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2022 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

2. Examples of Failures in Intra-Organizational Risk Transmission in Past Disasters

Authors : Dmitry Chernov, Didier Sornette, Giovanni Sansavini, Ali Ayoub

Published in: Don't Tell the Boss!

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Excerpt

At 3:30 a.m. on June 22, 1941, the Nazi German Wehrmacht, with the support of Italian, Romanian, Finnish, Hungarian, and Slovakian forces, invaded the Soviet Union. It was the most powerful invasion in world history in terms of the number of soldiers: more than 5.5 million fighters were amassed in 192 divisions for the Eastern campaign. The forces had more than 4,300 tanks, 5,000 military airplanes and 47,200 artillery guns and mortars.2 The Soviet Red Army actually had numerical superiority over the Wehrmacht, but could not make use of it because of its unreadiness for the sudden attack. During the first day, the Wehrmacht penetrated between 25 and 50 km into Soviet territory. By the end of the first week they had taken Minsk, the capital of the Soviet Republic of Belarus. By the third week, the depth of the invasion exceeded 600 km and the Wehrmacht was close to Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) and Kiev (the capital of the Soviet Republic of the Ukraine). After 31/2 months of fierce battles, the Nazis had advanced up to 1,000 km and reached the suburbs of Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union. …

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Footnotes
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This case study is an updated version of the previously published account in our book: Dmitry Chernov, Didier Sornette, Man-made Catastrophes and Risk Information Concealment: Case Studies of Major Disasters and Human Fallibility, Springer, 2016, https://​www.​springer.​com/​gp/​book/​9783319242996.
 
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Junguo Liu, Chuanfu Zang, Shiying Tian, Jianguo Liu, Hong Yang, Shaofeng Jia, Liangzhi You, Bo Liu, Miao Zhang, Water conservancy projects in China: Achievements, challenges and way forward, Global Environmental Change, Volume 23, Issue 3, 2013, pp. 633–643, https://​core.​ac.​uk/​download/​pdf/​82044474.​pdf.
 
138
Dai Qing, The river dragon has come!: the Three Gorges dam and the fate of China’s Yangtze River and Its People, Chapter Three: Yi Si, The Banqiao and Shimantan Dam Collapses, Routledge, 2015, pp. 25–38, https://​www.​taylorfrancis.​com/​books/​river-dragon-come-three-gorges-dam-fate-china-yangtze-river-people-dai-qing-john-thibodeau-michael-williams-qing-dai-ming-yi-audrey-ronning-topping/​10.​4324/​9781315502779.
 
139
Linda Liang, Water Management and Allocation of the Yellow River Basin. Report to International Water Management Institute, 2005, http://​www.​iwmi.​cgiar.​org/​assessment/​files_​new/​research_​projects/​River_​Basin_​Development_​and_​Management/​Liang_​WaterPolicy_​YRB.​pdf.
 
140
Ding Yihui, On the study of the unprecedented heavy rainfall in Henan Province during 4—8 August 1975, Review and assessment. Acta Meteorologica Sinica, 2015, 73(3), pp. 411–424, http://​www.​cmsjournal.​net/​qxxb_​cn/​ch/​reader/​create_​pdf.​aspx?​file_​no=​2015067&​flag=​1&​journal_​id=​qxxb_​cn&​year_​id=​2015.
 
141
Terra Pitta, Catastrophe: A Guide to World’s Worst Industrial Disasters, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2015.
 
142
Guan Tie-sheng, Xu Qin, Chen Xing, Xiang Yana, Flood control and safety evaluation of Banqiao reservoir, Procedia Engineering, Volume 28, 2012, pp. 368–375, https://​www.​sciencedirect.​com/​science/​article/​pii/​S187770581200745​X.
 
144
Terra Pitta, Catastrophe: A Guide to World’s Worst Industrial Disasters, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2015.
 
145
Dai Qing, The river dragon has come!: the Three Gorges dam and the fate of China’s Yangtze River and Its People, Chapter Three: Yi Si, The Banqiao and Shimantan Dam Collapses, Routledge, 2015, pp. 25–38, https://​www.​taylorfrancis.​com/​books/​river-dragon-come-three-gorges-dam-fate-china-yangtze-river-people-dai-qing-john-thibodeau-michael-williams-qing-dai-ming-yi-audrey-ronning-topping/​10.​4324/​9781315502779.
 
146
Linda Liang, Water Management and Allocation of the Yellow River Basin. Report to International Water Management Institute, 2005, http://​www.​iwmi.​cgiar.​org/​assessment/​files_​new/​research_​projects/​River_​Basin_​Development_​and_​Management/​Liang_​WaterPolicy_​YRB.​pdf.
 
147
Dai Qing, The river dragon has come!: the Three Gorges dam and the fate of China’s Yangtze River and Its People, Chapter Three: Yi Si, The Banqiao and Shimantan Dam Collapses, Routledge, 2015, pp. 25–38, https://​www.​taylorfrancis.​com/​books/​river-dragon-come-three-gorges-dam-fate-china-yangtze-river-people-dai-qing-john-thibodeau-michael-williams-qing-dai-ming-yi-audrey-ronning-topping/​10.​4324/​9781315502779.
 
148
J.B. Sheng, L. Li, Z.S. Wang, Discussion on dam security of small-scale reservoirs in China, China Water Resources, 2006, 2, pp. 41–43.
 
149
Dai Qing, The river dragon has come!: the Three Gorges dam and the fate of China’s Yangtze River and Its People, Chapter Three: Yi Si, The Banqiao and Shimantan Dam Collapses, Routledge, 2015, pp. 25–38, https://​www.​taylorfrancis.​com/​books/​river-dragon-come-three-gorges-dam-fate-china-yangtze-river-people-dai-qing-john-thibodeau-michael-williams-qing-dai-ming-yi-audrey-ronning-topping/​10.​4324/​9781315502779.
 
150
Junguo Liu, Chuanfu Zang, Shiying Tian, Jianguo Liu, Hong Yang, Shaofeng Jia, Liangzhi You, Bo Liu, Miao Zhang, Water conservancy projects in China: Achievements, challenges and way forward, Global Environmental Change, Volume 23, Issue 3, 2013, pp. 633–643, https://​core.​ac.​uk/​download/​pdf/​82044474.​pdf.
 
151
Dai Qing, The river dragon has come!: the Three Gorges dam and the fate of China’s Yangtze River and Its People, Chapter Three: Yi Si, The Banqiao and Shimantan Dam Collapses, Routledge, 2015, pp. 25–38, https://​www.​taylorfrancis.​com/​books/​river-dragon-come-three-gorges-dam-fate-china-yangtze-river-people-dai-qing-john-thibodeau-michael-williams-qing-dai-ming-yi-audrey-ronning-topping/​10.​4324/​9781315502779.
 
152
Terra Pitta, Catastrophe: A Guide to World’s Worst Industrial Disasters, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2015.
 
153
Hongbo Ma, Jeffrey A. Nittrouer, Kensuke Naito, Xudong Fu, Yuanfeng Zhang, Andrew J. Moodie, Yuanjian Wang, Baosheng Wu and Gary Parker, The exceptional sediment load of fine-grained dispersal systems: Example of the Yellow River, China, Science Advances, Vol. 3, no. 5, May 12, 2017, https://​advances.​sciencemag.​org/​content/​advances/​3/​5/​e1603114.​full.​pdf.
 
154
Li Shu, Brian Finlayson, Flood management on the lower Yellow River: hydrological and geomorphological perspectives, Sedimentary Geology, Volume 85, Issues 1–4, May 1993, pp. 285–296, https://​www.​sciencedirect.​com/​science/​article/​abs/​pii/​003707389390089N​.
 
155
Hongbo Ma, Jeffrey A. Nittrouer, Kensuke Naito, Xudong Fu, Yuanfeng Zhang, Andrew J. Moodie, Yuanjian Wang, Baosheng Wu and Gary Parker, The exceptional sediment load of fine-grained dispersal systems: Example of the Yellow River, China, Science Advances, Vol. 3, no. 5, May 12, 2017, https://​advances.​sciencemag.​org/​content/​advances/​3/​5/​e1603114.​full.​pdf.
 
156
Philip Ball, The Chinese are obsessed with building giant dams, BBC, October 15, 2015, https://​www.​bbc.​com/​future/​article/​20151014-the-chinese-are-obsessed-with-building-giant-dams.
 
157
Zhao Cheng, 长河孤旅: 黄万里九十年人生沧桑 [Long River Lonely Journey: Huang Wanli’s Ninety Years of Life Vicissitudes], Shanxi people’s Publishing House, 2012, http://​www.​wakbook.​com/​Article/​1x0000000002/​159450x12234/​ (Chinese).
 
158
Jianguo Chen, Wenhao Zhou, Shanshan Han, Gaohu Sun, Influences of retrogressive erosion of reservoir on sedimentation of its downstream river channel—A case study on Sanmenxia Reservoir and the Lower Yellow River, International Journal of Sediment Research, Volume 32, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 373–383, https://​www.​sciencedirect.​com/​science/​article/​abs/​pii/​S100162791730053​7.
 
159
Jianguo Chen, Wenhao Zhou, Shanshan Han, Gaohu Sun, Influences of retrogressive erosion of reservoir on sedimentation of its downstream river channel—A case study on Sanmenxia Reservoir and the Lower Yellow River, International Journal of Sediment Research, Volume 32, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 373–383, https://​www.​sciencedirect.​com/​science/​article/​abs/​pii/​S100162791730053​7.
 
160
One dam mistake after another leaves $4.4bn bill, May 22, 2004, The Sydney Morning Herald, https://​www.​smh.​com.​au/​world/​one-dam-mistake-after-another-leaves-4-4bn-bill-20040522-gdiz5v.​html.
 
161
Zhao Cheng, 长河孤旅: 黄万里九十年人生沧桑 [Long River Lonely Journey: Huang Wanli’s Ninety Years of Life Vicissitudes], Shanxi people’s Publishing House, 2012, http://​www.​wakbook.​com/​Article/​1x0000000002/​159450x12234/​.
 
162
Terra Pitta, Catastrophe: A Guide to World’s Worst Industrial Disasters, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2015.
 
163
Dai Qing, The river dragon has come!: the Three Gorges dam and the fate of China’s Yangtze River and Its People, Chapter Three: Yi Si, The Banqiao and Shimantan Dam Collapses, Routledge, 2015, pp. 25–38.
 
164
Dai Qing, The river dragon has come!: the Three Gorges dam and the fate of China’s Yangtze River and Its People, Chapter Three: Yi Si, The Banqiao and Shimantan Dam Collapses, Routledge, 2015, pp. 25–38.
 
165
RCEM—Reclamation Consequence Estimating Methodology Dam Failure and Flood Event Case History Compilation, U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Reclamation, June 2015, https://​www.​usbr.​gov/​ssle/​damsafety/​documents/​RCEM-CaseHistories201​5.​pdf.
 
166
Dai Qing, The river dragon has come!: the Three Gorges dam and the fate of China’s Yangtze River and Its People, Routledge, 2015, p. xvi.
 
167
Terra Pitta, Catastrophe: A Guide to World’s Worst Industrial Disasters, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2015.
 
168
Dai Qing, The river dragon has come!: the Three Gorges dam and the fate of China’s Yangtze River and Its People, Chapter Three: Yi Si, The Banqiao and Shimantan Dam Collapses, Routledge, 2015, pp. 25–38.
 
169
Oral History of Rivers on World Water Day (9)-Recalling the collapse of Banqiao Reservoir in Henan http://​www.​fon.​org.​cn/​index.​php?​option=​com_​k2&​view=​item&​id=​10617:​9&​Itemid=​211.
 
170
以史为鉴 确保江河安澜 [Take history as a mirror to ensure that the river is safe], Henan Daily, August 6, 2015, http://​newpaper.​dahe.​cn/​hnrb/​images/​2015-08/​06/​03/​hnrbRB03BRB03BC1​50806_​h.​pdf.
 
171
The disaster was triggered by the Tohoku M9 earthquake on March 11, 2011, which produced a large tsunami that flooded the side and in particular the cooling system, resulting in overheat, core melting and release of nuclear radioactive elements.
 
172
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, pp. 21, 81, https://​www.​nirs.​org/​wp-content/​uploads/​fukushima/​naiic_​report.​pdf.
 
173
Guan Tie-sheng, Xu Qin, Chen Xing, Xiang Yana, Flood control and safety evaluation of Banqiao reservoir, Procedia Engineering, Volume 28, 2012, pp. 368–375, https://​www.​sciencedirect.​com/​science/​article/​pii/​S187770581200745​X.
 
174
Dai Qing, The river dragon has come!: the Three Gorges dam and the fate of China’s Yangtze River and Its People, Routledge, 2015, pp. 22–24, https://​www.​routledge.​com/​The-River-Dragon-Has-Come--Three-Gorges-Dam-and-the/​Qing-Thibodeau-Williams-Dai-Yi-Topping/​p/​book/​9780765602060.
 
175
Utpal Sandesara, Tom Wooten, Paul Farmer, No One Had a Tongue to Speak: The Untold Story of One of History’s Deadliest Floods, Prometheus Books, 2011.
 
176
John H. Fielder et al., The DC-10 Case: A Study in Applied Ethics, Technology, and Society, State University of New York Press, 1992, p. 57.
 
177
Paul Eddy, Elaine Potter and Bruce Page, Destination disaster: From the Tri-Motor to the DC-10, Times Newspapers, Ltd, 1976, pp. 179–180.
 
178
John H. Fielder, et al., The DC-10 Case: A Study in Applied Ethics, Technology, and Society, State University of New York Press, 1992, pp. 85–88.
 
179
Paul Eddy, Elaine Potter, Bruce Page, Destination disaster, Granada Publishing Limited, 1976, p. 176.
 
180
Paul Eddy, Elaine Potter, Bruce Page, Destination disaster, Granada Publishing Limited, 1976, p. 161.
 
181
Richard Witkin, Engineer’s Warning on DC‐10 Reportedly Never Sent, The New York Times, March 12, 1975.
 
182
John H. Fielder et al., The DC-10 Case: A Study in Applied Ethics, Technology, and Society, State University of New York Press, 1992, pp. 101–107.
 
183
Richard Witkin, Engineer’s Warning on DC‐10 Reportedly Never Sent, The New York Times, March 12, 1975.
 
184
Paul Eddy, Elaine Potter, Bruce Page, Destination disaster, Granada Publishing Limited, 1976, p. 160.
 
185
John H. Fielder et al., The DC-10 Case: A Study in Applied Ethics, Technology, and Society, State University of New York Press, 1992, pp. 29–206.
 
186
Paul Eddy, Elaine Potter, Bruce Page, Destination disaster, Granada Publishing Limited, 1976, p. 267.
 
187
Paul Eddy, Elaine Potter, Bruce Page, Destination disaster, Granada Publishing Limited, 1976, p. 177.
 
188
Paul Eddy, Elaine Potter, Bruce Page, Destination disaster, Granada Publishing Limited, 1976, pp. 254–257.
 
189
Paul Eddy, Elaine Potter, Bruce Page, Destination disaster, Granada Publishing Limited, 1976, pp. 213–251.
 
190
This case study is an updated version of the previously published account in our book: Dmitry Chernov, Didier Sornette, Man-made Catastrophes and Risk Information Concealment: Case Studies of Major Disasters and Human Fallibility, Springer, 2016, https://​www.​springer.​com/​gp/​book/​9783319242996.
 
193
Information about fluoroelastomer (FKM), http://​en.​wikipedia.​org/​wiki/​FKM.
 
194
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
195
Diane Vaughan, The Challenger launch decision: risky technology, culture and deviance at NASA. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; 1996, p. 309.
 
196
Chris Bergin, Remembering the mistakes of Challenger, NASASpaceflight.com, January 28, 2007, https://​www.​nasaspaceflight.​com/​2007/​01/​remembering-the-mistakes-of-challenger/​.
 
198
Andrew Dunar, Stephen Waring, Power To Explore—History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990, Government Printing Office, p. 373.
 
199
Diane Vaughan, The Challenger launch decision, The University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 155.
 
200
Diane Vaughan, The Challenger launch decision, The University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 309.
 
201
Edward Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information, 2nd ed.; Graphics Press: Cheshire, Connecticut, USA 2001.
 
202
Didier Sornette, Euan Mearns and Spencer Wheatley, Revisiting the predictability of the Haicheng and Tangshan earthquakes, Symmetry 13, 1206, 2021, https://​doi.​org/​10.​3390/​sym13071206.
 
203
One of the authors has documented similar issues of the importance of synthetising and presenting complex data and empirical evidence to decision makers. In the run-up to the destructive Haicheng (1975) and Tangshan (1976) earthquakes in China, large sets of precursory data from hundreds of monitoring stations were recorded but the data was never collated into a central database and the Chinese at the time depended upon amateur staff manning individual stations to draw and report conclusions based upon that single station’s results. The Chinese seismologists have been sequentially analyzing each anomaly (levelling, geomagnetism, soil resistivity, earth currents, gravity, earth stress, radon, well water level). There was a diffuse understanding of an acceleration of the rate and amplitudes of anomalies and the Chinese experts have been gathering and debating for months in attempts to understand the accumulating data sets. While such “gut feelings” may explain the human drama of how scientists and decision makers prior to the catastrophic Tangshan earthquake were discussing and quarrelling over the growing feeling of incipient deadly risks, the experts apparently never made the step to quantify this impression of an imminent danger in the simple and transparent way provided by a coarse-graining approach of counting the total number of reported anomalies as a function of time [Didier Sornette, Euan Mearns and Spencer Wheatley, Revisiting the predictability of the Haicheng and Tangshan earthquakes, Symmetry 13, 1206, 2021]. We think that this could have made a big difference in convinging the decision makers about the imminence of the disasters [Euan Mearns, Didier Sornette, The Great 1976 Tangshan Earthquake: Learning from the 1966–1976 Chinese Prediction Program, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, 2021].
 
204
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
205
Richard P. Feynman, What Do You Care What Other People Think?, 1988, W W Norton, p. 141, https://​wwnorton.​com/​books/​9780393355642.
 
206
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
207
Diane Vaughan, The Challenger launch decision, The University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 312.
 
208
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
209
Howard Berkes, Remembering Roger Boisjoly: He Tried To Stop Shuttle Challenger Launch, NPR, February 6, 2012, https://​www.​npr.​org/​sections/​thetwo-way/​2012/​02/​06/​146490064/​remembering-roger-boisjoly-he-tried-to-stop-shuttle-challenger-launch.
 
210
Chris Bergin, Remembering the mistakes of Challenger, NASASpaceflight.com, January 28, 2007, https://​www.​nasaspaceflight.​com/​2007/​01/​remembering-the-mistakes-of-challenger/​.
 
211
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
212
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
213
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
214
David E. Sanger, Record Shows NASA Aide Told Of Doubt On Seals, The New York Times, August 7, 1986, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​1986/​08/​07/​us/​record-shows-nasa-aide-told-of-doubt-on-seals.​html.
 
215
Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, pp. 19, 232, https://​science.​ksc.​nasa.​gov/​shuttle/​missions/​51-l/​docs/​rogers-commission/​Rogers_​Commission_​Report_​Vol1.​pdf.
 
216
Diane Vaughan, The Challenger launch decision, The University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 309.
 
217
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
218
Howard Berkes, Remembering Roger Boisjoly: He Tried To Stop Shuttle Challenger Launch, NPR, February 6, 2012, https://​www.​npr.​org/​sections/​thetwo-way/​2012/​02/​06/​146490064/​remembering-roger-boisjoly-he-tried-to-stop-shuttle-challenger-launch.
 
219
Diane Vaughan, The Challenger launch decision, The University of Chicago Press, 1996, pp. 49, 149.
 
220
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
221
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
222
Andrew Dunar, Stephen Waring, Power To Explore—History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990, Government Printing Office, p. 353.
 
223
Andrew Dunar, Stephen Waring, Power To Explore—History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990, Government Printing Office, p. 352.
 
224
Investigation of the Challenger accident. Report of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session, October 29, 1986, pp. 105–106, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/​pdf/​GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016.​pdf.
 
225
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
226
Investigation of the Challenger accident: hearings before the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, June 15, 16, 23, 24, 1986, Vol.1, p. 69, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/​pdf/​GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016.​pdf.
 
227
Diane Vaughan, The Challenger launch decision, The University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 267.
 
228
Andrew Dunar, Stephen Waring, Power To Explore—History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990, Government Printing Office, pp. 339–379.
 
229
Diane Vaughan, The Challenger launch decision, The University of Chicago Press, 1996, pp. 149.
 
230
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
231
Investigation of the Challenger accident. Report of the Committee on Science and Technology House of Representatives, Oct. 29, 1986, p. 22, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/​pdf/​GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016.​pdf.
 
232
Roger Pielke Jr, Radford Byerly, Shuttle programme lifetime cost, Nature, 472 (7341), 07 April 2011, http://​sciencepolicy.​colorado.​edu/​admin/​publication_​files/​2011.​09.​pdf.
 
233
William Starbuck, Moshe Farjoun, Organization at the Limit: Lessons from the Columbia Disaster, Oxford: Blackwell, 2005, p. 31, https://​citeseerx.​ist.​psu.​edu/​viewdoc/​download?​doi=​10.​1.​1.​473.​447&​rep=​rep1&​type=​pdf.
 
234
The final cost of one kilogram of payload amounted to US $60,000; the Shuttle’s payload, which was taken up to low earth orbit (LEO), was 24,400 kg. For example, the payload cost of the American expendable Titan IV space rocket, used by the U.S. Air Force, was calculated as US $27,000/kg–US $588 million per launch at 2010 prices with 21,680 kg of payload to low earth orbit; the Russian Proton rocket had a payload cost of US $5,300/kg–US $110 million per launch with 20,700 kg of payload to low earth orbit.
 
235
According to a report of the United States Air Force, the average unit cost of the Titan IV rocket was US $450 mln in 1999. The cumulative rate of US inflation between 1999 to 2000 was 30.9%. This implies that expenditure on every launch was US $588 at 2010 prices. “Titan IV” report, United States Air Force, 1999, http://​www.​dote.​osd.​mil/​pub/​reports/​FY1999/​pdf/​99titaniv.​pdf.
 
236
Peter B. De Selding, ILS May pitch proton as cost-saver over Soyuz for Galileo satellites, space news, January 15, 2010, https://​spacenews.​com/​ils-may-pitch-proton-cost-saver-over-soyuz-galileo-satellites/​.
 
237
John R. London III, LEO on the Cheap Methods for Achieving Drastic Reductions In Space Launch Costs, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Oct. 1994, p. 45, https://​apps.​dtic.​mil/​sti/​citations/​ADA289106.
 
238
Investigation of the Challenger accident. Report of the Committee on Science and Technology House of Representatives, Oct. 29, 1986, p. 120, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/​pdf/​GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016.​pdf.
 
239
Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Chap. VIII: Pressures on the system, Washington, D.C., June 6th, 1986, https://​history.​nasa.​gov/​rogersrep/​genindex.​htm.
 
