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Political Behavior

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01-03-2015 | Original Paper

Explaining Group Influence: The Role of Identity and Emotion in Political Conformity and Polarization

Author: Elizabeth Suhay

Published in: Political Behavior | Issue 1/2015

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Abstract

Evidence has accumulated that people often conform to political norms. However, we know little about the mechanisms underlying political conformity. Whose norms are people likely to follow, and why? This article discusses two phenomena—social identity and “self-conscious” emotions—that are key to understanding when and why people follow the crowd. It argues that adherence to in-group norms is a critical basis of status among in-group peers. Conformity generates peer approval and leads to personal pride. Deviance generates disapproval and causes embarrassment or shame. These emotional reactions color an individual’s political perspectives, typically generating conformity. These same mechanisms can spur between-group polarization. In this case, differentiation from the norms of disliked out-groups results in peer approval and pride, and conformity to out-group norms disapproval and embarrassment or shame. This framework is supported by the results of two experiments that examine the influence of group opinion norms over economic and social aspects of citizens’ political ideologies. One exogenously varies the social identity of attitudinal majorities; the other primes the relevant emotions. In addition to contributing to the study of political conformity and polarization, this article adds to our growing understanding of the relevance of social identity and emotion to political life.

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While political scientists often associate norms with behavior, group norms may be behaviors, thoughts, or even feelings that are typical within a group (Hogg and Reid 2006, p. 8).

Many types of groups are relevant, ranging from face-to-face (e.g., workplace, neighborhood) to broader demographic (e.g., race, sex, religious) groups. A person who identifies with a group perceives it to be an important element of his or her personal self-concept (Tajfel and Turner 1986).

This article focuses on descriptive norms (an opinion held or behavior engaged in by the majority), not injunctive norms (opinions or behaviors considered socially desirable or even morally correct). Note, however, that the line between descriptive and injunctive norms is unclear. Like injunctive norms, descriptive norms typically suggest to people how they ought to behave (Theiss-Morse 2009), signaling opinions and behaviors “appropriate” for group members (Turner et al. 1987). Also similar to injunctive norms, descriptive norms can be enforced via social-psychological rewards and sanctions (Scheff 1988).

See also work by Elster on adherence to social norms (e.g., 1999).

Many definitions of polarization exist. In this article, polarization refers to the phenomenon whereby the norms of two or more groups increasingly differ from one another over time.

The borders of social identity theory are ambiguous, in large part because it has spawned an enormous literature. A common error is to attribute theoretical propositions and empirical insights associated with self-categorization theory to social identity theory, particularly in the arena of social influence (see Haslam et al. 2010). Such confusion is understandable given the overlapping themes (social identity) and authorship (Tajfel and Turner). And, in some cases, authors explicitly use the “social identity theory” label to refer to both theories, while clarifying that there exist two separate branches of the theory (e.g., Huddy 2001; Huddy and Khatib 2007). In this article, the term “social identity perspective” is used as an umbrella term to refer to both theories together along with newer theories that build on their insights.

These studies do not argue that homophily does not contribute to within-group similarity; rather, they argue that group influence over the individual and homophily both are reasons for within-group similarity but also that their effects can be disentangled through experimentation.

Defining emotion is notoriously difficult. Lazarus (1991) says that “emotion is an integrative, organismic concept that…unites motivation, cognition, and adaptation in a complex configuration” (40). Cognitive appraisals of whether and how a situation is relevant to an individual’s goals set in motion (ideally) adaptive action tendencies and coping mechanisms. Much of this psychological and physiological activity occurs automatically and subconsciously, but some may be conscious, including subjectively felt “feelings.”

Self-categorization theory also includes this idea, but Turner casts it in cognitive terms (Turner 1985, p. 261) and does not incorporate it into his explanation for conformity and polarization. Turner’s de-emphasis of the self-esteem plank of social identity theory may stem from uneven empirical support for this proposition (see Brown 2000). The self-esteem hypothesis discussed in this article is related but clearly distinct from that discussed as a part of social identity theory.

