. the programme of legal studies at the Jagiellonian University: https://​wpia.​uj.​edu.​pl/​prawo/​program-i-plan-studiow; at the University of Warsaw: http://​strony.​wpia.​uw.​edu.​pl/​zarzadzeniauchwa​ly/​files/​2017/​02/​Zal_​1.​pdf; and at the University of Gdańsk: https://​prawo.​ug.​edu.​pl/​jesli_​studiujesz/​studenci/​programy_​studiow/​program_​studiow_​-_​prawo.

Ibid.

See https://​www.​gov.​pl/​web/​sprawiedliwosc/​wstepne-wyniki-egzaminow-na-aplikacje-prawnicze.

Order of Minister of Justice, 10.06.2022, Dz.U. 2022 item 126.

Up until October 2018, the official guideline was to translate radca prawny as legal counsellor or legal adviser. 2019, however, the National Council of Legal Counsellors decided that this term does not reflect the scope of their competences and resolved that ‘attorney-at-law’ will be more fitting, especially considering that there is now a para-legal profession of legal adviser (doradca prawny, see below).

Act of 26 May 1982 Law on the Advocates’ Profession (Dz. U 2019, 1513 as amended), Act of 6 July 1982 on Attorneys-at-Law (Dz. U. 2019, 730, as amended); Act of 23 January 2009 on the National School of the Judiciary and Prosecution Service (Dz. U. 2019, 1042); Act of 14 February 1991 Law on Notaries (Dz. U. 2019, 540 as amended); Act of 22 March 2018 on Court Bailiffs (Dz. U. 2019, 55 as amended).

For instance, after 6 months of apprenticeship, a trainee advocate may substitute an advocate at court, before organs of law enforcement, state authorities, self-government bodies and other institutions with the exception of the Supreme Court, Supreme Administrative Court, Constitutional Tribunal and Tribunal of State.

The existing division between advocates and attorneys-at-laws is currently deemed artificial and has mostly historical significance. In the 1960s, when Poland was a socialist country, legal counsellors (attorneys-at-law) were appointed to provide legal services to state enterprises, which was their domain until the end of the 1980s.

See no. 222.

Their competences only do not cover cases involving decisions on pre-trial detention and the handling of complaints against decisions not to open an investigation. Art. 2 § 1 of the Act of 27 July 2001 on the organizational structure of common courts; Dz.U. 2019, 52, as amended.

Art. 6 § 1 and Art. 6a § 1 LSAC.

Ibid Art. 106xa § 1–2.

After the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 24 October 2007, which came into effect on 5 May 2009.

Own calculations based on announcements of the President of the Republic of Poland, see https://​prezydent.​pl/​aktualnosc/​nominacje.

The decision was issued on November 19, 2019. C-585/18, C 624/18 and 625/18.

Resolution of the combined Chambers of Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance of the Supreme Court of 23.01.2020. BSA I-4110-1/20 Cf. Judgment of the Supreme Court of 5 December 2019, III PO 7/18.

Act of 8 December 2017 on the Supreme Court, Dz. U. 2019, 825, as amended.

See no. 231.

E.g., Art. 25 para. 1 point 1 of the Act on Attorneys-at-Law.

E.g., ibid Art. 25 para. 1 point 5.

E.g., ibid Art. 25 para. 2.

Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 22 November 2016, SK 22/02.

For other competencies see: Art. 87 para. 1 and Art. 87 para. 3,4,5,6 of the CCP.

Art. 182 of the Constitution.

Art. 182 of the Constitution.

In civil cases, lay judges are present, e.g. in some labour law cases and cases involving damages in case of mobbing, as well as in some family law cases, including divorce and separation. In criminal cases, adjudicating panels with lay judges adjudicate in cases involving accusation of a felony, i.e. acts punishable by more than 3 years’ imprisonment. Cf. Art. 7. § 2 of the PC. List of cases heard with the participation of lay judges cf. Rycak (2011), pp. 6 ff.

See, e.g. Zalewski (2016), pp. 213 ff.; Stefański (2008), p. 435.

Response by the Minister of Justice to parliamentary interpellation No. 33017. This issue will be subject to further policy decisions in connection with the Senate bill of 21 July 2022, not supported by the Ministry, repealing this provision, http://​orka.​sejm.​gov.​pl/​Druki9ka.​nsf/​Projekty/​9-020-920-2022/​$file/​9-020-920-2022.​pdf.

Act of 8 December 2017 on the Supreme Court.

Ibid Art. 59 § 1.

Cf. Paper no. 2003, Draft Act on the Supreme Court presented by the President of the Republic of Poland; paper no. 2071, Report of the Justice and Human Rights Committee on the draft law on the Supreme Court presented by the President of the Republic of Poland; paper no. 2071-A, Additional report of the Justice and Human Rights Committee on the draft law on the Supreme Court presented by the President of the Republic of Poland.

Ibid.

