6. Barnard and the Theory of Authority

The main writings of M. Parker Follett are the following: The New State: Group Organization, the Solution of Popular Government, 1920; ID., Creative Experience, 1951 (printed in 1924); ID., Dynamic Administration: the Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett, in Metcalf and Urwick (Eds.), 1941; this text is available in Italian: Parker Follett (1970). Complete texts of some of the author’s works can be found on the website: http://​mpfollett.​ning.​com.

Cfr. Graham (2003).

Simon (1958), chapter VII.

More precisely, formal authority is the potential capacity to realize things through others; power, however, is the capacity to get things done effectively.

Barnard (1938), p. 163.

Ibidem, p. 163.

Ibidem, p. 183.

Ibidem, pp. 165–166.

Orders are often incomprehensible; sometimes they are expressed in general terms and therefore must be interpreted by the recipient; in these cases, there is no order in the strict sense.

Sometimes there can be conflicting orders. In these cases, a procedure is necessary to resolve the conflict, attributing priority either to a certain characteristic of the order or to its origin or the time of receipt, etc. Until we solve this problem, there is no real acceptance and consequently, there is no manifestation of authority.

“If a communication is believed to involve a burden that destroys the net advantage of connection with the organization, there no longer would remain a net inducement to the individual to contribute to it. The existence of a net inducement is the only reason for accepting any orders at all.” Ibidem p. 166.

Ibidem, p. 165. On page 166, the author states: “To order a man who cannot swim to swim a river is a sufficient case. Such extreme cases are not frequent; but they occur. The more usual case is to order a man to do things only a little beyond his capacity; but a little impossible is still impossible.”

Ibidem, p. 167.

Ibidem, p. 167.

Ibidem, p. 169. Barnard states (pp. 168–169): “If all the orders for actions reasonably practicable be arranged in the order of their acceptability to the person affected, it may be conceived that there are a number which are clearly unacceptable, that is, which certainly will not be obeyed; there is another group somewhat more or less on the neutral line, that is, either barely acceptable or barely unacceptable; and a third group unquestionably acceptable. This last group lies within the ‘zone of indifference’.”

Ibidem, p. 169.

Ibidem, p. 169.

Ibidem, p. 172.

Cfr. Granger (1964), Litterer (1965), and Simon (1958), chap. IV.

Naturally, this is true also for objectives, strategies, policies, etc., because all these elements are the product of company decisions.

Barnard (1938) says that authority (objective aspect) is definable as “a character of a communication in a formal organization,” and adds, “A ‘superior’ is not in our view an authority nor does he have authority strictly speaking; nor is a communication authoritative except when it is an effort or action of organization. This is what we mean when we say that individuals are able to exercise authority only when they are acting ‘officially’, a principle well established in law, and generally in secular and religious practice. Hence, the importance ascribed to time, place, dress, ceremony, and authentication of a communication to establish its official character. These practices confirm the statement that authority relates to a communication ‘in formal organization’.”

On this point, see: Davis (1951), chap. X; Koontz and O’Donnell (1959), p. 155 ff.; Mooney and Reiley (1958), p. 50 ff.; Pfiffner and Sherwood (1990), p. 155 ff.; Terry (1955), p. 359 ff.

Barnard (1938), p. 174.

The processes of development and change of mission or strategy involve, naturally, the reorganization of regulation process parameters.

Barnard (1938), p. 175.

Ibidem, p. 175.

Ibidem, pp. 175 ff.

Barnard (1938), p. 176 (in the notes) observes that, in organizations, it is not unusual that a person reports to and is therefore subordinate to two or three “superiors.” In this case, in his view, tasks, powers, and responsibilities should be clearly defined and regulated. In this case, we are in the presence of the so-called functional authority (prescription authorities) which is used together with hierarchical authority and breaks the “unity of command principle.” Functional authority requires the assignment of the right to command to certain specialists, to take advantage of their professional skills. It entails the obligation of obedience on the part of the subordinate that receives the command. Authority passes between roles located in different control lines (i.e., it is a transversal relationship). The relation of functional authority is, moreover, limited to a specific subject (that is, a particular aspect of the subordinate task); it is also limited in time. The holder of functional authority may propose sanctions and rewards but they are managed by the hierarchical head. Functional authority breaks the unity of command. Therefore, it is used carefully to exploit particular competencies in the organization. For example, when in the performance of some of the roles assigned to specific people it is necessary to use information held by certain specialists located in different lines of command and it is necessary to give these specialists formal authority and not just advisory powers, transversal authoritarian organizational relationships are set up, which—as mentioned—are limited in time and by subject. Giving up the influences of functional authority would mean giving up using specialist expertise in company decision-making processes, unless also non-authoritarian transversal functional relationships are not effective, such as advisory functional, service, monitoring, and coordination relationships. This is a problem that must be solved case by case when creating and revising the organizational structure. It should be noted that the violation of the principle of unity of control must be taken into careful consideration in any case. Therefore the introduction of relations of specialist functional authority must be accompanied by the establishment of clear, detailed, and careful regulation of organizational relationships. In other words, the content and the limitations of functional authority must be specified unequivocally and this information must be included in the relevant job descriptions, organigram, and the organizational manual.

Organization members have the natural tendency to distort the information they submit to their superiors (hierarchical and functional) to please them or to make their performance appear better than it actually is. They also tend to filter and modify the information they receive from above and must forward to their hierarchical subordinates or to other roles of the company’s organizational structure. This happens, generally, in good faith with the aim to clarify and make orders more acceptable. Sometimes this phenomenon manifests with the deliberate intention to accentuate personal power within the organization: information, means, knowledge and therefore power.

Barnard (1938), p. 176.

Barnard (1938), p. 178.

This is because when Barnard talks about leadership, he seems to favor the socialization model (adaptation of the objectives of employees to those of the company) to the fusion/integration model (in which company goals and those of individuals are integrated mainly by creating organizational roles and company relationships that enable employees to satisfy their motives in carrying out their work tasks, deriving satisfaction intrinsic to work).