While Lazarus argues that the main difference between these two emotions is intensity level (Lazarus 1991), note that some argue for differences in kind as well as degree (e.g., see Miller 2007).

Intergroup emotions theory, a broadly applicable theory developed by Smith and Mackie (see, e.g., Mackie et al. 2009), argues that, when social identity is salient, people will appraise situations and experience relevant emotions in accord not with their personal identities but, rather, with their social identities. For example, when a social identity is highly salient, an out-group attack on the in-group is experienced as an attack on the self, and fear or anger directed at the out-group is generated as a result. Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) provide an updated take on social identity theory’s “need for positive distinctiveness” with their construct “collective self-esteem,” i.e., that part of an individual’s self-esteem that is derived from the status of one’s in-group(s) within society at large. This concept is distinct from what they call “membership esteem,” that part of self-esteem stemming from one’s status as an individual within the group. While collective self-esteem may be the cause of many important intergroup phenomena (including prejudice and people’s desire to “exit” low status groups), emotions scholars have made clear that within-group conformity hinges on membership esteem.

Many distinguish between “informational influence” (“true” influence based on information) and “normative influence” (surface compliance due to an effort to ingratiate oneself with peers) (Deutsch and Gerard [1955] 1965) but others have challenged this dichotomy (e.g., Turner et al. 1987; Hogg and Reid 2006). This article suggests that what many would call “normative influence” can in fact cause the “true” influence often associated with informational influence.

It is common for causal variables to be both mediators and moderators in a theoretical framework. This is the case with respect to self-conscious emotions in the model proposed herewith (see the “An Integrated Perspective on Social Influence” section). Because the critical test of emotions’ causal influence in Study 2 below involves exogenous arousal, a moderation test is performed. However, one could argue that—taken together—the two studies test mediation: Group norms arouse self-conscious emotions in Study 1, and their causal effects are demonstrated in Study 2 (see Bullock et al. 2010; Imai et al. 2012).

While a religious person’s opinions on social issues are also influenced by religious doctrine, religious leaders, etc., the focus here will be specifically on religious peer influence.

Reflecting the demographic attributes of the participating Archdiocese, the sample is more racially homogeneous (98 % white) and upper-income (50 % middle-class; 40 % upper-middle class) than U.S. Catholics as a whole. (National statistics from Pew Research Center 2008.)

American Evangelicals and Catholics tend to be mutually exclusive groups (Putnam and Campbell 2010). Only one participant, removed from the sample, identified as Evangelical. In the post-test, participants rated Evangelicals 25 points lower than Catholics on average on a 100-point scale. (Ratings were not influenced by experimental treatments.)

The questions that make up the identity measure reflect the social identity perspective’s definition of “identification”: “the extent to which the category is valued and contributes to an enduring sense of self” (Haslam et al. 2010, p. 349). By design, the measure is somewhat out of sync with self-categorization theory’s exclusively cognitive focus (the “importance” question has an affective component). However, the measure admittedly does not emphasize affiliative, emotional attachments to the same extent as those of some authors, such as Theiss-Morse (2009).

Because the information does not challenge de facto assumptions, it is unlikely to influence participants.

Note that confidence intervals surrounding two estimates that are significantly different from one another may still overlap somewhat. (Confidence intervals are wider than standard errors.)

Statistical tests assessing experimental group balance on demographic and political variables showed that randomization was successful and, therefore, no control variables were used.

One-tailed tests are employed throughout this section given the directional nature of the hypotheses. Note p-values for the following additional contrasts: Catholics conservative vs. Catholics progressive (p = .07); Catholics conservative vs. Evangelicals conservative (p = .08).

Similar results are obtained if this treatment effect is estimated separately for those with Catholic identities above vs. at/below the scale midpoint. Those with strong Catholic identities appeared to shift their views in the progressive direction in response to the “Evangelicals are conservative” stimulus (b = −.126, p ≤ .01) but weak identifiers did not.

