Beyond Social Acceptability: Applying Lessons from CCS Social Science to Support Deployment of BECCS

BECCS is a specific application of CCS where the CO₂ is captured from a process using a biomass feedstock; it was initially conceived as a stop-gap solution which could allow more ambitious climate change targets to be achieved. More recently, the need for greater levels of emission reduction, driven by the 1.5° C imperative combined with an understanding of the potential role for CCS in reducing emissions across the whole economy and its potential to deliver CDR, has changed the policy context and BECCS is now a mainstay of proposed climate mitigation portfolios. Not surprisingly, given that CCS was more commonly associated with fossil-fuelled electricity generation, there has historically been more work looking at CCS from fossil sources or which does not distinguish between different types of CCS. One of the earliest studies, which does distinguish between different sources of CO₂, [9], found that fossil fuel sources of CO₂ were perceived less favourably by survey respondents than industrial or bioenergy sources. Whilst research has started to consider different applications for carbon capture (e.g., carbon capture and utilisation (CCU) [10]), we found that BECCS is often compared with other CDR technologies (e.g., [11]), or other sources of CO_2, (e.g., [12, 13]) rather than considered on its own. More favourable responses to CCS have been observed when it is combined with bioenergy and increased support has been reported for CCU—notably amongst climate sceptics, for whom addressing concerns about waste carried greater traction than climate change mitigation [10]. Utilisation of captured CO₂ for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) could provide a revenue stream to reduce the costs and accelerate CCS infrastructure development [14, 15]. However, the potential scale of CO₂ reductions which could be made through CCU options, including EOR, remains limited (Mac Dowell et al., 2017). Furthermore, the use of captured CO₂ as a feedstock for industrial processes (CCU) presents its own set of issues from a societal and governance perspective (e.g., [16]), and Jones et al. [5, 17] explore some of these issues across three dimensions of social acceptance (socio-political, market, and community).

Storage has been shown to be the most contentious part of the CCS chain (e.g., [10, 18‐20]) whereby people living closer to storage sites express a lower acceptance of CCS [19] and offshore storage is more likely to be seen as acceptable (e.g., [21]). These findings are relevant for BECCS, and acceptance of storage has been shown to depend on national policy contexts, local industry and identity, and perceived risks and benefits (e.g., [18]). The greater support observed for CCU may arise because capture is the most accepted element of the CCS chain. CCU brings the potential to offset capture costs, is seen as an incremental change to existing industrial processes (e.g., [22]), and is viewed in relation to perceptions of the industry and local history, in contrast to CO₂ transport, which affects multiple communities along its route [23•] and storage, which is seen as the most novel element of CCS [17].

There is, as yet, little research that has been undertaken on BECCS compared with other forms of CCS. Drawing on experience and expertise with CCS, Dowd et al. [6•] reflect on the need for a social licence, trust and procedural fairness, and provision of information and sources (e.g., the media). Furthermore, views of BECCS reflect perceptions of the bioenergy and particularly the need for sustainable biomass with associated environmental and food implications, as well as perceptions of CCS (e.g., [24, 25]).

Whilst research into BECCS is in its infancy and there is limited deployment of the technology, research into CCS highlights the influence of geographical context on the social responses. CCS studies have explored responses in countries where there are already operational CCS projects e.g., Canada [26] and Norway [27], where there is policy interest in CCS e.g., the UK [18, 22, 28‐30], the wider Nordic region [21], and New Zealand [31], and where there has been opposition to CCS projects e.g., The Netherlands [32] and Germany [9, 19, 33, 34]. These studies emphasise the importance of understanding the specific social context for deployment as a dynamic interaction of people, places, and events which drive public perceptions. Familiarity with the technology, or other related industries, influences perceptions or risk and benefits (e.g., [26, 35]), particularly in terms of the trust in an established local industry and the local policy context under which those industries are governed (e.g., [22]).

Cross-national studies have explored how different factors, e.g., geographical, social, psychological and informational [10], and cultural [36], affect views on CCS amongst lay publics. Karimi et al. [36] found that although cultural characteristics did influence public perceptions of CCS and its potential risks, responses were unlikely to be predicted by cultural factors alone, highlighting the critical role of contingent factors at a local scale. Whitmarsh et al. [10] found marked differences in awareness of and support for CCS between the countries included in the study (Netherlands, Canada, Norway, USA, UK). The greatest support was reported in the UK where, for example, storage sites will be located offshore and the lowest in the Netherlands, which has previously seen high-profile opposition to a proposed project [37].

