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Cognitive Computation
Published in: Cognitive Computation 3/2012

01-09-2012

Autonomy and Desire in Machines and Cognitive Agent Systems

Authors: Kevin Magill, Yasemin J. Erden

Published in: Cognitive Computation | Issue 3/2012

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Abstract

The development of cognitive agent systems relies on theories of agency, within which the concept of desire is key. Indeed, in the quest to develop increasingly autonomous cognitive agent systems, desire has had a significant role. We argue, however, that insufficient attention has been given to analysis and clarification of desire as a complex concept. Accordingly, in this paper, we will draw on some key philosophical accounts of the nature of desire, including what distinguishes it from other mental and motivational states, in order to identify some key characteristics of desire as a complex concept. We will then draw on these in order to investigate the role, definition and adequacy of concepts of desire within applied theoretical models of agency and agent systems.
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Footnotes
1
There are of course other models: for example, the Soar (cognitive architecture) project, which offers more of a cognitive psychology approach, in contrast to the philosophical grounding of BDI. Nevertheless, since these do not differ from BDI models in tending to equate desires with goals, we take BDI models as representative and confine our analysis to those.
 
2
Note: as described by Turing, the interrogator has no judgment to make about whether the machine thinks: he or she takes it for granted that both respondents are thinking humans.
 
3
Indeed, when desires are acted upon, whether immediately or following deliberation and decision, our conception of rational action, in which beliefs and desires provide reasons for acting, is one in which action follows a judgement in favour of the reasons for undertaking it. One possible implication of this is that while desires are causally antecedent to the actions that realise them, they are not necessarily, so to speak, the immediate or direct causes of actions. The position—immediate or mediated—of desires in the causal ancestry of actions is clearly relevant to an understanding of agency and presumably also therefore of potential relevance to agent systems, but is not an issue we can pursue in this paper.
 
4
Elsewhere higher-order desires are discussed as the basis of a related, but arguably quite different, capacity for ‘fully human agency’ [9, 10].
 
5
To borrow an idea from Wittgenstein, the notion of desire in this context would be idle.
 
6
See also the discussion of fantastical desires below.
 
7
Morillo, in [12], for example, argues that actions are caused, conjointly with beliefs (neurologically conceived), by pleasure events in the brain, from which it is said to follow, since this is the causal role of desires, that desires are such pleasure events. See Strawson [13] for a rather different set of arguments for the pleasure-directedness of desire.
 
8
Although some philosophers have argued that desire might be a special category of belief: see [14] and [15].
 
9
‘The world as it was’ and ‘as it will be’ in respect of past- and future-directed beliefs.
 
10
Admittedly in relation to quite a different notion of the intentional content of desire from what is discussed in this paper.
 
11
It might still be argued, implausibly in our view, that regardless of whatever distress or pain it may occasion or be accompanied by, desire is characterised by intrinsic feelings of anticipatory pleasure. Something like this appears to be Morillo’s [12] view. Alternatively, it might be argued that it is possible to desire something only to the extent that one regards its satisfaction as pleasing. This would treat the belief that the object or satisfaction of desire is or would be pleasing as a necessary condition of desiring rather than being intrinsic to the content of desire. Opponents of the claim have urged putative counterexamples. We would take the view that the account of desire we go on to develop will serve to demotivate the claim.
 
12
We therefore reject the position we considered in an earlier version of this paper [11] that desire can be understood in part as having an intentional content in which the object of desire is thought of or regarded as pleasing.
 
13
Not feeling in the sense often expressed by screen characters, for example, ‘I’ve got a feeling that something’s wrong’, where feeling is typically a synonym for sense, indicating something one can’t put one’s finger on, perhaps something disturbing peripheral awareness.
 
14
Desires for continuation of what is already taking place seem to present a counterexample to the idea that desire involves a feeling of the object of desire as lacking. If I want an experience I am enjoying to continue, I could not very easily feel it to be lacking. However, the object of desire in that case would not be what I am currently experiencing, but rather its continuation beyond the present. There need be no dissonance between an experience one is having and a feeling of lack in relation to its continuation: a feeling that would be assuaged by its continuation.
 
15
See [2] for discussion of a range of issues relating to such judgements.
 
16
Recalling Bentham’s famous judgement on what our grounds should be for the moral consideration of animals: ‘The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’ [18].
 
17
The notion of a machine capable of intentional action might be thought to present considerable further challenges.
 
18
For contemporary analysis of the latter, cf. Dong et al [19].
 
19
Setting aside the issue of whether what we are talking about is really action as opposed to behaviour, as discussed above.
 
20
There are, of course, other approaches. Dastani and van der Torre [23], for example, note the problems engendered by the unification of desires and goals into a single motivational attitude and instead offer an approach that distinguishes between them. This is not, however, the most common approach. Cf. Schroeder [24], who, though not specifically dealing with a goal/desire distinction, does present a linear materialist view of desire as determined by reward systems in the brain.
 
21
The authors hold different positions on this matter and about how far this relates to wishing or desire.
 
22
The fact that we might not be aware of certain desires may or may not play a role in they effect they have on our behaviour and intentions, or indeed our sense of what we find pleasant or unpleasant, but as we have noted already, this is not to say that the significance of such desires can be easily dismissed from our conception of human autonomy.
 
23
Multi-agent systems (MAS) are systems of multiple interacting intelligent agents, which enable surveyability of, for example, large systems and rely on the autonomy of each individual agent; see Brazier et al [31]. Notions of desire are therefore thought to play a significant role in ensuring not only the autonomy of each agent, but also to ensure that each agent works towards achieving different but overlapping or complementary ends.
 
24
There are of course some issues with these definitions. For instance, intentions would more naturally be thought of as often being produced by or following from a process of reasoning. We do not have the space to consider these objections here, but they should not be neglected in the application of BDI, and related, models.
 
25
See discussion in earlier sections on multiple goals in relation to the Turing machine, where we show that even a multiplicity of goals does not automatically create a role for desire.
 
26
Embodiment might also play a role in this, although this view remains speculative at present and as such is somewhat outside the scope of this paper.
 
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Metadata
Title
Autonomy and Desire in Machines and Cognitive Agent Systems
Authors
Kevin Magill
Yasemin J. Erden
Publication date
01-09-2012
Publisher
Springer-Verlag
Published in
Cognitive Computation / Issue 3/2012
Print ISSN: 1866-9956
Electronic ISSN: 1866-9964
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12559-012-9140-9

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