240
Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Vol. 2: Appendix I—NASA Pre-Launch Activities Team Report, Washington, D.C., June 6th, 1986, https://​history.​nasa.​gov/​rogersrep/​genindex.​htm.
 
242
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
244
Investigation of the Challenger accident. Report of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session, October 29, 1986, pp. 3–7, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/​pdf/​GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016.​pdf.
 
245
Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, pp. 177–178, https://​science.​ksc.​nasa.​gov/​shuttle/​missions/​51-l/​docs/​rogers-commission/​Rogers_​Commission_​Report_​Vol1.​pdf.
 
246
Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, pp. 10,17, https://​science.​ksc.​nasa.​gov/​shuttle/​missions/​51-l/​docs/​rogers-commission/​Rogers_​Commission_​Report_​Vol1.​pdf.
 
249
David Shayler, Disasters and Accidents in Manned Spaceflight, Springer, 2000, p. xxviii, https://​www.​springer.​com/​gp/​book/​9781852332259.
 
250
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
251
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
252
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
255
Andrew Dunar, Stephen Waring, Power To Explore—History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990, Government Printing Office, p. 360, https://​history.​nasa.​gov/​SP-4313.​pdf.
 
256
Andrew Dunar, Stephen Waring, Power To Explore—History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990, Government Printing Office, p. 378, https://​history.​nasa.​gov/​SP-4313.​pdf.
 
257
Richard P Feynman, What Do You Care What Other People Think?’: Further Adventures of a Curious Character, Bantam Books, 1988, pp. 158–161.
 
258
Andrew Dunar, Stephen Waring, Power To Explore—History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990, Government Printing Office, p. 362–363, https://​history.​nasa.​gov/​SP-4313.​pdf.
 
259
Andrew Dunar, Stephen Waring, Power To Explore—History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990, Government Printing Office, p. 362, https://​history.​nasa.​gov/​SP-4313.​pdf.
 
260
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
261
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
262
Andrew Dunar, Stephen Waring, Power To Explore—History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990, Government Printing Office, p. 364, https://​history.​nasa.​gov/​SP-4313.​pdf.
 
263
Andrew Dunar, Stephen Waring, Power To Explore—History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990, Government Printing Office, p. 362, https://​history.​nasa.​gov/​SP-4313.​pdf.
 
265
Andrew Dunar, Stephen Waring, Power To Explore—History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990, Government Printing Office, p. 364–366.
 
266
Investigation of the Challenger accident. Report of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session, October 29, 1986, pp. 32–33, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/​pdf/​GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016.​pdf.
 
267
Chris Bergin, Remembering the mistakes of Challenger, NASASpaceflight.com, January 28, 2007, https://​www.​nasaspaceflight.​com/​2007/​01/​remembering-the-mistakes-of-challenger/​.
 
268
Diane Vaughan, The Challenger launch decision, The University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 49.
 
269
Columbia Accident Investigation Board, CAIB Final Report, Volume 1, August 26, 2003, p. 25, https://​ehss.​energy.​gov/​deprep/​archive/​documents/​0308_​caib_​report_​volume1.​pdf.
 
270
Nancy G. Leveson, MIT, Technical and Managerial Factors in the NASA Challenger and Columbia Losses: Looking Forward to the Future published within Kleinman, Cloud-Hansen, Matta, and Handelsman Controveries in Science and Technology Volume 2, Mary Ann Liebert Press, 2008, http://​sunnyday.​mit.​edu/​papers/​controversies-final.​doc.
 
271
Andrew Dunar, Stephen Waring, Power To Explore—History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990, Government Printing Office, p. 355–356.
 
272
Andrew Dunar, Stephen Waring, Power To Explore—History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990, Government Printing Office, p. 377.
 
273
Andrew Dunar, Stephen Waring, Power To Explore—History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990, Government Printing Office, p. 362.
 
274
Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Appendix F—Personal observations on the reliability of the Shuttle by R.P. Feynman, Washington, D.C., June 6th, 1986, https://​history.​nasa.​gov/​rogersrep/​genindex.​htm.
 
276
Roger M. Boisjoly, Telecom Meeting (Ethical Decisions—Morton Thiokol and the Challenger Disaster), 2006, http://​www.​onlineethics.​org/​cms/​7061.​aspx.
 
277
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
279
Thiokol Chemical Corporation profile, http://​en.​wikipedia.​org/​wiki/​Thiokol.
 
280
U.S. General Accounting office, Government Contracting: Review of Morton Thiokol Separation, NSIAD-90–220, August 1990, p. 3, https://​www.​gao.​gov/​assets/​nsiad-90-220.​pdf.
 
281
Sidney Dekker, second victim: error, guilt, trauma, and resilience, CRC Press, 2013, P. 23, https://​www.​routledge.​com/​second-victim-error-guilt-trauma-and-resilience/​dekker/​p/​book/​9781466583412.
 
282
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
283
Allan J. McDonald, James R. Hansen, Truth, lies, and o-rings: inside the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, University Press of Florida, 2009, https://​upf.​com/​book.​asp?​id=​MCDON001.
 
284
This case study is an updated version of the previously published account in our book: Dmitry Chernov, Didier Sornette, Man-made Catastrophes and Risk Information Concealment: Case Studies of Major Disasters and Human Fallibility, Springer, 2016, https://​www.​springer.​com/​gp/​book/​9783319242996.
 
285
Alexandr Borovoy, Evgeny Velihov. Experience of Chernobyl, National Research Center “Kurchatovsky Institute”, Moscow, 2012, p. 25.
 
287
PBq stands for Peta Bequerel, so 1 PBq = 1015 atomic disintegrations per second (1 million billion).
 
288
Chernobyl Accident 1986, World Nuclear Association, updated April 2014.
 
289
From April, 27 to May, 8, 1986, 99195 residents with a 30-km zone were evacuated. 17122 people were additionally evacuated from May, 14 till September 1986. Total number of evacuated residents was 116287. Source: 25 years of the Chernobyl accident (1986-2011). Results and Prospects overcoming its consequences in Russia, Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Management of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 2011, p. 20.
 
290
Alexander Berezin, What are the real consequences of the Chernobyl disaster: how many people died and why there were tens of times more deaths from fear of radiation, Esquire, April 26, 2021, https://​esquire.​ru/​articles/​99252-kakovy-realnye-posledstviya-chernobylskoy-katastrofy-skolko-chelovek-pogibli-i-pochemu-ot-straha-pered-radiaciey-smertey-bylo-v-desyatki-raz-bolshe.
 
291
Chernobyl: the true scale of the accident, World Health Organization, 2005, http://​www.​who.​int/​mediacentre/​news/​releases/​2005/​pr38/​en/​.
 
292
Interview with Mikhail Gorbachev, documentary “The Battle of Chernobyl”, Director: Thomas Johnson, 2006.
 
293
Official exchange rate of State Bank of the USSR by the end of 1986: Soviet ruble/US dollar—0,6783, Archive of Bank of Russia, http://​cbr.​ru/​currency_​base/​OldDataFiles/​USD.​xls.
 
294
Consolidated budget of the USSR and Russia, Information-Analytical Center “The budget system of the Russian Federation”, http://​www.​budgetrf.​ru/​Publications/​Magazines/​Ve/​1995/​95-7illarionov/​95-7illarionov020.​htm.
 
295
Valery Legasov, Problems of Safe Development of the Technosphere, Communist Journal, #8, 1987, pp. 92–101.
 
296
Nikolay Dollezhal’, At the root the man-made world, Moscow, 2010, 4th edition, p. 136.
 
297
Nikolaii Karpan, Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom, Dnepropetrovsk, 2006, p. 255.
 
298
Andrew Scott Cooper, The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2011, pp. 123, 149.
 
299
Gennady Shmal, Energy heart of Russia. 60 years of West-Siberian oil and gas province, Drilling and Oil Magazine, Moscow, November 2013.
 
300
Uranium Quick Facts, Environmental Science Division of Argonne National Laboratory for the United States Department of Energy, http://​web.​ead.​anl.​gov/​uranium/​guide/​facts.
 
301
Former deputy director of Chernobyl NPP: We began to make such nuclear power plants because of Arkady Raikin, Interfax, April 23, 2016.
 
302
Ivan Moiseev, The process of development of model of the “Sarcophagus” shelter for the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Modern problems of the shelter,SAFETY FORUM MATERIALS, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 2016, p. 57, https://​docplayer.​ru/​26250848-Nauchno-tehnicheskiy-vestnik-sbornik-dokladov-forum-materials-sankt-peterburg-rossiya-st-petersburg-russia-maya-may-2016.​html.
 
303
Nikolay Dollezhal’, At the root the man-made world, Moscow, 2010, 4th edition, pp. 160–162.
 
304
Anatoly Aleksandrov, October and Physics, Pravda, November 10, 1967.
 
305
Valery Legasov, Record from cassettes, 1986–1988.
 
306
Valery Legasov, Record from cassettes, 1986–1988.
 
307
INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, pp. 47–48, https://​www-pub.​iaea.​org/​MTCD/​publications/​PDF/​Pub913e_​web.​pdf.
 
308
Anatoly Dyatlov, Chernobyl. How it was, Nauchtekhlitizdat, Moscow, 2003, p. 153.
 
309
The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, p. 39.
 
310
Zhores Medvedev, The legacy of Chernobyl, HarperCollins, 1992.
 
311
The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, pp. 31,59.
 
312
Alexander Rumyantsev, About development of RMBK-1000, http://​accidont.​ru/​memo/​Rumjantsev.​html.
 
313
Anatoly Dyatlov, Chernobyl. How it was, Nauchtekhlitizdat, Moscow, 2003, pp. 61-64, 91-93.
 
314
Nikolaii Karpan, Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom, Dnepropetrovsk, 2006, pp. 294-296,399.
 
315
Valery Legasov, Record from cassettes, 1986–1988.
 
316
Nikolaii Karpan, Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom, Dnepropetrovsk, 2006, pp. 294–296.
 
317
Grigori Medvedev, Chernobyl Notebook, New World Magazine, №6, 1989.
 
318
H. Seldon, Chernobyl in the mirror three generations, Druzhba Narodov, № 7, 2006, p. 169.
 
319
Excerpts from transcripts of the meetings of Politburo concerning Chernobyl disaster (April 1986–November 1989). The transcripts was published in book “Within the Soviet Politburo…”. Records of Anatoly Chernyaev, Vadim Medvedev, Georgy Shakhnazarov (1985-1991), The Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow, 2008, www.​gorby.​ru/​userfiles/​protokoly_​politbyuro.​pdf.
 
320
INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, p. 87, https://​www-pub.​iaea.​org/​MTCD/​publications/​PDF/​Pub913e_​web.​pdf.
 
321
Grigori Medvedev, Chernobyl Notebook, New World Magazine, №6, 1989.
 
322
Grigori Medvedev, Chernobyl Notebook, New World Magazine, №6, 1989.
 
323
Dialogue with Viktor Bryukhanov: “We all went to this accident…”, December 1, 1989, https://​karaulovlife.​ru/​news/​dialog-s-viktorom-bryuhanovym/​4885/​.
 
324
Olga Drokonova, Monograph “CHERNOBYL: The Cognitive History of the Creation of Trouble (1970–1986), Tuymen oil and gas university, 2015, https://​www.​tyuiu.​ru/​wp-content/​uploads/​2016/​02/​Monografiya.​-CHernobyl.​-Kognitivnaya-istoriya-sotvoreniya-bedy-1970-1986-gg.​.​pdf, pp. 51, 52, 79, 80.
 
325
Svetlana Samodelova, Personal disaster of the director of Chernobyl, Moskovsky Komsomolets, April 21, 2011, https://​www.​mk.​ru/​politics/​russia/​2011/​04/​21/​583211-lichnaya-katastrofa-direktora-chernobyilya.​html.
 
326
Grigori Medvedev, Chernobyl Notebook, New World Magazine, №6, 1989.
 
327
Anatoly Dyachenko, Experience of liquidation of Chernobyl disaster, Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Institute of Strategic Stability” of Rosatom, Moscow, 2004, http://​www.​iss-atom.​ru/​book-7/​glav-2-3.​htm.
 
328
Interview with Mikhail Gorbachev, documentary “The Battle of Chernobyl”, Director: Thomas Johnson, 2006.
 
329
Nikolaii Karpan, Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom, Dnepropetrovsk, 2006, p. 401.
 
330
ValeryLegasov, Record from cassettes, 1986–1988.
 
331
Grigori Medvedev, Chernobyl Notebook, New World Magazine, №6, 1989.
 
332
INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, p. 51, https://​www-pub.​iaea.​org/​MTCD/​publications/​PDF/​Pub913e_​web.​pdf.
 
333
Günter Kessler, Anke Veser, Franz-Hermann Schlüter, Wolfgang Raskob, Claudia Landman, Jürgen Päsler-Sauer, Safety Concepts of Light Water Reactors, Springer, p. 173.
 
334
INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, p. 52, https://​www-pub.​iaea.​org/​MTCD/​publications/​PDF/​Pub913e_​web.​pdf.
 
335
The causes of the accident lie not in the programme [of the experiment] as such, but in the ignorance on the part of the programme developers of the characteristics of the behavior of the RBMK-1000 reactor under the planned operating conditions”, INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, p. 52, https://​www-pub.​iaea.​org/​MTCD/​publications/​PDF/​Pub913e_​web.​pdf.
 
336
Grigori Medvedev, Chernobyl Notebook, New World Magazine, №6, 1989.
 
337
Nikolaii Karpan, Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom, Dnepropetrovsk, 2006, p. 446, 451.
 
338
Anatoly Dyatlov, Chernobyl. How it was, Nauchtekhlitizdat, Moscow, 2003, p. 134.
 
339
Sergey Leskov, Smart guys, Vremya publisher, Moscow, 2011. p. 65.
 
340
Mikhail Moshkin, Went down in the history by sentence, Moscow News, №22, April 26, 2011.
 
341
Anatoly Dyatlov, Chernobyl. How it was, Nauchtekhlitizdat, Moscow, 2003, p. 134.
 
342
Anatoly Dyachenko, Experience of liquidation of Chernobyl disaster, Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Institute of Strategic Stability” of Rosatom, Moscow, 2004, http://​www.​iss-atom.​ru/​book-7/​glav-2-3.​htm.
 
343
Unapprehended atom. Interview with Victor Bryukhanov, “Profile” Magazine, Moscow, № 29(477), 24.04.2006.
 
344
INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, pp. 47–48, https://​www-pub.​iaea.​org/​MTCD/​publications/​PDF/​Pub913e_​web.​pdf.
 
345
Unapprehended atom. Interview with Victor Bryukhanov, “Profile” Magazine, Moscow, № 29(477), April 24, 2006.
 
346
Nikolaii Karpan, Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom, Dnepropetrovsk, 2006, pp. 400-404.
 
347
INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, p. 43, https://​www-pub.​iaea.​org/​MTCD/​publications/​PDF/​Pub913e_​web.​pdf.
 
348
Nikolaii Karpan, Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom, Dnepropetrovsk, 2006, p. 290.
 
349
Anatoly Dyatlov, Chernobyl. How it was, Nauchtekhlitizdat, Moscow, 2003, pp. 136.
 
350
INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, pp. 44-45, https://​www-pub.​iaea.​org/​MTCD/​publications/​PDF/​Pub913e_​web.​pdf.
 
351
Nikolaii Karpan, Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom, Dnepropetrovsk, 2006, pp. 262, 398.
 
352
INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, p. 31, https://​www-pub.​iaea.​org/​MTCD/​publications/​PDF/​Pub913e_​web.​pdf.
 
353
INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, p. 13, https://​www-pub.​iaea.​org/​MTCD/​publications/​PDF/​Pub913e_​web.​pdf.
 
354
Grigori Medvedev, Chernobyl Notebook, New World Magazine, №6, 1989.
 
355
Excerpts from transcripts of the meetings of Politburo concerning Chernobyl disaster (April 1986–November 1989). The transcripts was published in book “Within the Soviet Politburo… Records of Anatoly Chernyaev, Vadim Medvedev, Georgy Shakhnazarov (1985-1991), The Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow, 2008, https://​web.​archive.​org/​web/​20200605083257/​www.​gorby.​ru/​userfiles/​protokoly_​politbyuro.​pdf.
 
356
Nikolaii Karpan, Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom, Dnepropetrovsk, 2006, pp. 400-404.
 
357
In IAEA’s INSAG-7 report was noted that “The USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety was established only three years before the Chernobyl accident and, notwithstanding the safety culture concept, it could not be regarded as an independent body, since it was part of the same state authorities responsible for the construction of nuclear power plants and electricity generation. … However, since the regulatory bodies have no legal basis, no economic methods of control, and no human and financial resources, and since it is very difficult to set up an institute of independent experts in this country, the system that existed and still exists is one consisting of many links providing step by step control and finicky supervision of nuclear power plants, rather than a full blooded regulatory system for the safe use of nuclear energy in the interests of the whole population” [INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, p. 88, https://​www-pub.​iaea.​org/​MTCD/​publications/​PDF/​Pub913e_​web.​pdf].
 
358
Valery Legasov, Record from cassettes, 1986–1988.
 
359
In 1985, the plant was called best nuclear plant within the Ministry of Energy and Electrification of USSR [Nikolaii Karpan, Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom, Dnepropetrovsk, 2006, pp. 410, 487]. In 1992 IAEA’s report, it was mentioned that “As a whole, the Chernobyl personnel in 1986 were characterized as a fairly typical, mature and stable group of specialists with qualifications regarded in the USSR as satisfactory. They were no better, but no worse, than the personnel at other nuclear plants” [INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, p. 31, https://​www-pub.​iaea.​org/​MTCD/​publications/​PDF/​Pub913e_​web.​pdf].
 
360
Excerpts from transcripts of the meetings of Politburo concerning Chernobyl disaster (April 1986–November 1989). The transcripts was published in book “Within the Soviet Politburo…”. Records of Anatoly Chernyaev, Vadim Medvedev, Georgy Shakhnazarov (1985-1991), The Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow, 2008, https://​web.​archive.​org/​web/​20200605083257/​www.​gorby.​ru/​userfiles/​protokoly_​politbyuro.​pdf.
 
361
Nikolaii Karpan, Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom, Dnepropetrovsk, 2006, pp. 400-404.
 
362
Excerpts from transcripts of the meetings of Politburo concerning Chernobyl disaster (April 1986–November 1989). The transcripts was published in book “Within the Soviet Politburo…”. Records of Anatoly Chernyaev, Vadim Medvedev, Georgy Shakhnazarov (1985-1991), The Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow, 2008, https://​web.​archive.​org/​web/​20200605083257/​www.​gorby.​ru/​userfiles/​protokoly_​politbyuro.​pdf.
 
363
Nikolaii Karpan, Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom, Dnepropetrovsk, 2006, pp. 400-404.
 
364
INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, pp. 29-32, https://​www-pub.​iaea.​org/​MTCD/​publications/​PDF/​Pub913e_​web.​pdf.
 
365
INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, p. 13, https://​www-pub.​iaea.​org/​MTCD/​publications/​PDF/​Pub913e_​web.​pdf.
 
366
Order of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR about measures for strengthening of counterintelligence on objects of nuclear power in connection with the Chernobyl accident, August 30, 1986, pp. 2–4, http://​avr.​org.​ua/​viewDoc/​24451.
 
367
Chernobyl KGB file, Collection of documents about the Chernobyl disaster, Kiev, 2019, p. 22, http://​resource.​history.​org.​ua/​item/​0014508.
 
368
Order of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR about measures for strengthening of counterintelligence on objects of nuclear power in connection with the Chernobyl accident, August 30, 1986, pp. 2-5, http://​avr.​org.​ua/​viewDoc/​24451.
 
369
Anatoly Dyatlov, Chernobyl. How it was, Nauchtekhlitizdat, Moscow, 2003, p. 102.
 
370
Unapprehended atom. Interview with Victor Bryukhanov, “Profile” Magazine, Moscow, № 29(477), 24.04.2006.
 
371
Vladimir Shunevich, Victor Bryuhanov: I ​​was expelled from the party directly at a meeting of the Politburo, Fakty newspaper, Kiev, July 7, 2012.
 
372
Anatoly Dyachenko, Experience of liquidation of Chernobyl disaster, Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Institute of Strategic Stability” of Rosatom, Moscow, 2004, http://​www.​iss-atom.​ru/​book-7/​glav-2-3.​htm.
 
373
Survivor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant—about the fatal experiment and interrogations of the KGB, September 14, 2018, https://​youtu.​be/​uPRyciXh07k?​t=​3772.
 
374
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 229.
 
375
The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, pp. 31, 48, 87.
 
376
The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, IAEA Publications, Vienna, 1992, pp. 27, 48-49.
 
377
Mikhail Moshkin, “Evgeny Adamov: ‘The repetition of the Chernobyl scenario is impossible’”, Moscow News, №22, April 26, 2011.
 
378
World Nuclear Reactor Status as of 1 January 2021 (with DataViz), World Nuclear Industry Status Report, January 4, 2021, https://​www.​worldnuclearrepo​rt.​org/​World-Nuclear-Reactor-Status-as-of-1-January-2021-with-DataViz.​html.
 
379
Nikolaii Karpan, Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom, Dnepropetrovsk, 2006, pp. 339-342.
 
380
Svetlana Samodelova, Personal disaster of the director of Chernobyl, Moskovsky Komsomolets, April 21, 2011, https://​www.​mk.​ru/​politics/​russia/​2011/​04/​21/​583211-lichnaya-katastrofa-direktora-chernobyilya.​html.
 
382
Grigori Medvedev, Chernobyl Notebook, New World Magazine, №6, 1989.
 
383
Seven hours after the accident (at 10:00 a.m. on 26 April 1986), one of the engineers of Chernobyl NPP explored the reactor room and found out that the reactor was demolished, but the Director of the plant did not believe his statement. It took a helicopter ride 12 h after the accident (around 3:00 p.m. on 26 April 1986) to establish the fact that Reactor #4 was destroyed and was throwing out radioactive material into the atmosphere [Alexandr Borovoy, Evgeny Velihov. Experience of Chernobyl, National Research Center “Kurchatovsky Institute”, Moscow, 2012, p. 11].
 
384
Yuri Shcherbak, Chernobyl: A Documentary Story, Soviet Writer, 1991.
 
385
Alexandr Borovoy, Evgeny Velihov. Experience of Chernobyl, National Research Center “Kurchatovsky Institute”, Moscow, 2012, p. 11; Grigori Medvedev, Chernobyl Notebook, New World Magazine, №6, 1989.
 
386
Grigori Medvedev, Chernobyl Notebook, New World Magazine, №6, 1989.
 
387
Yuri Shcherbak, Chernobyl: A Documentary Story, Soviet Writer, 1991.
 
388
Nikolaii Karpan, Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom, Dnepropetrovsk, 2006, p. 427.
 
389
Online-interview with Mikhail Gorbachev, BBC Russian Service, March 8, 2002, http://​news.​bbc.​co.​uk/​hi/​russian/​talking_​point/​newsid_​1861000/​1861942.​stm.
 
