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2016 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

6. Emission Tax Timing and a Monopoly Market

Author : Yasunori Ouchida

Published in: Sustainable Growth and Development in a Regional Economy

Publisher: Springer Japan

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Abstract

In many economically developed countries, “voluntary approaches”, widely recognized as environmental policy instruments, have been introduced during the last few decades.

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previous chapter Endogenous Growth Model with Public Financed R&D

next chapter The Basic Model of Illegal Dumping and Recycling of Wastes

For detailed arguments related to voluntary approaches, see Carraro and Lévêque [3] and OECD [14, 15].

For details for Keidanren’s voluntary action, see, for example, see the relevant report by Ikkatai et al. [11] among others.

In addition, Scott [28, 30] considers environmental R&D investment in terms of corporate social responsibility.

For details, see Section 2.1 of Petrakis and Xepapadeas [19].

The emission function of end-of-pipe type is also used by Ulph [32], Poyago-Theotoky and Teerasuwannajak [20], Straume [31], Poyago-Theotoky [21], Wang and Wang [33], Naito and Ogawa [13], Kato [12], Pal [17], and others. For examples of the emission function of a cleaner production type, see Petrakis and Xepapadeas [18], Chiou and Hu [5], Puller [23], Ben Youssef and Dinar [1], Cato [4], Hattori [9], and others.

Many environmental economics studies employ this type. For an example, see Chiou and Hu [5].

Petrakis and Xepapadeas [19], Wang and Wang [33], and others employ the specialization of γ = 1.

The second-order condition is satisfied.

For details of arguments about a ratchet effect, see Hepburn [10], Puller [23], and Brunner et al. [2].

The second-order condition is satisfied.

For details, see p. 203 of Petrakis and Xepapadeas [19].

For details, see Requate [24, 25], Petrakis and Xepapadeas [18, 19], Fujiwara [8], Poyago-Theotoky [22], Ben Youssef and Dinar [1], and others.

For details, see p. 518 of David [7].

For details, see footnote 13 of Ouchida and Goto [16].

For details of emission-reducing effect of time-consistent emission subsidy, see Section 3 of Ouchida and Goto [16].

For the case of differentiated Cournot duopoly with end-of-pipe technology, see Poyago-Theotoky and Teerasuwannajak [20].

The second-order condition is satisfied.

For details, see p. 158 of Petrakis and Xepapadeas [18].

Ben Youssef, S., & Dinar, Z. (2011). Regulation of a duopoly and environmental R&D. Environmental Economics, 2(3), 47–51.

Brunner, S., Flachsland, C., & Marschinski, R. (2012). Credible commitment in carbon policy. Climate Policy, 12(2), 255–271.CrossRef

Carraro, C., & Lévêque, F. (1999). Voluntary approaches in environmental policy. Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer Academic.CrossRef

Cato, S. (2011). Environmental policy in a mixed market: Abatement subsidies and emission taxes. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 13, 283–301.CrossRef

Chiou, J. R., & Hu, J. L. (2001). Environmental research joint ventures under emission taxes. Environmental and Resource Economics, 20, 129–146.CrossRef

Conrad, K. (2001). Voluntary environmental agreement vs. emission taxes in strategic trade models. Environmental and Resource Economics, 19, 361–381.

David, M. (2005). Regulating a polluting oligopoly: Emission tax or voluntary agreement. Review of Development Economics, 9(4), 514–529.CrossRef

Fujiwara, K. (2009). Environmental policies in a differentiated oligopoly revisited. Resource and Energy Economics, 31, 239–247.CrossRef

Hattori, K. (2013). Environmental innovation and policy harmonization in international oligopoly. Environment and Development Economics, 18, 162–183.CrossRef

10.

Hepburn, C. (2006). Regulation by prices, quantities, or both: A review of instrument choice. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(2), 226–247.CrossRef

11.

Ikkatai, S., Ishikawa, D., Ohori, S., & Sasaki, K. (2008). Motivation of Japanese companies to take environmental action to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions: An econometric analysis. Sustainability Science, 3, 145–154.CrossRef

12.

Kato, K. (2011). Emission quota versus emission tax in a mixed duopoly. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 13, 43–63.CrossRef

13.

Naito, T., & Ogawa, H. (2009). Direct versus indirect environmental regulation in a partially privatized mixed duopoly. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 10, 87–100.CrossRef

14.

OECD (1999). Voluntary approaches for environmental policy: An assessment. Paris: OECD.

15.

OECD (2003). Voluntary approaches for environmental policy – Effectiveness, efficiency and usage in policy mixes. Paris: OECD.

16.

Ouchida, Y., & Goto, D. (2014). Do emission subsidies reduce emission? in the context of environmental R&D organization. Economic Modelling, 36, 511–516.CrossRef

17.

Pal, R. (2012). Delegation and emission tax in a differentiated oligopoly. The Manchester School, 80(6), 650–670.CrossRef

18.

Petrakis, E., & Xepapadeas, A. (1999). Does government precommitment promote environmental innovation? In E. Petrakis, E. S. Sartzetakis, & A. Xepapadeas (Eds), Environmental regulation and market power: Competition, time consistency and international trade (pp. 145–161). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

19.

Petrakis, E., & Xepapadeas, A. (2003). Location decisions of a polluting firm and the time consistency of environmental policy. Resource and Energy Economics, 25, 197–214.CrossRef

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Poyago-Theotoky, J., & Teerasuwannajak, K. (2002). The timing of environmental policy: A note on the role of product differentiation. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 21(3), 305–316.CrossRef

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Poyago-Theotoky, J. (2007). The organization of R&D and environmental policy. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62(1), 63–75.CrossRef

22.

Poyago-Theotoky, J. (2010). Corrigendum to “The organization of R&D and environmental policy” [Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 62, 63–75]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 76, 449.CrossRef

23.

Puller, S. (2006). The strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standard. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 52, 690–706.CrossRef

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Requate, T. (1993). Pollution control under imperfect competition: Asymmetric Bertrand duopoly with linear technologies. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149(2), 415–442.

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Requate, T. (1993). Pollution control in a Cournot duopoly via taxes or permits. Journal of Economics, 58(3), 255–291.CrossRef

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Requate, T. (2005). Dynamic incentive by environmental policy instruments – A Survey. Ecological Economics, 54, 175–195.CrossRef

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30.

Scott, J. T. (2005). Corporate social responsibility and environmental research and development. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 16, 313–331.CrossRef

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Straume, O. D. (2006). Product market integration and environmental policy coordination in an international duopoly. Environmental and Resource Economics, 34, 535–563.CrossRef

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Ulph, A. (1996). Environmental policy and international trade when governments and producers act strategically. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30(3), 265–281.CrossRef

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Wang, L. F. S., & Wang, J. (2009). Environmental taxes in a differentiated mixed duopoly. Economic Systems, 33(4), 389–396.CrossRef

Title: Emission Tax Timing and a Monopoly Market
Author: Yasunori Ouchida
Publisher: Springer Japan
Book: Sustainable Growth and Development in a Regional Economy
Print ISBN: 978-4-431-55293-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-4-431-55294-9

Copyright Year: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55294-9_6

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