Challenges of Nuclear Waste Governance

This is the second volume examining high level radioactive waste (HLW) disposal processes around the world. Volume I examined European and North American cases (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Volume II looks at: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Croatia, Japan, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, South Africa, and the Ukraine.

China has rapidly developed its nuclear power sector since the start of the 21^st century. As most nuclear power plants (NPPs) only recently were put into operation, the majority of spent fuel is still stored at the reactor sites although some is transported to offsite interim storage facilities. China has expressed interest in building a geological deep repository for disposal of high level waste (HLW) from its nuclear facilities. Screening of potential sites started during the mid 1980s. R&D proceeded over the years, but received only limited funds, as attention was more focussed on China’s ambitions to realise a closed nuclear fuel cycle strategy with reprocessing. So far, a site for a deep geological HLW repository in Northwest China is not confirmed and the planned construction of an underground research laboratory (URL) and a final repository have been delayed. The existing legislation regarding the treatment of nuclear waste remains fragmented and unsystematic, as China lacks a comprehensive National Atomic Law that regulates the obligation for NPP operators to treat and dispose nuclear waste. The overland transportation of spent fuel via public highways, a distance of over 4,000 km from the NPPs in the eastern provinces to the designated interim storage facilities and later final repository site, seems to be both the bottleneck and the Achilles heel of the nuclear waste strategy. Although nuclear safety issues have been discussed to some extent by the Chinese public in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident and in recent years protests against NPPs and related industries have been reported, the issue of nuclear waste has not yet been addressed in the public debate. This is expected to change as nuclear waste transports to the treatment facilities increase in the coming years.

Over the past ten years, the Russian nuclear industry has undergone a profound reorganisation. In the course of this development, radioactive waste management has received substantial attention. The Russian Federation has formed a regulatory base in order to define radioactive waste and provide solutions for its disposal. The selected approach includes near-surface disposal and storage of radioactive waste in deep geological formations. Apart from the development of a necessary infrastructure, increased reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and the development of a closed fuel cycle shall provide answers to the pressing issue of radioactive waste disposal. The guiding principle in restructuring the nuclear complex was not to increase democratic control or ecological standards, but to adjust Russia´s nuclear industry according to the demands of a market economy.

Due to the fact that the temporary spent fuel storage facilities in nuclear power plants will reach full capacity in the near future, the disposal of spent nuclear waste has become a matter of great concern in the Republic of Korea (South Korea). This article discusses the current status and limits of the Korean nuclear waste storage policy and governance. Considering the ecological and social impact of radioactivity, there is a compelling need for a nuclear waste governance system based on a social consensus on nuclear waste disposal. However, the participation of citizens and stakeholders in the decision-making process and their access to nuclear related information were restricted. Successive governments introduced legal and institutional instruments to do more to engage the public on spent fuel storage after a series of failed attempts to select a nuclear waste repository site. However, anti-nuclear non-governmental organisations (NGOs) refused to participate in this government-led public discussion and criticized it for being a mere formality. There are signs of change since the election of Moon Jae-In as president in the spring of 2017. Moon’s government initiated a major shift in Korea’s energy policy as well as in the policy-making process. Moon’s government has sought input from the public and NGOs in nuclear-related questions and is promoting more openness and transparency.

It is almost 50 years since Japan’s first nuclear power plant went into operation. Prior to the Fukushima accident, the country was the world’s third largest producer of nuclear energy. This huge industry and research sector was built on the premise that Japan would recycle its spent nuclear fuels. It is upon this unstable foundation that Japan attempted to establish its nuclear disposal construct. Even after the government made the decision to abandon the Monju fast breeder reactor which has been plagued by problems for years, Japan is not giving up its pursuit of a demonstration fast reactor. The nuclear fuel cycle has remained a major ambition of the government, so reprocessing cannot be excluded in any consideration of final disposal in Japan.

Nuclear waste management is always discussed separately from nuclear power policy in Japan. The power companies use nuclear power without serious consideration for nuclear waste, and even after the Fukushima nuclear accident, they tried to restart their reactors as quickly as possible.

In addition to the lack of transparency and alternatives and the confusion surrounding the management of nuclear waste in Japan, the debate has never really made it to the public arena. As a result, the site selection process in Japan has made little progress.

To change this situation, the site selection method was changed, from the system of voluntary application by local governments to a government-led selection system. The government is adopting a stronger role, and in August 2017, they issued a report which indicates that up to one-third of the Japanese territory could be considered suitable for building a disposal site. The government hopes to narrow down the candidate sites over the next 20 years.

