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01-09-2008

Explanation in Dynamical Cognitive Science

Author: Joel Walmsley

Published in: Minds and Machines | Issue 3/2008

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Abstract

In this paper, I outline two strands of evidence for the conclusion that the dynamical approach to cognitive science both seeks and provides covering law explanations. Two of the most successful dynamical models—Kelso’s model of rhythmic finger movement and Thelen et al.’s model of infant perseverative reaching—can be seen to provide explanations which conform to the famous explanatory scheme first put forward by Hempel and Oppenheim. In addition, many prominent advocates of the dynamical approach also express the provision of this kind of explanation as a goal of dynamical cognitive science. I conclude by briefly outlining two consequences. First, dynamical cognitive science’s explanatory style may strengthen its links to the so-called “situated” approach to cognition, but, secondly, it may also undermine the widespread intuition that dynamics is related to emergentism in the philosophy of mind.

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Pope (1903, p. 142), lines 35–29. Quoted in Kelso (2003).

Globus (1992); Skarda and Freeman (1987); Foss (1992).

Busemeyer and Townsend (1993); Thelen and Smith (1994).

Brooks (1991); Beer (1995); Bedau (1997).

Van Gelder (1995, 1997a, 1997b, 1998); Bechtel (1998); Clark (1997); Horgan and Tienson (1992, 1994, 1996).

Thompson (2007).

Tschacher and Haken (2007).

Kelso (2003, p. 46).

Kelso (1995, p. 49).

See Van Gelder (1999) for a good summary.

Thelen and Smith (1994), Thelen et al. (2001).

van Gelder (1998, p. 625). My emphasis.

Ibid.

Clark (1997, p. 119).

Bechtel (1998, p. 311).

Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2002, p. 267).

Putting it like this makes it clear why such explanations are sometimes called “deductive-nomological” explanations. Bill Seager has suggested that “covering law” explanation might be construed as a broader category than “deductive-nomological” if the former is intended to cover deduction from statistical and probabilistic laws whereas the latter is not. Since I am more interested in the deductive form of the explanation than the content of the laws, I shall use the former, broader, phrase.

Hempel and Oppenheim say that initial conditions aren’t necessary so that cases where one law is deduced from another count as explanations. So, suppose one asked a question such as “Why is Boyle’s law such that p = k(v/t)?” An answer would show how p = k(v/t) is derived from a law of statistical thermodynamics. Even though the answer does not mention any initial conditions, Hempel and Oppenheim still want this to count as an explanation (i.e., an answer to the explanation-seeking question).

Hempel (1965, p. 337). Italics in original. Note how this description assimilates explanation and prediction.

All four quotations are from Hempel and Oppenheim (1948, p. 137).

Ibid., p. 138.

I owe this point to Kukla (2001) who writes: “an experiment may be defined as an arrangement whereby the antecedent of a counterfactual is satisfied, whereupon we can observe whether the consequent falls into line.” (p. 48).

Thelen et al. (2001, p. 1).

Van Gelder (1991, p. 500).

Ibid.

Van Gelder and Port (1995, p. 14).

Ibid., p. 19.

Clark (1997, p. 100).

Ibid., p. 115.

Holland (1998, p. 45).

Carruthers (2004, p. 159).

We might want to say that the height of the flagpole explains the length of the shadow, but we would not normally want to say that the length of the shadow explains the height of the flagpole. The covering law model offers no way to distinguish between the two with the former being the genuine explanation.

Consider the following (covering law) explanation: All males who take birth control pills regularly do not get pregnant, John Jones takes birth control pills regularly, therefore John Jones does not get pregnant. Such an argument conforms to a covering law scheme, but we would not normally want to say that the premises are a good explanation of why John Jones fails to get pregnant.

Van Gelder (1991, p. 500).

Thanks to Christian Lacroix for pointing this out.

Kim (1999, p. 17).

Bird (1999, p. 17).

Glymour (2007).

See, for example, Chemero (2001).

Bechtel, W. (1998). Representations and cognitive explanations: assessing the dynamicist’s challenge in cognitive science. Cognitive Science, 22(3), 295–318.CrossRef

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Title: Explanation in Dynamical Cognitive Science
Author: Joel Walmsley
Publication date: 01-09-2008
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Published in: Minds and Machines / Issue 3/2008
Print ISSN: 0924-6495
Electronic ISSN: 1572-8641
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9103-9

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