Does Knowing the Jointly Rational Solution Make You Want to Pursue it? Motivational Orientation, Information, and Behavior in Two Social Dilemmas.

This paper reports two experiments which examined the impact of information about the collectively rational solution on the behaviour of individuals who differed in social value orientation. In the first, Rapoport’s(1988) version of the largest number game1 was given to subjects under minimal, and extended, information conditions. It was predicted that prosocial, or cooperative subjects would show higher levels of cooperation when given extended information, but that pro-self subjects would not, on the grounds that the latter are not motivated to maximize collective utility. Results supported the hypothesis, although absolute levels of cooperation remained low. The second study employed an investment dilemma game, in which subjects started with a fixed amount of money invested, and could withdraw all, part, or none of it. The rules of the game specified that the investment group would collapse if more than half of the fiinds were withdrawn. Cooperators and competitors were assigned to either a basic or extended information condition; in the latter, they were given additional information and examples about which behaviours were necessary to keep the investment account going to ensure that all would gain (joint maximisation), and which behaviours would be most likely to maximise individual gain /avoid loss, if others were not cooperative (individual maximising strategy). Extended information produced significantly higher rates of cooperation only for subjects with prosocial motives, as predicted. Across information conditions, competitors were significantly less cooperative than prosocial subjects. Expectations about others’ investment behaviours were highly correlated with own investments. The pattern of results in the two studies is interpreted as consistent with the argument that information facilitates cooperation only in those who have a prosocial orientation.