The main source of nuclear waste in Hungary is the four VVER-440 reactors at the Paks site, which began producing commercial electricity between 1982 and 1987. At the time of plant construction, in the 1970s, an agreement was made between Hungary and the Soviet Union that spent fuel should be transported to the Soviet Union for reprocessing. This was the practice for more than a decade; the last shipment took place in 1998, with a total of 2,331 spent fuel cartridges transported to Russia. Although this final shipment took place 18 years ago, there has been no final decision regarding Hungary’s nuclear waste management strategy. The reference scenario foresees domestic deep geological disposal, however the option of shipping spent fuel to Russia for reprocessing still remains open. Spent fuel is currently stored in an interim storage facility next to the Paks NPP.

A complex screening procedure for a potential waste disposal site (hosting either high level waste from decommissioning or spent fuel as well as high level waste) started in 1999. As a result, six geological formations were “recommended for further research”. The most favoured is the Boda Siltstone Formation in the Western Mecsek Mountain, in the southern part of Hungary. According to plans, the site will start to operate in 2064.

The Hungarian national programme, based on the Council Directive 2011/70/EURATOM was prepared by the government and submitted to the European Commission in August 2015. The document was made public in June 2016, and its final version was adopted by the government in August 2016.

There is only one nuclear power plant in Lithuania – the Ignalina NPP. Both of its units are permanently shut down and under decommissioning. Unlike many other nations with nuclear power plants, Lithuania never operated a research reactor. During the Ignalina NPP’s operation from 1983 until 2010, roughly 21,500 spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies were accumulated. A portion of this fuel has already been transferred to a facility for dry interim storage in casks for 50 years and the remaining portion will be transferred to the new facility that is currently under construction.

Since 2003, two near surface repositories (NSRs) have been under implementation near the Ignalina NPP: a landfill facility for 60,000 m³ of Very Low Level Radioactive Waste and a NSR facility with engineering barriers for 100,000 m³ of Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Wastes. In the site selection process for the NSR facilities, Lithuanian authorities concluded that public acceptance and good relations with neighbouring countries are as important as geological criteria.

Possibilities for disposal of SNF in a geological repository were analysed in 2001–2004 with support from Swedish experts. Because of these investigations, crystalline rocks and clay formations were declared as prospective for SNF disposal. In parallel, a repository in crystalline rocks was proposed and a related generic safety assessment of this repository concept was performed. Thus, at the moment the Lithuanian SNF disposal program is in the initial site investigation and preliminary facility design stage. It should be emphasized that existing knowledge has largely been gained from international cooperation.

Regarding EC Directive 2011/70/EURATOM, a new national program on the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste has been prepared and approved by the government in 2015. As initial activities, more detailed planning and preparation of a research program for implementation of the geological repository have been proposed. The intention is to continue investigation of clay and rock formations with support from safety assessments.

After its founding in 1993, Slovakia faced two main challenges in the governance of nuclear waste disposal, mainly with regards to a final solution for spent nuclear fuel (SNF): 1.) the SNF generated in the territory of the former Czechoslovakia was to be disposed on the territory of the Czech Republic due to its more suitable geological conditions, and 2.) help was expected from Russia, as the former Czechoslovakia cooperated closely with the former Soviet Union. Despite the fact that a national agency for nuclear waste was envisaged in the Slovak legislation, its establishment was delayed, and relevant roles were ‘entrusted’ to the state-owned company JAVYS only in 2011. This contributed to the delayed restart of the national SNF geological repository development programme, which was suspended in 2004. Despite the government’s request to restart this programme as soon as possible, as affirmed in the Nuclear Back-end Strategy of 2008, only some desk research activities have been carried out since 2013. The plan for a final solution for SNF was most recently reported on in the joint National Policy and National Programme document (prepared in order to comply with the Council Directive-2011/70/Euratom), approved in 2015.

As the plans for the first Yugoslavian Nuclear power plant (NPP) Krško were drafted in the 1970s, there was no mention of nuclear waste. Similarly, the purchase contract with Westinghouse made no mention of it. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1990, the previous contract between the two states, Slovenia and Croatia, extended the primary 50:50 provision of ownership to nuclear waste. This agreement is the origin of both cooperation and entanglements about nuclear waste. Slovenia and Croatia have decided to postpone the construction of a final depository for used nuclear fuel until the NPP Krško I, and the pending NPP Krško II has been definitively put out of operation. The first strategy for spent fuel management was adopted in 1996. It was based on the agreement between the governments of Slovenia and Croatia. However, cooperation has proven difficult as each side wants to make as much profit from the NPP as possible and to take over as little cost regarding used fuel as it can. Two separate final repositories for nuclear waste are probable.

