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Published in: Journal of Happiness Studies 5/2010

01-10-2010 | Research Paper

Happiness, morality, and politics

Author: Bengt Brülde

Published in: Journal of Happiness Studies | Issue 5/2010

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Abstract

The idea that politics should promote the happiness of the population is rather common in the community of happiness researchers. This political view is sometimes based on the happiness principle, the fundamental ethical view that we have a strong moral reason to do what we can to maximize the happiness and minimize the suffering in the world. The first main purpose of this paper is to investigate (1) what role this principle play in ethics as a whole, how it should be weighed against other moral considerations, and (2) how exactly it should be understood, i.e. which possible version of the principle that is most plausible. This is the only way to arrive at well-founded theory of the fundamental moral (and political) significance of happiness and suffering (an “ethics of happiness and suffering”). The idea that politics should promote happiness is sometimes accompanied by the notion that we should introduce some kind of happiness index, and that it is a central goal of politics to maximize the value of this index. The second main purpose of this paper is to examine this suggestion. I will first ask (3) how such an index should be constructed, assuming that it might be a good idea to construct an index in the first place. I assume that an index of this kind cannot be plausible unless it incorporates a number of moral considerations, and that (3) is very closely related to (2). I will then ask (4) whether the suggestion is plausible, or whether there are better ways to put a politics of happiness into practice, e.g. to simply apply the knowledge we have about the determinants of happiness.

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Footnotes
1
There are also a number of happiness researchers who reject these ideas; cf. de Prycker 2010 for a brief overview.
 
2
Should we also be concerned with equality between groups? I think not. In practice, we often need to concern ourselves with group inequalities, but this is mainly because some inequalities between individuals are caused by social injustices, and because it is a more manageable political goal to try to reduce the latter. But we should also be concerned with inequality within groups.
 
3
Depending on how it is constructed, it might also (if used on the local level) be used to identify those populations (municipalities, groups) that are least happy and thus most in need of support (i.e. as a basis for resource allocation), as well as for research purposes, e.g. to learn more about the effects of large-scale social factors on happiness.
 
4
If this view on the weighing of happiness is adopted, at least three alternative views are rejected, namely: (1) The utilitarian idea each improvement of a certain magnitude should be regarded as equally valuable regardless of where on the scale it occurs. (2) The idea that once a certain level (e.g. “normal” or “acceptable” happiness) has been attained, further improvements are worth nothing from a political perspective. Politics should do nothing for those who have reached this level (and who can be expected to stay on this level). (3) Improvements beyond normal happiness still have value, but they are worth less (from a political perspective) than improvements below this level (cf. Brülde forthcoming).
 
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Metadata
Title
Happiness, morality, and politics
Author
Bengt Brülde
Publication date
01-10-2010
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Published in
Journal of Happiness Studies / Issue 5/2010
Print ISSN: 1389-4978
Electronic ISSN: 1573-7780
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-010-9207-9

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