Having examined in some detail what information and knowledge are and what the relationship is that exists between them (by way of an examination of the essential property that characterises both, namely, the property of truth) it is now time to turn our attention to the notion of wisdom so as to explore further the conceptual relationship that holds between information, wisdom and a good life.
What is of interest in Maxwell’s quoted passage for our present purposes is the relationship he draws between the concepts of reason, knowledge, understanding, and the desire, capacity, and active endeavour for the achievement (or as in my case attainment) of what is of value in life, for oneself and others. With the exception of understanding, for which I will have more to say in what follows, the other concepts to which Maxwell draws attention seems to anticipate and reflect both explicitly and implicitly, the concepts included in my own normative analysis of information and knowledge, in terms of their epistemological, ethical, and axiological dimensions. The basis of that analysis is the meta-theoretical framework comprising the Dual Obligation Information Theory and the Argument from the Goodness of Informational Agents.
Four theories of wisdom
In an article in the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Ryan (
2007) identifies at least four different theories of wisdom: (A)
Wisdom as Epistemic Humility, which she attributes to Socrates in Plato’s
Apology (20e–23c). There Socrates expresses puzzlement concerning the oracle of Delphi’s pronouncement that he is the “wisest of men” and declares that his knowledge extends only as far as his knowledge of his own ignorance, the prototype case of
epistemic humility (B)
Wisdom as Epistemic Accuracy, for which Ryan provides two versions to the effect that (B1)
S is wise iff for all
p, (
S believes
S knows
p iff
S knows
p.) (EA1) or the weaker version (B2)
S is wise iff for all
p, (
S believes
S knows p iff
S’s belief in
p is highly justified.) (EA2); (C)
Wisdom as Knowledge: the view that knowledge is at least a necessary condition of wisdom. Ryan identifies several philosophers who hold some version of (C) including Aristotle (
1941, VI, Ch. 7), Descartes, R. (
1979, pp. 201–302).), Garrett (
1996), Kekes (
1983), Lehrer et al. (
1996), Nicholas Maxwell (
2007), Robert Nozick (
1989), Plato (
1978), and Ryan (
1996,
1999). According to Ryan, all these philosophers “have theories of wisdom that require a wise person to have some knowledge of some sort” and what’s more, “all these views maintain that wise people know what is important” (
2007). Overall, these theories differ according to Ryan “over what it is that the wise person must know and whether there is any action that is required for wisdom” (
2007).
In order to further differentiate different notions of wisdom that fall under the broad category of “wisdom as knowledge” Ryan refers to Aristotle who held two main theories of wisdom,
Sophia or
Theoretical Wisdom and
Phronesis or
Practical Wisdom. Theoretical wisdom according to Aristotle is “scientific knowledge, combined with intuitive reason, of the things that are highest by nature (Ryan
2007 quoting Aristotle in
Nichomachean Ethics, VI, 1141b). On that basis, Ryan interprets Aristotle’s notion of theoretical wisdom as the following view: (C1)
Wisdom as extensive factual knowledge (WFK) which in effect amounts to “
S is wise iff
S has extensive factual knowledge about science, history, philosophy, literature, music, etc.” (Ryan
2007). Ryan finds this notion of wisdom implausible for as she correctly observes “some of the most knowledgeable people are not wise” (Ryan
2007). Ryan maintains that Aristotle’s notion of phronesis or practical wisdom is a more reasonable theory to hold. According to Aristotle,
Now it is thought to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of things conduce to health or strength, but about what sorts of things conduce to the good life in general (Nichomachean Ethics, VI, 1140a01140b).
Ryan concludes that “for Aristotle, practical wisdom requires knowing, in general, how to live well”. She goes on to say that although many philosophers are in agreement with Aristotle on this point they would not agree with Aristotle “that theoretical wisdom is one kind of wisdom and practical wisdom another. Wisdom, in general,” Ryan concludes, “requires practical wisdom” (
2007). I agree.
In support of this general notion of practical wisdom Ryan cites Robert Nozick who claims that “Wisdom is what you need to understand in order to live well and cope with the central problems and avoid the dangers in the predicaments human beings find themselves in” (Nozick
1989, p. 267). She also cites John Kekes, whose view is that “what a wise man knows, therefore, is how to construct a pattern that, given the human situation, is likely to lead to a good life (Kekes
1983, p. 280). Ryan defines this type of general practical wisdom as (C2)
Wisdom as Knowing How to Live Well (KLW): “
S is wise iff
S knows how to live well”, which according to Ryan captures on the whole Aristotle’s concept of practical wisdom as well as the views held by Nozick et al. (2007).
