Literature review
Institutional logics and institutional theory
Hybrid strategies as organizational responses
Institutional logics in context
Methods
Firm selection
Data collection
Firm or company | Interviewee’s position within the company | Number of years of legal practice (for lawyers)/number of years working in the legal sector (for non-lawyers) |
---|---|---|
Law Firm A | Partner 1 | 12 |
Law Firm A | Partner 2 | 14 |
Law Firm A | Partner 3 | 10 |
Law Firm A | Partner 4 | 10 |
Law Firm A | Partner 5 | 12 |
Law Firm A | Partner 6 | 11 |
Law Firm A | Senior Associate 1 | 5 |
Law Firm A | Senior Associate 2 | 5 |
Law Firm A | Senior Associate 3 | 4 |
Law Firm A | Senior Associate 4 | 7 |
Law Firm A | Senior Associate 5 | 5 |
Law Firm A | Associate | 2 |
Law Firm A | Trainee | Not yet called to the bar but currently undergoing training within the firm. |
Law Firm A | Secretary | 14 |
Law Firm B | Managing Partner | 17 |
Law Firm B | Senior Consultant | 22 |
Law Firm B | Senior Associate | 6 |
Law Firm B | Associate | 2 |
Law Firm Alpha | Partner 1 | 25 |
Law Firm Alpha | Partner 2 | 18 |
Law Firm Beta | Managing Partner | 24 |
Law Firm Beta | Trainee | Not yet called to the bar but currently undergoing training within the firm. |
Law Firm Gamma | Partner | 10 |
Law Firm Gamma | Associate | 3 |
Law Firm Delta | Partner | 23 |
Law Firm Epsilon | Partner | 13 |
Law Firm Epsilon | Associate 1 | 1 |
Law Firm Epsilon | Associate 2 | 1 |
Law Firm Zeta | Trainee | Not yet called to the bar but currently undergoing training within the firm. |
Law Firm Eta | Managing Partner | 40 |
Law Firm Theta | Managing Partner | 26 |
Law Firm Iota | Counsel | 14 |
Law Firm Kappa | Partner | 14 |
Law Firm Lambda | Partner | 17 |
Law Firm Mu | Partner | 24 |
Law Firm Mu | Business Development Associate | 2 |
Law Firm Nu | Senior Associate | 13 |
Financial Institution 1 | In-House Legal Counsel | 10 |
Financial Institution 2 | In-House Legal Counsel | 21 |
Financial Institution 3 | In-House Legal Counsel | 16 |
Financial Institution 4 | In-House Legal Counsel | 22 |
Financial Institution 5 | In-House Legal Counsel | 13 |
Financial Institution 6 | In-House Legal Counsel | 14 |
Financial Institution 7 | In-House Legal Counsel | 1 |
Government Institution 1 | Civil Servant | 17 |
Government Institution 2 | Civil Servant | 1.5 |
University 1 | Academic, Head of Division | 24 |
University 2 | Academic | 7 |
Data analysis
Case study results
Names of foreign law firms | Corresponding global lawyer headcount | Names of the largest local law firms | Corresponding lawyer headcount within Singaporea | |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Allen & Overy | 2,172 | Allen & Gledhill | 367 |
2 | Clifford Chance | 2,495 | Rajah & Tann | 334 |
3 | Herbert Smith | 1,868 | WongPartnership | 302 |
4 | Latham & Watkins | 2,100 | Drew & Napier | 275 |
5 | Norton Rose | 3,461 | Rodyk & Davidson | 193 |
6 | White & Case | 1,878 | Shook Lin & Bok | 96 |
7 | Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher | 1,204 | Lee & Lee | 94 |
8 | Jones Day | 2,510 | Khattar Wong | 70 |
9 | Linklaters | 2,252 | Morgan Lewis Stamford | 75 |
10 | Sidley Austin | 1,761 | RHT Law Taylor Wessing | 73 |
Before 2000 | After 2000 |
---|---|
Legal system highly protective of local law firms and held in place restrictions for foreign law practices —foreign law firms were not allowed to practice Singapore Law. They could only practice “offshore” (i.e., international) law, their home country law or third country law (Chan, 2009). | 1. First wave of liberalization: Legal Profession (Amendment) Act passed by Parliament in January 2000 allowed for the formation of Joint Law Ventures (JLVs) between local and foreign law firms. This scheme allowed a loose coupling between foreign and local firms, giving a foreign firm the leeway to refer its clients to its Singapore law practice in the JLV for matters that required the practice of Singapore Law. In turn, Singapore law firms could also refer work to their foreign counterparts. Nevertheless, without their JLV partner, foreign law firms were still restricted to practicing offshore law in Singapore (Chan, 2009). |
2. Second wave of liberalization: In 2008, the government allowed for the establishment of Qualifying Foreign Law Practices (QFLPs). Essentially the QFLP is a foreign law practice which is allowed to practice Singapore Law, but “only through Singapore lawyers who are its partners or associates” (Chan, 2009). The QFLPs are free to practice Singapore Law in all areas of legal practice, except for ring-fenced domestic areas such as litigation, family law, conveyancing and probate law (Ministry of Law, 2013). Six foreign firms were awarded QFLP licenses in the first round (Ministry of Law, 2013). These were the following: Allen & Overy, Clifford Chance, Herbert Smith, Latham & Watkins, Norton Rose and White & Case. | |
3. Third wave of liberalization: In 2013, the Ministry of Law continued the process of liberalization by awarding QFLP licenses to four foreign law firms namely, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Jones Day, Linklaters and Sidley Austin (Ministry of Law, 2013). |
…[previously] I think a lawyer would, would’ve seen himself as a [kind of] Jesuit priest…they would deal more with the public at large … and try to enforce certain norms of what the law says, [and] what the regulations are. … but with the QFLPs…the competition has pushed us…it has…made us [feel] more concerned about our bottom line…than … the work for the passion of it.