The actual distribution of responsibilities through the end of the operation of the nuclear power facilities in Slovenia between the Agency for Radioactive Waste of Slovenia (ARAO) for low and medium active waste and the NPP Krško for used fuel is unsatisfactory and creates risks. The ARAO is a state public institution, and is responsible for handling all waste, preparing strategies, and developing technical capacity as well as operating facilities for storage or disposal. The NPP is primarily a profit-driven company that operates the plant and whose purpose is generation of electricity. These two functions challenge one another.

In 1986, Ukraine experienced a major nuclear accident at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant (NPP); over three decades later, this event continues to define Ukraine’s waste management situation. Today, radioactive waste at the Chornobyl NPP site and surrounding exclusion zone (CEZ) constitutes over 98 percent of total solid radioactive waste. Spent nuclear fuel is excluded from this figure as it has special legal status and is not considered to be radioactive waste. Following Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union, its institutional system to manage nuclear waste problems has continually changed and has not reached the state of clear responsibilities and distribution of roles between various institutions. However, the need for this clarity is recognized by experts and proposals have been made to centralise the management system. EU and IAEA funding enables research on the waste management system most suitable for Ukraine, including deep geological disposal (DGD), regulatory system improvements and physical infrastructure. Adaptation of the Ukrainian standards and practices to the European standards will be accelerated in view of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Because of the ongoing military conflict with Russia, Ukraine lost control over its research reactor in Sebastopol and nuclear waste collection center in Donetsk.

Over the past decade, Canada has been implementing an ‘Adaptive Phased Management’ approach to handling its radioactive waste, involving interim storage at reactor sites and eventual final disposal in a centralised, deep geological repository. The process is described as a flexible step-by-step, phased approach supported by public engagement and scientific research at each interval along the way. Its timeline for implementation is long. From identifying a willing host community through to the construction, monitoring and eventual closure of the repository, the process will span generations, taking potentially upwards of 140 years or more to fully implement.

In Argentina and Brazil, the management of nuclear wastes remains an unresolved question. Despite some relevant regulations issued after the restoration of democracy, like the Regulatory Requirements for the Mangement of Radioactive Wastes in Argentina (Law 25018, enacted in 1998), and Law 10308 on the Selection of Sites, Construction, Licensing, Operation, Monitoring, Costs, the Compensation, Civil Liability and Guarantees relating to Deposits of Radioactive Tailings, among other Provisions, enacted in Brazil in 2001, neither of these two countries have long-term disposal strategies for nuclear waste. Spent nuclear fuel is stored in interim facilities located at the nuclear power plants. In the case of Argentina, the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) submitted the Strategic Plan of the National Program for Radioactive Waste Management (PEGRR) to the National Executive in 2014 for its evaluation and approval. The plan defines the characteristics for nuclear wastes sites. The PEGRR has been preliminary approved but has not obtained the final approval from the National Congress.

The difficulty in finding a solution resides in the limited involvement of relevant actors in the process of selecting a nuclear disposal strategy. The CNEA in Argentina and the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) in Brazil, together with their national governments, have generally exercised a centralized and low-transparency control over nuclear issues, including nuclear waste, leaving almost no room for social participation. This has resulted in great uncertainty that has defined the management of nuclear waste.

Since the Manhattan project, South Africa’s links with the global nuclear industry have been profound, starting out as a provider of uranium. From 1965 it commissioned a research reactor, and since 1984 has been producing nuclear electricity. There was a secretive nuclear weapons programme between 1978 and 1990. Together with considerable waste resulting from the mining of uranium, it is surprising that the first policy document on radioactive waste appeared only in 2005. Government was forced to do this because of civil society litigation, yet the policy was issued with almost no public input. The industry has seldom felt accountable to the public, and the regulator has struggled to meet its obligations, given shortages of expert staff and budgets. There is concern about current government plans to add six to eight more reactors to the existing two, given the need to ensure that the institutions governing and regulating the industry are competent and viable. This chapter aims to uncover the history of nuclear waste in South Africa, providing some detail on the inventories, the legal and institutional background, and current controversies.