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Published in: Review of Industrial Organization 4/2017

08-12-2016

Avoiding the Pitfalls of Net Uniformity: Zero Rating and Nondiscrimination

Author: Christopher S. Yoo

Published in: Review of Industrial Organization | Issue 4/2017

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Abstract

The current debate over network neutrality has not fully appreciated how service differentiation can benefit consumers and promote Internet adoption. On the demand-side, service differentiation addresses the primary obstacle to adoption, which is the lack of perceived need for Internet service, and reflects the growing heterogeneity of consumer demand. On the supply-side, monopolistic competition has long underscored how product differentiation can create stable equilibria with multiple providers—notwithstanding the presence of unexhausted economies of scale—by allowing competitors to target subsegments of the overall market that place a higher value on particular services. Conversely, prohibiting service differentiation would restrict competition to price and network size, which are factors that favor the largest players. These dynamics are well illustrated by global enforcement patterns with respect to a practice known as “zero rating”, which permits subscribers to access certain content without having that traffic count against their data caps. Of the six countries that have brought enforcement actions against zero rating, only India has categorically banned the practice. The other five countries (the United States, Chile, Canada, Slovenia, and The Netherlands) have adopted a more nuanced approach. A case-by-case approach is consistent with the empirical literature on vertical integration and restraints and the well-established principles for determining when to impose per se illegality and when to apply the “rule of reason”. The U.S. Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence also helps identify factors that militate against liability, such as the lack of market power, nonexclusivity, and nonproprietary services.

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Footnotes
1
Declining average costs are a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for natural monopoly. More formally, natural monopoly only requires subadditivity, which exists when a single firm can satisfy the entire industry output at a lower cost than could two firms. This can occur even if average cost has begun to increase, so long as the average cost for the entire industry output remains below the average cost for half of the industry output (Baumol et al. 1982).
 
2
For modern studies exploring monopolistic competition, see, e.g., Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Salop (1979), Hart (1985), Solow (1998) and Zhelobodko et al. (2012).
 
3
See, e.g., Bode (2015) and Kivuva (2015).
 
4
See FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458–459 (1986); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 342 (1982); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9, 19 n.33 (1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49–50, 58–59 (1977); United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–608 (1972); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
 
5
See also Copperweld Corp. v. Independent Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (characterizing the rule of reason as “an inquiry into market power and market structure designed to assess the combination's actual effect”).
 
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Metadata
Title
Avoiding the Pitfalls of Net Uniformity: Zero Rating and Nondiscrimination
Author
Christopher S. Yoo
Publication date
08-12-2016
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Review of Industrial Organization / Issue 4/2017
Print ISSN: 0889-938X
Electronic ISSN: 1573-7160
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9555-7

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