Characteristic | Social trustee logic | Client-service logic |
---|---|---|
Role/identity of a legal firm | A social role/entity to serve public good. | An economic role/identity with a focus on extracting maximum rents for the benefit of the partnership. |
Role of a legal practitioner | Craft-based artisans with a focus on esoteric requirements of the law as a discipline in itself. | Commercially-oriented advisor with a boundary spanning role that includes project management service, business development and public relations. |
Client role in discourse | Client is largely dependent on lawyers. | Client dictates the flow of the entire discourse. |
Sources of legitimacy | Reputation of key individuals. | Scale and scope of the firm and branding. |
Basis of strategy (modus operandi) | Primary responsibility is to perpetuate local governance structures with little attention to cross-border elements. | Regionalization: responsibility to clients stretches across multiple jurisdictions— market driven, expansion in the form of best friends’ networks, tie-ups with other firms/regional firms and greenfield strategies. |
Attention is given to legal advice with cross border elements. |
And a partner continued,I think the local firms… [now] learn … how the foreign firms do matter management, file management…and [use] I.T systems that are very good in managing the different work streams or flows and calculating the fees … and also how they do client networking. The international firms…have a very good client database…from which they can configure everything for all the different clients. Whenever there is new…there is news globally or there are legal updates, these firms actually send out, actively…send automatic emails to these clients to tell them these are updates and to let them know—[this] makes the client feel like they’re part of the same team… (Associate 5, Firm A).
Based on the in-depth interviews with respondents, Table 5 summarizes the before and after changes in Firm A.[T]here was more and more impetus for us to enhance certain ways we run… operations… that we see practiced, adopted in the international firms. So, a lot of these things that we are doing are more or less the best practices seen throughout the legal world (Partner 3, Firm A).
Before | After | |
---|---|---|
1. Departments* | Firm had little differentiation between departments. | Greater emphasis on the specialization of departments; firm began to have different departments and practice groups with designations and functions similar to international law firms. For example, as opposed to one generic team to handle all M&A work, now there has been a reorganization of the department to focus on separate, growth areas of M&A work, such as private equity M&A. The administrative arm of the M&A department was also spun off to become another department. These measures reflect an increasing refinement of the departments into specialist silos. |
2. Marketing and business development | Little emphasis placed on these functions since work was plentiful. | Marketing and business development function critical—now, the firm had specialist departments staffed by full-time professionals trained in marketing and business development. |
3. I.T infrastructure and knowledge management | State of technology very much in start-up phase; more primitive since there was no need to manage so much information. | Sophisticated file management system and I.T infrastructure to manage large and continually-expanding precedent database. |
4. Human resource process changes | Performance assessment targets of individual employees not clear (i.e., not based on revenue generated). Pay tends to be discretionary (e.g., there is a large variable component for year-end bonuses of associates, which can be easily altered). | Restructure the pay system to be in-line with performance assessment targets. Performance assessment based on numbers (i.e., revenue generated). |
Pay of associates increased, pay system restructured by frontloading the bonuses, there is no longer a large discretionary bonus component at the year end. | ||
5. In-house training of lawyers in the areas of public relations and client-facing skills | Virtually non-existent. | Emphasis on training lawyers in the areas of social etiquette, public speaking skills, public relations skills, negotiation skills, etc. Professionals brought in from overseas to train the lawyers in these areas. |
At the same time, however, respondents noted that large full-service law firms could not solely depend on local clients. Diversifying risks to the rest of the region was an idea that was gaining traction, a point continually reiterated by the lawyers:We decided to [raise] the pay of associates by frontloading the bonuses… local firms again have to improve their remuneration practices to be in line with foreign practices.Local firms have to up [the] PR and marketing skills of their lawyers…[now] they bring in professionals from overseas to train the lawyers on social etiquette, public speaking skills, PR skills, negotiation skills, etc.