390
The accident occurred at 1:24 a.m. 26 April 1986, but evacuation was started only at 2:00 p.m. 27 April. Central government officials arrived in Chernobyl by the end of 26 April, and recognized that the real picture differed completely from the one in reports.
 
391
Sergey Babakov, Interview with Viktor Bryukhanov: “I don’t agree with the charges brought against me…”, Zerkalo Nedeli, August 27, 1999, https://​zn.​ua/​SOCIUM/​c_​predyavlennymi_​mne_​obvineniyami_​ne_​soglasen.​html.
 
392
Grigori Medvedev, Chernobyl Notebook, New World Magazine, №6, 1989.
 
393
Victor Andriyanov, Vladimir Chirskov, Boris Shcherbina, Molodaya Gvardia, Moscow, 2009.
 
394
Victor Andriyanov, Vladimir Chirskov, Boris Shcherbina, Molodaya Gvardia, Moscow, 2009.
 
395
Grigori Medvedev, Chernobyl Notebook, New World Magazine, №6, 1989.
 
396
Nikolaii Karpan, Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom, Dnepropetrovsk, 2006, pp. 434, 441, 442.
 
397
Yuri Shcherbak, Chernobyl: A Documentary Story, Soviet Writer, 1991.
 
398
Maria Vasil’, “Victor Bryuchanov, former director of Chernobyl NPP: ‘If they could find to me appropriate criminal article, I think, they will execute me’”, Fakty newspaper, Kiev, October 18, 2000.
 
399
Boris Oleynik, Literaturnaya Gazeta, Moscow, № 39 (5105), September 24, 1986.
 
400
Victor Andriyanov, Vladimir Chirskov, Boris Shcherbina, Molodaya Gvardia, Moscow, 2009.
 
401
Victor Andriyanov, Vladimir Chirskov, Boris Shcherbina, Molodaya Gvardia, Moscow, 2009.
 
402
Documentary “Chernobyl. Chronicle of silence”, Director: Irina Larina, 2006.
 
403
For example, it would take two years of intensive scientific research to draw the overall picture of the distribution of nuclear fuel lava in the reactor and nearly two decades to create a model of the flow disturbance—the formation and spread of nuclear lava [Alexandr Borovoy, Evgeny Velihov. Experience of Chernobyl, National Research Center “Kurchatovsky Institute”, Moscow, 2012, p. 33].
 
404
Documentary “The Battle of Chernobyl”, Director: Thomas Johnson, 2006.
 
406
Documentary “The Battle of Chernobyl”, Director: Thomas Johnson, 2006.
 
407
Radiation measurement in Kiev on April 30–May 2, 1986, The Institute of Nuclear Research, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, http://​avr.​org.​ua/​viewDoc/​24448.
 
408
Alla Yaroshinskaya, Lies without borders, Rosbalt, May 8, 2013, http://​www.​rosbalt.​ru/​blogs/​2013/​05/​08/​1126494.​html.
 
409
The radiation situation in Kiev and on the border of the 30-km zone, May 9, 1986, Archive of SBU, http://​avr.​org.​ua/​viewDoc/​24463.
 
410
Grigori Medvedev, Chernobyl Notebook, New World Magazine, №6, 1989, https://​apps.​dtic.​mil/​dtic/​tr/​fulltext/​u2/​a335076.​pdf.
 
411
A note about the radiation situation at the Chernobyl NPP and in Pripyat, July 2, 1986, Archive of SBU, http://​avr.​org.​ua/​viewDoc/​24471.
 
412
Documentary “Chernobyl. Chronicle of silence”, Director: Irina Larina, 2006.
 
413
Occupational Radiation Protection in Severe Accident Management. Interim Report, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, January 7, 2014, pp. 65-66.
 
414
25 years of the Chernobyl accident (1986-2011). Results and Prospects overcoming its consequences in Russia, Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Management of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 2011, p. 20.
 
415
Arifumi Hasegawa, Koichi Tanigawa, Akira Ohtsuru, Hirooki Yabe, Masaharu Maeda, Jun Shigemura, Tetsuya Ohira, Takako Tominaga, Makoto Akashi, Nobuyuki Hirohashi, Tetsuo Ishikawa, Kenji Kamiya, Kenji Shibuya, Shunichi Yamashita, Rethy K Chhem, Health effects of radiation and other health problems in the aftermath of nuclear accidents, with an emphasis on Fukushima, the Lancet, Volume 386, Issue 9992, 2015, pp. 479–488, https://​doi.​org/​10.​1016/​S0140-6736(15)61106-0.
 
416
This case study is an updated version of the previously published account in our book: Dmitry Chernov, Didier Sornette, Man-made Catastrophes and Risk Information Concealment: Case Studies of Major Disasters and Human Fallibility, Springer, 2016, https://​www.​springer.​com/​gp/​book/​9783319242996.
 
417
The Annual Register, Or, A View of the History, Politics, and Literature for the Year, London, J. Dodsley, 1825, p. 400.
 
418
Documentary “Going Rogue”, Journeyman Pictures, Dec. 2011.
 
419
Glyn A. Holton, Barings Debacle, Risk Encyclopedia, May 2013.
 
420
Report to the Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Collapse of Barings, Bank of England, 18 July 1995, Conclusion chapter, subsection “Outline”.
 
421
Documentary “Going Rogue”, Journeyman Pictures, Dec. 2011.
 
422
Report to the Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Collapse of Barings, Bank of England, 18 July 1995, Conclusion chapter, subsection: “Why was the True Position not Noticed Earlier?”.
 
423
Documentary “Going Rogue”, Journeyman Pictures, Dec. 2011.
 
424
A derivative itself is merely a contract between two or more parties. A price derivative is related to the changing price of an underlying asset. Derivatives are synthetic securities—in general, they are not used to purchase the underlying asset, but to hedge from the risks of the changing price of the underlying asset, and generate income from the difference in prices on the underlying asset. The most common underlying assets include stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies, interest rates and market indexes.
 
425
Documentary “25 Million Pounds”, Director Adam Curtis, 1999.
 
426
Gareth Hutchens, Barings wake up call unheeded: Leeson, Sydney Morning Herald, October 20, 2012.
 
427
Report to the Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Collapse of Barings, Bank of England, 18 July 1995, Conclusion chapter, subsection: “Why was the True Position not Noticed Earlier?”.
 
428
How Leeson broke the bank. BBC, June 22, 1999.
 
431
Gareth Hutchens, Barings wake up call unheeded: Leeson, Sydney Morning Herald, October 20, 2012.
 
432
Shelagh Heffernan, Modern Banking, John Wiley & Sons, 2005, p. 381.
 
433
Hisamitsu Ihara, Risk Management and Organization: An Analysis on the Snow Brand Case, 2000.
 
434
Yoshinari Koyama, Eugene Taniguchi, The Case of Organizational Accident of Snow Brand Milk Products Co., Ltd., 2007.
 
435
Hiroyuki Fukuchi, Factors That Obstruct Effective Impression Management during Organizational Crisis: A Case Study of the SNOW BRAND Food-poisoning Incident, 2012.
 
436
The following documents present the detailed information on the time development of the incidents (we are grateful to Professor Hiroyuki Fukuchi for this communication), http://​www.​ogawamikako.​com/​files/​071117SnowbrandC​aseA.​pdf and http://​www.​ogawamikako.​com/​files/​071117SnowbrandC​aseB.​pdf.
 
437
Sydney Finkelstein, Why Smart Executives Fail: And What You Can Learn from Their Mistakes, Penguin, 2004.
 
438
Matt Haig, Brand Failures: The Truth about the 100 Biggest Branding Mistakes of All Time, Kogan Page Publishers, 2005, pp. 134-136.
 
441
China’s Melamine Milk Crisis Creates Crisis of Confidence, Voice of America, November 1, 2009.
 
442
This case study is an updated version of the previously published account in our book: Dmitry Chernov, Didier Sornette, Man-made Catastrophes and Risk Information Concealment: Case Studies of Major Disasters and Human Fallibility, Springer, 2016, https://​www.​springer.​com/​gp/​book/​9783319242996.
 
443
WHO guidelines for the global surveillance of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), WHO (Department of Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response) Updated recommendations, October 2004, p. 6, https://​www.​who.​int/​csr/​resources/​publications/​WHO_​CDS_​CSR_​ARO_​2004_​1/​en/​.
 
444
Jong-Wha Lee, Warwick J. McKibbin, Estimating the global economic costs of SARS. Knobler S, Mahmoud A, Lemon S, et al., editors. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary, National Academies Press, 2004, https://​www.​ncbi.​nlm.​nih.​gov/​books/​NBK92473/​.
 
446
Yanzhong Huang, The SARS epidemic and its aftermath in China: a political perspective, Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats, Washington, D.C., National Academies Press, 2004, pp. 116–136, https://​www.​ncbi.​nlm.​nih.​gov/​books/​NBK92479/​.
 
447
Yanzhong Huang,The SARS epidemic and its aftermath in China: a political perspective, Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats, Washington, D.C., National Academies Press, 2004, pp. 116–136, https://​www.​ncbi.​nlm.​nih.​gov/​books/​NBK92479/​.
 
448
China’s Chernobyl? A health minister fired. A cover-up admitted to. Is China headed in a new direction?, The Ecomonist, April 24, 2003, https://​www.​economist.​com/​leaders/​2003/​04/​24/​chinas-chernobyl.
 
450
Yanzhong Huang, The SARS epidemic and its aftermath in China: a political perspective, Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats, Washington, D.C., National Academies Press, 2004, pp. 116–136, https://​www.​ncbi.​nlm.​nih.​gov/​books/​NBK92479/​.
 
451
Tim Richardson, China snoops on text messages Stamping out out ’false political rumours, The Register, July 2, 2004, https://​www.​theregister.​com/​2004/​07/​02/​china_​text_​snoop/​.
 
452
Pete Sweeney, Michael Martina, China detains 10 for bird flu rumors, death toll at 9, Reuters, April 10, 2013, https://​cn.​reuters.​com/​article/​instant-article/​idUKBRE93901V201​30410.
 
453
Ernest Zhang, William L Benoit, Former Minister Zhang’s discourse on SARS: Government’s image restoration or destruction?, Public relations review, Vol. 35, 3, 2009, pp. 240-246.
 
454
David Cyranoski, China joins investigation of mystery pneumonia, Nature, April 3, 2003, https://​www.​nature.​com/​articles/​422459b.
 
455
Epidemic Intelligence from Open Sources (EIOS), Word Health Organization, https://​www.​who.​int/​initiatives/​eios.
 
456
Victor Yu, Lawrence Madoff, ProMED-mail: An Early Warning System for Emerging Diseases, Clinical Infectious Diseases, Volume 39, Issue 2, 15 July 2004, Pages 227–232, https://​doi.​org/​10.​1086/​422003.
 
458
Stephen Buranyi, The WHO v coronavirus: why it can’t handle the pandemic, The Guardian, April 10, 2020, https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​news/​2020/​apr/​10/​world-health-organization-who-v-coronavirus-why-it-cant-handle-pandemic.
 
459
Yanzhong Huang, The SARS epidemic and its aftermath in China: a political perspective, Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats, Washington, D.C., National Academies Press, 2004, pp. 116–136, https://​www.​ncbi.​nlm.​nih.​gov/​books/​NBK92479/​.
 
460
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) multi-country outbreak—Update 6, WHO, 21 March 2003, https://​www.​who.​int/​csr/​don/​2003_​03_​21/​en/​.
 
461
Debora MacKenzie, COVID-19: The Pandemic that Never Should Have Happened, and How to Stop the Next One, Hachette Books, June 30, 2020, https://​www.​hachettebooks.​com/​titles/​debora-mackenzie/​covid-19/​9780306924231/​.
 
462
Stephen Buranyi, The WHO v coronavirus: why it can’t handle the pandemic, The Guardian, April 10, 2020, https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​news/​2020/​apr/​10/​world-health-organization-who-v-coronavirus-why-it-cant-handle-pandemic.
 
463
Stephen Buranyi, The WHO v coronavirus: why it can’t handle the pandemic, The Guardian, April 10, 2020, https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​news/​2020/​apr/​10/​world-health-organization-who-v-coronavirus-why-it-cant-handle-pandemic.
 
465
Yanzhong Huang, The SARS epidemic and its aftermath in China: a political perspective, Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats, Washington, D.C., National Academies Press, 2004, pp. 116–136, https://​www.​ncbi.​nlm.​nih.​gov/​books/​NBK92479/​.
 
466
Stephen Buranyi, The WHO v coronavirus: why it can’t handle the pandemic, The Guardian, April 10, 2020, https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​news/​2020/​apr/​10/​world-health-organization-who-v-coronavirus-why-it-cant-handle-pandemic.
 
467
Stephen Buranyi, The WHO v coronavirus: why it can’t handle the pandemic, The Guardian, April 10, 2020, https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​news/​2020/​apr/​10/​world-health-organization-who-v-coronavirus-why-it-cant-handle-pandemic.
 
468
Erik Eckholm, THE SARS EPIDEMIC: EPIDEMIC; China Admits Underreporting Its SARS Cases, The New York Times, April 21, 2003, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2003/​04/​21/​world/​the-sars-epidemic-epidemic-china-admits-underreporting-its-sars-cases.​html.
 
469
Yanzhong Huang, The SARS epidemic and its aftermath in China: a political perspective, Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats, Washington, D.C., National Academies Press, 2004, pp. 116–136, https://​www.​ncbi.​nlm.​nih.​gov/​books/​NBK92479/​.
 
470
Yanzhong Huang, The SARS epidemic and its aftermath in China: a political perspective, Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats, Washington, D.C., National Academies Press, 2004, pp. 116–136, https://​www.​ncbi.​nlm.​nih.​gov/​books/​NBK92479/​.
 
474
Howard Kunreuther, Michael Useem, Learning from Catastrophes: Strategies for Reaction and Response, Pearson Prentice Hall, 2009, p. 196, https://​ptgmedia.​pearsoncmg.​com/​images/​9780137044856/​samplepages/​0137044852.​pdf.
 
475
Andrew Scobell, Larry M. Wortzel, Chinese National Security Decision-making Under Stress, Diane Publishing, 2005, pp. 108-115, http://​www.​dianepublishing.​net/​, no link to this publication.
 
476
Yanzhong Huang, The SARS epidemic and its aftermath in China: a political perspective, Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats, Washington, D.C., National Academies Press, 2004, pp. 116–136, https://​www.​ncbi.​nlm.​nih.​gov/​books/​NBK92479/​.
 
477
Erik Eckholm, THE SARS EPIDEMIC: EPIDEMIC; China Admits Underreporting Its SARS Cases, The New York Times, April 21, 2003, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2003/​04/​21/​world/​the-sars-epidemic-epidemic-china-admits-underreporting-its-sars-cases.​html.
 
478
Debora MacKenzie, COVID-19: The Pandemic that Never Should Have Happened, and How to Stop the Next One, Hachette Books, June 30, 2020, https://​www.​hachettebooks.​com/​titles/​debora-mackenzie/​covid-19/​9780306924231/​.
 
479
Ernest Zhang, William L Benoit, Former Minister Zhang’s discourse on SARS: Government’s image restoration or destruction?, Public relations review, Vol. 35, 3, 2009, pp. 240-246.
 
480
China’s Chernobyl? A health minister fired. A cover-up admitted to. Is China headed in a new direction?, The Economist, April 24, 2003, https://​www.​economist.​com/​leaders/​2003/​04/​24/​chinas-chernobyl.
 
481
John Gittings, James Meikle, China says Sars outbreak is 10 times worse than admitted, The Guardian, April 21, 2003, https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​society/​2003/​apr/​21/​china.​sars.
 
482
Erik Eckholm, THE SARS EPIDEMIC: EPIDEMIC; China Admits Underreporting Its SARS Cases, The New York Times, April 21, 2003, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2003/​04/​21/​world/​the-sars-epidemic-epidemic-china-admits-underreporting-its-sars-cases.​html.
 
483
John Gittings, James Meikle, China says Sars outbreak is 10 times worse than admitted, The Guardian, April 21, 2003, https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​society/​2003/​apr/​21/​china.​sars.
 
484
Erik Eckholm, THE SARS EPIDEMIC: EPIDEMIC; China Admits Underreporting Its SARS Cases, The New York Times, April 21, 2003, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2003/​04/​21/​world/​the-sars-epidemic-epidemic-china-admits-underreporting-its-sars-cases.​html.
 
486
Yanzhong Huang, The SARS epidemic and its aftermath in China: a political perspective, Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats, Washington, D.C., National Academies Press, 2004, pp. 116–136, https://​www.​ncbi.​nlm.​nih.​gov/​books/​NBK92479/​.
 
487
Lan Xue, Kaibin Zhong, Turning Danger to Opportunities: Reconstructing China’s National System for Emergency Management After 2003, https://​ebookreading.​net/​view/​book/​EB9780137067237_​22.​html, Learning from Catastrophes, Edited by Howard Kunreuther and Michael Useem, Wharton School Publishing, 2010, p. 203, https://​ptgmedia.​pearsoncmg.​com/​images/​9780137044856/​samplepages/​0137044852.​pdf.
 
488
WHO criticises Chinese reporting of SARS virus, Irish Times, May 10, 2003, https://​www.​irishtimes.​com/​news/​who-criticises-chinese-reporting-of-sars-virus-1.​476263.
 
489
Stephen Buranyi, The WHO v coronavirus: why it can’t handle the pandemic, The Guardian, April 10, 2020, https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​news/​2020/​apr/​10/​world-health-organization-who-v-coronavirus-why-it-cant-handle-pandemic.
 
490
Josephine Ma, Sars was brought under control in 2003 by an ‘extremely intense public health effort’, but it never disappeared, professor of epidemiology says, South China Morning Post, February 29, 2020, https://​www.​scmp.​com/​print/​news/​china/​society/​article/​3053008/​coronavirus-dont-bank-epidemic-easing-summer-scientists-say.
 
491
Outbreak communication. Best practices for communicating with the public during an outbreak, Report of the WHO Expert Consultation on Outbreak Communications, Singapore, September 21–23, 2004.
 
493
Yanzhong Huang, The SARS epidemic and its aftermath in China: a political perspective, Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats, Washington, D.C., National Academies Press, 2004, pp. 116–136, https://​www.​ncbi.​nlm.​nih.​gov/​books/​NBK92479/​.
 
494
Yanzhong Huang, The SARS epidemic and its aftermath in China: a political perspective, Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats, Washington, D.C., National Academies Press, 2004, pp. 116–136, https://​www.​ncbi.​nlm.​nih.​gov/​books/​NBK92479/​.
 
495
Yanzhong Huang, The SARS epidemic and its aftermath in China: a political perspective, Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats, Washington, D.C., National Academies Press, 2004, pp. 116–136, https://​www.​ncbi.​nlm.​nih.​gov/​books/​NBK92479/​.
 
496
Howard Kunreuther, Michael Useem, Learning from Catastrophes: Strategies for Reaction and Response, Wharton School Publishing, 2010, p. 197, https://​ptgmedia.​pearsoncmg.​com/​images/​9780137044856/​samplepages/​0137044852.​pdf.
 
497
RA2007–3–1, Railway Accident Investigation Report (Excerpt), Aircraft and Railway Accidents Investigation Commission, June 28, 2007.
 
498
Eiichi Yamaguchi, Root for the JR Fukuchiyama Train Incident—Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility from Science (in Japanese), NTT Publishing, May, 2007.
 
499
Shigeo Atsuji et al., A Case Study on the Failure of Human Resource Management and Corporate Governance in the West Japan Railway Accident on he Fukuchiyama Line, 2010.
 
500
Muneyuki Fujii and Ichimiya Makoto, Organizational CSR in Railway Accident: A Case Study of the West Japan Railway Accident on the Fukuchiyama Line, 2011.
 
501
Norimitsu Onishi, In Japan Crash, Time Obsession May Be Culprit, The New York Times, April 28, 2005.
 
502
This case study is an updated version of the previously published account in our book: Dmitry Chernov, Didier Sornette, Man-made Catastrophes and Risk Information Concealment: Case Studies of Major Disasters and Human Fallibility, Springer, 2016, https://​www.​springer.​com/​gp/​book/​9783319242996.
 
503
Joe P. Hasler, Investigating Russia’s Biggest Dam Explosion: What Went Wrong, Popular Mechanics, February 2, 2010.
 
504
The act of technical investigation of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPS, Rostechnadzor, October 3, 2009, pp. 32–33.
 
505
The act of technical investigation of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPS, Rostechnadzor, October 3, 2009, pp. 32–33.
 
506
N.Vulfovich, L. Gordon, N. Stefanenko, Arch-gravity dam of Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. Technical evaluation according to field observations, St. Petersburg, 2012, p. 45, 53–55, 60.
 
507
Dissenting opinion of R.M. Haziahmetov (member of investigation commision of Rostechnadzor) regarding the Act of technical investigation of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, Destruction of Tubine 2 of Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station: causes and lessons, Volume III, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, 2013, p. 273.
 
508
Rostehnadzor: the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is not unique, in 1983 was a similar situation at Nurek HPP, Interfax, Oct. 3, 2009; Review about accidents and other disturbances on power stations and electric networks of USSR energy system for 1983, Soyuztechenergo, Moscow, 1984.
 
509
S. Pryganov, Analysis of possible accidents on hydropower stations and response measures, Destruction of Tubine 2 of Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station: causes and lessons, Volume I, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, 2013, p. 327.
 
510
Ivan Sliva, Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP: conclusions have been drawn, RusHydro Herald, #5, May 2011, p. 3.
 
511
S. Pryganov, Analysis of possible accidents on hydropower stations and response measures, Destruction of Tubine 2 of Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station: causes and lessons, Volume I, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, 2013, p. 331.
 
512
Fabian Acker, Fatal failures: Siberia’s hydro disaster, The Institution of Engineering and Technology Magazine, July 11, 2011.
 
513
Platonov V.V., Russian electroenergetics: reform and development, Materials of public seminar “Economic Problems and Energy Complex”, Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, December 18, 2009, pp. 4, 26.
 
514
Platonov V.V., Russian electroenergetics: reform and development, Materials of public seminar “Economic Problems and Energy Complex”, Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, December 18, 2009, p. 12.
 
515
Victor Kudryavy, Systemic causes of accidents, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, #2, 2013.
 
516
Vasily Platonov, Analysis of development strategies and problems of reforming Russian electroenergetics, Novocherkassk, 2006.
 
517
Victor Kudryavy, Systemic destruction of the system, 2015, p. 29, http://​www.​exergy.​narod.​ru/​kudryavyi.​pdf.
 
518
Eugene Arsyukhin, Who is responsible for the accident?, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, May 27, 2005.
 
519
Vasily Platonov, Electricity crisis in Russia on American maner, Industrial Vedomosti, 2005, № 4–5.
 
520
Report about investigation of accident in RAO UES May 25, 2005, Joint Stock Company Of Power And Electrification RAO “UES Of Russia”, Moscow, June 2005.
 
521
Victor Kudryavy, Mister kilowatt, The Soviet Russia, November 28, 2013.
 
522
Chubais agrees with the Rostekhnadzor’s investigation conclusion concerning accident at SSHHPP—comment the former head of RAO UES of Russia, Interfax, Oct. 3, 2009.
 
