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Published in: International Tax and Public Finance 2/2023

18-01-2022

Corruption and distortion of public expenditures: evidence from Africa

Authors: Harouna Sedgo, Luc Désiré Omgba

Published in: International Tax and Public Finance | Issue 2/2023

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Abstract

This study investigates the effect of corruption on the trade-off between capital and current expenditures in a panel of 48 African countries over the period 2000–2016. Based on statistical yearbooks, we compile disaggregated data on public finances for African countries and find that a high prevalence of corruption distorts the composition of public expenditures at the expense of the share of capital expenditure. Specifically, an increase in corruption by one standard deviation is associated with a decrease in the proportion of capital expenditure from 29 to 18%. The results are robust to various specifications and estimation methods, including the fixed effects and instrumental variables approach. The supportive argument demonstrates that it seems more beneficial for corrupted bureaucrats to manipulate public spending in favor of current rather than capital expenditures. The latter relies on formal and traceable procedures, whereas current expenditure is known to be more open to the use of discretionary allocation.

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Appendix
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Footnotes
1
For the positive effect of corruption, see for example Leff (1964); Huntington (1968); Lui (1985). For the negative effect, see Krueger (1974); Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
 
2
Such as roads, irrigation, electricity, communication and education.
 
3
by applying this formula: (Max(Control of corruption)- Control of corruption)/(Max(Control of corruption)-Min(Control of corruption)).
 
4
Total expenditures here include capital expenditure, current expenditure and net lending. Although net lending accounts for less than 1% of total expenditures on average over the period, its variability could lead to an underestimation or overestimation of the trade-off effect between capital and current expenditures. To account for this potential problem, we relate capital expenditure directly to current expenditure. The estimation results with the proportion of capital expenditure in current expenditure as the dependent variable are reported in the Appendix, Table 11. Corruption significantly reduces the proportion of capital expenditure in current expenditure. The coefficients are even slightly larger than those in Table 2.
 
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Metadata
Title
Corruption and distortion of public expenditures: evidence from Africa
Authors
Harouna Sedgo
Luc Désiré Omgba
Publication date
18-01-2022
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
International Tax and Public Finance / Issue 2/2023
Print ISSN: 0927-5940
Electronic ISSN: 1573-6970
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-021-09718-6

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