Hurricane Katrina: The Making of Unworthy Disaster Victims

James Carney, et al., (September 19, 2005) reported that “hundreds or regional and federal officials” had met in Baton Rouge, Louisiana to stage a hurricane simulation exercise called “Hurricane Pam,” where the city of New Orleans would be covered with 10 ft of water. This simulation, sponsored by FEMA, “looked a lot like Katrina,” and the report that followed “warns that transportation would be a major problem.” In an article entitled, “Four Places Where the System Broke Down,” (p. 41). Also, this training simulation was published in a five-part series of articles entitled “Washing Away” by McQuaid and Schleifstein for the Times-Picayune newspaper in New Orleans as early as June 2002. The actual plan was entitled, “Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Functional Plan.”

Carney et al. (p. 41).

Based on 2000 Census data, this assessment comes from a report by Arloc Sherman and Isaac Shapiro. (September 19, 2005) entitled “Essential Facts about the Victims of Hurricane Katrina,” that was prepared for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (p. 2).

Disaster Researcher Henry Fischer has documented the effects of “disaster mythology” in shaping perceptions about how people behave and what happens during a disaster. His research focuses on such myths as: panic flight, looting, price gouging, martial law, psychological dependency, disaster shock, evacuation behavior, shelter use, and death, injury, and damage estimates. As his findings indicate, myths involving thses areas of inquiry persist despite empirical evidence to the contrary. Fischer, H. (1998) Response to Disaster: Fact versus Fiction and Its Perpetuation. New York: University Press of American, Inc.

Focusing on the ways media reproduced disaster myths in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Tierney outlines several phases: “initial media coverage of Katrina’s devastating impacts was quickly replaced by reporting that characterized disaster victims as opportunistic looters and violent criminals and that presented individual and group behavior following the Katrina disaster through the lens of civil unrest. Later, narratives shifted again and began to metaphorically represent the disaster-stricken city of New Orleans as a war zone and to draw parallels between the conditions in that city and urban insurgency in Iraq. These media frames helped guide and justify actions undertaken by military and law enforcement entities that were assigned responsibility for the post disaster emergency response. The overall effect of media coverage was to further bolster arguments that only the military is capable of effective action during disasters.” Tierney et al (2006). “Metaphors Matter: Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and Their Consequences in Hurricane Katrina.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 604, p. 3).

In his observations of media role during Hurricane Gilbert, Fischer concluded that: “When myths were portrayed, those most likely to appear in any medium were myths perpetuating belief in an increase in deviance during disaster such as looting and price gouging. The behaviors most likely to be reported accurately were those dealing with the rational preparation, clean-up activities engaged in by individuals and their families, the typical disaster subculture activities such as surfing, and instances of usual altruism, e.g., search and rescue activities” (pp. 43–85).

Ibid.

Kathleen Tierney contends that “social cohesiveness and informal mechanisms of social control increase during disasters, resulting in a lower incidence of deviant behavior than during non-disaster times” (p. 2).

Rodriguez et al. 2006 note that this imagery of anarchy was particularly evident in the coverage of electronic media, and in a more restrained way in the reporting by print media. Rodriguez et al. (March 2006). “Rising to the Challenges of a Catastrophe: The Emergent and Prosocial Behavior Following Hurricane Katrina” (pp. 2–3).

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, generally prohibits federal soldiers or National Guard troops under federal control from operating in a law enforcement capacity on US soil. But there are important exceptions. Two exceptions that relates to disaster situations are: National Guard forces operating under the state authority of Title 32 are exempt from restrictions, and pursuant to the presidential power to quell domestic violence, federal troops are also exempt from the prohibitions of the Act. See, “The Posse Comitatus Act, available at http://​www.​en.​wikipedia.​org/​wiki/​Posse_​Comitatus_​Act, and also Healy, “Deployed in the USA: The Creeping Militarization of the Home Front,” Washington, DC: Policy Analysis.

As recently as August 2006, The New York Times reported that 51 governors (including the governor of Puerto Rico) sent a letter to Congressional leaders detailing their argument that the “measure drawn up after Hurricane Katrina and tucked into a military authorization bill that the house recently passed, would undermine their authority and autonomy.” The governors’ note that such a move would represent “an unprecedented shift in authority from governors as Commanders and Chief of the Guard to the federal government.” Available at http://​www.​nytimes.​com.

Jeremy Scahill (Democracy Now!) reported that “the number of private security companies registered in Louisiana jumped from 185 to 235,” following Hurricane Katrina. The most noted of the private security companies registered was Blackwater who was under federal contract, not only in New Orleans, but in Iraq as well. Other companies were also hired by wealthy New Orleanians, “like F. Patrick Quinn, III, who brought in private security to guard his $3 million private estate and luxury hotels, which are under consideration for a lucrative federal contract with FEMA.” See transcript from Democracy Now! Available at http://​www.​democracynow.​org/​article.​pl?​sid=​05/​10/​03/​1353235.