523
Neil Buckle, Russia seeks $79 bn electricity funding, Financial Times, September 4, 2006.
 
524
Neil Buckle, Russia seeks $79 bn electricity funding, Financial Times, September 4, 2006.
 
525
Didier Sornette and Peter Cauwels, 1980–2008: The Illusion of the Perpetual Money Machine and what it bodes for the future, Risks 2, 103–131, 2014, http://​ssrn.​com/​abstract=​2191509.
 
526
Platonov V.V., Russian electroenergetics: reform and development, Materials of public seminar “Economic Problems and Energy Complex”, Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, December 18, 2009, p. 55.
 
527
Platonov V.V., Russian electroenergetics: reform and development, Materials of public seminar “Economic Problems and Energy Complex”, Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, December 18, 2009, p. 78.
 
528
Victor Khamraev, Responsibility for the accident on was laid on principle, Kommersant, December 22, 2009.
 
529
The act of technical investigation of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPS, Rostechnadzor, October 3, 2009, pp. 30–34.
 
530
Profile of the company. History transformations, RAO “UES of Russia”, http://​www.​rao-ees.​ru/​ru/​info/​history/​show.​cgi?​prof.​htm.
 
531
Anatoly Kuzovkin, Assets of Russian energy complex: how much eaten, how much is left, Industrial Vedomosti, September 2001, №16–17 (27–28).
 
532
Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation: the degree of asset deterioration of RAO UES is 59%, Finam, December 17, 2007.
 
533
Stepashin: degree of asset deterioration of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was 85%, BBC, September 8, 2009, https://​www.​bbc.​com/​russian/​russia/​2009/​09/​090908_​stepashin_​powerplant_​worn.
 
534
Annual Report of Joint-Stock Company “RusHydro”, 2008, p. 57.
 
535
On Sayano-Shushenskaya hydropower plant recorded maximum power output, press release of SSHPS, July 2, 2009, http://​www.​sshges.​rushydro.​ru/​press/​news/​33083.​html.
 
536
Irina Tumakova, Sergey Teplyakov, Firm-disaster, Izvestia, September 22, 2009, https://​iz.​ru/​news/​353279.
 
537
Irina Tumakova, Sergey Teplyakov, Firm-disaster, Izvestia, September 22, 2009, https://​iz.​ru/​news/​353279.
 
538
Elena Mazneva, Anna Peretolchina, Repair on trust, Vedomosti, September 21, 2009.
 
539
Boris Yurkevich, About causes of the accident on Turbine 2 of The Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station, Destruction of Tubine 2 of Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station: causes and lessons, Volume I, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, 2013, p. 459.
 
540
Repairs on the 2nd turbine of SSHPS were not made ​​in full—the commission of the State Duma, Interfax-Russia, October 30, 2009.
 
541
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin chaired a meeting at the National Crisis Management Centre of the Ministry for Emergencies held to discuss the relief efforts at the Sayano-Shushenskaya power plant, September 21, 2009, http://​archive.​premier.​gov.​ru/​events/​news/​5032/​.
 
542
Vladimir Putin meets with Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, December 30, 2011, http://​archive.​premier.​gov.​ru/​events/​news/​17554/​.
 
543
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin chaired a meeting of the Government Presidium, August 20, 2009, http://​archive.​premier.​gov.​ru/​events/​news/​4757/​.
 
544
Anastasia Lyrchikova, RusHydro has been uncovered machinations on SSHPS, Reuters Russia and CIS, September 18, 2009, https://​republic.​ru/​posts/​1137217.
 
545
Personal communication with RusHydro’s executive.
 
546
Dissenting opinion of R.M. Haziahmetov (member of investigation commision of Rostechnadzor) regarding the Act of technical investigation of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, Destruction of Tubine 2 of Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station: causes and lessons, Volume III, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, 2013, p. 276.
 
547
N. Baykov, Analysis of the circumstances of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, Destruction of Tubine 2 of Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station: causes and lessons, Volume I, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, 2013, p. 158.
 
548
The act of technical investigation of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPS, Rostechnadzor, October 3, 2009, p. 66.
 
549
The act of technical investigation of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPS, Rostechnadzor, October 3, 2009, p. 75.
 
550
The act of technical investigation of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPS, Rostechnadzor, October 3, 2009, p. 76.
 
551
J.-C. Anifrani, C. Le Floc’h, D. Sornette and B. Souillard, Universal Log-periodic correction to renormalization group scaling for rupture stress prediction from acoustic emissions, J.Phys.I France 5 (6), 1995, pp. 631–638.
 
552
A. Johansen and D. Sornette, Critical ruptures, Eur. Phys. J. B 18, 2000, pp. 163–181.
 
553
C. Le Floc’h and D. Sornette, Predictive acoustic emission: Application on helium high pressure tanks, Prédiction des évèenements catastrophiques: une nouvelle approche pour le controle de santé structurale, Instrumentation Mesure Metrologie (published by Hermes Science), RS serie I2M volume 3 (1–2), 2003, pp. 89–97.
 
554
H. Nechad, A. Helmstetter, R. El Guerjouma and D. Sornette, Andrade and Critical Time-to-Failure Laws in Fiber-Matrix Composites: Experiments and Model, Journal of Mechanics and Physics of Solids (JMPS), 53, 2005, pp. 1099–1127.
 
555
Valentine Bryzgalov, Monograph “From the experience of establishment and development of Krasnoyarsk and Sayano-Shushenskaya HPSs”, Krasnoyarsk, Surikov Publisher, 1999, p. 541.
 
556
Vladimir Demchenko, Andrew Krassikov, Sergey Teplyakov, Irina Tumakova. Was Turbine #2 on SSHPS shaking during 10 years?, Izvestia, September 14, 2009.
 
557
F. Kogan, Abnormal operating conditions and reliability of modern hydro turbines, Destruction of Tubine 2 of Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station: causes and lessons, Volume I, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, 2013, p. 49.
 
558
N. Baykov, Analysis of the circumstances of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, Destruction of Tubine 2 of Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station: causes and lessons, Volume I, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, 2013, p. 153.
 
559
Dmitry Malkov, Without condolences or apologies, Kommersant (Krasnoyarsk), November, 27, 2014, https://​www.​kommersant.​ru/​doc/​2619605.
 
560
Rostehnadzor: the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is not unique, in 1983 was a similar situation at Nurek HPP, Interfax, October 3, 2009 and review about accidents and other disturbances on power stations and electric networks of USSR energy system for 1983, Soyuztechenergo, Moscow, 1984.
 
561
B. Skorobogatykh, N.Shepilov, S.Kunavin, V.Ushakov, Investigation of the metal and the nature of damage studs of turbine cover of Turbine 2 of Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station, Destruction of Tubine 2 of Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station: causes and lessons, Volume I, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, 2013, p. 373.
 
562
Valentine Bryzgalov, Monograph “From the experience of establishment and development of Krasnoyarsk and Sayano-Shushenskaya HPSs”, Krasnoyarsk, Surikov Publisher, 1999, p. 541.
 
563
L.Godron, Assessment of condition of dam of the Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station before and after accident, Destruction of Tubine 2 of Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station: causes and lessons, Volume I, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, 2013, p. 206.
 
564
The act of technical investigation of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPS, Rostechnadzor, October 3, 2009, p. 66.
 
565
Dissenting opinion of R.M. Haziahmetov (member of investigation commision of Rostechnadzor) regarding the Act of technical investigation of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, Destruction of Tubine 2 of Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station: causes and lessons, Volume III, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, 2013, p. 271.
 
566
Victor Kudryavy, Systemic causes of accidents, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, #2, 2013.
 
567
Dissenting opinion of R.M. Haziahmetov (member of investigation commision of Rostechnadzor) regarding the Act of technical investigation of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, Destruction of Tubine 2 of Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station: causes and lessons, Volume III, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, 2013, pp. 271–278.
 
568
Victor Kudryavy, Systemic causes of accidents, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, #2, 2013.
 
569
From the sentence of Sayano-Gorsky District Court, Respublic of Khakasia, Russia, December 24, 2014.
 
570
A.Abakumov, M.Abdulin. D.Soloviev, V.Ustinenko, Numerical simulation of a possible accident scenario on Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station, Destruction of Tubine 2 of Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydropower Station: causes and lessons, Volume I, Hydrotechnical Construction, Moscow, 2013, p. 151.
 
571
Dmitry Malkov, The Hydro power station was closed for construction, Kommersant, August 28, 2009, №158 (4213).
 
572
Andrei Mitrofanov, former chief engineer of SSHPP, considers that the accident could be repeated, Khakasia News Agency, December 14, 2013.
 
573
Didier Sornette, Euan Mearns and Spencer Wheatley, Revisiting the predictability of the Haicheng and Tangshan earthquakes, Symmetry 13, 1206, 2021, https://​doi.​org/​10.​3390/​sym13071206.
 
574
The act of technical investigation of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPS, Rostechnadzor, October 3, 2009, p. 55–76.
 
575
Dmitry Malkov, SSHPS kept the last word, Kommersant, December 2, 2014.
 
576
The act of technical investigation of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPS, Rostechnadzor, October 3, 2009, pp. 111–113.
 
577
Victor Kudryavy, Mister kilowatt, The Soviet Russia, Nov. 28, 2013.
 
578
Vladimir Kononov, Integration of RusHydro’s information system “Production control” into the complex informatization system of Rostechnadzor, Forum materials of International Forum of industrial Safety, St. Peterburg, Russia, May 27–30, 2014, pp. 122–128.
 
579
Davitt McAteer and associates, Report to the Governor: Upper Big Branch, The April 5, 2010, explosion: a failure of basic coal mine safety practices, Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel, May 2011, http://​online.​wsj.​com/​public/​resources/​documents/​wvamine0519.​pdf.
 
580
Davitt McAteer, Monongah: The Tragic Story of the 1907 Monongah Mine Disaster, West Virginia University Press, 2007.
 
581
Peter Galuszka, Massey’s Dark Side, Style Weekly, April 07, 2010, https://​www.​styleweekly.​com/​richmond/​masseyts-dark-side/​Content?​oid=​1362686.
 
582
Davitt McAteer and associates, Report to the Governor: Upper Big Branch, The April 5, 2010, explosion: a failure of basic coal mine safety practices, Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel, May 2011, http://​online.​wsj.​com/​public/​resources/​documents/​wvamine0519.​pdf.
 
583
Davitt McAteer and associates, Report to the Governor: Upper Big Branch, The April 5, 2010, explosion: a failure of basic coal mine safety practices, Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel, May 2011, http://​online.​wsj.​com/​public/​resources/​documents/​wvamine0519.​pdf.
 
584
Davitt McAteer and associates, Report to the Governor: Upper Big Branch, The April 5, 2010, explosion: a failure of basic coal mine safety practices, Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel, May 2011, http://​online.​wsj.​com/​public/​resources/​documents/​wvamine0519.​pdf.
 
585
Davitt McAteer and associates, Report to the Governor: Upper Big Branch, The April 5, 2010, explosion: a failure of basic coal mine safety practices, Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel, May 2011, http://​online.​wsj.​com/​public/​resources/​documents/​wvamine0519.​pdf.
 
586
Davitt McAteer and associates, Report to the Governor: Upper Big Branch, The April 5, 2010, explosion: a failure of basic coal mine safety practices, Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel, May 2011, http://​online.​wsj.​com/​public/​resources/​documents/​wvamine0519.​pdf.
 
587
Davitt McAteer and associates, Report to the Governor: Upper Big Branch, The April 5, 2010, explosion: a failure of basic coal mine safety practices, Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel, May 2011, http://​online.​wsj.​com/​public/​resources/​documents/​wvamine0519.​pdf.
 
588
Davitt McAteer and associates, Report to the Governor: Upper Big Branch, The April 5, 2010, explosion: a failure of basic coal mine safety practices, Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel, May 2011, http://​online.​wsj.​com/​public/​resources/​documents/​wvamine0519.​pdf.
 
589
Pat Garofalo, Blankenship’s Union-Busting Goal: ‘Sell Coal Cheaper And Drive Union Coal Operations Out Of Business’, ThinkProgress, April 9, 2010, https://​archive.​thinkprogress.​org/​blankenships-union-busting-goal-sell-coal-cheaper-and-drive-union-coal-operations-out-of-business-53a1da6e984b/​.
 
590
Peter Galuszka, Massey’s Dark Side, Style Weekly, April 07, 2010, https://​www.​styleweekly.​com/​richmond/​masseyts-dark-side/​Content?​oid=​1362686.
 
592
Wendy Holdren, Blankenship jurors hear closing arguments, Register-Herald Reporter, November 17, 2015, https://​www.​register-herald.​com/​news/​blankenship-jurors-hear-closing-arguments/​article_​48cb6936-8d64-11e5-babf-aff71e6a853b.​html.
 
593
Wendy Holdren, Blankenship prosecution begins reclaiming its witness during redirect, Register-Herald Reporter, October 30, 2015, https://​www.​register-herald.​com/​news/​blankenship-prosecution-begins-reclaiming-its-witness-during-redirect/​article_​cae18bf6-8fc7-598c-ac75-504e36bab86a.​html.
 
596
Ken Ward Jr, Blanchard denies conspiring with Blankenship, Charleston Gazette-Mail, October 23, 2015, https://​www.​wvgazettemail.​com/​news/​blanchard-denies-conspiring-with-blankenship/​article_​f17d6123-c0ed-58ad-8fa3-84fcc3169194.​html.
 
597
Wendy Holdren, Notes in Blankenship trial indicate safety-related purchases for UBB were denied, Register-Herald Reporter, October 23, 2015, https://​www.​register-herald.​com/​news/​notes-in-blankenship-trial-indicate-safety-related-purchases-for-ubb-were-denied/​article_​08112278-79aa-11e5-ad42-cf595a698d18.​html.
 
598
Wendy Holdren, Blankenship jurors hear closing arguments, Register-Herald Reporter, November 17, 2015, https://​www.​register-herald.​com/​news/​blankenship-jurors-hear-closing-arguments/​article_​48cb6936-8d64-11e5-babf-aff71e6a853b.​html.
 
601
Wendy Holdren Cross examination of former Performance Coal president continues, Register-Herald Reporter, October 26, 2015, https://​www.​register-herald.​com/​news/​cross-examination-of-former-performance-coal-president-continues/​article_​c0dda165-8b21-551d-9f54-cdcd5b37797c.​html.
 
602
Howard Berkes, Former Massey CEO Accused Of Conspiracy In Court Hearing, NPR, February 28, 2013, https://​www.​npr.​org/​sections/​thetwo-way/​2013/​02/​28/​173178951/​former-massey-ceo-accused-of-conspiracy-in-court-hearing and Ken Ward Jr., Former Massey official pleads guilty in safety probe, says he conspired with CEO, Charleston Gazette-Mail, Feb 28, 2013, https://​www.​wvgazettemail.​com/​news/​special_​reports/​former-massey-official-pleads-guilty-in-safety-probe-says-he-conspired-with-ceo/​article_​babd2568-0c95-5284-84e3-f508da6dc096.​html.
 
603
John Raby, Vicki Smith, Ex-ally implicates Massey CEO in W.Va. mine case, The Associated Press, March 1, 2013, https://​apnews.​com/​article/​energy-don-blankenship-beckley-archive-explosions-be584dc10dfb4cb8​8e6121de2e73f4c6​.
 
606
Wendy Holdren, Former Performance Coal President testifies during the third week of Blankenship trial, Register-Herald Reporter, November 1, 2015, https://​www.​register-herald.​com/​news/​former-performance-coal-president-testifies-during-the-third-week-of-blankenship-trial/​article_​7abaae4d-040c-5dd0-a38e-89ebdf6993a3.​html.
 
607
Wendy Holdren, Blankenship prosecution begins reclaiming its witness during redirect, Register-Herald Reporter, October 30, 2015, https://​www.​register-herald.​com/​news/​blankenship-prosecution-begins-reclaiming-its-witness-during-redirect/​article_​cae18bf6-8fc7-598c-ac75-504e36bab86a.​html.
 
610
Holly Rosenkrantz, Massey Faked Reports Ahead of 2010 Fatal Mine Blast, U.S. Says, Bloomberg, June 29, 2011, https://​www.​bloomberg.​com/​news/​articles/​2011-06-29/​massey-faked-reports-ahead-of-2010-fatal-mine-blast-u-s-says.
 
611
Davitt McAteer and associates, Report to the Governor: Upper Big Branch, The April 5, 2010, explosion: a failure of basic coal mine safety practices, Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel, May 2011, http://​online.​wsj.​com/​public/​resources/​documents/​wvamine0519.​pdf.
 
612
Davitt McAteer and associates, Report to the Governor: Upper Big Branch, The April 5, 2010, explosion: a failure of basic coal mine safety practices, Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel, May 2011, http://​online.​wsj.​com/​public/​resources/​documents/​wvamine0519.​pdf.
 
613
Davitt McAteer and associates, Report to the Governor: Upper Big Branch, The April 5, 2010, explosion: a failure of basic coal mine safety practices, Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel, May 2011, http://​online.​wsj.​com/​public/​resources/​documents/​wvamine0519.​pdf.
 
614
Former coal CEO Don Blankenship gets one year in prison for deadly mine blast, The Guardian, April 6, 2016, https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​us-news/​2016/​apr/​06/​massey-energy-don-blankenship-prison-upper-big-branch-mine.
 
615
Former Massey Energy CEO Sentenced to a Year in Federal Prison, US Department of Justice, April 6, 2016, https://​www.​justice.​gov/​opa/​pr/​former-massey-energy-ceo-sentenced-year-federal-prison.
 
616
Alan Blinder, Donald Blankenship Sentenced to a Year in Prison in Mine Safety Case, The New York Times, April 6, 2016, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2016/​04/​07/​us/​donald-blankenship-sentenced-to-a-year-in-prison-in-mine-safety-case.​html.
 
619
A timeline of events in Upper Big Branch disaster, The Associated Press, October 1, 2015, https://​apnews.​com/​article/​fe7596a292ed4bf8​88334219c324ad4b​.
 
620
This case study is an updated version of the previously published account in our book: Dmitry Chernov, Didier Sornette, Man-made Catastrophes and Risk Information Concealment: Case Studies of Major Disasters and Human Fallibility, Springer, 2016, https://​www.​springer.​com/​gp/​book/​9783319242996.
 
621
Macondo: The Gulf Oil Disaster, Chief Counsel’s Report, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill, Government Printing Office, 2011, p. 25, https://​permanent.​fdlp.​gov/​gpo4390/​C21462-407CCRforPrint0.​pdf.
 
622
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 224, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
623
On January 15, 2015, a US federal judge ruled that BP spilled 3.19 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico during the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster. The US government has argued for 4.2 million and BP for 2.45 million. Six experts testified that between 2.4 and 6 million barrels of oil escaped during the 87 day long accident. BP and the US government agreed that 810,000 barrels were captured. The importance of this ruling lies in the fine facing BP, calculated at US $4300 per barrel. David Malakoff, After geoscientists joust, judge rules BP Gulf spill totaled 3.19 million barrels of oil, Science, January 15, 2015, https://​www.​sciencemag.​org/​news/​2015/​01/​after-geoscientists-joust-judge-rules-bp-gulf-spill-totaled-319-million-barrels-oil and News in brief, Science, 2015, 347 (6220), p. 356, https://​www.​jstor.​org/​stable/​i24745747.
 
624
Jonathan L. Ramseur, Curry L. Hagerty, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Recent Activities and Ongoing Developments, Congressional Research Service, January 31, 2013, p. 2, https://​fas.​org/​sgp/​crs/​misc/​R42942.​pdf.
 
625
Ron Bousso, BP Deepwater Horizon costs balloon to $65 billion, Reuters, January 16, 2018, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-bp-deepwaterhorizon​-idUSKBN1F50NL.
 
626
Steve Hargreaves, BP’s $70 billion whipping, CNN Money, June 2, 2010, https://​money.​cnn.​com/​2010/​06/​01/​news/​companies/​BP_​analysts/​index.​htm.
 
627
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, pp. vii, 123, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
628
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 23, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
629
Chevron Announces Record Setting Well Test at Jack, Press Release, Chevron, San Ramon, Calif., Sep. 5, 2006.
 
630
BP Announces Giant Oil Discovery In The Gulf Of Mexico, Press release, BP, Sep. 2, 2009, https://​investegate.​co.​uk/​bp-plc--bp--/​rns/​bp-announces-giant-oil-discov/​2009090210000138​69Y/​.
 
631
The U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2011.
 
632
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 73, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
633
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 75, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
634
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 72, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
635
Juliet Eilperin, U.S. exempted BP’s Gulf of Mexico drilling from environmental impact study, The Washington Post, May 5, 2010, https://​www.​washingtonpost.​com/​wp-dyn/​content/​article/​2010/​05/​04/​AR2010050404118.​html.
 
636
Mini Shear Study, WEST Engineering Services, Study for U.S. Minerals Management Service, Requisition No. 2–1011–1003, Dec. 2002, p. 13, http://​www.​boemre.​gov/​tarprojects/​455/​Final%20​Report.​pdf.
 
637
Allan Chernoff, Blowout preventers—disasters waiting to happen?, CNN, June 10, 2010, https://​edition.​cnn.​com/​2010/​US/​06/​10/​oil.​well.​preventers/​index.​html.
 
638
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, pp. 22–23.
 
639
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, pp. 42–43.
 
640
America Speaks to BP, Full Transcript: Bob Dudley Interview, Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), July 1, 2010, https://​www.​pbs.​org/​newshour/​show/​america-speaks-to-bp-full-transcript-bob-dudley-interview.
 
641
Steven Mufson, Federal records show steady stream of oil spills in gulf since 1964, The Washington Post, July 24, 2010, https://​www.​tampabay.​com/​archive/​2010/​07/​26/​oil-companies-gulf-spill-history-is-a-dirty-secret/​.
 
642
A Brief History of Offshore Oil Drilling, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Staff Working Paper No. 1 (Draft), p. 17, https://​www.​cs.​ucdavis.​edu/​~rogaway/​classes/​188/​materials/​bp.​pdf.
 
643
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 181.
 
644
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, pp. 122, 217, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
645
Clifford Krauss, Henry Fountain, Report on Oil Spill Pinpoints Failure of Blowout Preventer, The New York Times, Mar. 23, 2011, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2010/​10/​29/​us/​29spill.​html.
 
646
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, pp. 18–21.
 
647
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 95.
 
648
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 20.
 
649
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 21.
 
650
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, pp. 57–58.
 
651
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 2, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
652
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 2, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
653
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 200.
 
655
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 125, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
656
Macondo: The Gulf Oil Disaster, Chief Counsel’s Report, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill, Government Printing Office, 2011, p. 247, https://​permanent.​fdlp.​gov/​gpo4390/​C21462-407CCRforPrint0.​pdf.
 
657
Macondo Investigation Report, U.S. Chemical Safety Board, Volume 3, April 12, 2016, p. 214, https://​www.​sintef.​no/​globalassets/​project/​hfc/​documents/​macondo_​vol3_​final_​staff_​report.​pdf.
 