With 20 projects planned or operational (GCCSI), China is a key region for global CCS deployment; here, CCS costs are likely to be much lower than, for example, in the EU, and Chen et al. suggest that it could be economically competitive in China, without the need for support, by 2030 [38]. Despite this, there is limited social research published relating to this region—what there is shows that there is very low awareness of CCS amongst lay publics in China and limited support for the technology [39, 40].

Research has drawn on varied theoretical concepts including social licence to operate [22, 41], media representations (e.g., [42, 43]), and justice and human rights (e.g., [44]). There has been a strong emphasis on risk and risk communication; L’Orange Siego et al. [26] highlight the importance of mental models and knowledge to draft risk communication material, and the importance of benefit perceptions and trust, the importance of stakeholder engagement and experience of other technologies, findings echoed by many [4, 19, 31, 36, 45, 46].

The potential for public acceptance of CCS and the factors which impact upon it have been explored using a variety of methods, depending on the theoretical framework underpinning the research. For example, qualitative methods including focus groups [31] support an in-depth understanding of alternative viewpoints and the reasons behind different responses, whereas surveys (e.g., [12, 19]) provide a more superficial analysis from an extensive sample of people. In a recent study, Bellamy et al. [25] used a mixed methods approach, presenting alternative policy scenarios to different groups and assessing perceptions of BECCS using a limited survey and group discussions to understand the differences between the groups. Given the emergent nature of CCS, and lack of familiarity with the technology, analogies have been used for CCS and to explore how people’s attitudes are shaped by reference to other technologies e.g., fracking [22, 47] and nuclear [18].

The 2015 Paris Agreement, and its aspiration to limit global average temperature rise to 1.5 °C, introduces a new urgency and ambition to climate policy. Conventional mitigation approaches may be complemented by methods to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, as ‘net zero’ CO₂ becomes the policy benchmark. In principle, by removing atmospheric CO₂ at a level that matches emissions from ‘hard to abate’ sectors (such as aviation, for example), CDR approaches could compensate for these residual emissions to make a ‘net zero’ pathway achievable. Afforestation and BECCS are the two primary CDR approaches currently represented in integrated assessment models (IAMs) which inform the IPCC on pathways to deliver Paris temperature goals. The central role for CDR in achieving both the 1.5° C and the 2° C ambition introduces a new imperative to establish CCS as part of a sociotechnical imaginary [48] in which the policy aspiration of ‘net zero’ plays an important role in the framing and implementation of CCS, BECCS (and other CDR), technologies [49, 50].

The notion of geoengineering—the intentional manipulation of the earths’ climate—is a challenging and controversial concept which conventionally distinguishes between CDR and solar radiation management (SRM) approaches [51, 52]. Fossil CCS has not typically been identified as a geoengineering approach; however, its role in CDR through BECCS places it within a geoengineering framing [52]. Thus, some studies exploring ethical, social, and policy implications of BECCS as a CDR method analyse the approach as a method of geoengineering (e.g., [44, 53, 54]). Others, however, make the case for separating BECCS (and other CDR approaches) from a geoengineering ‘climate recovery’ framing, arguing that it is better identified as an ‘emission offsetting’ strategy [55] to complement mitigation in a way that is comparable to existing ‘enhancement of sinks’ policies [56] and consistent with a view of CDR as SRM’s less-risky cousin [57•]. This conceptual distinction becomes important, not just for how CDR can be incorporated into policy frameworks [56] but also when considering the ethical and governance implications [58] and, consequently, how it is perceived by different actors [25, 58]. This distinction is, in part, predicated on whether CDR is used to enable deeper emission cuts in the near term or to allow an ‘overshoot’ in carbon budgets. In this sense, BECCS can be seen as a means of separating abatement from emissions over time, by allowing CO₂ emissions to be ‘removed’ from the atmosphere at a future date (allowing an overshoot), or separated in space by potentially geographically extensive supply chains [59] (extended mitigation framing).