Including statements in the media by prof. E. Łętowska, prof. F. Zoll, prof. J. Zajadło and prof. M. Matczak (an interview for the online edition of Die Welt of 10 July 2019). More: Granat (2019), pp. 400–405, 422–425; Piotrowski (2016), and Ławnikowicz (2016), both in Machnikowska (ed), pp. 11–30, 85–102; Machnikowska (2018).

Cf. Interview with Prof. J. Pisuliński: https://​www.​prawo.​pl/​prawnicy-sady/​prof-pisulinski-po-skardze-nadzwyczajnej-niepewnosc-prawa,75048.​html.

See more: Evaluation of the judicial systems (2018–2020), The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, p. 19; see. https://​rm.​coe.​int/​en-poland-2018/​16809fe2e9. The exact number of active judges in 2022 is not publicly available information. From individually collected data, the number estimated by the largest judges’ association is put at around 9,800 judges, with data from 2021 containing only general wording about a decrease in the number of judges compared to the number of judges in 2018, i.e. 9776 judges, see more: https://​www.​iustitia.​pl/​images/​pliki/​e-Raport_​2015-2020-opt.​pdf.

26 judges per 100,000 inhabitants, see more: CEPEJ Report on ‘European judicial systems—Edition 2018 (2016 data) efficiency and quality of justice’, Table 7.1, Présentation PowerPoint zob. https://​coe.​int.

Art. 20a § 1 act of 27 July 2001—Law on the system of common courts—the Minister of Justice, allocates new judge and assessor positions to individual courts, taking into account the rational use of the staff of the common judiciary and the needs arising from the workload of individual courts.

See more: https://​krs.​pl.​home.​pl/​pl/​dzialalnosc/​posiedzenia-rady/​f,177,posiedzenia-w-2016-r/​578,11-14-pazdziernika-2016%2D%2Droku/​4444,stanowisko-krajowej-rady-sadownictwa-z-dnia-14-pazdziernika-2016-r-nr-wo401-2816-dot-wo-0752-8316; https://​rpo.​gov.​pl/​pl/​content/​ms-%E2%80%9Ezamrozilo%E2%80%9D-etaty%2D%2Ds%C4%99dziowskie-procesy-przed%C5%82uzaja-sie-kolejne-wyst%C4%85pienie-rpo%2D%2Ddo-zbigniewa-ziobry.

Art. 69 § 1, § 1b, § 3 PrUSP a judge retires on reaching the age of 65, the National Council of the Judiciary may consent to the continuation of the judge’s position if it is justified by the interests of the administration of justice—Article 1(4)(a) of the Act of 12 April 2018 r. (Dz.U. 2018 r. poz. 848), amending, inter alia, the Act of 27 July 2001.—Law on the system of common courts (Dz.U. z 2018 r. poz. 23 ze zm.).

See more Machnikowska (2022), pp. 80–124.

Wasilkowski (1997), p. 15.

Triepel (1899).

Official translation of the Polish Constitution. See https://​www.​sejm.​gov.​pl/​prawo/​konst/​angielski/​kon1.​htm.

Boć (1998), p. 157. Cf. Szafarz (1997), pp. 19 and 24; Wójtowicz (2016), p. 325; Masternak-Kubiak (1997), p. 200; Garlicki (2019), 160.

Cf. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 11 May 2005, K 18/04.

Cf. Łętowska (2005), pp. 3–10.

Art. 133 para. 1 point 1 of the Constitution.

Ibid Art. 89 para. 1. The approving act is required for treaties concerning: (1) peace, alliance, political pacts or military pacts; (2) civic freedoms, rights and obligations provided for in the Constitution; (3) membership of the Republic of Poland in an international organisation; (4) major financial liabilities of the State; (5) matters governed by an act or for which the Constitution requires an act (Article 89 (1) of the Constitution). All the other international treaties do not require an approving act (however, the Sejm must be notified by the Prime Minister. Cf. Art. 89 para. 2).

2/3 in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of members of each chamber. Cf. Art. 90 para. 2 of the Constitution.

Cf. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 19 December 2002, K 33/02.

Cf. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 December 2009, K 8/09.

Wyrozumska (2006a), pp. 31–108; Masternak-Kubiak (2003), p. 203. Cf. also judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 19 December 2002, K 33/02. One of the methods of implementing the provisions of non-ratified treaties is the reference contained in the Constitution or in an Act of Parliament. E.g., the Supreme Administrative Court in a judgment of 26 August 1999 (V SA 708/99) granted the rights arising from the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 on refugee status (which, according to the Supreme Administrative Court, is a non-ratified, however still binding upon Poland, treaty), the rank of constitutional rights, due to the reference to binding international treaties included in Art. 56 para. 2 of the Polish Constitution. According to Masternak-Kubiak, these norms should be directly applied in the internal legal circulation and do not require any additional (transforming) actions, see Masternak-Kubiak (2013), p. 163.

Art. 91 para. 2 of the Constitution. Cf. also Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 4 March 2008, SK 3/07.