…all these are very new initiatives because of the need to restructure to meet the competition.I think now there’s more of an emphasis in having best friends’ relationships [i.e., building strategic alliances] with more, with other independent firms and international firms as well [in order to keep getting business].The surging domination by a client-service logic was revealed in the following frank remarks:Well, with increasing competition and more pricing pressures and the need to deliver our services at a much higher speed and to deliver them more efficiently and effectively, it’s only natural for lawyers to feel that law has become much more of a business than a profession. Now, increasingly, clocking time and filling up time sheets have become more and more of a focus for local firms. Lawyers need to work for a targeted number of hours per year. This all goes into performance measurements…something that follows the pattern of the international firms (Partner 1, Firm A).We advis[e] clients how to go about doing their business so that they won’t fall afoul of the law. So that’s part of our business, and our business for us is to make money (Partner 2, Firm A).[We’re] [n]ot particularly discerning where these premium clients come from as long as it’s good business (laughs) (Partner 3, Firm A).
Therefore, the larger local firms tried to counter the onslaught of the international firms by becoming more multi-jurisdictional (i.e., by providing cross-border service). At the same time, this can be explained by the fact that they were trying to operate in the same space (i.e., serve the same type of clients) as the international firms, which necessitated their being able to be a one-stop shop that provided a holistic suite of services for their clients. Archival data showed that there were advantages to providing multi-jurisdictional service:The bigger law firms here cannot survive on the local market. You don’t have [high profit] margins [here]. It is a very cost conscious market and…and legal services are commoditized already. [The large full-service local law firms]…have moved regionally…[t]hey have not stayed [local]. You can’t support a staff…you can’t support a structure that size on the floor.
Triangulation with interviewees from other firms corroborated this:There is something about being able to tell a client we can handle everything, including the Singapore aspects. In the scheme of things, that is the biggest win—we can go out there and say ‘we can do this, only a third of the market can, two thirds of the market can’t’ and we’re on the good side of that (Interview with Jones Day Partner Dennis Barsky, as cited in Broomhall, 2013).
Firm A was no exception from the other large local firms, for it also tried to expand into other markets such as Malaysia and Vietnam, “[we hoped] to have cross referrals so that the business could grow” (Partner 3, Firm A). However, despite its regionalization efforts and other attempts to be more commercial, Firm A’s lawyers appeared rather gloomy about the prospects for the firm. This is because they noted that their clients were mainly legal counsel from MNCs or large firms and that these cared a great deal about firm branding. “[Reputation is] definitely a big factor, especially for [our] clients...[s]ay for premium clients for example, premium clients generally would want to know who is the best” (Partner 1, Firm A). However, they felt that ultimately they could not compete…to compete with an offshore law firm, become an offshore firm yourself… You [large local law firms] either go regional or you die (Partner 2, Law Firm Alpha).
Triangulation with other lawyers also revealed the fact that premium clients tended to be more selective about their service provider, and based their choice on reputation, plus the fact that firms had to offer them an increased range of services to meet their expanded needs:I mean we have retreats and they have retreats, but I know, like, some UK firm, when they go overseas for retreats, everybody stays in Ritz Carlton. Whereas for local firm… you go for a retreat…you stay in, a, a…I don’t know, [something] a few shades lower, like I said. This time around the alternative is very formidable, you know! You know, Ritz Carlton and all that (Partner 1, Firm A).Two drivers may have the same skill sets but the two of them may be driving different cars. One could be a Mercedes and the other one a Proton. Do you get what I mean? It’s not just how good your lawyers are, it’s how good your platform is? (Partner 2, Firm A).
However, despite the obvious cleaving to the values of a client-service logic of increased rent-seeking and cost consciousness, Firm A’s lawyers still reiterated their responsibility to uphold their duty as officers of the court and advise clients of the regulatory norms in Singapore. At the same time, the reputation of key individuals, a tenet of the social trustee logic, cannot be done away with completely, simply because law is a service industry, and trust is important between the client and the firm. Therefore, Firm A’s adherence to certain tenets of the social trustee logic meant that there was no complete collapse of the logic. Quotes from Firm A’s lawyers and triangulation with others in the industry revealed this pattern:Typically we don’t outsource (to law firms) unless it’s a very complex issue. Expectations of local law firms are A LOT higher now…and there are now so many choices of law firms (In-House Legal Counsel, Financial Institution 1).