658
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, pp. 14–15, 39–40, 200–204.
 
659
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 2, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
660
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 102, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
661
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 4, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
662
Christina Ingersoll, Richard M. Locke, Cate Reavis, BP and the Deepwater Horizon Disaster of 2010, MIT Sloan School of Management, April 3, 2012, p. 15, https://​mitsloan.​mit.​edu/​sites/​default/​files/​2020-03/​BP%20​and%20​the%20​Deepwater%20​Horizon%20​Disaster%20​of%20​2010.​IC_​.​pdf.
 
663
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, pp. 117, 123, 224, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
664
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 117, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
665
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 95.
 
666
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 4, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
667
Fred H. Bartlit Jr. Fred H. Bartlit, Jr., Sean C. Grimsley, Sambhav N Sankar, Letter to the commissioners, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, October 28, 2010, http://​graphics8.​nytimes.​com/​packages/​pdf/​science/​spilldoc.​PDF.
 
668
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 123, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
669
Tom Cohen, Letter: BP, Halliburton knew of flaws in cement in Gulf oil spill well, CNN, October 28, 2010, http://​edition.​cnn.​com/​2010/​US/​10/​28/​gulf.​oil.​spill/​index.​html.
 
670
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 92.
 
671
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 97.
 
672
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 21.
 
673
Jim Snyder, BP Ignored ‘Red Flags’ Before Well Blowout, Halliburton Says, Bloomberg, September 26, 2010, https://​www.​bloomberg.​com/​news/​articles/​2010-09-26/​bp-ignored-red-flags-before-well-blowout-halliburton-says.
 
674
John M. Broder, Panel Says Firms Knew of Cement Flaws Before Spill, The New York Times, October 28, 2010, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2010/​10/​29/​us/​29spill.​html.
 
676
Clifford Krauss, Halliburton Pleads Guilty to Destroying Evidence After Gulf Spill, The New York Times, July 25, 2013, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2013/​07/​26/​business/​halliburton-pleads-guilty-to-destroying-evidence-after-gulf-spill.​html.
 
677
Harry R. Weber, Plaintiffs: Halliburton’s reckless behavior marring Gulf spill trial, Fuelfix, March 21, 2013.
 
678
Allen Johnson Jr., Margaret Cronin Fisk Halliburton, Official ‘Surprised’ by Unauthorized Tests, Bloomberg News, March 12, 2013.
 
679
Halliburton Agrees to Plead Guilty to Destruction of Evidence in Connection with Deepwater Horizon Tragedy, the US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, July 25, 2013, https://​www.​justice.​gov/​opa/​pr/​halliburton-agrees-plead-guilty-destruction-evidence-connection-deepwater-horizon-tragedy.
 
680
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, pp. 6, 107, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
681
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, pp. 5–7, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
682
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 143.
 
683
Macondo Investigation Report, U.S. Chemical Safety Board, Volume 3, April 12, 2016, pp. 212, 217, https://​www.​sintef.​no/​globalassets/​project/​hfc/​documents/​macondo_​vol3_​final_​staff_​report.​pdf.
 
684
Macondo Investigation Report, U.S. Chemical Safety Board, Volume 3, April 12, 2016, p. 218, https://​www.​sintef.​no/​globalassets/​project/​hfc/​documents/​macondo_​vol3_​final_​staff_​report.​pdf.
 
685
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 224, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
686
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 224, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
687
Anonymous interview with risk management consultant specializing in oil and gas.
 
688
M. Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, Learning from the Piper Alpha Accident: A Postmortem Analysis of Technical and Organizational Factors, Risk Analysis, 1993, 13(2), p. 231, https://​www.​osti.​gov/​biblio/​6452717-learning-from-piper-alpha-accident-postmortem-analysis-technical-organizational-factors.
 
689
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, p. 125, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
690
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. Report to the President, January 2011, pp. 115, 122, 223, https://​www.​govinfo.​gov/​content/​pkg/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION/​pdf/​GPO-OILCOMMISSION.​pdf.
 
691
Earl Boebert, James M Blossom, Deepwater Horizon: A Systems Analysis of the Macondo Disaster, Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 182–184.
 
692
Didier Sornette, Spencer Wheatley and Peter Cauwels, The fair reward problem: the illusion of success and how to solve it, Advances in Complex Systems 22 (3), 2019.
 
693
This case study is an updated version of the previously published account in our book: Dmitry Chernov, Didier Sornette, Man-made Catastrophes and Risk Information Concealment: Case Studies of Major Disasters and Human Fallibility, Springer, 2016, https://​www.​springer.​com/​gp/​book/​9783319242996.
 
694
Report for 1st quarter of 2010, Raspadskaya Open Joint Stock Company, pp. 33–34, http://​www.​raspadskaya.​ru/​upload/​files/​qr0110.​pdf?​FileID=​311.
 
695
The economic potential of the Kemerovo region, Administation of Keverovo region, April 16, 2010, https://​ako.​ru/​Ekonomik/​potens.​asp?​n=​1.
 
696
On the state and prospects of development of the coal industry, Government of Russia, April 4, 2016, http://​government.​ru/​news/​22437/​.
 
697
Nikolay Kononov, The accident is the daughter of methane, Forbes Russia, September 2008, https://​www.​forbes.​ru/​ekonomika/​lyudi/​43145-avariya-doch-metana.
 
698
On the state and prospects of development of the coal industry, Government of Russia, April 4, 2016, http://​government.​ru/​news/​22437/​.
 
699
Tatiana Zykova, Coal without the right to live. Rostehnadzor needs to regain the authority to halt unsafe mines without a trial, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, July 7, 2007, https://​rg.​ru/​2007/​07/​03/​shahty.​html.
 
700
Anastasia Platonova, On Paspad, Takie dela, May 8, 2020, https://​takiedela.​ru/​2020/​05/​na-raspade/​.
 
701
Nikolay Kononov, The accident is the daughter of methane, Forbes Russia, September 2008, https://​www.​forbes.​ru/​ekonomika/​lyudi/​43145-avariya-doch-metana.
 
702
Press-conference “How to prevent explosions in the mines? The opinions of scientists”, RIA Novosti, Moscow, May 13, 2010, https://​ria.​ru/​20100513/​233925199.​html.
 
703
The accident at the “Raspadskaya”—12 Weeks Later, Finmarket, July 28, 2010, http://​www.​finmarket.​ru/​main/​article/​1596882.
 
704
Sergey Slastunov, Methane coal mine safety in Russia—key issues of the coal industry, Mining informational and analytical bulletin, Moscow, 2011, №12, https://​www.​giab-online.​ru/​en/​catalog/​archives/​10582/​view.
 
705
Tatiana Zykova, Coal without the right to live. Rostehnadzor needs to regain the authority to halt unsafe mines without a trial, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, July 7, 2007, https://​rg.​ru/​2007/​07/​03/​shahty.​html.
 
706
Dmitry Ivanov, Raspadskaya will not launch soon, Trud newspaper, May 26, 2010.
 
707
Predestination of trouble, Radio Russia, June 7, 2010.
 
708
Opinion of scientists: How can mine explosions be prevented?, RIA Novosti, May 13, 2010, http://​ria.​ru/​press_​video/​20100513/​233925199.​html.
 
709
Tatiana Zykova, Coal without the right to live. Rostehnadzor needs to regain the authority to halt unsafe mines without a trial, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, July 7, 2007, https://​rg.​ru/​2007/​07/​03/​shahty.​html.
 
710
Tatiana Zykova, Coal without the right to live. Rostehnadzor needs to regain the authority to halt unsafe mines without a trial, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, July 7, 2007.
 
711
Anonymous interview with Russian mining HSE executive.
 
712
Opinion of scientists: How can mine explosions be prevented?, RIA Novosti, May 13, 2010, http://​ria.​ru/​press_​video/​20100513/​233925199.​html.
 
713
Anonymous interview with Russian mining HSE executive.
 
714
Anonymous interviews with Russian mining HSE executives.
 
715
Speech of Vladimir Putin at Russian State Council on the development of the coal industry, The Kremlin, Aug. 29, 2002, http://​en.​kremlin.​ru/​events/​president/​transcripts/​statements/​21697/​print.
 
716
Vladimir Kara-Murza, How did the state of the Russian coal industry manifest itself during the tragic events in Kuzbass?, Radio Svoboda, May 11, 2010, https://​www.​svoboda.​org/​a/​2039104.​html.
 
717
Artem Vernidub, Raspadskaya was considered the most advanced and safest by everyone except the miners who worked on it, Russian Newsweek, 2010, 21 (289), https://​www.​forbes.​ru/​ekonomika/​lyudi/​49606-gornodobivayushc​haya-promyshlennost.
 
718
Tatiana Zykova, Coal without the right to live. Rostehnadzor needs to regain the authority to halt unsafe mines without a trial, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, July 7, 2007.
 
719
Opinion of scientists: How can mine explosions be prevented?, RIA Novosti, May 13, 2010, http://​ria.​ru/​press_​video/​20100513/​233925199.​html.
 
720
Olga Kortunova, Miners will continue to fear, Inaya gazeta, May 30, 2010, http://​www.​beriki.​ru/​2010/​05/​30/​shakhtery-prodolzhat-boyatsya.
 
721
Dmitry Ivanov, Raspadskaya will not launch soon, Trud newspaper, May 26, 2010.
 
722
Predestination of trouble, Radio Russia, June 7, 2010.
 
723
Anastasia Platonova, On Raspad (Decay), Takie dela, May 8, 2020, https://​takiedela.​ru/​2020/​05/​na-raspade/​.
 
724
Dictator from lower classes, Ogoniok, #20, May 24, 2010, p. 16, https://​www.​kommersant.​ru/​doc/​1371809.
 
725
Vladimir Kara-Murza, How did the state of the Russian coal industry manifest itself during the tragic events in Kuzbass?, Radio Svoboda, May 11, 2010, https://​www.​svoboda.​org/​a/​2039104.​html.
 
726
Nikolay Kononov, The accident is the daughter of methane, Forbes Russia, September 2008, https://​www.​forbes.​ru/​ekonomika/​lyudi/​43145-avariya-doch-metana.
 
727
Dictator from lower classes, Ogoniok, #20, May 24, 2010, p. 16, https://​www.​kommersant.​ru/​doc/​1371809.
 
728
Olga Kortunova, Miners will continue to fear, Inaya gazeta, May 30, 2010, http://​www.​beriki.​ru/​2010/​05/​30/​shakhtery-prodolzhat-boyatsya.
 
729
Dictator from lower classes, Ogoniok, #20, May 24, 2010, p. 16, https://​www.​kommersant.​ru/​doc/​1371809.
 
730
Dictator from lower classes, Ogoniok, #20, May 24, 2010, p. 16, https://​www.​kommersant.​ru/​doc/​1371809.
 
731
“Putting a Price on Energy: International Coal Pricing”, Energy Charter Secretariat, 2010, https://​www.​energycharter.​org/​fileadmin/​DocumentsMedia/​Thematic/​Coal_​Study_​2010_​en.​pdf.
 
733
Alfred Kueppers, Severstal cuts steel output as crisis hits demand, Reuters, October 13, 2008, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​basicIndustries/​idUKLA1503632008​1013.
 
734
Cost reduction on salary, Vedomosti. November 14, 2008.
 
735
Report for 1st quarter of 2010, Raspadskaya Open Joint Stock Company, p. 63, http://​www.​raspadskaya.​ru/​upload/​files/​qr0110.​pdf?​FileID=​311.
 
736
Report for 1st quarter of 2010, Raspadskaya Open Joint Stock Company, p. 34, http://​www.​raspadskaya.​ru/​upload/​files/​qr0110.​pdf?​FileID=​311.
 
737
Annual report of JSC “Raspadskaya” for 2009
 
738
Annual report of JSC “Raspadskaya” for 2005.
 
739
Annual report of JSC “Raspadskaya” for 2005.
 
740
Annual report of JSC “Raspadskaya” for 2007.
 
741
Annual report of JSC “Raspadskaya” for 2007.
 
742
Annual report of JSC “Raspadskaya” for 2009.
 
743
Annual report of JSC “Raspadskaya” for 2009.
 
744
Annual report of JSC “Raspadskaya” for 2009.
 
745
Consolidated financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2008, JSC “Raspadskaya”, http://​www.​raspadskaya.​com/​upload/​files/​FS_​raspadskaya_​2008.​pdf?​FileID=​194.
 
746
Consolidated financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2009, JSC “Raspadskaya”, http://​www.​raspadskaya.​com/​upload/​files/​Raspadskaya_​FS_​2009.​pdf?​FileID=​198.
 
747
Annual report of JSC “Raspadskaya” for 2009.
 
748
Anonymous interviews with Russian mining HSE executive.
 
749
Olga Kortunova, Miners will continue to fear, Inaya gazeta, May 30, 2010, http://​www.​beriki.​ru/​2010/​05/​30/​shakhtery-prodolzhat-boyatsya.
 
750
Alexander Terentyeva, Andrei Kotov, Investigators want to prosecute former director of “Raspadskaya” coal mine, Vedomosti, May 18, 2010.
 
751
8 defendants in the criminal case about the explosions at the Raspadskaya mine, which resulted in the death of 91 people, will appear before the court, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, February 18, 2016, https://​sledcom.​ru/​news/​item/​1017978.
 
752
Case of explosions at Raspadskaya sent to court, Kommersant, February 19, 2016, https://​sledcom.​ru/​press/​smi/​item/​1018466.
 
753
The court dismissed the case on the death of 90 Kuzbass miners and rescuers in the explosions at Raspadskaya, Tayga, April 8, 2020, https://​tayga.​info/​153777.
 
754
Anastasia Platonova, On Paspad, Takie dela, May 8, 2020, https://​takiedela.​ru/​2020/​05/​na-raspade/​.
 
756
Anonymous interviews with two Russian mining HSE executives.
 
757
Dictator from lower classes, Ogoniok, #20, May 24, 2010, p. 16, https://​www.​kommersant.​ru/​doc/​1371809.
 
758
Revelation by miners about the practice of blocking methane detectors reported by journalists of “Week with Marianne Maksimovskaya”, REN TV, May 15, 2010 and “Kvant’ local TV channel of Keverovo region (May 10–16, 2010), https://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​0IIWCvgnEWc.
 
759
Revelation by miners about the practice of blocking methane detectors reported by journalists of “Week with Marianne Maksimovskaya”, REN TV, May 15, 2010 and “Kvant’ local TV channel of Keverovo region (May 10–16, 2010), https://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​0IIWCvgnEWc.
 
760
The former head of “Raspadskaya” was submitted for disqualification four times, ITAR-TASS, May 18, 2010.
 
761
Anastasia Platonova, On Raspad (Decay), Takie dela, May 8, 2020, https://​takiedela.​ru/​2020/​05/​na-raspade/​.
 
762
Employment and unemployment in the Russian Federation in October 2009, Federal State Statistics Service, http://​www.​tambov.​gov.​ru/​site/​www2/​1376/​Trud/​zanat2009.​doc.
 
763
Artem Vernidub, Raspadskaya was considered the most advanced and safest by everyone except the miners who worked on it, Russian Newsweek, 2010, 21 (289), https://​www.​forbes.​ru/​ekonomika/​lyudi/​49606-gornodobivayushc​haya-promyshlennost.
 
765
Anastasia Platonova, On Paspad, Takie dela, May 8, 2020, https://​takiedela.​ru/​2020/​05/​na-raspade/​.
 
766
Anonymous interview with HSE manager for a gold mining company.
 
767
Dictator from lower classes, Ogoniok, #20, May 24, 2010, p. 16, https://​www.​kommersant.​ru/​doc/​1371809.
 
768
Press-conference “How to prevent explosions in the mines? The opinions of scientists”, RIA Novosti, May 13, 2010, https://​ria.​ru/​20100513/​233925199.​html.
 
769
Anastasia Platonova, On Raspad (Decay), Takie dela, May 8, 2020, https://​takiedela.​ru/​2020/​05/​na-raspade/​.
 
770
10 largest accidents at coal mines in Russia. Dossier, TASS, February 29, 2016, https://​tass.​ru/​info/​2705381.
 
771
Anonymous interview with HSE executive from the Russian mining industry.
 
772
Weekly digest with Marianne Maksimovskaya, REN TV, May 15, 2010 and “Kvant’ local TV channel of Keverovo region (May 10–16, 2010), http://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​0IIWCvgnEWc.
 
773
Families of miners who died at the Raspadskaya mine received about 465 million rubles of aid, TASS, May 8, 2020, https://​tass.​ru/​sibir-news/​8428183.
 
774
Anatoly Dzhumaylo, “Raspadskaya” produced losses, Kommersant, September 21, 2012, https://​www.​kommersant.​ru/​doc/​2028602.
 
775
Olga Alekseyeva, “Raspadskaya” is not for sale, Gazeta.RU, October 6, 2010, https://​www.​gazeta.​ru/​business/​2011/​10/​06/​3792066.​shtml.
 
776
Anatoly Dzhumailo, Gennady Kozovoy unloaded coal, Kommersant, June 27, 2014, No. 109, https://​www.​kommersant.​ru/​doc/​2499707.
 
777
This case study is an updated version of the previously published account in our book: Dmitry Chernov, Didier Sornette, Man-made Catastrophes and Risk Information Concealment: Case Studies of Major Disasters and Human Fallibility, Springer, 2016, https://​www.​springer.​com/​gp/​book/​9783319242996.
 
778
Natural catastrophes 2010. Analyses, assessments, positions, Munich Re, February 2011, p. 27.
 
779
A. Shapovalov, D. Butrin, $15 billion lost in Russian fires, Kommersant, August 10, 2010.
 
780
Anomalous phenomena don’t exempt from responsibility, Parliamentary newspaper, September 14, 2010.
 
781
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin chaired a conference on measures to reduce the number of wildfires, July 27, 2010, Website of the Government of the Russian Federation, http://​archive.​government.​ru/​docs/​11511.
 
782
Wildfires 2010: The miser pays twice, Greenpeace (Russia), press release, August 6, 2010.
 
783
Anomalous phenomena don’t exempt from responsibility, Parliamentary newspaper, September 14, 2010.
 
784
This case study is an updated version of the previously published account in our book: Dmitry Chernov, Didier Sornette, Man-made Catastrophes and Risk Information Concealment: Case Studies of Major Disasters and Human Fallibility, Springer, 2016, https://​www.​springer.​com/​gp/​book/​9783319242996.
 
785
Christina Nyquist, The March 11 Tohoku Earthquake, One Year Later. What Have We Learned? March 9, 2012, U.S. Geological Survey.
 
786
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Kröger, Fukushima: Need for Reappraisal of Nuclear Risks?, ETH Zürich, Keynote SRA-Europe 21st Annual Conference, Zurich, June 18–20, 2012.
 
787
Fukushima Nuclear Accident Analysis Report, Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc., June 20, 2012, pp. 8, 15.
 
788
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, pp. 17, 30.
 
789
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 13.
 
790
Fact Finding Expert Mission of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi NPP Accident Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, IAEA mission report, 24 May–2 June 2011, p. 11.
 
791
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 14.
 
792
Akira Izumo, Facts, Lessons Learned and Nuclear Power Policy of Japan after the Accident, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan, January 24, 2012.
 
793
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 13.
 
794
Overview of facility of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, TEPCO, http://​www.​tepco.​co.​jp/​en/​nu/​fukushima-np/​outline_​f1/​index-e.​html.
 
795
The Status of Nuclear Fuel Stored at the Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Plants, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (Japan), January 31, 2013, http://​www.​cnic.​jp/​english/​newsletter/​nit154/​nit154articles/​03_​nf.​html.
 
796
1 PBq equals 1015 disintegrations per second.
 
797
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 39.
 
798
Fukushima Accident, World Nuclear Association, January 13, 2014.
 
799
The evacuation map in the following official government site (http://​www.​meti.​go.​jp/​english/​earthquake/​nuclear/​roadmap/​pdf/​141001MapOfAreas​.​pdf) shows the most dangerous area called Area3, which is defined as follows: “Area3: Areas where it is expected that the residents have difficulties in returning for a long time”.
 
800
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 38.
 
801
For comparison, natural levels of radioactivity typically range from about 1.5 to 3.5 mSv/yr, but can be more than 50 mSv/yr in some regions of Iran, India and Europe.
 
803
Japan quake: Worst crisis since WWII, says PM, BBC, March 14, 2011, https://​www.​bbc.​co.​uk/​news/​world-asia-pacific-12726297.
 
804
The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Crisis Management—Lessons for Japan-U.S. Alliance Cooperation, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, September 2012, p. 38.
 
805
Mari Yamaguchi, IAEA: Japan nuke cleanup may take more than 40 yrs, Associated Press, April 22, 2013.
 
806
Nuclear Power in Japan, World Nuclear Association, updated February 2014.
 
807
World Nuclear Association, weekly digest 11 & 18 July 2014.
 
808
Japanese industry leaders call for nuclear restarts, World Nuclear Association, January 8, 2021, https://​www.​world-nuclear-news.​org/​Articles/​Japanese-industry-leaders-call-for-nuclear-restart.
 
809
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 21.
 
810
Nuclear Power in Japan, World Nuclear Association, updated February 2014.
 
811
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 43.
 
812
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 9.
 
813
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 16.
 
814
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 9.
 
815
Asmolov: Fukushima Disaster was Predictable, The Mainichi Daily News, April 26, 2011.
 
816
“It could have been prevented,” Leonid Bol’shov, head of the Russian Safety Institute of Atomic Energy Sciences, about the differences between Fukushima and Chernobyl, Kommersant, April 26, 2011, № 73 (4614).
 
817
Disasters, Rebuilding and Leadership—Tough Lessons from Japan and the U.S., The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, October 2013, https://​knowledge.​wharton.​upenn.​edu/​article/​lessons-leadership-fukushima-nuclear-disaster/​.
 
818
Disasters, Rebuilding and Leadership—Tough Lessons from Japan and the U.S., The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, October 2013, https://​knowledge.​wharton.​upenn.​edu/​article/​lessons-leadership-fukushima-nuclear-disaster/​.
 
819
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 28.
 
820
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 75.
 
821
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Chap. 1. Was the accident preventable?, July 5, 2012, pp. 53–57.
 
822
James M. Acton, Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima Was Preventable, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012, p. 2.
 
823
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 80.
 
824
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 80.
 
825
Mr Katsumata Speech BGM 2003, Reconstruction after Misconduct—the Pursuit of Excellence, TEPCO, http://​www.​tepco.​co.​jp/​en/​news/​presen/​pdf-1/​0310-e.​pdf.
 
826
Steve Stecklow, Nuclear Safety Reports Called Into Question, The Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2007.
 
827
James M. Acton, Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima Was Preventable, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012, p. 24.
 
828
Nuclear Power in Japan, World Nuclear Association, updated February 2014.
 
830
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 16.
 
831
Tepco rejected requests for anti-tsunami steps before 2001 nuclear crisis, The Japan Times, September 26, 2015, http://​www.​japantimes.​co.​jp/​news/​2015/​09/​26/​national/​tepco-rejected-requests-antitsunami-steps-2011-nuclear-crisis/​#.​VhOsotbWvyd.
 