The final theory of wisdom that Ryan considers is
Wisdom as Knowledge and Action, which she specifically defines as
Wisdom as Knowing How To, and Succeeding at, Living Well (KLS), which in effect amounts to:
S is wise iff (i)
S knows how to live well, and (ii)
S is successful at living well (
2007). According to Ryan the “idea of the success condition [condition (ii) in KLS] is that one puts one’s knowledge into practice”. She goes on to attribute a view broadly along the lines of (KLS) to Aristotle (his notion of practical wisdom), as well as to Kekes and Nozick. Ryan herself rejects this theory based on criticisms she raises in (Ryan
1999) but her main criticism with which I concur is that (KLS) seems to leave out the factual knowledge required by the theory of
wisdom as extensive factual knowledge (WFK).
In agreement with Ryan I also claim that some factual knowledge of the world (but not necessarily extensive) adequate for enabling a person to make their way in the world and have a good life, is necessary for wisdom. This consideration introduces an important distinction when enquiring into the conceptual connection between knowledge and wisdom: the distinction between knowledge for wisdom and knowledge as wisdom. Although related the two are quite different and their difference highlights an important and crucial distinction between knowledge and wisdom.
No doubt some general knowledge about the world acquired on the basis of reliable and veridical information that causes it and sustains it (Dretske
1999) is necessary for wisdom. This is in keeping with the notion of Socratic ignorance, roughly understood here as having knowledge of one’s ignorance (being aware of one’s ignorance and humbly acknowledging one’s lack of knowledge). For Socratic ignorance prompts and motivates one to acquire the knowledge of which one is ignorant (knowledge understood here as some minimal general knowledge about some basic aspects of the world, e.g., history, geography, science, mathematics, literature, art, etc.). Socratic ignorance as a special type of knowledge accords with Ryan’s theory of wisdom as epistemic humility, which was examined earlier. By contrast, those who claim to know what they lack knowledge of, are not in a position to be motivated to acquire the knowledge they lack; and moreover, the knowledge that is at least in a minimal and general sense partly necessary for the acquisition of wisdom and by extension, the attainment of a good life and eudemonia.
Thus at a minimum, and bracketing the possibility that “holy fools” though totally ignorant of facts about the world are nevertheless in some sense “wise”, some minimal and general knowledge about the world is instrumentally and prudentially necessary for the acquisition of wisdom. At least at a minimum, an attitude of Socratic ignorance
12 might be necessary for the acquisition of wisdom. For the Socratic elenchus can be applied as a method for acquiring the knowledge one lacks, through first recognizing and acknowledging one’s ignorance, and then being motivated to gradually acquire the knowledge of which one is ignorant, through critical enquiry and further investigation. According to John Kekes, “the elenchus enables its practitioners to progress from a special kind of ignorance—foolishness—to a special kind of knowledge—moral wisdom” (
1995, p. 39).
We can therefore say that the acquisition of such general minimal knowledge about the world or an attitude of Socratic ignorance when we lack such knowledge is instrumental to the acquisition of wisdom because it provides at least part of the necessary means, that is, the capacity for the acquisition of wisdom. Moreover, the acquisition of such minimal and general knowledge of the world or in its absence, an adoption of an attitude of Socratic ignorance, is prudential to the acquisition of wisdom. Insofar as we consider the acquisition of wisdom desirable, valuable and essential for the attainment of a good life, we should (normatively) inculcate in ourselves the virtue of learning: the desire and active pursuit of the acquisition of at least a minimal and general knowledge about the world. Hence, some minimal and general knowledge about the world is necessary for wisdom.
Where I disagree with Ryan with regard to her formulation for (KLS), however, is her claim that one’s practical knowledge in living well when put into practice should necessarily succeed in one’s living well. After all, circumstance beyond one’s control and the “arrows of outrageous fortune” might frustrate one’s best efforts in succeeding to live well. My re-formulation of KLS is a modification of Ryan’s fourth theory of wisdom as knowledge and action to, Wisdom as Knowing How to Live Well and Successfully Applying that Knowledge in Living Well (KLSA), which amount to S is wise iff (i) S knows how to live well, and (ii) S successfully applies that knowledge at living well. According to my re-formulation of KLS as KLSA, it is actual successful application of the knowledge of how to live well rather than actually succeeding in living well that is important. A subtle difference perhaps, but I think an important one. For my re-formulation of KLS in terms of KLSA avoids the problem of rendering wisdom a hostage to fortune. One can be wise even though, because of circumstances beyond one’s control, one fails to succeed in living well. It is sufficient that one both knows how to live well and one successfully applies that knowledge of how to live well, regardless of one’s actual success or failure in living well.
