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Published in: Public Choice 1-2/2014

01-04-2014

Implementing the Borda outcome via truncated scoring rules: a computational study

Authors: Onur Doğan, Ayça Ebru Giritligil

Published in: Public Choice | Issue 1-2/2014

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Abstract

This study is an attempt to empirically understand the likelihood of choosing the Borda outcome through a truncated scoring rule when n voters are asked to report only part of their linear preferences over m alternatives. We run Monte Carlo simulations through a grid search algorithm as we employ an impartial culture model to sample voters’ preferences. Given the range of parameter values we consider, we report the truncated scoring rules that maximize the likelihood of implementing the Borda outcome and how the maximum likelihood changes with m and n. We also present our results on the relative performances of some popular truncated voting rules, such as plurality and approval voting, in implementing the Borda outcome and demonstrate that two-level approval voting performs significantly better than the plurality rule. Moreover, we propose the expected Borda rule as a good proxy for the best implementor of the Borda rule among all truncated rules.

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Appendix
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Footnotes
1
Note that this voting rule is also known as r-block voting.
 
2
Given the computational complexity of the problem, larger parameter values would either not allow enough repetitions of the process to obtain low variance estimators or not let us be able to search through a grid fine enough to produce meaningful results.
 
3
As it can be noticed, computational difficulties forced us to use a coarser grid for r=4.
 
4
The algorithm we use incorporates a tie-breaking rule to be applied whenever the number of winners is greater than one. In such a case, among all the alternatives that are selected by the voting rule, the alternative with the smallest index is chosen as the winner. This is a very standard procedure that is used whenever a unique winner needs to be determined. This creates almost no bias on the results since the probability that a scoring method elects two or more alternatives is very small and approaches zero very rapidly when n increases.
 
5
Note that all scoring rules are anonymous (they treat voters equally), neutral (they treat alternatives equally) and Paretian (they respect the unanimous preferences of voters over pairs of alternatives).
 
6
Even though s BE(r) is, by definition, not r-truncated, it can be linearly transformed into an r-truncated score vector \(\widetilde{s}^{\mathit{BE}(r)}\) that is defined by \(\widetilde{s}^{\mathit{BE}(r)}=s^{\mathit{BE}(r)}-\frac{m+1-r}{2} \). Hence, we treat is as such.
 
7
We are thankful to one of our referees for stating the r-expected Borda rule as a good candidate to successfully implement the Borda outcome.
 
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Metadata
Title
Implementing the Borda outcome via truncated scoring rules: a computational study
Authors
Onur Doğan
Ayça Ebru Giritligil
Publication date
01-04-2014
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Public Choice / Issue 1-2/2014
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Electronic ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-0019-9

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