833
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Chap. 1. Was the accident preventable?, July 5, 2012, p. 23.
 
834
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Chap. 1. Was the accident preventable?, July 5, 2012, p. 23.
 
835
James M. Acton, Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima Was Preventable, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012, p. 12.
 
836
Study on the 869 Jogan earthquake tsunami, Active Fault and Earthquake Research Center, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), Japan, https://​unit.​aist.​go.​jp/​actfault-eq/​Tohoku/​jogan_​tsunami_​e.​html.
 
837
Yuichi Namegaya, Kenji Satake and Shigeru Yamaki, Numerical simulation of the AD 869 Jogan tsunami in Ishinomaki and Sendai plains and Ukedo river-mouth lowland, Annual Report on Active Fault and Paleoearthquake Researches, Geological Survey of Japan/AIST, No. 10, 2010, pp. 1–21, https://​www.​gsj.​jp/​data/​actfault-eq/​h21seika/​pdf/​namegaya.​pdf.
 
838
Richard A. Clarke, R.P. Eddy, Warnings: Finding Cassandras to Stop Catastrophes, Ecco, 2017, Chap. 5, The Seismologist: Fukushima Nuclear Disaster.
 
839
The certified agenda of the METI meeting and extracts of the meeting (in Japanese) were communicated to us and translated by Professor Kaizoji and are available from the authors upon request.
 
840
Reiji Yoshida, GE plan followed with inflexibility, The Japan Times, July 14, 2011, https://​www.​japantimes.​co.​jp/​news/​2011/​07/​14/​national/​ge-plan-followed-with-inflexibility/​.
 
841
James M. Acton, Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima Was Preventable, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012, p. 29.
 
842
Reiji Yoshida, GE plan followed with inflexibility, The Japan Times, July 14, 2011, https://​www.​japantimes.​co.​jp/​news/​2011/​07/​14/​national/​ge-plan-followed-with-inflexibility/​.
 
843
Reiji Yoshida, GE plan followed with inflexibility, The Japan Times, July 14, 2011, https://​www.​japantimes.​co.​jp/​news/​2011/​07/​14/​national/​ge-plan-followed-with-inflexibility/​.
 
844
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Chap. 1. Was the accident preventable?, July 5, 2012, pp. 24–25.
 
846
Michaela Ibrion, Nicola Paltrinieri, Amir R. Nejad, Learning from non-failure of Onagawa nuclear power station: an accident investigation over its life cycle, Results in Engineering, Volume 8, 2020, https://​doi.​org/​10.​1016/​j.​rineng.​2020.​100185.
 
847
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 44.
 
848
Reiji Yoshida, GE plan followed with inflexibility, The Japan Times, July 14, 2011, https://​www.​japantimes.​co.​jp/​news/​2011/​07/​14/​national/​ge-plan-followed-with-inflexibility/​.
 
849
James M. Acton, Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima Was Preventable, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012, p. 28.
 
850
James M. Acton, Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima Was Preventable, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012, p. 27.
 
851
James M. Acton, Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima Was Preventable, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012, p. 28.
 
852
James M. Acton, Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima Was Preventable, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012, p. 28.
 
853
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 77.
 
854
James M. Acton, Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima Was Preventable, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012, pp. 22–23.
 
855
James M. Acton, Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima Was Preventable, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012, p. 11.
 
856
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Chap. 1. Was the accident preventable?, July 5, 2012, p. 26.
 
857
Earthquake Report №443, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc, June 14, 2012.
 
858
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Chap. 1. Was the accident preventable?, July 5, 2012, p. 29, https://​www.​nirs.​org/​wp-content/​uploads/​fukushima/​naiic_​report.​pdf.
 
859
Stream record of NAIIC/Jikocho 12th Commission Meeting, May 14, 2012 No.1 http://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​BW4L-InZWg8 (1:25–1:33; 1:47–1:55; 2:00–2:04; 2:14–2:18).
 
860
Stream record of NAIIC/Jikocho 12th Commission Meeting, May 14, 2012 No.1 http://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​BW4L-InZWg8 (1:25–1:33; 1:47–1:55; 2:00–2:04; 2:14–2:18).
 
861
TEPCO chairman blames politicians, colleagues for Fukushima response, The Asahi Shimbun, May 15, 2012.
 
862
Five-year jail terms sought for ex-Tepco executives over Fukushima nuclear crisis, The Japan Times, December 26, 2018, https://​www.​japantimes.​co.​jp/​news/​2018/​12/​26/​national/​crime-legal/​5-year-jail-terms-sought-ex-tepco-execs-nuclear-crisis/​.
 
863
Mari Yamaguchi, Japan court: TEPCO execs not guilty in Fukushima disaster The Associated Press, September 19, 2019, https://​apnews.​com/​article/​35ad7c0e1dad4835​9335a928b57bdda7​.
 
864
Five-year jail terms sought for ex-Tepco executives over Fukushima nuclear crisis, The Japan Times, December 26, 2018, https://​www.​japantimes.​co.​jp/​news/​2018/​12/​26/​national/​crime-legal/​5-year-jail-terms-sought-ex-tepco-execs-nuclear-crisis/​.
 
865
Five-year jail terms sought for ex-Tepco executives over Fukushima nuclear crisis, The Japan Times, December 26, 2018, https://​www.​japantimes.​co.​jp/​news/​2018/​12/​26/​national/​crime-legal/​5-year-jail-terms-sought-ex-tepco-execs-nuclear-crisis/​.
 
866
Magdalena Osumi, Former Tepco executives found not guilty of criminal negligence in Fukushima nuclear disaster, The Japan Times, September 19, 2019, https://​www.​japantimes.​co.​jp/​news/​2019/​09/​19/​national/​crime-legal/​tepco-trio-face-tokyo-court-ruling-criminal-case-stemming-fukushima-nuclear-disaster/​.
 
867
James M. Acton, Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima Was Preventable, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012, pp. 1, 12, https://​carnegieendowmen​t.​org/​2012/​03/​06/​why-fukushima-was-preventable-pub-47361.
 
868
James M. Acton, Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima Was Preventable, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012, p. 16, https://​carnegieendowmen​t.​org/​2012/​03/​06/​why-fukushima-was-preventable-pub-47361.
 
869
James M. Acton, Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima Was Preventable, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012, p. 18, https://​carnegieendowmen​t.​org/​2012/​03/​06/​why-fukushima-was-preventable-pub-47361.
 
870
Chieko Tsuneoka, Tokyo Court Orders Executives to Pay $97 Billion Over Fukushima Nuclear Meltdowns, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 13, 2022, https://​www.​wsj.​com/​articles/​tokyo-court-orders-executives-to-pay-97-billion-over-fukushima-nuclear-meltdown-11657720289.
 
871
Mari Yamaguchi, Japan court: TEPCO execs not guilty in Fukushima disaster The Associated Press, September 19, 2019, https://​apnews.​com/​article/​35ad7c0e1dad4835​9335a928b57bdda7​.
 
872
Magdalena Osumi, Former Tepco executives found not guilty of criminal negligence in Fukushima nuclear disaster, The Japan Times, September 19, 2019, https://​www.​japantimes.​co.​jp/​news/​2019/​09/​19/​national/​crime-legal/​tepco-trio-face-tokyo-court-ruling-criminal-case-stemming-fukushima-nuclear-disaster/​.
 
874
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 81.
 
875
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 73.
 
876
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 76.
 
877
Plant Status of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (as of 0AM March 12th), TEPCO, Press Release, March 12, 2011, http://​www.​tepco.​co.​jp/​en/​press/​corp-com/​release/​11031203-e.​html.
 
878
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Chap. 3. Escalation of the accident, July 5, 2012, p. 8.
 
879
James M. Acton, Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima Was Preventable, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2012, p. 16.
 
880
NAIIC/Jikocho 6th Commission Meeting 2012/3/14, http://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​4cEM6cvLm2s (0:23–0:28).
 
881
Meltdown. Oversights in the Reactor Cooling System, NHK Documentary, Yoshihiro Nemoto, June 11, 2013.
 
882
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Chap. 2. Escalation of the accident, July 5, 2012, pp. 78, 82–89.
 
883
Plant Status of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (as of 1PM March 12th), TEPCO, Press Release, March 12, 2011, http://​www.​tepco.​co.​jp/​en/​press/​corp-com/​release/​11031219-e.​html.
 
884
TEPCO officials unaware of cooling system shutdown, The Asahi Shimbun, December 19, 2011.
 
885
WHAT WENT WRONG: Fukushima flashback a month after crisis started, The Asahi Shimbun, April 12, 2011.
 
886
WHAT WENT WRONG: Fukushima flashback a month after crisis started, The Asahi Shimbun, April 12, 2011.
 
887
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Chap. 3. Escalation of the accident, July 5, 2012, pp. 20, 40.
 
888
NAIIC/Jikocho 16th Commission Mtg. 2012/5/28. www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​rjl2H4zY7DE (0:49–0:50).
 
889
Phred Dvorak, Reactor Team Let Pressure Soar, The Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2011.
 
890
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 33.
 
891
Eric Talmadge, Mari Yamaguchi, How first 24 h shaped Japan’s nuclear crisis, Associated Press, July 3, 2011.
 
892
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Chap. 3. Escalation of the accident, July 5, 2012, p. 21.
 
893
Stream record of NAIIC/Jikocho 6th Commission Meeting, March 14, 2012, http://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​4cEM6cvLm2s (1:18–1:20).
 
894
Norihiko Shirouzu, Phred Dvorak, Yuka Hayashi, Andrew Morse, Bid to ‘Protect Assets’ Slowed Reactor Fight, The Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2011.
 
895
Norihiko Shirouzu, Phred Dvorak, Yuka Hayashi, Andrew Morse, Bid to ‘Protect Assets’ Slowed Reactor Fight, The Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2011.
 
896
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, pp. 77, 33.
 
897
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 34.
 
898
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Chap. 3. Escalation of the accident, July 5, 2012, pp. 21–22.
 
899
Frustrated with TEPCO, Kan turns to SDF in nuclear crisis, The Mainichi Daily News, March 17, 2011.
 
900
Our Basic Philosophy—Building a Free and Secure Society, The Democratic Party of Japan, April 1998, http://​www.​dpj.​or.​jp/​english/​about_​us/​philosophy.​html.
 
901
The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Crisis Management—Lessons for Japan-U.S. Alliance Cooperation, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, September 2012, p. 58.
 
902
Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan’s New Leader Endorses Nuclear Plants, The New York Times, December 30, 2012.
 
903
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 18.
 
904
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, pp. 78–79.
 
905
Stream record of NAIIC/Jikocho 16th Commission Meeting, May 28, 2012, www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​rjl2H4zY7DE (0:26–0:29).
 
906
Stream record of NAIIC/Jikocho 16th Commission Meeting, May 28, 2012, www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​rjl2H4zY7DE (2:23–2:26).
 
907
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 74.
 
908
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 80.
 
909
Japan PM to nuclear power firm: “What the hell’s going on?”, Reuters, March 15, 2011.
 
910
Disasters, Rebuilding and Leadership—Tough Lessons from Japan and the U.S., The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, October 2013, p. 4.
 
911
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 34.
 
912
The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Crisis Management—Lessons for Japan-U.S. Alliance Cooperation, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, September 2012, p. 100.
 
913
Eric Talmadge, Mari Yamaguchi, How first 24 h shaped Japan’s nuclear crisis, Associated Press, July 3, 2011.
 
914
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 80.
 
915
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 19.
 
916
Norimitsu Onishi and Martin Fackler, Japan Held Nuclear Data, Leaving Evacuees in Peril, New York Times, August 8, 2011.
 
917
Norimitsu Onishi and Martin Fackler, Japan Held Nuclear Data, Leaving Evacuees in Peril, New York Times, August 8, 2011.
 
918
The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Crisis Management—Lessons for Japan-U.S. Alliance Cooperation, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, September 2012, p. 48.
 
919
Shinichi Saoshiro, Tepco confirms meltdowns at 2 more Fukushima reactors, Reuters, May 24, 2011.
 
920
The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, The National Diet of Japan, Executive summary, July 5, 2012, p. 77.
 
921
Martin Adams, Powering ahead. Perspectives on Japan’s energy future, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 2012, p. 4.
 
922
Gavin Blair, Beginning of the end for nuclear power in Japan? he Christian Science Monitor, June 20, 2011, https://​www.​csmonitor.​com/​World/​Asia-Pacific/​2011/​0620/​Beginning-of-the-end-for-nuclear-power-in-Japan.
 
923
Mari Yamaguchi, Japan court: TEPCO execs not guilty in Fukushima disaster The Associated Press, September 19, 2019, https://​apnews.​com/​article/​35ad7c0e1dad4835​9335a928b57bdda7​.
 
924
Richard A. Clarke, R.P. Eddy, Warnings: Finding Cassandras to Stop Catastrophes, Ecco, 2017, Chap. 5, The Seismologist: Fukushima Nuclear Disaster.
 
925
World Nuclear Industry Status Report, 2021, pp. 100-124, https://​www.​worldnuclearrepo​rt.​org/​IMG/​pdf/​wnisr2021-hr.​pdf.
 
926
Andrea Vittorio, VW Sustainability Reports May Have Hinted at Problems, Daily Environment Report, Bloomberg BNA, October 16, 2015.
 
927
Jeff S. Bartlett, Michelle Naranjo, Jeff Plungis, Guide to the Volkswagen Emissions Recall, Consumers Union of U.S., November 1, 2016, https://​news.​yahoo.​com/​news/​guide-volkswagen-emissions-recall-221631045.​html.
 
928
Jerry Hirsch, U.S. taxpayers duped into shelling out $51 million in green subsidies for ’clean’ VW vehicles, The Los Angeles Times, September 21, 2015, https://​www.​latimes.​com/​business/​autos/​la-fi-vw-subsidies-20150922-story.​html.
 
929
EPA, California Notify Volkswagen of Clean Air Act Violations/Carmaker allegedly used software that circumvents emissions testing for certain air pollutants, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, September 18, 2015, https://​19january2017sna​pshot.​epa.​gov/​newsreleases/​epa-california-notify-volkswagen-clean-air-act-violations-carmaker-allegedly-used_​.​html.
 
930
Lifang Hou, Kai Zhang, Moira A. Luthin, Andrea A. Baccarelli, Public Health Impact and Economic Costs of Volkswagen’s Lack of Compliance with the United States’ Emission Standards, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Policy, September 8, 2016, https://​www.​ncbi.​nlm.​nih.​gov/​pmc/​articles/​PMC5036724/​.
 
931
Jack Ewing, Faster, Higher, Farther: The Inside Story of the Volkswagen Scandal, Random House, p. 3, https://​wwnorton.​com/​books/​Faster-Higher-Farther/​.
 
932
Jack Ewing, Volkswagen Not Alone in Flouting Pollution Limits, The New York Times, June 9, 2016, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2016/​06/​10/​business/​international/​volkswagen-not-alone-in-flouting-pollution-limits.​html.
 
933
Jack Ewing, Volkswagen C.E.O. Martin Winterkorn Resigns Amid Emissions Scandal, The New York Times, September 23, 2015, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2015/​09/​24/​business/​international/​volkswagen-chief-martin-winterkorn-resigns-amid-emissions-scandal.​html.
 
934
William Boston, Volkswagen Emissions Investigation, Zeroes In on Two Engineers The Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2015, https://​www.​wsj.​com/​articles/​vw-emissions-probe-zeroes-in-on-two-engineers-1444011602.
 
935
Noah Barkin, Volkswagen recall to start in January, Reuters, October 7, 2015, https://​news.​yahoo.​com/​news/​vw-ceo-says-recall-start-january-completed-end-015826482--finance.​html.
 
936
Mike Spector, Amy Harder, Volkswagen U.S. CEO Says He Didn’t Know in 2014 of Emissions Defeat Devices, October 9, 2015, https://​www.​wsj.​com/​articles/​volkswagen-u-s-ceo-says-he-didnt-know-in-2014-of-emissions-defeat-devices-1444316371.
 
937
Claire Groden, Volkswagen CEO issues video apology for emissions cheating scandal, Fortune, September 22, 2015, https://​fortune.​com/​2015/​09/​22/​volkswagen-apology-emissions-cheating/​.
 
938
Mike Spector, Amy Harder, Volkswagen U.S. CEO Says He Didn’t Know in 2014 of Emissions Defeat Devices, October 9, 2015, https://​www.​wsj.​com/​articles/​volkswagen-u-s-ceo-says-he-didnt-know-in-2014-of-emissions-defeat-devices-1444316371.
 
939
Paul Kedrosky, An Engineering Theory of the Volkswagen Scandal, The New Yorker, October 16, 2015, https://​www.​newyorker.​com/​business/​currency/​an-engineering-theory-of-the-volkswagen-scandal.
 
940
Jack Ewing, Volkswagen Memos Suggest Company Misled U.S. Regulators, The New York Times, February 18, 2016, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2016/​02/​19/​business/​volkswagen-memos-suggest-emissions-problem-was-known-earlier.​html.
 
941
EU says VW broke consumer laws in 20 countries, Deutsche Welle, September 5, 2016, https://​www.​dw.​com/​en/​eu-says-vw-broke-consumer-laws-in-20-countries/​a-19526814.
 
942
Zlata Rodionova, EU sues Germany and Britain over Volkswagen emissions scandal, Independent, December 8, 2016, https://​www.​independent.​co.​uk/​news/​business/​news/​eu-sues-germany-and-britain-over-volkswagen-emissions-scandal-a7462936.​html.
 
943
William Boston New Discovery Broadens VW Emissions-Cheating Crisis, The Wall Street Journal, November 6, 2016, https://​www.​wsj.​com/​articles/​volkswagen-probe-in-germany-extended-to-chairman-1478429066.
 
944
Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $4.3 Billion in Criminal and Civil Penalties; Six Volkswagen Executives and Employees are Indicted in Connection with Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, January 11, 2017, https://​www.​justice.​gov/​opa/​pr/​volkswagen-ag-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-43-billion-criminal-and-civil-penalties-six.
 
945
Volkswagen says diesel scandal has cost it 31.3 billion euros, Reuters, March 17, 2020, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-volkswagen-results-diesel-idUSKBN2141JB.
 
946
Patrick Donahue, Volkswagen Chief Warns on Existential Threat of Cheating Scandal, Bloomberg, October 4, 2015, https://​www.​bloomberg.​com/​news/​articles/​2015-10-04/​volkswagen-chief-warns-of-existential-threat-of-cheating-scandal.
 
947
VW boss: Emissions scandal ’a huge mistake’, BBC, September 29, 2016, https://​www.​bbc.​co.​uk/​news/​av/​business-37508135.
 
948
Euro emissions standards, Automobile Association Developments, October 1, 2015, http://​www.​theaa.​com/​motoring_​advice/​fuels-and-environment/​euro-emissions-standards.​html.
 
949
Ian Johnston, Volkswagen emissions scandal: EU officials knew of ’widespread concern’ that manufacturers were cheating tests, The Independent, 26 October 2015, https://​www.​independent.​co.​uk/​life-style/​motoring/​motoring-news/​volkswagen-emissions-scandal-eu-officials-knew-widespread-concern-manufacturers-were-cheating-tests-a6708656.​html.
 
950
Jim Holder, VW emissions scandal: Nine VW vehicles have false CO2 ratings, autocar.co.uk, December 9, 2015, http://​www.​autocar.​co.​uk/​car-news/​industry/​vw-emissions-scandal-nine-vw-vehicles-have-false-co2-ratings.
 
951
Clean Air Act Prohibits “Defeat Devices” in Vehicles, Engines, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, August 1998, https://​nepis.​epa.​gov/​Exe/​ZyPDF.​cgi/​500003QS.​PDF?​Dockey=​500003QS.​PDF.
 
952
Mack Trucks Diesel Engine Settlement, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, October 22, 1998, https://​www.​epa.​gov/​enforcement/​mack-trucks-diesel-engine-settlement.
 
953
Volkswagen considers shareholder lawsuit to be without merit, Volkswagen, March 2, 2016, https://​www.​automotiveworld.​com/​news-releases/​volkswagen-considers-shareholder-lawsuit-without-merit/​.
 
954
Jim Brunsden, Peter Campbell, Brussels knew carmakers gamed emissions tests before VW scandal, Financial Times, October 19, 2016, https://​www.​ft.​com/​content/​8ba08428-9554-11e6-a1dc-bdf38d484582.
 
955
David Connett, Volkswagen emissions scandal: More carmakers implicated as tests reveal pollution levels of popular diesels, Independent, September 30, 2015, https://​www.​independent.​co.​uk/​climate-change/​news/​volkswagen-emissions-scandal-more-carmakers-implicated-as-tests-reveal-pollution-levels-of-popular-diesels-a6674386.​html.
 
956
Damian Carrington, Wide range of cars emit more pollution in realistic driving tests, data shows, The Guardian, September 30, 2015, https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​environment/​2015/​sep/​30/​wide-range-of-cars-emit-more-pollution-in-real-driving-conditions-tests-show.
 
957
Kartikay Mehrotra, Dodge Truck Owners Accuse Chrysler of VW-Like Cheating, Bloomberg, November 14, 2016, https://​www.​bloomberg.​com/​news/​articles/​2016–11-14/​dodge-truck-owners-accuse-chrysler-of-vw-like-emissions-cheating.
 
958
Chris Isidore, Fiat Chrysler will pay $800 million to settle emissions charges in the US, CNN Business, January 10, 2019, https://​edition.​cnn.​com/​2019/​01/​10/​business/​fiat-chrysler-settlement/​index.​html.
 
960
Christoph Rauwald, Ryan Beene, Daimler to Pay $2.2 Billion to Settle U.S. Diesel Issues, Bloomberg, August 13, 2020, https://​www.​ttnews.​com/​authors/​christoph-rauwald-and-ryan-beene.
 
961
Matthias Holweg, Nick Oliver, Crisis, Resilience and Survival: Lessons from the Global Auto Industry, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 70, https://​www.​researchgate.​net/​publication/​291523517_​Crisis_​Resilience_​and_​Survival_​Lessons_​from_​the_​Global_​Auto_​Industry.
 
962
William Boston, Volkswagen Emissions Investigation Zeroes In on Two Engineers, The Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2015, https://​www.​wsj.​com/​articles/​vw-emissions-probe-zeroes-in-on-two-engineers-1444011602.
 
963
Volkswagen considers shareholder lawsuit to be without merit, Volkswagen, March 2, 2016, https://​www.​automotiveworld.​com/​news-releases/​volkswagen-considers-shareholder-lawsuit-without-merit/​.
 
964
William Boston, Volkswagen Emissions Investigation Zeroes In on Two Engineers, The Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2015, https://​www.​wsj.​com/​articles/​vw-emissions-probe-zeroes-in-on-two-engineers-1444011602.
 
965
Bosch warned VW about illegal software use in diesel cars, report says, Automotive News, September 27, 2015, https://​www.​autonews.​com/​article/​20150927/​COPY01/​309279989/​bosch-warned-vw-about-illegal-software-use-in-diesel-cars-report-says.
 
