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Dynamic Games and Applications
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications 4/2023

02-12-2023 | Preface

Evolutionary Games and Applications: Fifty Years of ‘The Logic of Animal Conflict’

Authors: Christian Hilbe, Maria Kleshnina, Kateřina Staňková

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications | Issue 4/2023

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Excerpt

Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection has become one of the most influential theories in biology and adjacent fields [34]. It provided answers to many existing puzzles, but it also inspired many new questions. Some of these questions are still being addressed today, with a variety of methods. When it comes to the evolution of behavior, perhaps one of the most well-established methods is evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in ‘The logic of animal conflict’ by John Maynard Smith and George Price in 1973 [95]. This method proved to be both versatile and insightful, with many applications in biology, anthropology, political science, economics, and other domains. In this special issue, we want to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the field by discussing some of the advances, and by highlighting potential challenges and future directions that lie ahead of the field. …
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Metadata
Title
Evolutionary Games and Applications: Fifty Years of ‘The Logic of Animal Conflict’
Authors
Christian Hilbe
Maria Kleshnina
Kateřina Staňková
Publication date
02-12-2023
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Dynamic Games and Applications / Issue 4/2023
Print ISSN: 2153-0785
Electronic ISSN: 2153-0793
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00545-4

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