In addition, along with Aristotle, I also wish to claim that being a good person is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for being wise. For Aristotle claims, “Therefore it is evident that it is impossible to be practically wise without being good” (
Nichomachean Ethics, VI 1144a). You will recall that the goodness of the agent and specifically the informational agent in terms of the possession of a virtuous character, was discussed in (“
Information and the good life”) on the basis of the
Argument from the Goodness of Informational Agents (GIA). (See also Spence
2006, Ch. 10).
John Kekes seems to also have the view that a virtuous character is an essential characteristic of the wise person. In the opening sentence of his book
Moral Wisdom and Good Lives (
1995, p. ix) Kekes tells us that “moral wisdom is a virtue—the virtue of reflection”. A more detailed characterisation of moral wisdom by Kekes, is that
Moral wisdom is the capacity [a psychological capacity] to judge rightly what should be done in particular situations to make life better…Because this human psychological capacity, once developed, is likely to be lasting and important, it can be identified as a character trait….We can say, therefore, that people have moral wisdom if they regularly and predictably act wisely in the appropriate situations and if so acting is an enduring pattern in their lives…Whether an action is morally wise depends also on what the agents bring to the judgements they make, such as their particular conception of what would make life better. An action being morally wise depends therefore not just on the nature of the action and the situation, but also on the agent, and this invalidates generalisations of moral wisdom which ignore the character and beliefs of the agents. (
1995, 5–7).
According to Kekes, moral wisdom is a second order virtue whose primary concern,
[Is] the
development of our character [emphasis added] in a desirable direction by strengthening or weakening some of our dispositions. First-order virtues guide our actions in view of what we think of a good life; second-order virtues guide our actions with a view of developing the kind of character that reflects a reasonable conception of a good life (
1995, 9).
The psychology of wisdom: the Berlin wisdom paradigm
Finally, it is worth mentioning a
psychological theory of wisdom that runs parallel to the philosophical theories of wisdom discussed above. This is the theory of wisdom postulated by Paul Baltes and his research associates from the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin. The theory known as the
Berlin Wisdom Paradigm views wisdom as a kind of expertise in the matters of human life (Baltes et al.
2002, Baltes and Smith
1990 as referred to by Banicki
2009). According to Banicki (
2009), wisdom as knowledge is viewed in the theory of the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm as.
“Integrative, Holistic and Balanced” (Baltes et al.
2002, p.342) and, as such, is intended to involve cognitive, social, personal, motivational, emotional and behavioral elements. Furthermore, the knowledge in question is again strictly connected with judgment and action. Accordingly, Baltes and Smith (
1990, p. 95) characterize wisdom as “expert knowledge involving good judgment and advice” and associate it with three main tasks in life: planning (future), review (past) and management (present).
In a chapter from
A Handbook of Wisdom: Psychological Perspectives (Sternberg and Jordan
2005, p. 115) Kunzmann and Baltes define wisdom in accordance with the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm, as a
Highly valued and outstanding expertise in dealing with fundamental, that is, existential, problems related to the meaning and conduct of life (
2005, 117).
Or as a
Special “expertise-like” case of the pragmatics of intelligence (intellect) that includes knowledge about cognitive, motivational, and emotional aspects of adaptive functioning in a specific domain, that is, the meaning and conduct of life (
2005, 115).
Kunzmann and Baltes go on to elaborate that the “focus of their theoretical work has been to define wisdom as an expert system in human thought and behavior that coordinates
knowledge and virtue, mind and character” [emphasis added] (
2005, p. 128), and that thus defined, wisdom for them “reflects both components of wisdom: intellect and character” (
2005, p. 130). According to them, “wisdom differs from other human strengths in that it involves an orchestration of mind and virtue, intellect and character” (
2005, p. 131).
It is not too much of a jump to reasonably interpret the psychological notion of the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm as expressed above by Kunzmann and Baltes as parallel and broadly in keeping with the general view of practical wisdom I argue for in this paper: namely, as knowledge of how to live well and the successful application of that knowledge in living well (KLSA). To that, however, we must also add the proviso that the knowledge in question must also include some knowledge of facts concerning the world generally and the world one experiences in specific contexts. The (KLSA) you will recall is the philosophical notion of wisdom I defended above, which is a re-formulation of Ryan’s (KLS) view. Such knowledge does involve an “orchestration”, as in the case of Kunzmann and Baltes’ psychological notion of wisdom, of “intellect” or “cognition” (the epistemological features of wisdom in my model) and virtue and character (the ethical, axiological and eudemonic features of wisdom in my model).