966
Jack Ewing, VW Presentation in’06 Showed How to Foil Emissions Tests, The New York Times, April 26, 2016, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2016/​04/​27/​business/​international/​vw-presentation-in-06-showed-how-to-foil-emissions-tests.​html.
 
967
Andreas Cremer, Tom Bergin, Fear and respect: VW’s culture under Winterkorn, Reuters, October 10, 2015, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​uk-volkswagen-emissions-culture-idUKKCN0S40MN201​51010.
 
968
Andreas Cremer, Alexander Smith, VW ’Dieselgate’ software developed at Audi in 1999: report, Reuters, April 19, 2016, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-volkswagen-emissions-audi-idUSKCN0XG2DN.
 
969
Reports: Audi was deeply involved in Dieselgate, Deutsche Welle, September 22, 2016, https://​www.​dw.​com/​en/​reports-audi-was-deeply-involved-in-dieselgate/​a-19567774.
 
970
Monica Houston, VW began using emissions software in 2008: report, The Wall Street Journal, October 4, 2015, https://​www.​marketwatch.​com/​story/​vw-began-using-emissions-software-in-2008-report-2015-10-04.
 
971
William Boston, Volkswagen Emissions Investigation Zeroes In on Two Engineers, The Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2015, https://​www.​wsj.​com/​articles/​vw-emissions-probe-zeroes-in-on-two-engineers-1444011602.
 
972
Jack Ewing, Faster, Higher, Farther: The Inside Story of the Volkswagen Scandal, Random House, https://​wwnorton.​com/​books/​Faster-Higher-Farther/​.
 
973
Jeff S. Bartlett, Michelle Naranjo, Jeff Plungis, Guide to the Volkswagen Emissions Recall, Consumers Union of U.S., November 1, 2016, https://​news.​yahoo.​com/​news/​guide-volkswagen-emissions-recall-221631045.​html.
 
974
Joel Schectman, Exclusive: U.S. probes Bosch in VW cheating scandal—sources, Reuters, November 19, 2015, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-volkswagen-emissions-probe-exclusive-idUSKCN0T82Q3201​51119.
 
975
David Shepardson, Joel Schectman, Bosch worked ’hand-in-glove’ with Volkswagen in emissions fraud—lawyers, Reuters, August 18, 2016, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-volkswagen-emissions-idUSKCN10S2EI.
 
976
Margaret Cronin Fisk, Bosch Allegedly Sought VW Legal Cover for Defeat Device, Bloomberg, September 6, 2016, https://​www.​bloomberg.​com/​news/​articles/​2016-09-06/​bosch-allegedly-sought-vw-legal-cover-for-defeat-device-in-2008.
 
977
Bosch warned VW about illegal software use in diesel cars, report says, Automotive News, September 27, 2015, https://​www.​autonews.​com/​article/​20150927/​COPY01/​309279989/​bosch-warned-vw-about-illegal-software-use-in-diesel-cars-report-says.
 
978
David Shepardson, Joel Schectman, Bosch worked ’hand-in-glove’ with Volkswagen in emissions fraud—lawyers, Reuters, August 18, 2016, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-volkswagen-emissions-idUSKCN10S2EI.
 
979
David Shepardson, Joel Schectman, Bosch worked ’hand-in-glove’ with Volkswagen in emissions fraud—lawyers, Reuters, August 18, 2016, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-volkswagen-emissions-idUSKCN10S2EI.
 
980
Bosch won’t admit to anything, but will pay VW owners $327.5 million anyway, Autoweek, February 2, 2017, http://​autoweek.​com/​article/​vw-diesel-scandal/​vw-diesel-owners-will-get-cash-compensation-bosch-too.
 
981
Clifford Atiyeh, Everything You Need to Know about the VW Diesel-Emissions Scandal, Car and Driver, November 15, 2016, http://​blog.​caranddriver.​com/​everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-vw-diesel-emissions-scandal/​.
 
982
Alex Davies, The Real Winner in the VW Diesel Scandal? Hybrid Cars, Wired, September 24, 2015, https://​www.​wired.​com/​2015/​09/​volkswagen-diesel-cheating-scandal-is-good-for-hybrid-cars/​.
 
983
Global auto industry ‘Pressure Cooker’ could have led VW to cheat emissions tests, The University of Edinburgh Business School, January 20, 2016, https://​www.​globenewswire.​com/​news-release/​2016/​01/​20/​803136/​37852/​en/​Global-auto-industry-Pressure-Cooker-could-have-led-VW-to-cheat-emissions-tests-says-new-research-by-Oxford-Said.​html.
 
984
Jack Ewing, Faster, Higher, Farther: The Inside Story of the Volkswagen Scandal, Random House, https://​wwnorton.​com/​books/​Faster-Higher-Farther/​.
 
985
Jack Ewing, Faster, Higher, Farther: The Inside Story of the Volkswagen Scandal, Random House, https://​wwnorton.​com/​books/​Faster-Higher-Farther/​.
 
986
Andreas Cremer, Tom Bergin, Fear and respect: VW’s culture under Winterkorn, Reuters, October 10, 2015, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​uk-volkswagen-emissions-culture-idUKKCN0S40MN201​51010.
 
987
Jack Ewings, Volkswagen C.E.O. Martin Winterkorn Resigns Amid Emissions Scandal, The New York Times, September 23, 2015, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2015/​09/​24/​business/​international/​volkswagen-chief-martin-winterkorn-resigns-amid-emissions-scandal.​html.
 
988
Jack Ewings, Volkswagen Says Whistle-Blower Pushed It to Admit Broader Cheating, The New York Times, November 8, 2015, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2015/​11/​09/​business/​international/​volkswagen-says-whistle-blowers-pushed-it-to-admit-gas-car-cheating.​html.
 
989
Jack Ewings, Graham Bowley, The Engineering of Volkswagen’s Aggressive Ambition, The New York Times, December 13, 2015, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2015/​12/​14/​business/​the-engineering-of-volkswagens-aggressive-ambition.​html.
 
990
‘We just couldn’t believe it’: Swiss recalls uncovering VW scandal, Expatica, November 20, 2017, https://​www.​expatica.​com/​ch/​news/​country-news/​SW-We-just-couldnt-believe-it-Swiss-recalls-uncovering-VW-scandal_​1549707.​html.
 
991
Jack Ewing, Faster, Higher, Farther: The Inside Story of the Volkswagen Scandal, Random House, https://​wwnorton.​com/​books/​Faster-Higher-Farther/​.
 
992
Andreas Cremer, Tom Bergin, Fear and respect: VW’s culture under Winterkorn, Reuters, October 10, 2015, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​uk-volkswagen-emissions-culture-idUKKCN0S40MN201​51010.
 
993
Richard Milne, Volkswagen’s home city enveloped in fear, anger and disbelief, Financial Times, October 11, 2015, https://​www.​ft.​com/​content/​5ae421be-6dcd-11e5-8171-ba1968cf791a.
 
994
Noah Barkin, Volkswagen recall to start in January, Reuters, October 7, 2015, https://​news.​yahoo.​com/​vw-ceo-says-recall-start-january-completed-end-015826482--finance.​html.
 
995
William Boston Volkswagen Chief Matthias Müller Takes Aim at Auto Maker’s Culture, The Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2016, https://​www.​wsj.​com/​articles/​vw-chief-takes-aim-at-wayward-culture-1456221603.
 
996
Noah Barkin, Volkswagen recall to start in January, Reuters, October 7, 2015, https://​news.​yahoo.​com/​vw-ceo-says-recall-start-january-completed-end-015826482--finance.​html.
 
997
Josephine Sandler Nelson, The Criminal Bug: Volkswagen’s Middle Management, Stanford Graduate School of Business, April 19, 2016, https://​papers.​ssrn.​com/​sol3/​papers.​cfm?​abstract_​id=​2767255.
 
998
Andreas Cremer, Bruce Wallace, Paul Lienert, Volkswagen made several defeat devices to cheat emissions tests—sources, Reuters, October 17, 2015, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-volkswagen-emissions-software-idUSKCN0SB0PU201​51017.
 
999
Timothy Aeppel, Nissan CEO says it would be hard to hide any effort to falsify emissions data, Reuters, September 22, 2015, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​usa-volkswagen-ghosn-idCNL1N11S2JN201​50922?​edition-redirect=​uk.
 
1000
Joshua Dowling, Volvo executive says Volkswagen diesel cheat was an ‘open secret’ in the car industry seven years ago, News Corp Australia Network, June 29, 2016, https://​www.​adelaidenow.​com.​au/​motoring/​volvo-executive-says-volkswagen-diesel-cheat-was-an-open-secret-in-the-car-industry-seven-years-ago/​news-story/​d01e377a913bf5db​77894f22f5fe9b68​.
 
1001
Prosecution: ‘Volkswagen manipulated emission gas at German headquarters’ instruction’, The Dong-A Ilbo, June 18, 2016.
 
1002
Bosch warned VW about illegal software use in diesel cars, report says, Automotive News, September 27, 2015, https://​www.​autonews.​com/​article/​20150927/​COPY01/​309279989/​bosch-warned-vw-about-illegal-software-use-in-diesel-cars-report-says.
 
1003
Volkswagen Engineer Pleads Guilty for His Role in Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests, U.S. Department of Justice, September 9, 2016, https://​www.​justice.​gov/​opa/​pr/​volkswagen-engineer-pleads-guilty-his-role-conspiracy-cheat-us-emissions-tests.
 
1004
Bill Vlasic, Volkswagen Engineer Gets Prison in Diesel Cheating Case, The New York Times, August 25, 2017, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2017/​08/​25/​business/​volkswagen-engineer-prison-diesel-cheating.​html.
 
1005
Volkswagen Senior Manager Sentenced to 84 Months in Prison for Role in Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests, U.S. Department of Justice, December 6, 2017, https://​www.​justice.​gov/​opa/​pr/​volkswagen-senior-manager-sentenced-84-months-prison-role-conspiracy-cheat-us-emissions-tests.
 
1006
United States of America v. Zaccheo Giovanni Pamio, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, July 6, 2017, https://​www.​justice.​gov/​opa/​press-release/​file/​978436/​download.
 
1007
Jack Ewing, Audi Engineer Implicates Superiors in Diesel Case, Lawyer Says, The New York Times, August 21, 2017, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2017/​08/​21/​business/​audi-volkswagen-diesel-emissions.​html.
 
1008
Jack Ewing, Volkswagen Memos Suggest Company Misled U.S. Regulators, The New York Times, February 18, 2016, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2016/​02/​19/​business/​volkswagen-memos-suggest-emissions-problem-was-known-earlier.​html.
 
1009
David McHugh, David Rising, Former Volkswagen CEO investigated over emissions scandal, Associated Press, June 20, 2016, https://​apnews.​com/​article/​4b3908c46df34602​9073f34ffcaeb32b​.
 
1010
Volkswagen considers shareholder lawsuit to be without merit, Volkswagen, March 2, 2016, https://​www.​automotiveworld.​com/​news-releases/​volkswagen-considers-shareholder-lawsuit-without-merit/​.
 
1011
Andreas Cremer, Tom Bergin, Fear and respect: VW’s culture under Winterkorn, Reuters, October 10, 2015, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​uk-volkswagen-emissions-culture-idUKKCN0S40MN201​51010.
 
1012
Jack Ewings, Volkswagen Emissions Scandal Inquiry Widens to Top Levels, The New York Times, November 6, 2016, https://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2016/​11/​07/​business/​inquiry-in-emissions-scandal-widens-to-volkswagens-top-levels.​html.
 
1013
Andreas Cremer, German prosecutors open fraud inquiry into former VW CEO, Reuters, January 27, 2017, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​volkswagen-emissions-probe-idUSL1N1FH0H8.
 
1014
Former CEO of Volkswagen AG Charged with Conspiracy and Wire Fraud in Diesel Emissions Scandal, U.S. Department of Justice, May 3, 2018, https://​www.​justice.​gov/​opa/​pr/​former-ceo-volkswagen-ag-charged-conspiracy-and-wire-fraud-diesel-emissions-scandal.
 
1015
Volkswagen’s Supervisory Board reaches agreement with Prof. Martin Winterkorn on EUR 11.2 million in compensation, Volkswagen, June 9, 2021, https://​www.​volkswagenag.​com/​en/​news/​2021/​06/​Volkswagens_​Supervisory_​Board_​reaches_​agreement_​with_​Prof_​Martin_​Winterkorn.​html.
 
1016
Charles Riley, Volkswagen’s ex-CEO pays company $14 million over his role in the diesel scandal, CNN Business, June 9, 2021, https://​edition.​cnn.​com/​2021/​06/​09/​business/​volkswagen-martin-winterkorn-dieselgate/​index.​html.
 
1017
Joint report of the Supervisory Board and Board of Management of VOLKSWAGEN AG on agenda items 10 and 11, Volkswagen, June 9, 2021, https://​www.​volkswagenag.​com/​presence/​investorrelation​/​publications/​sonstrechtlangel​egentheiten/​2021/​Preliminary%20​report.​pdf.
 
1018
A tailings dam is typically an earth-fill embankment dam used to store byproducts of mining operations after separating the ore from the gangue. Tailings dams rank among the largest engineered structures on Earth.
 
1019
An open letter to the International Community & Australian Parliament on the ongoing crisis in Brazil, February 18, 2016, http://​www.​aph.​gov.​au/​~/​media/​Committees/​fadt_​ctte/​estimates/​add_​1516/​Openletter.​pdf.​
 
1020
Flávio Fonseca doCarmo et al., Fundão tailings dam failures: the environment tragedy of the largest technological disaster of Brazilian mining in global context, Perspectives in Ecology and Conservation, July–September 2017, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp. 145–151, https://​www.​sciencedirect.​com/​science/​article/​pii/​S167900731630156​6.
 
1021
Norbert R. Morgenstern, Steven G. Vick, Cássio B. Viotti, Bryan D. Watts, Report on the Immediate Causes of the Failure of the Fundão Dam, Fundão Tailings Dam Review Panel, August 25, 2016, http://​fundaoinvestigat​ion.​com/​wp-content/​uploads/​general/​PR/​en/​FinalReport.​pdf.
 
1022
Flávio Fonseca doCarmo et al., Fundão tailings dam failures: the environment tragedy of the largest technological disaster of Brazilian mining in global context, Perspectives in Ecology and Conservation, July–September 2017, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp. 145–151, https://​www.​sciencedirect.​com/​science/​article/​pii/​S167900731630156​6.
 
1023
Catastrophic Failure: The biggest environmental disaster in Brazil’s mining history, ABC Australia/Journeyman Pictures, 2016, https://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​KF3Clm6T_​kI.
 
1024
Efforts towards preventing future tailings dam failures, Mining Weekly, September 29, 2017, www.​miningweekly.​com/​article/​efforts-towards-preventing-future-tailings-dam-failures-2017-09-29/​rep_​id:​3650.
 
1025
Flávio Fonseca doCarmo et al., Fundão tailings dam failures: the environment tragedy of the largest technological disaster of Brazilian mining in global context, Perspectives in Ecology and Conservation, July–September 2017, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp. 145–151, https://​www.​sciencedirect.​com/​science/​article/​pii/​S167900731630156​6.
 
1026
Holding BHP Accountable for Samarco’s Deadly Fundão Disaster, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, https://​www.​rgrdlaw.​com/​cases-in-re-bhp-billiton-ltd-sec-litig.​html.
 
1027
In re BHP BILLITON LIMITED SECURITIES LITIGATION, Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-01445-NRB, Document 53, United States District Court, S.D. New York, August 15, 2016, http://​securities.​stanford.​edu/​filings-documents/​1057/​BBL00_​01/​2016815_​r01c_​16CV01445.​pdf.
 
1028
Naomi Reice Buchwald, Memorandum and Order on In re BHP Billiton Ltd. Sec. Litig., United States District Court, S.D. New York, August 28, 2017, https://​casetext.​com/​case/​in-re-bhp-billiton-ltd-sec-litig.
 
1029
Dom Phillips, Brazil’s mining tragedy: was it a preventable disaster?, the Guardian, November 25, 2015, https://​www.​theguardian.​com/​sustainable-business/​2015/​nov/​25/​brazils-mining-tragedy-dam-preventable-disaster-samarco-vale-bhp-billiton.
 
1030
Naomi Reice Buchwald, Memorandum and Order on In re BHP Billiton Ltd. Sec. Litig., United States District Court, S.D. New York, August 28, 2017, https://​casetext.​com/​case/​in-re-bhp-billiton-ltd-sec-litig.
 
1031
Naomi Reice Buchwald, Memorandum and Order on In re BHP Billiton Ltd. Sec. Litig., United States District Court, S.D. New York, August 28, 2017, https://​casetext.​com/​case/​in-re-bhp-billiton-ltd-sec-litig.
 
1032
Naomi Reice Buchwald, Memorandum and Order on In re BHP Billiton Ltd. Sec. Litig., United States District Court, S.D. New York, August 28, 2017, https://​casetext.​com/​case/​in-re-bhp-billiton-ltd-sec-litig.
 
1033
Daniel Cerqueira, Letícia Aleixo, Two years after the Mariana disaster, the mining industry keeps the upper hand in Brazil, Democracia Abierta, October 16, 2017, https://​www.​opendemocracy.​net/​democraciaabiert​a/​daniel-cerqueira-let-cia-aleixo/​two-years-after-mariana-disaster-mining-industry-k.
 
1034
Catastrophic Failure: The biggest environmental disaster in Brazil’s mining history, ABC Australia/Journeyman Pictures, 2016, https://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​KF3Clm6T_​kI.
 
1035
Stephen Eisenhammer, Arsenic and mercury found in river days after Brazil dam burst, Reuters, November 26, 2015, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-brazil-damburst-tests/​arsenic-and-mercury-found-in-river-days-after-brazil-dam-burst-idUSKBN0TF20U201​51126.
 
1036
Naomi Reice Buchwald, Memorandum and Order on In re BHP Billiton Ltd. Sec. Litig., United States District Court, S.D. New York, August 28, 2017, https://​casetext.​com/​case/​in-re-bhp-billiton-ltd-sec-litig.
 
1037
Daniel Cerqueira, Letícia Aleixo, Two years after the Mariana disaster, the mining industry keeps the upper hand in Brazil, Democracia Abierta, October 16, 2017, https://​www.​opendemocracy.​net/​democraciaabiert​a/​daniel-cerqueira-let-cia-aleixo/​two-years-after-mariana-disaster-mining-industry-k.
 
1038
Daniel Cerqueira, Letícia Aleixo, Two years after the Mariana disaster, the mining industry keeps the upper hand in Brazil, Democracia Abierta, October 16, 2017, https://​www.​opendemocracy.​net/​democraciaabiert​a/​daniel-cerqueira-let-cia-aleixo/​two-years-after-mariana-disaster-mining-industry-k.
 
1039
Frederico Barbosa, ’No lessons learned’ from Samarco dam burst, Bnamericas, November 6, 2017, https://​www.​bnamericas.​com/​en/​news/​miningandmetals/​no-lessons-learned-by-the-government-from-samarco-dam-burst.
 
1040
Samantha Pearson, Luciana Magalhaes, Vale Fails to Get Safety Clearance for 18 Structures in Brazil, the Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2019, https://​www.​wsj.​com/​articles/​vale-fails-to-get-safety-clearance-for-17-structures-in-brazil-11554137430.
 
1041
Nick Toscano, BHP loses bid to limit shareholder claims in dam disaster class action, The Sydney Morning Herald, December 1, 2020, https://​www.​smh.​com.​au/​business/​companies/​bhp-loses-bid-to-limit-shareholder-claims-in-dam-disaster-class-action-20201130-p56j6i.​html.
 
1042
Mariaan Webb, Samarco unlikely to reopen this year, job cuts planned—BHP Billiton, Mining Weekly, July 14, 2016, http://​www.​miningweekly.​com/​article/​samarco-unlikely-to-reopen-this-year-bhp-billiton-2016-07-14.
 
1043
Bruno Venditti, Samarco resumes operations 5 years after Fundão dam tragedy, December 11, 2020, https://​www.​mining.​com/​samarco-resumes-operations-5-years-after-fundao-dam-tragedy.
 
1044
A criminal case on the accident at the Severnaya mine in the Komi Republic was sent to the court, the Investigative Committee of Russia, November 18, 2019, https://​sledcom.​ru/​news/​item/​1410904/​.
 
1045
Case of explosions at the Severnaya mine in Vorkuta brought to court, Rossiyskaya gazeta, November 18, 2019, https://​rg.​ru/​2019/​11/​18/​reg-szfo/​delo-v-vzryvah-na-shahte-severnaia-v-vorkute-peredano-v-sud.​html.
 
1046
Anonymous interview with HSE executive from the Russian mining and metals industry.
 
1052
Anonymous interview with HSE executive from the Russian mining and metals industry.
 
1054
Rostechnadzor: the accident at the Severnaya mine in Vorkuta has natural nature, TASS, February 28, 2016, https://​tass.​ru/​proisshestviya/​2702693.
 
1055
Natalia Telegina, Roman Asankin, Nature or negligence: could the explosion on the “Severnaya” be avoided, February 29, 2016, RBC, www.​rbc.​ru/​business/​29/​02/​2016/​56d45cfb9a794735​d67bd230.
 
1056
Tatyana Britskaya, Zinaida Burskaya, Mine face, Novaya Gazeta, February 28, 2016, https://​novayagazeta.​ru/​articles/​2016/​02/​28/​67586-zaboy.
 
1057
Maria Petrova, There are nobody to rescue at Severnaya, Trud, February 28, 2016.
 
1058
Maxim Polyakov, Cloud of anger. What happens in Vorkuta after the explosions at Severnaya coamine, 7 × 7, March 4, 2016, https://​meduza.​io/​feature/​2016/​03/​04/​oblako-gneva.
 
1059
Zinaida Burskaya, How mines explode, Novaya Gazeta, April 20, 2016, https://​novayagazeta.​ru/​articles/​2016/​04/​19/​68283-kak-vzryvayutsya-shahty.
 
1060
Severstal CEO rejects claims of manipulation of methane sensors for intensification of coal production, Interfax, February 29, 2016, https://​www.​interfax-russia.​ru/​northwest/​main/​gendirektor-severstali-otvergaet-zayavleniya-o-manipulyaciyah-s-datchikami-metana-radi-vyrabotki.
 
1061
A criminal case on the accident at the Severnaya mine in the Komi Republic was sent to the court, the Investigative Committee of Russia, November 18, 2019, https://​sledcom.​ru/​news/​item/​1410904/​.
 
1062
Case of explosions at the Severnaya mine in Vorkuta brought to court, Rossiyskaya gazeta, November 18, 2019, https://​rg.​ru/​2019/​11/​18/​reg-szfo/​delo-v-vzryvah-na-shahte-severnaia-v-vorkute-peredano-v-sud.​html.
 
1063
Arthur Priymak, Mass death of miners in Vorkuta “went on trial”, EADaily, January 11, 2020, https://​eadaily.​com/​ru/​news/​2020/​01/​11/​massovaya-gibel-shahterov-v-vorkute-ushla-pod-sud.
 
