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International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal
Published in: International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal 3/2019

03-01-2019

Determinants of say on pay vote: a configurational analysis

Author: Nicola Cucari

Published in: International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal | Issue 3/2019

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Abstract

This study is the first to employ a relatively new analytical method to investigate combinations of board structure and other corporate characteristics that lead firms to achieve high levels of say on pay voting, based on configurational analysis. In this pioneering manner, using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fs-QCA) and the data from 51 listed firms in three different countries (Italy, France and Spain), the results identify four different causal paths that lead to high voting dissent, and two configurational board governance are identified as prototypes of unsatisfactory governance. These configurations, jointly analysing the interactions, allow us to think more carefully about the structure of boards. In particular, the study contributes to theory by identifying how board structure can affect shareholder voting, and by demonstrating the advantages of the configurational approach. Finally, the analysis could assist shareholders in reflecting upon, and justifying their choice to have a specific board structure.
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Appendix
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Footnotes
1
As shown by Schneider and Wagemann (2010), it is “tempting to run an analysis including every possible condition in order to have an allegedly exhaustive view of sufficient and necessary conditions”, however high numbers of conditions are dysfunctional for QCA because it raises the problem of “limited diversity”. Limited diversity is the phenomenon wherein not all logically possible combinations of conditions exist in a dataset, or even in reality. In this specific case, based on the review paper by Mello (2012), where they find, on average, six conditions, also in this empirical analysis only six conditions was chosen.
 
2
Morrow Sodali and Frontis Governance.
 
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Metadata
Title
Determinants of say on pay vote: a configurational analysis
Author
Nicola Cucari
Publication date
03-01-2019
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal / Issue 3/2019
Print ISSN: 1554-7191
Electronic ISSN: 1555-1938
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11365-018-0556-x

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