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Published in: Journal of Quantitative Economics 4/2023

05-08-2023 | Notes and Short Article

Banks and Markets from an Insurance Perspective

Authors: Amaury Goguel, Maxence Miéra

Published in: Journal of Quantitative Economics | Issue 4/2023

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Abstract

This article aims to clarify the analogy between contingent claims in a complete market and banking contracts in a capitalized financial intermediary that combines both deposit and equity. It brings together insurance theory and financial intermediation theory in a synthetic model by focusing on the risk allocation function rather than on a particular kind of institutional arrangement. The model includes both idiosyncratic liquidity risk and aggregate uncertainty on asset return, and it focuses on risk allocation in a perfect information setting from an insurance perspective. This article then highlights that equity contracts are equivalent to state-contingent claims in the aggregate-risk shifting, that deposit contracts are equivalent to type-contingent claims in the idiosyncratic-risk mutualization, and that banks and markets both implement the optimal allocation by simply using different mechanisms.

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Appendix
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Footnotes
1
See Allen and Santomero (1997) for a critical view of this approach. They notably point out that: "The literature’s emphasis on the role of intermediaries as reducing the frictions of transaction costs and asymmetric information is too strong. (...) Risk management has become a key area of intermediary activity, though intermediation theory has offered little to explain why institutions should perform this function" (p. 1462).
 
2
The framework constitutes a variation on Diamond and Dybvig (1983). This variation is close to that of Allen and Gale (2004). The main difference is that liquidity shocks are assumed to be observable for the purpose of analysis.
 
3
See Judd (1985) regarding the application of the law of large numbers in a continuum.
 
4
As \(\pi _s / p_s\) is a constant, we can express all prices with respect to a reference state k:
$$\begin{aligned} \forall s, \quad p_s = \pi _s \frac{p_k}{\pi _k}. \end{aligned}$$
It follows that
$$\begin{aligned} \sum _s p_s (W_{2s}^{A*} - R_s) = \frac{p_k}{\pi _k} \sum _s \pi _s (W_{2s}^{A*} - R_s) = 0, \end{aligned}$$
which can be rewritten as
$$\begin{aligned} \sum _s \pi _s W_{2s}^{A*} = \sum _s \pi _s R_s. \end{aligned}$$
 
5
We assumed that the coefficient of risk aversion of consumers was greater than unity: \(-C u_C''(C) / u_C'(C) >1\). This can be rewritten as follows: \(u_C'(C) + C u_C'' (C) <0\), or \(\partial C u_C'(C) / \partial C < 0\).
 
6
Note that \(\sum \pi _s u_I(B_s^I) = u_I(\sum \pi _s B_s^I)\) and that \(u_I(\sum \pi _s B_s^I) \ge u_I(E(R))\) if and only if \(\sum \pi _s B_s^I \ge E(R)\).
 
7
The determination of the optimality conditions is less direct than for the other programs. We focus here on the main features from an economic perspective and provide technical details in the Appendix.
 
8
Financial intermediaries can mutualize and reduce transaction costs (Benston and Smith 1976). They can produce information (Fama 1985). They can also deal efficiently with private information (Diamond and Dybvig 1983), contract incompleteness (Allen and Gale 2004), or agency problems (Townsend 1979; Diamond 1984).
 
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Metadata
Title
Banks and Markets from an Insurance Perspective
Authors
Amaury Goguel
Maxence Miéra
Publication date
05-08-2023
Publisher
Springer India
Published in
Journal of Quantitative Economics / Issue 4/2023
Print ISSN: 0971-1554
Electronic ISSN: 2364-1045
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40953-023-00365-8

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