1064
Zinaida Burskaya, How mines explode, Novaya Gazeta, April 20, 2016, https://​novayagazeta.​ru/​articles/​2016/​04/​19/​68283-kak-vzryvayutsya-shahty.
 
1065
Zinaida Burskaya, How mines explode, Novaya Gazeta, April 20, 2016, https://​novayagazeta.​ru/​articles/​2016/​04/​19/​68283-kak-vzryvayutsya-shahty.
 
1066
Mansur Mirovalev, Methane explosions in Russian coal mine kill 36; cause disputed, Los Angeles Times, February 28, 2016, https://​www.​latimes.​com/​world/​europe/​la-fg-russia-mine-36-20160228-story.​html.
 
1067
Ani Oganisyan, “Grief crushed the city”. Vorkuta residents—about the accident at the Severnaya mine, Meduza, March 10, 2016, https://​meduza.​io/​feature/​2016/​03/​10/​gore-pridavilo-gorod.
 
1068
Mine “Severnaya”: forced to turn a blind eye to the excess of methane level, Sever. Realities, May 15, 2020, https://​www.​severreal.​org/​a/​30376565.​html.
 
1069
Audio recording of a meeting of native miners of the “Severnaya” with Dvorkovich and Mordashov, Medialinks, https://​www.​youtube.​com/​watch?​v=​L2XSyAC2EQA.
 
1070
Zinaida Burskaya, How mines explode, Novaya Gazeta, April 20, 2016, https://​novayagazeta.​ru/​articles/​2016/​04/​19/​68283-kak-vzryvayutsya-shahty.
 
1071
Zinaida Burskaya, How mines explode, Novaya Gazeta, April 20, 2016, https://​novayagazeta.​ru/​articles/​2016/​04/​19/​68283-kak-vzryvayutsya-shahty.
 
1072
Ani Oganisyan, “Grief crushed the city”. Vorkuta residents—about the accident at the Severnaya mine, Meduza, March 10, 2016, https://​meduza.​io/​feature/​2016/​03/​10/​gore-pridavilo-gorod.
 
1073
Rostechnadzor announces the completion of a technical investigation of the causes of an accident at the Severnaya mine, Rostechnadzor, July 22, 2016, http://​www.​gosnadzor.​ru/​news/​64/​1273/​.
 
1074
Experts of Rostekhnadzor named a new cause of the accident at the Severnaya mine, RBC, April 25, 2016, https://​www.​rbc.​ru/​business/​25/​04/​2017/​58ff56a19a794704​c16aefc8.
 
1075
Zinaida Burskaya, How mines explode, Novaya Gazeta, April 20, 2016, https://​novayagazeta.​ru/​articles/​2016/​04/​19/​68283-kak-vzryvayutsya-shahty.
 
1076
Depth—780. What changed one year after the emergency at the mine Severnaya mine, AiF-Komi, February 22, 2017, https://​perm.​aif.​ru/​komi/​glubina_​780_​chto_​izmenilos_​spustya_​god_​posle_​chp_​v_​shahte_​severnaya.
 
1077
Alexander Terentyeva, Vitaly Petlevoy, Severstal suspends the Severnaya mine, where 36 people died, Vedomosti, September 20, 2016, https://​www.​vedomosti.​ru/​business/​articles/​2016/​09/​21/​657859-severstal-severnaya.
 
1079
Alexander Goncharenko is appointed as director of the Vorkutinskaya mine, VorkutaUgol, January 20, 2014, http://​vorkutaugol.​ru/​rus/​press_​center/​news/​document2207.​pdf.
 
1080
Witness: “Vorkutaugol ‘appointed’ Goncharenko as the head of Rostekhnadzor in Komi”, Sever-Media, December 12, 2017, https://​www.​bnkomi.​ru/​data/​news/​71742/​.
 
1081
Witness: “Vorkutaugol ‘appointed’ Goncharenko as the head of Rostekhnadzor in Komi”, Sever-Media, December 12, 2017, https://​www.​bnkomi.​ru/​data/​news/​71742/​.
 
1082
Vitaly Petlevoy, “Persons acting in the interests of Vorkutaugol gave bribes”—Investigation Committee, Vedomosti, November 28, 2016, https://​www.​vedomosti.​ru/​business/​articles/​2016/​11/​28/​667254-litsa-deistvuyuschie.
 
1083
Investigation of criminal case of ex-head of the Pechora Administration of Rostechnadzor was completed in Komi, BNK News agency, October 2, 2017, https://​www.​bnkomi.​ru/​data/​news/​68927/​.
 
1084
Igor Nadezhdin, “This is not me, it is Moscow has aggressive motive”, Lenta.ru, May 8, 2018, https://​lenta.​ru/​articles/​2018/​05/​08/​vorkuta/​.
 
1085
Timofey Dzyadko, Ran away according to own volition. Ex-CEO of Severstal Vadim Larin was accused of bribery of supervisory bodies, RBC, November 30, 2016, https://​www.​rbc.​ru/​newspaper/​2016/​12/​01/​583f05119a794783​328b6e16.
 
1086
JSC “Vorkutaugol” will pay more than 30 million rubles as punishment for corruption, Kommersant, March 4, 2018, https://​www.​kommersant.​ru/​doc/​3592904.
 
1087
Timofey Dzyadko, Ran away according to own volition. Ex-CEO of Severstal Vadim Larin was accused of bribery of supervisory bodies, RBC, November 30, 2016, https://​www.​rbc.​ru/​newspaper/​2016/​12/​01/​583f05119a794783​328b6e16.
 
1088
Igor Nadezhdin, “This is not me, it is Moscow has aggressive motive”, Lenta.ru, May 8, 2018, https://​lenta.​ru/​articles/​2018/​05/​08/​vorkuta/​.
 
1089
Igor Nadezhdin, “This is not me, it is Moscow has aggressive motive”, Lenta.ru, May 8, 2018, https://​lenta.​ru/​articles/​2018/​05/​08/​vorkuta/​.
 
1090
Rostekhnadzor experts named a new cause of the accident at the Severnaya mine, RBC, April 25, 2017, https://​www.​rbc.​ru/​business/​25/​04/​2017/​58ff56a19a794704​c16aefc8.
 
1091
The ex-head of Severstal was put on the international wanted list, RBC, March 10, 2017, https://​www.​rbc.​ru/​business/​10/​03/​2017/​58c2797e9a7947fb​bc21d954.
 
1092
Igor Nadezhdin, “This is not me, it is Moscow has aggressive motive”, Lenta.ru, May 8, 2018, https://​lenta.​ru/​articles/​2018/​05/​08/​vorkuta/​.
 
1093
Anastasia Stepanova, Vorkutaugol. Paid for with life: about violations in mines, Regnum, March 6, 2020, https://​regnum.​ru/​news/​accidents/​2877403.​html.
 
1095
Vasily Milkin, Why Mordashov sells coal business to Trotsenko, Severstal wants to increase its ESG rating and eliminate the risks of tightening work in mines, Vedomosti, December 02, 2021, https://​www.​vedomosti.​ru/​business/​articles/​2021/​12/​02/​898708-mordashov-trotsenko-biznes.
 
1096
Hallie Gu, Josephine Mason,China reports first African swine fever outbreak, culls 1,000 hogs, Reuters, August 3,2018, https://​uk.​reuters.​com/​article/​china-swineflu-pigs/​rpt-update-2-china-reports-1st-african-swine-fever-outbreak-culls-1000-hogs-idUSL4N1V123R.
 
1097
Hallie Gu, Josephine Mason,China reports first African swine fever outbreak, culls 1,000 hogs, Reuters, August 3,2018, https://​uk.​reuters.​com/​article/​china-swineflu-pigs/​rpt-update-2-china-reports-1st-african-swine-fever-outbreak-culls-1000-hogs-idUSL4N1V123R.
 
1098
热搜|在今年春天, 非洲猪瘟为何“插上翅膀”难以防范, Caixin, July 18, 2019, http://​www.​caixin.​com/​2019-07-18/​101441108.​html.
 
1100
Sun Liangzi, Tang Ziyi, Deadly Pig Disease Has Cost China More Than $140 Billion: Professor, Caixin, September 25, 2019, https://​www.​caixinglobal.​com/​2019-09-25/​deadly-pig-disease-has-cost-china-more-than-140-billion-professor-101466143.​html.
 
1101
Swine fever in China among risks to food markets, Reuters, July 8, 2019, https://​in.​reuters.​com/​news/​picture/​swine-fever-in-china-among-risks-to-food-idINKCN1U31GM.
 
1102
特稿|非洲猪瘟调查: 病毒是如何插上翅膀的, Caixin, July 5, 2019, http://​science.​caixin.​com/​2019-07-05/​101436118.​html (Chinese).
 
1103
How African swine fever was buried in the USSR, https://​fsvps.​gov.​ru/​fsvps-forum/​posts/​downloadAttach/​970.​page (Russian).
 
1104
Report on the results of studying the ways of introduction and spread of African swine fever in the Odessa region in 1977, State Scientific Institution VNIIVViM of the Russian Agricultural Academy, 2014, https://​www.​fsvps.​gov.​ru/​fsvps-forum/​posts/​downloadAttach/​975.​page (Russian).
 
1105
Beltrán-Alcrudo, D., Arias, M., Gallardo, C., Kramer, S. & Penrith, M.L. African swine fever: detection and diagnosis—A manual for veterinarians, FAO Animal Production and Health Manual No. 19, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, p. 9, http://​www.​fao.​org/​3/​I7228EN/​i7228en.​pdf.
 
1106
Mapи-Лyиз Пeнpит, Bиттopиo Гyбepти, Клayc Дeпнep, Xyaн Лyбpoт, Пocoбиe пo пoдгoтoвкe чpeзвычaйныx плaнoв дeйcтвий нa cлyчaйэпидeмии aфpикaнcкoй чyмы cвинeй, FAO Animal Production and Health Manual No. 8, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2009, p. 6, www.​fao.​org/​3/​a-i1196r.​pdf (Russian), http://​www.​fao.​org/​3/​a-i1196e.​pdf (English).
 
1107
Beltrán-Alcrudo, D., Arias, M., Gallardo, C., Kramer, S. & Penrith, M.L. African swine fever: detection and diagnosis—A manual for veterinarians, FAO Animal Production and Health Manual No. 19, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, p. 9, http://​www.​fao.​org/​3/​I7228EN/​i7228en.​pdf.
 
1108
Mary-Louise Penrith, Vittorio Guberti, Klaus Depner, Juan Lubroth, Preparation of African swine fever contingency plans, FAO Animal Production and Health Manual No. 8, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, p. 51, http://​www.​fao.​org/​3/​a-i1196e.​pdf.
 
1109
Kolbasov, D., Titov, I., Tsybanov, S., Gogin, A., & Malogolovkin, A., African Swine Fever Virus, Siberia, Russia, 2017. Emerging infectious diseases, 2018, 24(4), pp. 796–798, https://​researchonline.​lshtm.​ac.​uk/​id/​eprint/​4652232/​1/​African%20​Swine%20​Fever%20​Virus%2C%20​Siberia%2C%20​Russia%2C%20​2017.​pdf.
 
1110
Sergei Khomenko, Daniel Beltrán-Alcrudo, Andriy Rozstalnyy, Andrey Gogin, Denis Kolbasov, Julio Pinto, Juan Lubroth, Vincent Martin, African swine fever in the Russian Federation: risk factors for Europe and beyond, Empres watch of FAO, Volume 28, May 2013, http://​www.​fao.​org/​3/​aq240e/​aq240e.​pdf.
 
1111
Mary-Louise Penrith, Vittorio Guberti, Klaus Depner, Juan Lubroth, Preparation of African swine fever contingency plans, FAO Animal Production and Health Manual No. 8, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, pp. 47, 55, http://​www.​fao.​org/​3/​a-i1196e.​pdf.
 
1112
Dominique Patton, Special Report: Before coronavirus, China bungled swine epidemic with secrecy, Reuters, March 5, 2020, https://​uk.​reuters.​com/​article/​uk-swinefever-china-epidemic-specialrepo/​special-report-before-coronavirus-china-bungled-swine-epidemic-with-secrecy-idUKKBN20S18U.
 
1113
特稿|非洲猪瘟调查: 病毒是如何插上翅膀的, Caixin, July 5, 2019, http://​science.​caixin.​com/​2019-07-05/​101436118.​html (Chinese).
 
1114
Jason Gale, Hannah Dormido and Adrian Leung, The World Doesn’t Have Enough Pigs to Fill China’s Pork Deficit, Bloomberg, June 6, 2019, https://​www.​bloomberg.​com/​graphics/​2019-eliminating-african-swine-fever/​.
 
1115
特稿|非洲猪瘟调查: 病毒是如何插上翅膀的, Caixin, July 5, 2019, http://​science.​caixin.​com/​2019-07-05/​101436118.​html (Chinese).
 
1116
Dominique Patton, Special Report: Before coronavirus, China bungled swine epidemic with secrecy, Reuters, March 5, 2020, https://​uk.​reuters.​com/​article/​uk-swinefever-china-epidemic-specialrepo/​special-report-before-coronavirus-china-bungled-swine-epidemic-with-secrecy-idUKKBN20S18U.
 
1117
Megan Tatum, Fear the Fever: what can be done to tackle the African swine fever pandemic?, The Grocer, October 31, 2019, https://​www.​thegrocer.​co.​uk/​food-safety/​fear-the-fever-what-can-be-done-to-tackle-the-african-swine-fever-pandemic/​599045.​article.
 
1118
Beltrán-Alcrudo, D., Arias, M., Gallardo, C., Kramer, S. & Penrith, M.L. African swine fever: detection and diagnosis—A manual for veterinarians, FAO Animal Production and Health Manual No. 19, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, p. 15, http://​www.​fao.​org/​3/​I7228EN/​i7228en.​pdf.
 
1119
热搜|在今年春天, 非洲猪瘟为何“插上翅膀”难以防范, Caixin, July 18, 2019, http://​www.​caixin.​com/​2019-07-18/​101441108.​html, (Chinese).
 
1120
特稿|非洲猪瘟调查: 病毒是如何插上翅膀的, Caixin, July 5, 2019, http://​science.​caixin.​com/​2019-07-05/​101436118.​html (Chinese).
 
1121
Linda Dixon, Karl Stahl, Ferran Jori, Laurence Vial, Dirk U. Pfeiffer, African Swine Fever Epidemiology and Control, Annual Review of Animal Biosciences Volume 8, 2020, pp 221-246, https://​www.​annualreviews.​org/​doi/​abs/​10.​1146/​annurev-animal-021419-083741.
 
1122
Dominique Patton, Special Report: Before coronavirus, China bungled swine epidemic with secrecy, Reuters, March 5, 2020, https://​uk.​reuters.​com/​article/​uk-swinefever-china-epidemic-specialrepo/​special-report-before-coronavirus-china-bungled-swine-epidemic-with-secrecy-idUKKBN20S18U.
 
1123
热搜|在今年春天, 非洲猪瘟为何“插上翅膀”难以防范, Caixin, July 18, 2019, http://​www.​caixin.​com/​2019-07-18/​101441108.​html (Chinese).
 
1124
Du Caicai, Feng Yuding, Chen Shuning, Qi Xiaomei, Ren Qiuyu, In Depth: How Secrecy and Loopholes Fueled China’s Swine Fever Crisis, Caixin, Jul 05, 2019, https://​www.​caixinglobal.​com/​2019-07-05/​how-secrecy-and-quarantine-fueled-chinas-swine-fever-crisis-101436251.​html.
 
1125
Ren Qiuyu, China’s ‘Man-Made’ Swine Fever Crisis Revealed, Caixin, July 08, 2019, https://​www.​caixinglobal.​com/​2019-07-08/​chinas-man-made-swine-fever-crisis-revealed-101436966.​html.
 
1127
Dominique Patton, Piles of pigs: Swine fever outbreaks go unreported in rural China, Reuters, March 20, 2019, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-china-swinefever-reporting-insight-idUSKCN1R10VQ.
 
1128
Dominique Patton, Special Report: Before coronavirus, China bungled swine epidemic with secrecy, Reuters, March 5, 2020, https://​uk.​reuters.​com/​article/​uk-swinefever-china-epidemic-specialrepo/​special-report-before-coronavirus-china-bungled-swine-epidemic-with-secrecy-idUKKBN20S18U.
 
1129
热搜|在今年春天, 非洲猪瘟为何“插上翅膀”难以防范, Caixin, July 18, 2019, http://​www.​caixin.​com/​2019-07-18/​101441108.​html (Chinese).
 
1130
Echo Xie, Keegan Elmer, Orange Wang, China declares victory over African swine fever but cover-up claims call success into question, the South China Morning Post, March 22, 2019, https://​www.​scmp.​com/​economy/​china-economy/​article/​3002717/​china-says-it-has-contained-african-swine-fever-cover-claims.
 
1131
Dominique Patton, Piles of pigs: Swine fever outbreaks go unreported in rural China, Reuters, March 20, 2019, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-china-swinefever-reporting-insight-idUSKCN1R10VQ.
 
1132
Dominique Patton, Special Report: Before coronavirus, China bungled swine epidemic with secrecy, Reuters, March 5, 2020, https://​uk.​reuters.​com/​article/​uk-swinefever-china-epidemic-specialrepo/​special-report-before-coronavirus-china-bungled-swine-epidemic-with-secrecy-idUKKBN20S18U.
 
1133
Xu Wen, The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs talks about the prevention and control of African swine fever: exposed the lack of people and money in the grassroots epidemic prevention system, July 4, 2019, Beijing News, http://​www.​bjnews.​com.​cn/​news/​2019/​07/​04/​599122.​html.
 
1134
Jason Gale, Hannah Dormido and Adrian Leung, The World Doesn’t Have Enough Pigs to Fill China’s Pork Deficit, Bloomberg, published June 6, 2019, updated: November 29 2019, https://​www.​bloomberg.​com/​graphics/​2019-eliminating-african-swine-fever/​.
 
1135
特稿|非洲猪瘟调查: 病毒是如何插上翅膀的, Caixin, July 5, 2019, http://​science.​caixin.​com/​2019-07-05/​101436118.​html (Chinese).
 
1136
Temporary Awarding Method for Reporting ASF Epidemic Situation, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the PRC, November 22, 2019, http://​www.​moa.​gov.​cn/​govpublic/​xmsyj/​201911/​t20191122_​6332267.​htm (Chinese).
 
1137
China urges crack down on concealing African swine fever: agriculture ministry, Reuters, March 4, 2019, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-china-swinefever-idUSKCN1QL0XN.
 
1138
Dominique Patton, Special Report: Before coronavirus, China bungled swine epidemic with secrecy, Reuters, March 5, 2020, https://​uk.​reuters.​com/​article/​uk-swinefever-china-epidemic-specialrepo/​special-report-before-coronavirus-china-bungled-swine-epidemic-with-secrecy-idUKKBN20S18U.
 
1139
特稿|非洲猪瘟调查: 病毒是如何插上翅膀的, Caixin, July 5, 2019, http://​science.​caixin.​com/​2019-07-05/​101436118.​html.
 
1140
Dominique Patton, Piles of pigs: Swine fever outbreaks go unreported in rural China, Reuters, March 20, 2019, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-china-swinefever-reporting-insight-idUSKCN1R10VQ.
 
1141
Dominique Patton, Hallie Gu, China has culled more than 900,000 pigs due to African swine fever, Reuters, January 15, 2019, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-china-swinefever-idUSKCN1P90I1.
 
1142
Rod McGuirk, Australia deports woman to Vietnam over smuggled pork, The Associated Press, October 15, 2019, https://​apnews.​com/​article/​a7b6ae454bb04d0b​b4ad1954e33ed79b​.
 
1143
Dominique Patton, Piles of pigs: Swine fever outbreaks go unreported in rural China, Reuters, March 20, 2019, https://​www.​reuters.​com/​article/​us-china-swinefever-reporting-insight-idUSKCN1R10VQ ―.
 
1144
Sybille de La Hamaide, No country immune to risk of African swine fever spreading: OIE, Reuters, October 30, 2019, https://​uk.​reuters.​com/​article/​global-swinefever-oie/​rpt-no-country-immune-to-risk-of-african-swine-fever-spreading-oie-idUSL8N27F8F5.
 
1145
Dominique Patton, Special Report: Before coronavirus, China bungled swine epidemic with secrecy, Reuters, March 5, 2020, https://​uk.​reuters.​com/​article/​uk-swinefever-china-epidemic-specialrepo/​special-report-before-coronavirus-china-bungled-swine-epidemic-with-secrecy-idUKKBN20S18U.
 
1146
Echo Xie, Keegan Elmer, Orange Wang, China declares victory over African swine fever but cover-up claims call success into question, the South China Morning Post, March 22, 2019, https://​www.​scmp.​com/​economy/​china-economy/​article/​3002717/​china-says-it-has-contained-african-swine-fever-cover-claims.
 
1147
Megan Tatum, Fear the Fever: what can be done to tackle the African swine fever pandemic?, The Grocer, October 31, 2019, https://​www.​thegrocer.​co.​uk/​food-safety/​fear-the-fever-what-can-be-done-to-tackle-the-african-swine-fever-pandemic/​599045.​article.
 
1148
Echo Xie, Keegan Elmer, Orange Wang, China declares victory over African swine fever but cover-up claims call success into question, the South China Morning Post, March 22, 2019, https://​www.​scmp.​com/​economy/​china-economy/​article/​3002717/​china-says-it-has-contained-african-swine-fever-cover-claims.
 
1149
中国有能力控制非洲猪瘟疫情——世界动物卫生组织总干事谈中国非洲猪瘟防控 (China has the ability to control the African swine fever epidemic——The Director-General of the World Organisation for Animal Health), Xinhua News Agency, February 2, 2019, http://​www.​gov.​cn/​xinwen/​2019-02/​02/​content_​5363492.​htm (Chinese).
 
1150
Sybille de La Hamaide, No country immune to risk of African swine fever spreading: OIE, Reuters, October 30, 2019, https://​uk.​reuters.​com/​article/​global-swinefever-oie/​rpt-no-country-immune-to-risk-of-african-swine-fever-spreading-oie-idUSL8N27F8F5.
 
1151
Yufeng Ding Yanli Wang, Big government: The fight against the African Swine Fever in China, Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity, Volume 2, Issue 1, March 2020, Pages 44-49, https://​www.​sciencedirect.​com/​science/​article/​pii/​S258893382030006​6.
 
1152
Jason Gale, Hannah Dormido and Adrian Leung, The World Doesn’t Have Enough Pigs to Fill China’s Pork Deficit, Bloomberg, published June 6, 2019, updated: November 29 2019, https://​www.​bloomberg.​com/​graphics/​2019-eliminating-african-swine-fever/​.
 
Metadata
Title
Examples of Failures in Intra-Organizational Risk Transmission in Past Disasters
Authors
Dmitry Chernov
Didier Sornette
Giovanni Sansavini
Ali Ayoub
Copyright Year
2022
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05206-4_2