The IAMs that inform the IPCC pathways and, hence, the global policy dialogue, are central to the debate about the potential role of CDR measures in relation to carbon budgets and have attracted significant attention in the literature, which highlights the uncertainties and ethical implications associated with representing global-scale CDR through BECCS, the level of influence that this might have on the policy agenda and the assumptions made within the models [50, 60‐66]. The key is that BECCS and CDR are not alternatives to conventional emission mitigation; the magnitude of CDR required to meet carbon budgets associated with the Paris Agreement is highly challenging even with ambitious emission reductions in the near term [20, 63, 67, 68].

Furthermore, there is a mismatch between how BECCS may be viewed at a national or regional level and its significance within global analyses [69]. This gap between global, regional, and national priorities, combined with complex and pervasive non-technical challenges [70], places limitations on the potential for BECCS [61, 66]. With limited awareness of BECCS and CDR beyond expert communities, and very little empirical research into potential public responses, understanding the broader ethical, political, and governance issues will be critical to how societies view the ‘acceptability’ of CDR through BECCS.

The literature in this area calls for a more democratic process, one which opens up critical discussion of wider implications, differentiating by scale rather than ‘technology’, to consider social, ethical, and political impacts of different levels of deployment and decision making (for example, 58, 59). Ethical mapping of CCS has identified justice, prevention of harm, and techno-scientific and regulatory competence as potential faultlines or areas of contention [71‐73]. With extended BECCS supply chains, where biomass feedstock and storage of CO₂ potentially takes place across multiple countries and continents, in addition to technical and sustainability challenges [20, 74], there are deep underlying ethical issues associated with its implementation [70]. Separating the emission and removal of CO₂ spatially and temporally further increases the ethical implications, particularly in terms of inter- and intra-generational justice.

Concerns persist that the promise of CCS and BECCS might allow society to continue to fail to adequately address the causes of climate change [58, 63, 67]. The potential for CDR approaches, and BECCS in particular, to deter or obstruct mitigation in the near term is widely addressed. This presents a moral hazard, of which Lenzi identifies three types presented by CDR: obstructing mitigation, taking a climate policy ‘gamble’, and exaggerated potential (hubris) [57]. The complexities of understanding the issue of mitigation deterrence have been further explored from a cultural political economy perspective [75].

Introducing bioenergy feedstocks to the CCS process will require advanced and innovative regulatory frameworks to manage BECCS’ potential deployment at a scale consistent with carbon budget constraints. Delivering genuine ‘negative emissions’ with a sustainable use of biomass brings an additional layer of complexity to maintain multiple sustainability goals (such as food security, ecosystem and biodiversity impacts, water availability inter alia) and recognise conflicting values [20, 70, 76, 77].

A recent special issue on the politics and governance of ‘negative emission technologies’ explores wide-ranging issues in this field [78], including the potential for mitigation deterrence [57•, 75] and the need to develop policies which mitigate against direct or indirect impacts to social and natural systems, paying attention to equity and justice, particularly in the context of the potentially significant role of developing countries [44, 60]. Geden and Scott et al. argue that large-scale ‘comprehensive’ CO₂ removal challenges current low-carbon policies at an EU level, suggesting that a more ‘limited’ role in delivering ‘net zero’ emissions in the coming decades is likely to gain more traction than a longer-term ‘net negative’ framing [49, 50, 79, 80].

There are currently no international policy mechanisms to support the implementation of CDR approaches or to incentivise the financing of projects and protect against undesirable sustainability implications [81, 82]. Consideration of trade-offs between sustainability goals and CDR potential will impact supply chain configurations [74] and new regulatory frameworks should account for the diverse and interconnected impacts of BECCS. To achieve effective CDR, international standardised regulatory frameworks must be in place to monitor, report, and verify (MRV) carbon flows across projects [83]. Challenges with carbon accounting arise with BECCS supply chains crossing sectoral and national boundaries—how to allocate and ensure genuine effective CDR is further complicated by temporal aspects associated with carbon sequestered in biomass [84]. Other literatures explore the possible mechanisms through which BECCS could be incentivised or credited [83, 85‐87], the potential relevance of existing policies exploiting co-benefits (such as utilising local waste products) [82] and how different policy approaches might influence public opinion or support [25, 88]. McLaren et al. (2019) recommend that to avoid a mitigation deterrence effect, policies relating to CDR should be separated from mitigation across four areas: defining targets, offsetting and emission trading, incentivisation, and modelling and evaluation [89].