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Published in: Policy Sciences 1/2018

27-01-2018 | Discussion and Commentary

Creating comity amidst gridlock: a corporatist repair for a broken congress

Author: Stuart Kasdin

Published in: Policy Sciences | Issue 1/2018

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Abstract

With partisanship and gridlock at record levels in the US Congress, there is a need for institutional reforms that can encourage greater cooperation and productivity. We explore forms of deliberative democracy to help overcome the problem. Deliberative democracy holds that for a democratic decision to be legitimate, it must be preceded by authentic deliberation; that is, voting alone is not sufficient to establish legitimacy and public buy-in. We examine institutions of deliberative democracy that might be applied to the Congress. We first examine the federal advisory committees used to inform and counsel government agencies in the implementation of federal programs. These standing advisory committees, with members taken from the relevant stakeholder groups, provide an opportunity for antagonistic interests to build relationships over an extended period. We then look at democratic neo-corporatism, in which certain community or interest groups are privileged participants in the national policy formulation and implementation. We then apply these approaches to Congress, assessing whether advisory committees made up of interest group representatives could help establish genuine deliberation, potentially enhancing communication and compromise. We analyze what such a Congressional advisory system would look like and how it could be designed.

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Footnotes
1
It also helps Congress to better control the federal bureaucracy, by allowing greater transparency for the Congress, and allowing Congress to influence the information flow to federal agencies (Balla and Wright 2001).
 
2
Congress has shown support for the idea of collaboration and public participation on environmental issues in other ways, funding the US Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution, a program of the Udall Foundation. This proposed reform would offer some of the same opportunities for the authorizing committees.
 
3
A number of factors affect the size of each Federal advisory committee, such as what statutes or Executive Orders may require for membership, or what is needed to accomplish the mission for agency authority committees; there are Federal advisory committees with as few as three members, and grant review committees with thousands of members. Note that agencies/departments report all individuals who served during a fiscal year, even if they only served 1 day on a committee during the fiscal year. So two different individuals may have served in one fiscal year in the same member slot for a committee (i.e., one replaced the other at some point during the fiscal year).
 
4
A standing committee has greater opportunities for success when the committee works together on a constituent basis, thereby allowing members to get to know each other. That means that the membership should be able to stay together for an extended period. Such stability means that representativeness is harder to ensure; as opposed to a rotating membership, with different organizations taking turns representing different interests. It makes the membership selection process even more critical.
 
5
The Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of 2011 require members of advisory committees be selected without regard to their partisan affiliation.
 
6
Alternatively, a stronger version would be to permit interest groups and the public to propose potential advisory groups, petitioning Congress to begin the process establishing advisory committees and/or to select topics for the groups in order to overcome an intransigent or recalcitrant Congress.
 
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Metadata
Title
Creating comity amidst gridlock: a corporatist repair for a broken congress
Author
Stuart Kasdin
Publication date
27-01-2018
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Policy Sciences / Issue 1/2018
Print ISSN: 0032-2687
Electronic ISSN: 1573-0891
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-018-9310-z

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