In contrast to Firm A, the intruding client-service logic seems to have left Firm B’s core business relatively unscathed. Firm B, the small, boutique law firm for our study, was a law firm dealing with corporate and litigation work. It had only 12 legal staff (inclusive of the office manager and secretaries). The firm appears to have been doing well despite the increased competition, “[W]e can barely cope with our [number of] existing clients…we don’t think we would want any more.” According to Firm B’s partners, this is because the firm has found a niche, a different client market from the international law firms. By servicing a niche clientele, Firm B is still able to do interesting, and relatively lucrative work that big law firms are unable to do, due to the fact that the latter have been conflicted out of serving the smaller counterparties due to their work for the big transnationals. So for instance, in the case of a mine acquisition, the firm usually acts for the smaller counterparty on the deal to protect it from being subjected to disadvantages in its negotiation with the big players. Firm B’s opposing counsel would be a big law firm acting for the large MNC. Firm B felt that their objective was to help the less resource-rich firms or individuals.From my experience, yes, [there is more of an impetus to please the client] because of competitive pressures, lawyers are driven to engage more and more with clients and to perhaps go out of the way for them…[though] obviously [the fact is] as lawyers you [still] have to advise your client of the risk and discharge your responsibility and duty to them by advising them…[on] what the position in law is (Partner 3, Firm A).
Drawing on the interview data, we noticed that the partners of Firm B were critical of the overt commercialism inherent to a client service logic. Marketing was rather peremptorily dismissed since most of the firm’s work came from clients who had sought legal service from the firm since the inception of the firm and from client referrals.We help the more individual litigants…that might be priced out of the market if they want to go elsewhere. We definitely are priced more competitively than other law firms…the average individual does not have super deep pockets. So in that sense we help the [less resource-rich clients] (Senior Associate, Firm B).
In spite of their critique of the client-service logic and the organizational practices that support it, the partners of Firm B drew upon what it deemed to be the key resource implied in this logic—specialist knowledge in niche areas of professional service. Essentially, the partners of Firm B acknowledged that, especially in an environment of increased competition from international firms backed up by years of legal expertise, top quality legal advice was needed by their clients. Therefore, the ethos of the client-service logic was satisfied by the Firm’s judicious hiring of lawyers from top law firms who had specialized knowledge and ability to give quality advice to clients. However, interviewees thought of this as an adaptation, not a fundamental change in the attitude of boutique firms such as Firm B. For example, an In-House Legal Counsel from a financial institution expressed the following sentiment:…We came out of the big firms because we wanted to have no politicking, less focus on money, we just wanted to be with our clients and service them…we didn’t want to have hours and hours of partners’ meetings, paper pushing, etc…(Interview with Managing Partner, Firm B).
With respect to the client pool, we observed that Firm B served clients locally and from a core geographic region, i.e., Indonesia. Firm B tried to follow a regionalization model of innovative expansion to exert influence over geographical and jurisdictional space (Lee & Ong, 2013). With respect to the regionalization model, which is a basis of strategy for the client-service logic driving the international law firms, there are two elements: (1) scope—the source of legitimacy for the law firm is derived from its scale and scope of services, because these enhance added value in the eyes of clients, and (2) specialization—since the law firm spans multiple jurisdictions, it can lay claim to be an authority as it has got experience doing work everywhere and has built up a rich knowledge base. However, unlike their international counterparts, Firm B’s regionalization model is different in some key aspects. It specialized in advising on its home country laws, primarily to reinforce and strengthen its focus on the home market and help less resource-rich clients to survive in the market. At the same time, it reinterpreted the meaning of specialization to mean personalized knowledge tailored to fit the client, deemphasizing scope because it made the deliberate choice to focus on clients from Indonesia, rather than target all other regions. At the same time, Firm B appeared to be a one-man show, in that much of the knowledge base and personal relationships resided in the founder. This was a reinterpretation of the meaning of good service and specialized knowledge:In order to ‘game’ the system…such firms keep doing what they’re good at but then they procure talent to reassure clients that they have the expertise. To impress clients? I guess it’s a very superficial way but it does help to impress clients.
Firm B took pains to defend its core social trustee logic with respect to its legal and fiduciary duty. For example, the lawyers in the firm believed the purpose of the profession was to help frame legality:I’ve been in Indonesia for 16 years! No Singapore lawyer has half that experience…[I] really know the work…(Interview with Managing Partner, Firm B).…if any help is needed one just needs to shout out from one’s room…[the managing partner] would probably know [the answer] (Interview with Senior Consultant, Firm B).
