China’s Local Political Turnover in the Twenty-First Century

This paper provides empirical evidence on the incentive role of personnel control in China in the twenty-first century. Employing the city-level turnover data of political leaders in China between 2000 and 2018 and utilizing the fixed effects ordered logit model, we find that the likelihood of promotion of local leaders rises with their economic performance. This relationship holds more firmly in the municipal party secretary. The probability is also found to decrease with the economic performance of their immediate predecessors and neighboring cities. This finding is robust to various robustness tests. We interpret the finding as evidence that the relative economic performance (peer effects) also contributes to the local political turnover, in particular within a province. Moreover, after the Third Plenary Session of the 18^th CPC Central Committee, a material change in the personnel arrangement within the party arises and this promotion mechanism shows a dynamic change. Our study sheds some light on the growing literature emphasizing the relationship between political turnover and economic performance.