A contrario to Art. 91 para. 2. Cf. Garlicki (2019), p. 164; Banaszak (2004), p. 146. Cf. Art. 188 para. 2–3 of the Constitution.

Garlicki (2019), p. 164.

Ibid.

Cf., e.g. judgments of ECJ in Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR 1891; and Case C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I–4135 as well.

Cf. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 10 February 2015, SK 50/13.

Cf., e.g. ECJ judgments in the following cases: Case C-8/81 Becker vs. Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53; Case C-102/79 European Commission v. Belgium [1980] ECR 1473; Case C-41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337; Case C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and others [1991] ECR I-5357.

See no. 261.

Garlicki (2019), p. 161.

Cf. Sokolewicz (2001), p. 16.

Art. 178 of the Constitution.

Wyrozumska (2006b), p. 39. Cf. resolution of the Supreme Court of 11 January 2000 (I PKN 562/99).

Banaszak (2004), pp. 149–150.

As it was emphasised in the opinion of the Advisory Legal Committee to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 21 May 1999, resolutions of international organisations, after having met all the procedures required to obtain binding force in relation to the Republic of Poland, may be considered binding upon authorities of the Republic of Poland not only based on the effect of an international legal action, but also under Art. 9 of the Constitution of 1997. Private opinion, cited after Wasilkowski (2006), p. 16. Cf. Wójtowicz (2016), p. 332. In a judgment of 16 November 2011 (SK 45/09), the Constitutional Tribunal clearly emphasised that although the Constitution of the Republic of Poland has been clearly guaranteed the status of the highest law of the Republic of Poland, this regulation is accompanied by the ‘order to respect and favorable attitude towards properly shaped and binding regulations of international law in the territory of the Republic of Poland (Article 9 of the Constitution)’. Cf. Also: Łętowska (1998) and Bałaban (1998).

E.g., in a letter to the Speaker of the Sejm dated 20 January 2012.

Łętowska (2006), pp. 68–70; Fuchs (2010), p. 126; Fuchs (2007).

It is established that they give rise to legal consequences stipulated in Art. 56 of the Civil Code, which states that ‘an act in law shall not only produce the consequences expressed in it but also those which result from, among others, established customs’ and in Art. 65 of the CC: ‘§ 1. A declaration of intent shall be construed in such a manner as required by principles of community coexistence and established customs, with account of the circumstances in which it was made, § 2. When contracts are concerned, the concurrent intention of the parties and the purpose of the contract shall rather be examined than its literal wording’.

Cf. Regulation of the Minister of Finance of 22 April 2004 on the detailed requirements that a customs declaration must satisfy (Dz. U. 2014, 94, 902); Ordinance of the Director General of State Forests no. 64 of 16 September 2015 on the rules applicable to the sale of timber at the State Forests National Forest Holding (B.I.LP. 2015, 10(274));

Cf. Judgment of the Appellate Court in Szczecin of 23 December 2014 (I ACa 461/14); Judgment of the SC of 29 June 2010 (III CSK 255/09); Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 22 June 2010 (I FSK 1114/09) and of 16 October 2014 (I GSK 1071/13); Judgment of the voivodship administrative court in Poznań of 30 July 2009 (I SA/Po 331/09); Judgment of the voivodship administrative court in Warsaw of 5 May 2009 (III SA/Wa 3448/08).

Strzępka and Wyrzykowski (2013), pp. 402–411.

Cf: Juchniewicz (2015).

See https://​mgm.​gov.​pl/​wp-content/​uploads/​2016/​01/​Polityka-morska-Rzeczypospolitej​-Polskiej_​uchw.​_​Nr_​33_​RM_​z_​17_​03_​2015.​pdf.

I KZP 21/06, OSNKW 2006, 9, 77.

K 1/13.

Skąpska (2018).

Such a change is made while remaining faithful to the formal procedures for amending the constitution, and based on democratic legitimacy, i.e. the support of a sufficient part of the electorate (constitutional majority) and its representation in the parliament. More: Landau (2013), pp. 189–260. Landau gives among others Hungarian example.

Skąpska (2018), p. 287 ff.

See more Garlicki (2022), pp. 156–169.

Ibid, 277.

Skąpska (2011), p. 76. In Poland the phenomenon of ‘exchange of elites’ is taking place. In practice it means that prestigious and lucrative positions in state administration, public media, nationalised banks and state-owned companies are filled based on political rather than substantive criteria, often based on family connections. Particularly, positions in the managing and supervisory boards of state-owned companies are important. They make it possible to transfer profits from these companies to enterprises important for the government, including social programmes, as well as propaganda activities that are to ensure the favour of the electorate. Skąpska (2018), p. 289.

37.58% with the voter turnout of 50.92% https://​parlament2015.​pkw.​gov.​pl/​.

43.59% with the voter turnout of 61.74% https://​sejmsenat2019.​pkw.​gov.​pl/​sejmsenat2019.