The total N available is too small for a test of H6 (emotion moderation). The reason for the small N is as follows: (1) For methodological reasons, the analysis cannot include the control group (because the emotion questions asked for reactions to the treatments) or participants who said in the pre-test that they disagreed with socially conservative Church teachings (a different emotional pattern is expected from such individuals, and there are too few to analyze separately). (2) There was significant attrition prior to the emotion questions because they followed a difficult screening question at the end of the study. This attrition is statistically unrelated to treatment group and, thus, does not threaten the causal inferences. The final N is 31.

The identity moderation hypothesis (H4) was only partially supported, however; strong identifiers were not more likely than low identifiers to shift in a progressive direction when exposed to progressive in-group norms. One explanation for this null result is that some of the most devoted Catholics, who also tended to be the most conservative, may have dismissed the progressive Catholics depicted in the study as not “true Catholics.” Borrowing again from Turner (1991), if an in-group norm is too different from a person’s personal beliefs, he or she may choose to redraw group boundaries—separating him or herself from the former in-group—rather than conform. Exploring when such identity redefinition occurs is an important topic for further study.

Demographics are as follows: 47 % Democratic, 23 % Republican, and 31 % Independent or “other.” 78 % white, 8 % African American, 7 % Asian, 5 % Hispanic, and 2 % Native American. Men made up 52 % of the sample. The mean age was 19.

A post-test probe did not turn up any skepticism with regard to the veracity of these stimuli.

In other words, “incidental affect” (orthogonal to study content) rather than “integral affect” (arising in response to related content) is examined (see Blanchette and Richards 2010). The former allows one to more cleanly isolate the causal influence of emotion on the dependent variable; the latter is usually intertwined with cognitive content related to the study.

In most cases, these individuals expressed mild opposition to just one of the statements. While there are too few cases for separate analysis here, note that adding these individuals to the analyses that follow does not considerably alter the results.

Patterns of results presented below are similar when the variables are assessed separately.

This battery of questions was based on a widely-used emotion measure called the “Profile of Mood States” (POMS) created by McNair and Droppleman (1971).

Note that it is inappropriate to test the moderating effect of emotion in this study by comparing the opinion treatment effect across levels of embarrassment and pride separately and for all participants, regardless of treatment. To illustrate, take the case of embarrassment. The meaning and effects of a high level of embarrassment differ depending on whether it occurs in participants who received the pro-individualism or the anti-individualism treatment. In response to the anti-individualism treatment, where the participant is in the minority, embarrassment signals a participant is likely to conform, as expected; however, in response to the pro-individualism treatment, the unusual circumstance of embarrassment in response to being in the majority suggests a participant may instead deviate from the perceived norm because he or she is, evidently, uncomfortable being in the mainstream. (A parallel, opposite, result would occur if one concentrated on pride.) Thus, despite a focus on one emotion, the changing context means such an analysis is not comparing like to like. Interacting the opinion treatment variable with the above-described Self-Conscious Emotion Intensity scale better tests the emotion moderation hypothesis.

Randomization successfully balanced the treatment groups with respect to age and political ideology but not sex or race. These two variables are therefore added to the analyses as controls; however, their addition does not substantially alter the results of the analyses.

Note that this study tests H6 in the context of conformity to in-group norms. Future research will be needed to address the emotion moderation hypothesis with respect to polarization in response to out-group norms.

While hypotheses with clear directional claims continue to be tested, the F ratio is akin to a two-tailed test.

Self-reported emotion is entered into the ANOVA as a continuous variable, i.e., the analysis is technically an ANCOVA (with interaction). While this variable theoretically ranges from 0 to 1, the actual range is 0–.75 because few participants reported experiencing extreme emotion.

An average of three basic emotions: anxiety, anger, and enthusiasm (see, e.g., Panksepp 1994).

Seven answer categories for Likert items ranged from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” Identity items included five possible responses, from, e.g., “not very important” to “extremely important.” Emotion questions had five possible responses, from “not at all” to “extremely.”

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Title: Explaining Group Influence: The Role of Identity and Emotion in Political Conformity and Polarization
Author: Elizabeth Suhay
Publication date: 01-03-2015
Publisher: Springer US
Published in: Political Behavior / Issue 1/2015
Print ISSN: 0190-9320
Electronic ISSN: 1573-6687
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-014-9269-1

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