Although Firm B admitted that certain international best practices might be useful (for example, “Know Your Client” or K.Y.C processes), overall, respondents noted that they tended to make piecemeal adaptations with regard to organizational practices, and this only on a needs-to basis. For instance, compared to the large law firm, Firm B’s precedent base was much more scattered and ad hoc, and the overall ethos appeared to be less emphasis on technology, and more on personalized service from the individual lawyer. Additionally, the Firm preferred to let its associates learn by trial-and-error. In fact, the founders of the firm preferred to have an open-door policy with their associates should they require any guidance or advice.[T]here is some social good in what we do…in the situations where you act against banks…and we do, quite a bit of that kind of work...we act for individuals…so if you get a good judgment on their behalf in that sense you crystallize the law, you can change the banking laws…and affect the judgment for the greater good. This is a very important contribution because Singapore has a pro-banking outlook. If you think about it, if you contribute to developments in the law, whether it be for consumer rights or if it’s individual-related in whatever aspect, this can help to crystallize rights more clearly, which obviously is helpful for the individuals…That’s where we help. That’s where the lawyers can help…in persuading the court to develop the law. This social ethos…is definitely an underlying factor (Senior Associate, Firm B).
There was certainly more emphasis on particular personalities within Firm B, as compared to Firm A. For example, dependence on key individuals such as the founder was in fact encouraged, and if any help was needed one just had to ‘shout out’ from one’s room. Firm B’s lawyers firmly believed in the personal capitalism of the founder, and they thought that the individual owner-managers should be the ones to control the firm entirely (see also Langlois, 1998), since “firms are managed fairly basically” (Interview with Senior Consultant, Firm B), with little need for the elaborate bureaucracy and organizational structures of the Anglo-American law firms. Resistance against the bureaucracy associated with multiple layers of hierarchy was very apparent:[The big firms] are rich in years of experience. For example, if I have a coal mining matter, buying over a coal mine, for instance, they can pull out [many] years’ worth of precedents on this and give to their lawyers as a basis for the new matter. But this breeds laziness. They’re not reactive. For some big firm meetings, I have gone there and the other side’s lawyer (from the big firm) says, I can’t do this clause because it’s not standard. What does that mean? Just adapt it! Use your head! (interview, managing partner of Firm B).
Additionally, the partners pointed out the inefficiency of technology and the demerits of a rigid KPI system, which were key support functions of the client-service logic:In terms of (organizational culture)….we are very comfortable….We never learn anything, you don’t want to learn anything from the big firms. It’s a different temperament here, I think you’ll have noticed, from other firms.
Additionally, using NVIVO software, analysis of the data from Firms A and B supported these findings. Firm A’s interviews emphasized market realities, cost pressures, pricing demands, service quality, employee retention through pay and the importance of firm branding to an inordinate degree. Clearly, Firm A’s key preoccupations coalesced around a client-service logic orientation. Even after controlling for size of sample by correcting for the different length of transcript information provided by Firms A and B, the frequency of usage of phrases pertaining to commercial orientation toward clients, commercial orientation toward employees, competition for work and branding and marketing emphasis were still significantly more in Firm A’s data. For instance, references associated with the Firm’s commercial orientation toward clients appeared at least five times more in Firm A’s data, and Firm A’s interviewees used branding and marketing references at least eleven times more than Firm B’s respondents (Table 6).At the end of the day, sometimes the traditional systems work best. For example, when I was working in [a large international firm], there could be a partner who was working…20 hours a month? And he charged for exactly 20 billable hours. So his efficiency looked like it was 100%. Whereas I would work for, say, 120 hours a month, and bill like, for 90…no, 100 hours? But it looked like I wasn’t 100% efficient. That’s where computers don’t capture the full story. It looks like I’m not meeting my KPIs, when in actual fact I am exceeding my billable targets! I’m working to, like, midnight or whatever, and (generating so much more profits) than he is. So after a while, I got fed up…I had to justify myself…what for? (Interview with Managing Partner, Firm B).
Firm A* | Firm B | |
---|---|---|
Code name | ||
Competition for work | 68 | 8 |
Commercial orientation toward clients | 58 | 11 |
Commercial orientation toward employees | 30 | 6 |
Branding and marketing emphasis | 45 | 4 |
Firm A* | Firm B | |
---|---|---|
Code name | ||
Social role of legal firm | .7 | 19 |
Social purpose of lawyers | 3.1 | 15 |
Dependency of client on lawyer | 3.13 | 5 |
Reputation of the partners | 1.0 | 5 |